Descartes on causation

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 841-872

  Flage, Daniel E ^a   Bonnen, Clarence A ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040683414     PISSN: 00346632     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (278)

1. René Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes (hereafter, "AT"), ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, republished by Nouvelle Presentation, ed. B. Rochot, P. Costabel, and J. Beaude, 11 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1964-76), 7:49-50; The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (CSM), trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, with the correspondence translated in part by Anthony Kenny, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 1985, and 1991), 2:34.
2. René Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes (hereafter, "AT"), ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, republished by Nouvelle Presentation, ed. B. Rochot, P. Costabel, and J. Beaude, 11 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1964-76), 7:49-50; The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (CSM), trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, with the correspondence translated in part by Anthony Kenny, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 1985, and 1991), 2:34.
3. AT, 7:95, CSM 2:68; AT, 7:207-13, CSM, 2:146-50.
4. AT, 7:95, CSM 2:68; AT, 7:207-13, CSM, 2:146-50.
5. AT, 7:95, CSM 2:68; AT, 7:207-13, CSM, 2:146-50.
6. AT, 7:95, CSM 2:68; AT, 7:207-13, CSM, 2:146-50.
7. Some philosophers might argue that the Cartesian texts are so under-determined with respect to a theory of causation that any project to delineate such a theory is a form of wishful thinking. We find this contention a bit premature and leave it to our readers to judge whether we have succeeded in demonstrating that a Cartesian theory of causation can be gleaned from Descartes' writings.
8. AT, 7:49-50, CSM, 2:34.
9. AT, 7:49-50, CSM, 2:34.
10. AT, 7:108-9, CSM, 2:78.
11. AT, 7:108-9, CSM, 2:78.
12. AT, 7:95, CSM, 2:68.
13. AT, 7:95, CSM, 2:68.
14. AT, 7:95, CSM, 2:68-9.
15. AT, 7:95, CSM, 2:68-9.
16. AT, 7:95, CSM, 2:69.
17. AT, 7:95, CSM, 2:69.
18. See Francisco Suarez, On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19, trans. Alfred Freddoso (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), Disputation 18, §7, pp. 131-77, and Disputation 17, Introductory Remarks, 3. For careful discussion of Aristotle's, Aquinas's, and Suarez's criteria for deeming a cause an efficient cause, see J. E. K. Secada, "Descartes on Time and Causality," Philosophical Review 99 (1990): 45-72, esp. 49-51.
19. See Francisco Suarez, On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19, trans. Alfred Freddoso (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), Disputation 18, §7, pp. 131-77, and Disputation 17, Introductory Remarks, 3. For careful discussion of Aristotle's, Aquinas's, and Suarez's criteria for deeming a cause an efficient cause, see J. E. K. Secada, "Descartes on Time and Causality," Philosophical Review 99 (1990): 45-72, esp. 49-51.
20. AT, 7:108, CSM, 2:78.
21. AT, 7:108, CSM, 2:78.
22. AT, 7:108-9, CSM, 2:78.
23. AT, 7:108-9, CSM, 2:78.
24. AT, 7:109, CSM, 2:79.
25. AT, 7:109, CSM, 2:79.
26. AT, 7:110, CSM, 2:79.
27. AT, 7:110, CSM, 2:79.
28. AT, 7:110, CSM, 2:79-80.
29. AT, 7:110, CSM, 2:79-80.
30. AT, 8B:368, CSM, 2:310.
31. AT, 8B:368, CSM, 2:310.
32. One might think that "blur" is too weak a word here. It appears that Descartes is attempting to make an exception to the standard criteria for efficient causality in the case of God's causing himself. However, this would make nonsense of the argument in Meditation 3, since it would introduce an equivocation on the notion of an efficient cause. Taken in this strict sense, such a move might provide evidence for elements of the dissimulation thesis, that is, the thesis that the Descartes of the Meditations intentionally misrepresented important elements of his philosophy. See Louis E. Loeb, "Is There Radical Dissimulation in Descartes' Meditations?" in Essays on Descartes's Meditations, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 243-70, for a discussion of the dissimulation thesis. To examine the thesis is beyond the scope of this paper.
33. AT, 7:109, CSM, 2:79.
34. AT, 7:109, CSM, 2:79.
35. Such a move would conflate Descartes' cosmological argument with his ontological argument, and we believe he had methodological reasons for not wanting to do so. To examine those reasons, however, is beyond the scope of the present paper.
36. See AT, 7:55, 5:158; CSM, 2:38-9, 3:341; Principles 1:28, AT, 8A:15-16, CSM, 1:202-3.
37. See AT, 7:55, 5:158; CSM, 2:38-9, 3:341; Principles 1:28, AT, 8A:15-16, CSM, 1:202-3.
38. See AT, 7:55, 5:158; CSM, 2:38-9, 3:341; Principles 1:28, AT, 8A:15-16, CSM, 1:202-3.
39. See AT, 7:55, 5:158; CSM, 2:38-9, 3:341; Principles 1:28, AT, 8A:15-16, CSM, 1:202-3.
40. See AT, 7:55, 5:158; CSM, 2:38-9, 3:341; Principles 1:28, AT, 8A:15-16, CSM, 1:202-3.
41. See AT, 7:55, 5:158; CSM, 2:38-9, 3:341; Principles 1:28, AT, 8A:15-16, CSM, 1:202-3.
42. See AT, 7:55, 5:158; CSM, 2:38-9, 3:341; Principles 1:28, AT, 8A:15-16, CSM, 1:202-3.
43. See AT, 7:242, 366; CSM, 2:169, 252.
44. See AT, 7:242, 366; CSM, 2:169, 252.
45. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 5.2, 1013a29-33, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 752. See also Posterior Analytics, 2.11, 93a36-94b8, trans. G. R. G. Mure, Basic Works, 171; and Physics, 2.3, 194b29-32, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, Basic Works, 241.
46. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 5.2, 1013a29-33, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 752. See also Posterior Analytics, 2.11, 93a36-94b8, trans. G. R. G. Mure, Basic Works, 171; and Physics, 2.3, 194b29-32, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, Basic Works, 241.
47. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 5.2, 1013a29-33, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 752. See also Posterior Analytics, 2.11, 93a36-94b8, trans. G. R. G. Mure, Basic Works, 171; and Physics, 2.3, 194b29-32, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, Basic Works, 241.
48. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 5.2, 1013a29-33, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 752. See also Posterior Analytics, 2.11, 93a36-94b8, trans. G. R. G. Mure, Basic Works, 171; and Physics, 2.3, 194b29-32, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, Basic Works, 241.
49. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 5.2, 1013a29-33, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 752. See also Posterior Analytics, 2.11, 93a36-94b8, trans. G. R. G. Mure, Basic Works, 171; and Physics, 2.3, 194b29-32, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, Basic Works, 241.
50. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 5.2, 1013a29-33, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 752. See also Posterior Analytics, 2.11, 93a36-94b8, trans. G. R. G. Mure, Basic Works, 171; and Physics, 2.3, 194b29-32, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, Basic Works, 241.
51. See Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, trans. F. R. Larcher (Albany, NY: Magi Books, 1970), 198-9; Peter of Spain, Topics, in The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, Logic and the Philosophy of Language, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 236; William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, trans. Norman Kretzmann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), 86-7; Suarez, On Efficient Causality; and Antoine Arnauld, The Art of Thinking: Port-Royal Logic, trans. James Dickoff and Patricia James, Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 243.
52. See Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, trans. F. R. Larcher (Albany, NY: Magi Books, 1970), 198-9; Peter of Spain, Topics, in The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, Logic and the Philosophy of Language, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 236; William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, trans. Norman Kretzmann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), 86-7; Suarez, On Efficient Causality; and Antoine Arnauld, The Art of Thinking: Port-Royal Logic, trans. James Dickoff and Patricia James, Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 243.
53. See Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, trans. F. R. Larcher (Albany, NY: Magi Books, 1970), 198-9; Peter of Spain, Topics, in The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, Logic and the Philosophy of Language, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 236; William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, trans. Norman Kretzmann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), 86-7; Suarez, On Efficient Causality; and Antoine Arnauld, The Art of Thinking: Port-Royal Logic, trans. James Dickoff and Patricia James, Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 243.
54. See Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, trans. F. R. Larcher (Albany, NY: Magi Books, 1970), 198-9; Peter of Spain, Topics, in The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, Logic and the Philosophy of Language, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 236; William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, trans. Norman Kretzmann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), 86-7; Suarez, On Efficient Causality; and Antoine Arnauld, The Art of Thinking: Port-Royal Logic, trans. James Dickoff and Patricia James, Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 243.
55. See Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, trans. F. R. Larcher (Albany, NY: Magi Books, 1970), 198-9; Peter of Spain, Topics, in The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, Logic and the Philosophy of Language, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 236; William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, trans. Norman Kretzmann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), 86-7; Suarez, On Efficient Causality; and Antoine Arnauld, The Art of Thinking: Port-Royal Logic, trans. James Dickoff and Patricia James, Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 243.
56. AT, 7:236, CSM, 2:165.
57. AT, 7:236, CSM, 2:165.
58. See Descartes' Passion of the Soul (hereafter, "POS"), §§34-36, AT, 11:354-7, CSM, 1:341-2. See also Suarez, On Efficient Causality, Disputation 18, §2, n. 40, p. 88; Disputation 19, §2, nn. 12-23, pp. 290-300. See also Daniel Garber, "Descartes and Occasionalism," in Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony, ed. Steven Nadler (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 9-26.
59. See Descartes' Passion of the Soul (hereafter, "POS"), §§34-36, AT, 11:354-7, CSM, 1:341-2. See also Suarez, On Efficient Causality, Disputation 18, §2, n. 40, p. 88; Disputation 19, §2, nn. 12-23, pp. 290-300. See also Daniel Garber, "Descartes and Occasionalism," in Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony, ed. Steven Nadler (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 9-26.
60. See Descartes' Passion of the Soul (hereafter, "POS"), §§34-36, AT, 11:354-7, CSM, 1:341-2. See also Suarez, On Efficient Causality, Disputation 18, §2, n. 40, p. 88; Disputation 19, §2, nn. 12-23, pp. 290-300. See also Daniel Garber, "Descartes and Occasionalism," in Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony, ed. Steven Nadler (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 9-26.
61. See Descartes' Passion of the Soul (hereafter, "POS"), §§34-36, AT, 11:354-7, CSM, 1:341-2. See also Suarez, On Efficient Causality, Disputation 18, §2, n. 40, p. 88; Disputation 19, §2, nn. 12-23, pp. 290-300. See also Daniel Garber, "Descartes and Occasionalism," in Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony, ed. Steven Nadler (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 9-26.
62. See Descartes' Passion of the Soul (hereafter, "POS"), §§34-36, AT, 11:354-7, CSM, 1:341-2. See also Suarez, On Efficient Causality, Disputation 18, §2, n. 40, p. 88; Disputation 19, §2, nn. 12-23, pp. 290-300. See also Daniel Garber, "Descartes and Occasionalism," in Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony, ed. Steven Nadler (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 9-26.
63. See Boethius of Dacia, "The Sophisma 'Every Man is of Necessity an Animal'," in The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, 499; and Suarez, On Efficient Causality, Disputation 18, §3, n. 12, pp. 98-9.
64. See Boethius of Dacia, "The Sophisma 'Every Man is of Necessity an Animal'," in The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, 499; and Suarez, On Efficient Causality, Disputation 18, §3, n. 12, pp. 98-9.
65. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 5.2, 1013a27-9, in Basic Works, 752.
66. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 5.2, 1013a27-9, in Basic Works, 752.
67. AT, 7:242, CSM, 2:169.
68. AT, 7:242, CSM, 2:169.
69. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 2.11, 94a27-35, in Basic Works, 171. See also Posterior Analytics, 2.8, 93a3-14, in Basic Works, 167; Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, 198.
70. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 2.11, 94a27-35, in Basic Works, 171. See also Posterior Analytics, 2.8, 93a3-14, in Basic Works, 167; Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, 198.
71. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 2.11, 94a27-35, in Basic Works, 171. See also Posterior Analytics, 2.8, 93a3-14, in Basic Works, 167; Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, 198.
72. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 2.11, 94a27-35, in Basic Works, 171. See also Posterior Analytics, 2.8, 93a3-14, in Basic Works, 167; Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, 198.
73. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 2.11, 94a27-35, in Basic Works, 171. See also Posterior Analytics, 2.8, 93a3-14, in Basic Works, 167; Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, 198.
74. Suarez, On Efficient Causality, Disputation 17, §1, n. 2, p. 5.
75. It is comparable to doing a formal proof in logic. While one is typically asked to show that the conclusion follows from the premises and a certain set of rules, the same procedure can be seen as explaining why the conclusion follows from the premises and a set of rules.
76. Suarez, On Efficient Causality, Disputation 17, Introduction, 3.
77. Peter of Spain, Topics, 237; Arnauld, The Art of Thinking, 244; see also William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, 86-7.
78. Peter of Spain, Topics, 237; Arnauld, The Art of Thinking, 244; see also William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, 86-7.
79. Peter of Spain, Topics, 237; Arnauld, The Art of Thinking, 244; see also William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, 86-7.
80. AT, 7:236, CSM, 2:165.
81. AT, 7:236, CSM, 2:165.
82. AT, 7:209, CSM, 2:147; quoted from AT, 7:108, CSM, 2:78.
83. AT, 7:209, CSM, 2:147; quoted from AT, 7:108, CSM, 2:78.
84. AT, 7:209, CSM, 2:147; quoted from AT, 7:108, CSM, 2:78.
85. AT, 7:209, CSM, 2:147; quoted from AT, 7:108, CSM, 2:78.
86. AT, 7:209, CSM, 2:147.
87. AT, 7:209, CSM, 2:147.
88. AT, 2:209-10, CSM, 2:147, 147-8.
89. AT, 2:209-10, CSM, 2:147, 147-8.
90. AT, 7:210, CSM, 2:147.
91. AT, 7:210, CSM, 2:147.
92. AT, 7:211, CSM, 2:148.
93. AT, 7:211, CSM, 2:148.
94. AT, 7:211, CSM, 2:148.
95. AT, 7:211, CSM, 2:148.
96. AT, 7:211, CSM, 2:148-9.
97. AT, 7:211, CSM, 2:148-9.
98. AT, 7:211-12, CSM, 2:149.
99. AT, 7:211-12, CSM, 2:149.
100. AT, 7:212, CSM, 2:149.
101. AT, 7:212, CSM, 2:149.
102. AT, 7:212, CSM, 7:149. This is a position Descartes rejects, as we shall see below when examining elements of his voluntarism. Further, the contention that essences are uncreated was not universally accepted. See Suarez, On the Essence of Finite Being as such, on the Existence of that Essence and Their Distinction, trans. Norman J. Wells (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1983), Disputation 31, §2, 57-66. This is not to say that Descartes' views were in complete compliance with Suarez's. On the differences, see Gary Hatfield, "Reason, Nature, and God in Descartes," in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, ed. Stephen Voss (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 269-75.
103. AT, 7:212, CSM, 7:149. This is a position Descartes rejects, as we shall see below when examining elements of his voluntarism. Further, the contention that essences are uncreated was not universally accepted. See Suarez, On the Essence of Finite Being as such, on the Existence of that Essence and Their Distinction, trans. Norman J. Wells (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1983), Disputation 31, §2, 57-66. This is not to say that Descartes' views were in complete compliance with Suarez's. On the differences, see Gary Hatfield, "Reason, Nature, and God in Descartes," in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, ed. Stephen Voss (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 269-75.
104. AT, 7:212, CSM, 7:149. This is a position Descartes rejects, as we shall see below when examining elements of his voluntarism. Further, the contention that essences are uncreated was not universally accepted. See Suarez, On the Essence of Finite Being as such, on the Existence of that Essence and Their Distinction, trans. Norman J. Wells (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1983), Disputation 31, §2, 57-66. This is not to say that Descartes' views were in complete compliance with Suarez's. On the differences, see Gary Hatfield, "Reason, Nature, and God in Descartes," in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, ed. Stephen Voss (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 269-75.
105. AT, 7:212, CSM, 7:149. This is a position Descartes rejects, as we shall see below when examining elements of his voluntarism. Further, the contention that essences are uncreated was not universally accepted. See Suarez, On the Essence of Finite Being as such, on the Existence of that Essence and Their Distinction, trans. Norman J. Wells (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1983), Disputation 31, §2, 57-66. This is not to say that Descartes' views were in complete compliance with Suarez's. On the differences, see Gary Hatfield, "Reason, Nature, and God in Descartes," in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, ed. Stephen Voss (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 269-75.
106. AT, 7:212, CSM, 2:149.
107. AT, 7:212, CSM, 2:149.
108. AT, 2:212-13, CSM, 2:149-50.
109. AT, 2:212-13, CSM, 2:149-50.
110. See note 18.
111. AT, 7:235, CSM, 2:164-5.
112. AT, 7:235, CSM, 2:164-5.
113. AT, 7:235-6, CSM, 2:165.
114. AT, 7:235-6, CSM, 2:165.
115. AT, 7:236, CSM, 2:165.
116. AT, 7:236, CSM, 2:165.
117. AT, 7:236, CSM, 2:165.
118. AT, 7:236, CSM, 2:165.
119. AT, 7:236-7; CSM, 2:165.
120. AT, 7:236-7; CSM, 2:165.
121. AT, 7:238, CSM, 2:166.
122. AT, 7:238, CSM, 2:166.
123. AT, 7:238, CSM, 2:166.
124. AT, 7:238, CSM, 2:166.
125. AT, 7:238-9, CSM, 2:166-7.
126. AT, 7:238-9, CSM, 2:166-7.
127. AT, 7:243, CSM, 2:170.
128. AT, 7:243, CSM, 2:170.
129. AT, 7:239, CSM, 2:167.
130. AT, 7:239, CSM, 2:167.
131. AT, 7:239-40, CSM, 2:167; see also AT, 7:245, CSM, 2:170-1.
132. AT, 7:239-40, CSM, 2:167; see also AT, 7:245, CSM, 2:170-1.
133. AT, 7:239-40, CSM, 2:167; see also AT, 7:245, CSM, 2:170-1.
134. AT, 7:239-40, CSM, 2:167; see also AT, 7:245, CSM, 2:170-1.
135. We shift from the Cartesian term "indefinite" to "infinite" because Descartes holds that God's causal efficacy is truly infinite. See the following note.
136. See, for example, AT, 7:220, CSM, 2:155.
137. See, for example, AT, 7:220, CSM, 2:155.
138. AT, 7:107-8; CSM, 2:78.
139. AT, 7:107-8; CSM, 2:78.
140. AT, 6:85, CSM, 1:155-6; see also AT, 6:112, CSM, 1:165.
141. AT, 6:85, CSM, 1:155-6; see also AT, 6:112, CSM, 1:165.
142. AT, 6:85, CSM, 1:155-6; see also AT, 6:112, CSM, 1:165.
143. AT, 6:85, CSM, 1:155-6; see also AT, 6:112, CSM, 1:165.
144. AT, 6:239, CSM, 2:173n2.
145. AT, 6:239, CSM, 2:173n2.
146. AT, 3:491-2, CSM, 3:205.
147. AT, 3:491-2, CSM, 3:205.
148. We examine this is greater detail below.
149. The Logike of the Most Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr, trans. Roland MacIlmaine (1574), ed. Catherine M. Dunn (Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1969), 15. See also William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, 85-6; Thomas Wilson, The Rule of Reason (1553), ed. Richard S. Sprague (Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1972), 111-12; John Poinsot (John of St. Thomas), Tractatus de Signis (1632), trans. John N. Deely (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 382. By a hundred years after Descartes, the formal/efficient causality distinction seems distinctly to have fallen out of favor. Thus it is that Hume, giving the results of his analysis of causation, could write: "We may learn from the foregoing doctrine, that all causes are of the same kind, and that in particular there is no foundation for that distinction, which we sometimes make betwixt efficient causes, and causes sine qua non; or betwixt efficient causes, and formal, and material, and exemplary, and final causes. For as our idea of efficiency is deriv'd from the constant conjunction of two objects, wherever this is observ'd, the cause is efficient; and where it is not, there can never be a cause of any kind"; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed., rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 171. Hume's conclusion is unacceptable. Insofar as he held that the truths of arithmetic and algebra, although perhaps not geometry, are known on the basis of relations of ideas, they are subject to demonstration; see Treatise, 71. Corresponding to every arithmetic or algebraic demonstration, however, there is an explanation from formal causes. It is thus false that "where it is not [for efficient causality], there can never be a cause of any kind." Nonetheless, as history shows, Hume was on the winning side in the intellectual war over the number and kind of causes. Hence, insofar as Descartes' attempt to extend the notion of an efficient cause to God's self-causality, Descartes was on the winning side in the war, even though we must grant that Arnauld won the battle.
150. The Logike of the Most Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr, trans. Roland MacIlmaine (1574), ed. Catherine M. Dunn (Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1969), 15. See also William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, 85-6; Thomas Wilson, The Rule of Reason (1553), ed. Richard S. Sprague (Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1972), 111-12; John Poinsot (John of St. Thomas), Tractatus de Signis (1632), trans. John N. Deely (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 382. By a hundred years after Descartes, the formal/efficient causality distinction seems distinctly to have fallen out of favor. Thus it is that Hume, giving the results of his analysis of causation, could write: "We may learn from the foregoing doctrine, that all causes are of the same kind, and that in particular there is no foundation for that distinction, which we sometimes make betwixt efficient causes, and causes sine qua non; or betwixt efficient causes, and formal, and material, and exemplary, and final causes. For as our idea of efficiency is deriv'd from the constant conjunction of two objects, wherever this is observ'd, the cause is efficient; and where it is not, there can never be a cause of any kind"; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed., rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 171. Hume's conclusion is unacceptable. Insofar as he held that the truths of arithmetic and algebra, although perhaps not geometry, are known on the basis of relations of ideas, they are subject to demonstration; see Treatise, 71. Corresponding to every arithmetic or algebraic demonstration, however, there is an explanation from formal causes. It is thus false that "where it is not [for efficient causality], there can never be a cause of any kind." Nonetheless, as history shows, Hume was on the winning side in the intellectual war over the number and kind of causes. Hence, insofar as Descartes' attempt to extend the notion of an efficient cause to God's self-causality, Descartes was on the winning side in the war, even though we must grant that Arnauld won the battle.
151. The Logike of the Most Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr, trans. Roland MacIlmaine (1574), ed. Catherine M. Dunn (Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1969), 15. See also William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, 85-6; Thomas Wilson, The Rule of Reason (1553), ed. Richard S. Sprague (Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1972), 111-12; John Poinsot (John of St. Thomas), Tractatus de Signis (1632), trans. John N. Deely (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 382. By a hundred years after Descartes, the formal/efficient causality distinction seems distinctly to have fallen out of favor. Thus it is that Hume, giving the results of his analysis of causation, could write: "We may learn from the foregoing doctrine, that all causes are of the same kind, and that in particular there is no foundation for that distinction, which we sometimes make betwixt efficient causes, and causes sine qua non; or betwixt efficient causes, and formal, and material, and exemplary, and final causes. For as our idea of efficiency is deriv'd from the constant conjunction of two objects, wherever this is observ'd, the cause is efficient; and where it is not, there can never be a cause of any kind"; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed., rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 171. Hume's conclusion is unacceptable. Insofar as he held that the truths of arithmetic and algebra, although perhaps not geometry, are known on the basis of relations of ideas, they are subject to demonstration; see Treatise, 71. Corresponding to every arithmetic or algebraic demonstration, however, there is an explanation from formal causes. It is thus false that "where it is not [for efficient causality], there can never be a cause of any kind." Nonetheless, as history shows, Hume was on the winning side in the intellectual war over the number and kind of causes. Hence, insofar as Descartes' attempt to extend the notion of an efficient cause to God's self-causality, Descartes was on the winning side in the war, even though we must grant that Arnauld won the battle.
152. The Logike of the Most Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr, trans. Roland MacIlmaine (1574), ed. Catherine M. Dunn (Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1969), 15. See also William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, 85-6; Thomas Wilson, The Rule of Reason (1553), ed. Richard S. Sprague (Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1972), 111-12; John Poinsot (John of St. Thomas), Tractatus de Signis (1632), trans. John N. Deely (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 382. By a hundred years after Descartes, the formal/efficient causality distinction seems distinctly to have fallen out of favor. Thus it is that Hume, giving the results of his analysis of causation, could write: "We may learn from the foregoing doctrine, that all causes are of the same kind, and that in particular there is no foundation for that distinction, which we sometimes make betwixt efficient causes, and causes sine qua non; or betwixt efficient causes, and formal, and material, and exemplary, and final causes. For as our idea of efficiency is deriv'd from the constant conjunction of two objects, wherever this is observ'd, the cause is efficient; and where it is not, there can never be a cause of any kind"; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed., rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 171. Hume's conclusion is unacceptable. Insofar as he held that the truths of arithmetic and algebra, although perhaps not geometry, are known on the basis of relations of ideas, they are subject to demonstration; see Treatise, 71. Corresponding to every arithmetic or algebraic demonstration, however, there is an explanation from formal causes. It is thus false that "where it is not [for efficient causality], there can never be a cause of any kind." Nonetheless, as history shows, Hume was on the winning side in the intellectual war over the number and kind of causes. Hence, insofar as Descartes' attempt to extend the notion of an efficient cause to God's self-causality, Descartes was on the winning side in the war, even though we must grant that Arnauld won the battle.
153. The Logike of the Most Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr, trans. Roland MacIlmaine (1574), ed. Catherine M. Dunn (Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1969), 15. See also William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, 85-6; Thomas Wilson, The Rule of Reason (1553), ed. Richard S. Sprague (Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1972), 111-12; John Poinsot (John of St. Thomas), Tractatus de Signis (1632), trans. John N. Deely (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 382. By a hundred years after Descartes, the formal/efficient causality distinction seems distinctly to have fallen out of favor. Thus it is that Hume, giving the results of his analysis of causation, could write: "We may learn from the foregoing doctrine, that all causes are of the same kind, and that in particular there is no foundation for that distinction, which we sometimes make betwixt efficient causes, and causes sine qua non; or betwixt efficient causes, and formal, and material, and exemplary, and final causes. For as our idea of efficiency is deriv'd from the constant conjunction of two objects, wherever this is observ'd, the cause is efficient; and where it is not, there can never be a cause of any kind"; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed., rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 171. Hume's conclusion is unacceptable. Insofar as he held that the truths of arithmetic and algebra, although perhaps not geometry, are known on the basis of relations of ideas, they are subject to demonstration; see Treatise, 71. Corresponding to every arithmetic or algebraic demonstration, however, there is an explanation from formal causes. It is thus false that "where it is not [for efficient causality], there can never be a cause of any kind." Nonetheless, as history shows, Hume was on the winning side in the intellectual war over the number and kind of causes. Hence, insofar as Descartes' attempt to extend the notion of an efficient cause to God's self-causality, Descartes was on the winning side in the war, even though we must grant that Arnauld won the battle.
154. The Logike of the Most Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr, trans. Roland MacIlmaine (1574), ed. Catherine M. Dunn (Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1969), 15. See also William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, 85-6; Thomas Wilson, The Rule of Reason (1553), ed. Richard S. Sprague (Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1972), 111-12; John Poinsot (John of St. Thomas), Tractatus de Signis (1632), trans. John N. Deely (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 382. By a hundred years after Descartes, the formal/efficient causality distinction seems distinctly to have fallen out of favor. Thus it is that Hume, giving the results of his analysis of causation, could write: "We may learn from the foregoing doctrine, that all causes are of the same kind, and that in particular there is no foundation for that distinction, which we sometimes make betwixt efficient causes, and causes sine qua non; or betwixt efficient causes, and formal, and material, and exemplary, and final causes. For as our idea of efficiency is deriv'd from the constant conjunction of two objects, wherever this is observ'd, the cause is efficient; and where it is not, there can never be a cause of any kind"; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed., rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 171. Hume's conclusion is unacceptable. Insofar as he held that the truths of arithmetic and algebra, although perhaps not geometry, are known on the basis of relations of ideas, they are subject to demonstration; see Treatise, 71. Corresponding to every arithmetic or algebraic demonstration, however, there is an explanation from formal causes. It is thus false that "where it is not [for efficient causality], there can never be a cause of any kind." Nonetheless, as history shows, Hume was on the winning side in the intellectual war over the number and kind of causes. Hence, insofar as Descartes' attempt to extend the notion of an efficient cause to God's self-causality, Descartes was on the winning side in the war, even though we must grant that Arnauld won the battle.
155. AT, 7:243, CSM, 2:170.
156. AT, 7:243, CSM, 2:170.
157. Descartes' divine voluntarism regarding essences and eternal truths is not without precedents. See Suarez, On the Essence of Finite Being, Disputation 31, §2, pp. 57-64.
158. Suarez, On Efficient Causality, Disputation 17, §1, n. 2, p. 5.
159. There is an ambiguity in the expression "natural law." It is sometimes taken to be certain uniformities in nature; at other times it is taken to be statement describing those uniformities. We are using it within this paragraph and the next in the second way, although nothing in our interpretation of Descartes' treatment of natural laws hangs on how we use the expression.
160. Philosophers of science often distinguish two kinds of natural law: laws of simultaneity and transtemporal laws. An examination of Descartes' examples of natural laws suggest that they are all laws of simultaneity, though such a construal might be more temporal than Descartes requires; see AT, 9:38-48, CSM, 1:92-8; Principles, 2:37-52. Descartes has a problem with time. Principles 1:57 suggest that he understands time as a theoretical construct; Descartes maintains motion as primary in his physics and time as measured on the basis of arbitrarily chosen motions. A thorough examination of this issue is beyond the scope of the present paper.
161. Philosophers of science often distinguish two kinds of natural law: laws of simultaneity and transtemporal laws. An examination of Descartes' examples of natural laws suggest that they are all laws of simultaneity, though such a construal might be more temporal than Descartes requires; see AT, 9:38-48, CSM, 1:92-8; Principles, 2:37-52. Descartes has a problem with time. Principles 1:57 suggest that he understands time as a theoretical construct; Descartes maintains motion as primary in his physics and time as measured on the basis of arbitrarily chosen motions. A thorough examination of this issue is beyond the scope of the present paper.
162. Philosophers of science often distinguish two kinds of natural law: laws of simultaneity and transtemporal laws. An examination of Descartes' examples of natural laws suggest that they are all laws of simultaneity, though such a construal might be more temporal than Descartes requires; see AT, 9:38-48, CSM, 1:92-8; Principles, 2:37-52. Descartes has a problem with time. Principles 1:57 suggest that he understands time as a theoretical construct; Descartes maintains motion as primary in his physics and time as measured on the basis of arbitrarily chosen motions. A thorough examination of this issue is beyond the scope of the present paper.
163. Philosophers of science often distinguish two kinds of natural law: laws of simultaneity and transtemporal laws. An examination of Descartes' examples of natural laws suggest that they are all laws of simultaneity, though such a construal might be more temporal than Descartes requires; see AT, 9:38-48, CSM, 1:92-8; Principles, 2:37-52. Descartes has a problem with time. Principles 1:57 suggest that he understands time as a theoretical construct; Descartes maintains motion as primary in his physics and time as measured on the basis of arbitrarily chosen motions. A thorough examination of this issue is beyond the scope of the present paper.
164. If we are right on this point, of course, it is ironic that the logical positivists were both the foremost proponents of the deductive-nomological account of explanation and purported champions of a nonmetaphysical philosophy of science. See also B. A. Brody, "Towards an Aristotelian Theory of Scientific Explanation," Philosophy of Science 39 (1972): 20-31.
165. David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3d ed., rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 35 and 37-8. Jonathan Bennett in "Descartes' Theory of Modality," Philosophical Review 103 (1994): 639-67, argues that the domain of the conceivable the possible are one and the same for Descartes. He is uneasy about our argument here. He objects that natural laws are not eternal truths because their falsehood is conceivable. This he takes as one upshot of his paper. We grant Bennett the thesis of his paper, but deny this conclusion. To see why, consider two cases. First, one may confront a necessary truth without recognizing it as such. Hobbes relates with delight his astonishment at finding a seemingly false, indeed, necessarily false, theorem in Euclid's Elements. Only after tracing its deductive ancestry back to Euclid's most basic elements did he recognize that the theorem was not only true, but necessarily so. Hobbes has discovered a feature of nonbasic eternal truths, namely, that those truths derived from the more basic need not be self-evident on first consideration. Second, nor does the apparent conceivability of a state of affairs demonstrate that it is possible. Consider a perpetual motion machine consisting of an electric motor and a generator. The generator produces enough electricity to power the motor, which turns the generator. So far no obvious trouble arises. Upon closer and more careful scrutiny, however, one finds reasons that, while the machine may be possible, it cannot be a perpetual motion machine. Physics tells us that both the motor and generator are subject to friction. Therefore, the system will slowly lose energy that will need to be replaced if the machine were to run perpetually. When all the laws of physics are brought to bear on this system, we discover that what we had taken as a clear and possible idea was not. These two cases show that if the eternal truths are arranged in a hierarchical structure, then one clearly conceives an eternal truth lower in the hierarchy only when one understands its relationships to the more fundamental eternal truths. Thus, if Descartes construed natural laws as lower level eternal truths, then he can at once reject Hume's maxim and embrace Bennett's account of Cartesian modalities.
166. David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3d ed., rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 35 and 37-8. Jonathan Bennett in "Descartes' Theory of Modality," Philosophical Review 103 (1994): 639-67, argues that the domain of the conceivable the possible are one and the same for Descartes. He is uneasy about our argument here. He objects that natural laws are not eternal truths because their falsehood is conceivable. This he takes as one upshot of his paper. We grant Bennett the thesis of his paper, but deny this conclusion. To see why, consider two cases. First, one may confront a necessary truth without recognizing it as such. Hobbes relates with delight his astonishment at finding a seemingly false, indeed, necessarily false, theorem in Euclid's Elements. Only after tracing its deductive ancestry back to Euclid's most basic elements did he recognize that the theorem was not only true, but necessarily so. Hobbes has discovered a feature of nonbasic eternal truths, namely, that those truths derived from the more basic need not be self-evident on first consideration. Second, nor does the apparent conceivability of a state of affairs demonstrate that it is possible. Consider a perpetual motion machine consisting of an electric motor and a generator. The generator produces enough electricity to power the motor, which turns the generator. So far no obvious trouble arises. Upon closer and more careful scrutiny, however, one finds reasons that, while the machine may be possible, it cannot be a perpetual motion machine. Physics tells us that both the motor and generator are subject to friction. Therefore, the system will slowly lose energy that will need to be replaced if the machine were to run perpetually. When all the laws of physics are brought to bear on this system, we discover that what we had taken as a clear and possible idea was not. These two cases show that if the eternal truths are arranged in a hierarchical structure, then one clearly conceives an eternal truth lower in the hierarchy only when one understands its relationships to the more fundamental eternal truths. Thus, if Descartes construed natural laws as lower level eternal truths, then he can at once reject Hume's maxim and embrace Bennett's account of Cartesian modalities.
167. AT, 1:149-50, CSM, 3:24.
168. AT, 1:149-50, CSM, 3:24.
169. AT, 1:152-2, CSM, 3:25, see also AT, 1:145, 152-3, 2:138; CSM, 3:23, 25-6, 103.
170. AT, 1:152-2, CSM, 3:25, see also AT, 1:145, 152-3, 2:138; CSM, 3:23, 25-6, 103.
171. AT, 1:152-2, CSM, 3:25, see also AT, 1:145, 152-3, 2:138; CSM, 3:23, 25-6, 103.
172. AT, 1:152-2, CSM, 3:25, see also AT, 1:145, 152-3, 2:138; CSM, 3:23, 25-6, 103.
173. AT, 1:152-2, CSM, 3:25, see also AT, 1:145, 152-3, 2:138; CSM, 3:23, 25-6, 103.
174. See AT, 7:432, CSM, 2:291.
175. See AT, 7:432, CSM, 2:291.
176. AT, 2:268, CSM, 3:119; see also AT, 1:476, 3:39; CSM, 3:77, 145.
177. AT, 2:268, CSM, 3:119; see also AT, 1:476, 3:39; CSM, 3:77, 145.
178. AT, 2:268, CSM, 3:119; see also AT, 1:476, 3:39; CSM, 3:77, 145.
179. AT, 2:268, CSM, 3:119; see also AT, 1:476, 3:39; CSM, 3:77, 145.
180. AT, 2:268, CSM, 3:119; see also AT, 1:476, 3:39; CSM, 3:77, 145.
181. AT, 6:43, CSM, 1:132.
182. AT, 6:43, CSM, 1:132.
183. That he held this should be clear from the fact that, in The World, he introduced the assumption that God will never perform miracles and that "rational souls . . . will not disrupt in any way the ordinary course of nature"; AT, 6:48, CSM, 1:97. Note further that, assuming similar principles, the Descartes of the Principles claimed that all phenomena in the physical world could be explained. See Principles, 3:47, AT, 8A:102-3, CSM, 1:257-8.
184. That he held this should be clear from the fact that, in The World, he introduced the assumption that God will never perform miracles and that "rational souls . . . will not disrupt in any way the ordinary course of nature"; AT, 6:48, CSM, 1:97. Note further that, assuming similar principles, the Descartes of the Principles claimed that all phenomena in the physical world could be explained. See Principles, 3:47, AT, 8A:102-3, CSM, 1:257-8.
185. That he held this should be clear from the fact that, in The World, he introduced the assumption that God will never perform miracles and that "rational souls . . . will not disrupt in any way the ordinary course of nature"; AT, 6:48, CSM, 1:97. Note further that, assuming similar principles, the Descartes of the Principles claimed that all phenomena in the physical world could be explained. See Principles, 3:47, AT, 8A:102-3, CSM, 1:257-8.
186. That he held this should be clear from the fact that, in The World, he introduced the assumption that God will never perform miracles and that "rational souls . . . will not disrupt in any way the ordinary course of nature"; AT, 6:48, CSM, 1:97. Note further that, assuming similar principles, the Descartes of the Principles claimed that all phenomena in the physical world could be explained. See Principles, 3:47, AT, 8A:102-3, CSM, 1:257-8.
187. That he held this should be clear from the fact that, in The World, he introduced the assumption that God will never perform miracles and that "rational souls . . . will not disrupt in any way the ordinary course of nature"; AT, 6:48, CSM, 1:97. Note further that, assuming similar principles, the Descartes of the Principles claimed that all phenomena in the physical world could be explained. See Principles, 3:47, AT, 8A:102-3, CSM, 1:257-8.
188. AT, 3:233, CSM, 3:157.
189. AT, 3:233, CSM, 3:157.
190. AT, 3:298, CSM, 3:173. See also the Conversation with Burman, AT, 5:165, CSM, 3:346-7.
191. AT, 3:298, CSM, 3:173. See also the Conversation with Burman, AT, 5:165, CSM, 3:346-7.
192. AT, 3:298, CSM, 3:173. See also the Conversation with Burman, AT, 5:165, CSM, 3:346-7.
193. AT, 3:298, CSM, 3:173. See also the Conversation with Burman, AT, 5:165, CSM, 3:346-7.
194. AT, 11:43, CSM, 1:96.
195. AT, 11:43, CSM, 1:96.
196. AT, 11:47, CSM, 1:97.
197. AT, 11:47, CSM, 1:97.
198. AT, 7:17, CSM, 2:12.
199. AT, 7:17, CSM, 2:12.
200. AT, 3:39, CSM, 3:145; see also AT, 1:140-1; CSM, 3:22.
201. AT, 3:39, CSM, 3:145; see also AT, 1:140-1; CSM, 3:22.
202. AT, 3:39, CSM, 3:145; see also AT, 1:140-1; CSM, 3:22.
203. AT, 3:39, CSM, 3:145; see also AT, 1:140-1; CSM, 3:22.
204. Principles, 4:206, AT, 8A:328-9, CSM, 1:290-1.
205. Principles, 4:206, AT, 8A:328-9, CSM, 1:290-1.
206. Principles, 4:206, AT, 8A:328-9, CSM, 1:290-1.
207. Our discussion assumes that the distinction between God's action(s) and God's character (immutability) collapses. Following traditional theology, speaking of change in God's case can only be metaphorical. God's acts are not in time. Thus, all God's acts are "at the same time" because they are not at any time at all. Descartes accepted the traditional theology in part because he sought to avoid theological controversy. We believe that his theory of time also supports a traditional theology. See note 72.
208. Principles, 1:49, AT, 8A:23-4, CSM, 1:209.
209. Principles, 1:49, AT, 8A:23-4, CSM, 1:209.
210. Principles, 1:49, AT, 8A:23-4, CSM, 1:209.
211. AT, 6:41, CSM, 1:131.
212. AT, 6:41, CSM, 1:131.
213. AT, 5:275, CSM, 3:364-5.
214. AT, 5:275, CSM, 3:364-5.
215. AT, 7:57, CSM, 2:40.
216. AT, 7:57, CSM, 2:40.
217. AT, 5:347, CSM, 3:375.
218. AT, 5:347, CSM, 3:375.
219. AT, 7:57, CSM, 2:40; see also POS, §41.
220. AT, 7:57, CSM, 2:40; see also POS, §41.
221. AT, 7:57, CSM, 2:40; see also POS, §41.
222. POS, §41, AT, 11:359-60, CSM, 1:343.
223. POS, §41, AT, 11:359-60, CSM, 1:343.
224. POS, §41, AT, 11:359-60, CSM, 1:343.
225. AT, 4:314, CSM, 3:272.
226. AT, 4:314, CSM, 3:272.
227. See AT, 7:83-8, CSM, 2:58-61.
228. See AT, 7:83-8, CSM, 2:58-61.
229. AT, 8B:359, CSM, 1:304. In the optics one finds: "Instead we must hold that it is the movements composing this picture which, acting directly upon our soul in so far as it is united with our body, are ordained by nature to make it have such sensations"; AT, 6:130, CSM, 1:167. We believe that the doctrine of innate ideas suggests that the mind is structured in such a way that there are natural patterns of thought. While the will might be the motive force that begins a chain of thought, affirms and denies propositions, and pushes the process of analysis onward, innate ideas as dispositions to form occurent ideas with a certain content are lawfully organized. For example, if one begins with and idea of God as a magnified idea of oneself and inquires into the adequacy of that idea, this will lead to an idea of God as being that is infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, and so forth, and ultimately to an idea of a supremely perfect being. See Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen, "Descartes' Factitious Ideas of God," Modern Schoolman 66 (1989): 197-208; and Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen, "Innate Ideas and Cartesian Dispositions," International Studies in Philosophy 24 (1992): 65-80. If we are correct, this explains Descartes' confidence that anyone following his method will reach the same conclusions he reached.
230. AT, 8B:359, CSM, 1:304. In the optics one finds: "Instead we must hold that it is the movements composing this picture which, acting directly upon our soul in so far as it is united with our body, are ordained by nature to make it have such sensations"; AT, 6:130, CSM, 1:167. We believe that the doctrine of innate ideas suggests that the mind is structured in such a way that there are natural patterns of thought. While the will might be the motive force that begins a chain of thought, affirms and denies propositions, and pushes the process of analysis onward, innate ideas as dispositions to form occurent ideas with a certain content are lawfully organized. For example, if one begins with and idea of God as a magnified idea of oneself and inquires into the adequacy of that idea, this will lead to an idea of God as being that is infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, and so forth, and ultimately to an idea of a supremely perfect being. See Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen, "Descartes' Factitious Ideas of God," Modern Schoolman 66 (1989): 197-208; and Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen, "Innate Ideas and Cartesian Dispositions," International Studies in Philosophy 24 (1992): 65-80. If we are correct, this explains Descartes' confidence that anyone following his method will reach the same conclusions he reached.
231. AT, 8B:359, CSM, 1:304. In the optics one finds: "Instead we must hold that it is the movements composing this picture which, acting directly upon our soul in so far as it is united with our body, are ordained by nature to make it have such sensations"; AT, 6:130, CSM, 1:167. We believe that the doctrine of innate ideas suggests that the mind is structured in such a way that there are natural patterns of thought. While the will might be the motive force that begins a chain of thought, affirms and denies propositions, and pushes the process of analysis onward, innate ideas as dispositions to form occurent ideas with a certain content are lawfully organized. For example, if one begins with and idea of God as a magnified idea of oneself and inquires into the adequacy of that idea, this will lead to an idea of God as being that is infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, and so forth, and ultimately to an idea of a supremely perfect being. See Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen, "Descartes' Factitious Ideas of God," Modern Schoolman 66 (1989): 197-208; and Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen, "Innate Ideas and Cartesian Dispositions," International Studies in Philosophy 24 (1992): 65-80. If we are correct, this explains Descartes' confidence that anyone following his method will reach the same conclusions he reached.
232. AT, 8B:359, CSM, 1:304. In the optics one finds: "Instead we must hold that it is the movements composing this picture which, acting directly upon our soul in so far as it is united with our body, are ordained by nature to make it have such sensations"; AT, 6:130, CSM, 1:167. We believe that the doctrine of innate ideas suggests that the mind is structured in such a way that there are natural patterns of thought. While the will might be the motive force that begins a chain of thought, affirms and denies propositions, and pushes the process of analysis onward, innate ideas as dispositions to form occurent ideas with a certain content are lawfully organized. For example, if one begins with and idea of God as a magnified idea of oneself and inquires into the adequacy of that idea, this will lead to an idea of God as being that is infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, and so forth, and ultimately to an idea of a supremely perfect being. See Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen, "Descartes' Factitious Ideas of God," Modern Schoolman 66 (1989): 197-208; and Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen, "Innate Ideas and Cartesian Dispositions," International Studies in Philosophy 24 (1992): 65-80. If we are correct, this explains Descartes' confidence that anyone following his method will reach the same conclusions he reached.
233. AT, 8B:359, CSM, 1:304. In the optics one finds: "Instead we must hold that it is the movements composing this picture which, acting directly upon our soul in so far as it is united with our body, are ordained by nature to make it have such sensations"; AT, 6:130, CSM, 1:167. We believe that the doctrine of innate ideas suggests that the mind is structured in such a way that there are natural patterns of thought. While the will might be the motive force that begins a chain of thought, affirms and denies propositions, and pushes the process of analysis onward, innate ideas as dispositions to form occurent ideas with a certain content are lawfully organized. For example, if one begins with and idea of God as a magnified idea of oneself and inquires into the adequacy of that idea, this will lead to an idea of God as being that is infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, and so forth, and ultimately to an idea of a supremely perfect being. See Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen, "Descartes' Factitious Ideas of God," Modern Schoolman 66 (1989): 197-208; and Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen, "Innate Ideas and Cartesian Dispositions," International Studies in Philosophy 24 (1992): 65-80. If we are correct, this explains Descartes' confidence that anyone following his method will reach the same conclusions he reached.
234. AT, 8B:359, CSM, 1:304. In the optics one finds: "Instead we must hold that it is the movements composing this picture which, acting directly upon our soul in so far as it is united with our body, are ordained by nature to make it have such sensations"; AT, 6:130, CSM, 1:167. We believe that the doctrine of innate ideas suggests that the mind is structured in such a way that there are natural patterns of thought. While the will might be the motive force that begins a chain of thought, affirms and denies propositions, and pushes the process of analysis onward, innate ideas as dispositions to form occurent ideas with a certain content are lawfully organized. For example, if one begins with and idea of God as a magnified idea of oneself and inquires into the adequacy of that idea, this will lead to an idea of God as being that is infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, and so forth, and ultimately to an idea of a supremely perfect being. See Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen, "Descartes' Factitious Ideas of God," Modern Schoolman 66 (1989): 197-208; and Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen, "Innate Ideas and Cartesian Dispositions," International Studies in Philosophy 24 (1992): 65-80. If we are correct, this explains Descartes' confidence that anyone following his method will reach the same conclusions he reached.
235. In John J. Blom, Descartes: His Moral Philosophy and Psychology (New York: New York University Press, 1978), 106.
236. AT, 3:665, CSM, 3:218.
237. AT, 3:665, CSM, 3:218.
238. AT, 3:665, CSM, 3:218; see also AT, 3:690-1; CSM, 3:226.
239. AT, 3:665, CSM, 3:218; see also AT, 3:690-1; CSM, 3:226.
240. AT, 3:665, CSM, 3:218; see also AT, 3:690-1; CSM, 3:226.
241. AT, 3:665, CSM, 3:218; see also AT, 3:690-1; CSM, 3:226.
242. AT, 7:665-6, CSM, 2:218, emphasis added.
243. AT, 7:665-6, CSM, 2:218, emphasis added.
244. AT, 7:666-7, CSM, 2:219.
245. AT, 7:666-7, CSM, 2:219.
246. Principles, 1:48.
247. AT, 3:667-8, CSM, 3:218-19; see also AT, 3:693-4, 7:441-2; CSM, 3:227-8, 2:297-8.
248. AT, 3:667-8, CSM, 3:218-19; see also AT, 3:693-4, 7:441-2; CSM, 3:227-8, 2:297-8.
249. AT, 3:667-8, CSM, 3:218-19; see also AT, 3:693-4, 7:441-2; CSM, 3:227-8, 2:297-8.
250. AT, 3:667-8, CSM, 3:218-19; see also AT, 3:693-4, 7:441-2; CSM, 3:227-8, 2:297-8.
251. AT, 3:667-8, CSM, 3:218-19; see also AT, 3:693-4, 7:441-2; CSM, 3:227-8, 2:297-8.
252. AT, 3:667-8, CSM, 3:218-19; see also AT, 3:693-4, 7:441-2; CSM, 3:227-8, 2:297-8.
253. Daniel Garber presents an extended account of Descartes' views on substantial forms in his Descartes' Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 95-103.
254. In "The Unity of Descartes' Man," Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 339-70, Paul Hoffman argues that the union between mind and body is substantial. In "Descartes: The End of Anthropology," in Reason, Will and Sensation: Studies in Descartes's Metaphysics, ed. J. Cottingham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 273-306, Stephen Voss argues that Descartes did not have a settled view on the nature of human beings. While the Descartes of the Meditations might have held that there is a substantial unity between the human soul and the human body, the Descartes of the Principles and later did not clearly hold that the notion of a human being is significant, at least in any sense in which the mind and body ontologically constitute one entity.
255. In "The Unity of Descartes' Man," Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 339-70, Paul Hoffman argues that the union between mind and body is substantial. In "Descartes: The End of Anthropology," in Reason, Will and Sensation: Studies in Descartes's Metaphysics, ed. J. Cottingham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 273-306, Stephen Voss argues that Descartes did not have a settled view on the nature of human beings. While the Descartes of the Meditations might have held that there is a substantial unity between the human soul and the human body, the Descartes of the Principles and later did not
256. AT, 7:14, CSM, 2:10.
257. AT, 7:14, CSM, 2:10.
258. AT, 7:64, CSM, 2:44-5.
259. AT, 7:64, CSM, 2:44-5.
260. AT, 3:665, CSM, 3:218.
261. AT, 3:665, CSM, 3:218.
262. AT, 7:219, CSM, 2:115, emphasis added.
263. AT, 7:219, CSM, 2:115, emphasis added.
264. See Voss, "Descartes: The End of Anthropology."
265. See AT, 7:444-5, CSM, 2:299.
266. See AT, 7:444-5, CSM, 2:299.
267. AT, 7:222, CSM, 2:157.
268. AT, 7:222, CSM, 2:157.
269. Some will argue that even if we have shown that one can read Descartes' discussions of mind-body interaction in terms of formal causes, we have not solved the problem of mind-body or even body-body interaction in Descartes, since the problem of interaction presupposes the notion of efficient causality. Insofar as Descartes claimed that there is only a conceptual distinction between creation and preservation (AT, 7:49, 109, 110; CSM, 2:33, 79), we must at least explain how God continually recreates these laws, that is, how God acts in such a way that the relations between created entities appear to be lawful. Does not our account, we would be asked, follow Garber's views (Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 299-305, "Descartes and Occasionalism") and turn Descartes into at least a quasi-occasionalist? No. First, if one takes seriously Descartes' claim that the best model we have for divine will is human will (AT, 5:347, CSM, 3:375), and if one recognizes Cartesian beliefs are subject to the will, then a belief is the result of an act of the will, and any given belief will be retained until such a time as it is rescinded by some other act. If one applies this will-it-and-forget-it-forever theory of belief in the divine case, there is no reason to assume that God is continually acting behind the scenes to make sure all the laws are followed. This also fits nicely with the notion that God is immutable. Second, the question, "What is God doing?" is properly a theological question, and Descartes regularly indicates that theological questions, properly so called, are beyond the scope of his investigations. Third, Descartes claims he did not explain the nature of the unity between body and soul. Notice what he wrote to Clerselier: "These questions [how can the soul move the body if it is in no way material, and how can it receive the forms (espèces) of corporeal objects?] presuppose amongst other things an explanation of the union between the soul and the body, which I have not yet dealt with at all. But I will say, for your benefit at least, that the whole problem contained in such questions arises simply from a supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on each other. Yet those who admit of real accidents like heat, weight and so on, have no doubt that these accidents act on the body; but there is much more of a difference between them and it, i.e., between accidents and a substance, than there is between two substances"; AT, 9A:213, CSM, 2:275-6. Finally, occasionalism seems to be inconsistent with Descartes' theory of substance. Insofar as he draws a distinction between infinite substance, finite substance, and modes on the basis of independence (AT, 7:165-6, CSM, 2:117, Principles, 1:51), to suggest that God literally recreates the world at every moment would seem to collapse the distinction between finite substance and mode. If both a finite substance and the modes that clothe it depend solely on a God that recreates them every moment, neither is more independent than the other the substance-mode complex is reduced to a series of temporal slices and a finite substance, as such, would be nothing more than an abstraction from such a series of temporal slices. On such a view, the temporal slices, as such, would possess a greater degree of independence (reality) than the finite substances abstracted from them. Of course Descartes' official ontology provides no slot for a temporal slice as such. For these reasons, while granting that we have little understanding of the Cartesian God as an efficient cause, we would reject occasionalism as a plausible option.
270. Some will argue that even if we have shown that one can read Descartes' discussions of mind-body interaction in terms of formal causes, we have not solved the problem of mind-body or even body-body interaction in Descartes, since the problem of interaction presupposes the notion of efficient causality. Insofar as Descartes claimed that there is only a conceptual distinction between creation and preservation (AT, 7:49, 109, 110; CSM, 2:33, 79), we must at least explain how God continually recreates these laws, that is, how God acts in such a way that the relations between created entities appear to be lawful. Does not our account, we would be asked, follow Garber's views (Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 299-305, "Descartes and Occasionalism") and turn Descartes into at least a quasi-occasionalist? No. First, if one takes seriously Descartes' claim that the best model we have for divine will is human will (AT, 5:347, CSM, 3:375), and if one recognizes Cartesian beliefs are subject to the will, then a belief is the result of an act of the will, and any given belief will be retained until such a time as it is rescinded by some other act. If one applies this will-it-and-forget-it-forever theory of belief in the divine case, there is no reason to assume that God is continually acting behind the scenes to make sure all the laws are followed. This also fits nicely with the notion that God is immutable. Second, the question, "What is God doing?" is properly a theological question, and Descartes regularly indicates that theological questions, properly so called, are beyond the scope of his investigations. Third, Descartes claims he did not explain the nature of the unity between body and soul. Notice what he wrote to Clerselier: "These questions [how can the soul move the body if it is in no way material, and how can it receive the forms (espèces) of corporeal objects?] presuppose amongst other things an explanation of the union between the soul and the body, which I have not yet dealt with at all. But I will say, for your benefit at least, that the whole problem contained in such questions arises simply from a supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on each other. Yet those who admit of real accidents like heat, weight and so on, have no doubt that these accidents act on the body; but there is much more of a difference between them and it, i.e., between accidents and a substance, than there is between two substances"; AT, 9A:213, CSM, 2:275-6. Finally, occasionalism seems to be inconsistent with Descartes' theory of substance. Insofar as he draws a distinction between infinite substance, finite substance, and modes on the basis of independence (AT, 7:165-6, CSM, 2:117, Principles, 1:51), to suggest that God literally recreates the world at every moment would seem to collapse the distinction between finite substance and mode. If both a finite substance and the modes that clothe it depend solely on a God that recreates them every moment, neither is more independent than the other the substance-mode complex is reduced to a series of temporal slices and a finite substance, as such, would be nothing more than an abstraction from such a series of temporal slices. On such a view, the temporal slices, as such, would possess a greater degree of independence (reality) than the finite substances abstracted from them. Of course Descartes' official ontology provides no slot for a temporal slice as such. For these reasons, while granting that we have little understanding of the Cartesian God as an efficient cause, we would reject occasionalism as a plausible option.
271. Some will argue that even if we have shown that one can read Descartes' discussions of mind-body interaction in terms of formal causes, we have not solved the problem of mind-body or even body-body interaction in Descartes, since the problem of interaction presupposes the notion of efficient causality. Insofar as Descartes claimed that there is only a conceptual distinction between creation and preservation (AT, 7:49, 109, 110; CSM, 2:33, 79), we must at least explain how God continually recreates these laws, that is, how God acts in such a way that the relations between created entities appear to be lawful. Does not our account, we would be asked, follow Garber's views (Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 299-305, "Descartes and Occasionalism") and turn Descartes into at least a quasi-occasionalist? No. First, if one takes seriously Descartes' claim that the best model we have for divine will is human will (AT, 5:347, CSM, 3:375), and if one recognizes Cartesian beliefs are subject to the will, then a belief is the result of an act of the will, and any given belief will be retained until such a time as it is rescinded by some other act. If one applies this will-it-and-forget-it-forever theory of belief in the divine case, there is no reason to assume that God is continually acting behind the scenes to make sure all the laws are followed. This also fits nicely with the notion that God is immutable. Second, the question, "What is God doing?" is properly a theological question, and Descartes regularly indicates that theological questions, properly so called, are beyond the scope of his investigations. Third, Descartes claims he did not explain the nature of the unity between body and soul. Notice what he wrote to Clerselier: "These questions [how can the soul move the body if it is in no way material, and how can it receive the forms (espèces) of corporeal objects?] presuppose amongst other things an explanation of the union between the soul and the body, which I have not yet dealt with at all. But I will say, for your benefit at least, that the whole problem contained in such questions arises simply from a supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on each other. Yet those who admit of real accidents like heat, weight and so on, have no doubt that these accidents act on the body; but there is much more of a difference between them and it, i.e., between accidents and a substance, than there is between two substances"; AT, 9A:213, CSM, 2:275-6. Finally, occasionalism seems to be inconsistent with Descartes' theory of substance. Insofar as he draws a distinction between infinite substance, finite substance, and modes on the basis of independence (AT, 7:165-6, CSM, 2:117, Principles, 1:51), to suggest that God literally recreates the world at every moment would seem to collapse the distinction between finite substance and mode. If both a finite substance and the modes that clothe it depend solely on a God that recreates them every moment, neither is more independent than the other the substance-mode complex is reduced to a series of temporal slices and a finite substance, as such, would be nothing more than an abstraction from such a series of temporal slices. On such a view, the temporal slices, as such, would possess a greater degree of independence (reality) than the finite substances abstracted from them. Of course Descartes' official ontology provides no slot for a temporal slice as such. For these reasons, while granting that we have little understanding of the Cartesian God as an efficient cause, we would reject occasionalism as a plausible option.
272. Some will argue that even if we have shown that one can read Descartes' discussions of mind-body interaction in terms of formal causes, we have not solved the problem of mind-body or even body-body interaction in Descartes, since the problem of interaction presupposes the notion of efficient causality. Insofar as Descartes claimed that there is only a conceptual distinction between creation and preservation (AT, 7:49, 109, 110; CSM, 2:33, 79), we must at least explain how God continually recreates these laws, that is, how God acts in such a way that the relations between created entities appear to be lawful. Does not our account, we would be asked, follow Garber's views (Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 299-305, "Descartes and Occasionalism") and turn Descartes into at least a quasi-occasionalist? No. First, if one takes seriously Descartes' claim that the best model we have for divine will is human will (AT, 5:347, CSM, 3:375), and if one recognizes Cartesian beliefs are subject to the will, then a belief is the result of an act of the will, and any given belief will be retained until such a time as it is rescinded by some other act. If one applies this will-it-and-forget-it-forever theory of belief in the divine case, there is no reason to assume that God is continually acting behind the scenes to make sure all the laws are followed. This also fits nicely with the notion that God is immutable. Second, the question, "What is God doing?" is properly a theological question, and Descartes regularly indicates that theological questions, properly so called, are beyond the scope of his investigations. Third, Descartes claims he did not explain the nature of the unity between body and soul. Notice what he wrote to Clerselier: "These questions [how can the soul move the body if it is in no way material, and how can it receive the forms (espèces) of corporeal objects?] presuppose amongst other things an explanation of the union between the soul and the body, which I have not yet dealt with at all. But I will say, for your benefit at least, that the whole problem contained in such questions arises simply from a supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on each other. Yet those who admit of real accidents like heat, weight and so on, have no doubt that these accidents act on the body; but there is much more of a difference between them and it, i.e., between accidents and a substance, than there is between two substances"; AT, 9A:213, CSM, 2:275-6. Finally, occasionalism seems to be inconsistent with Descartes' theory of substance. Insofar as he draws a distinction between infinite substance, finite substance, and modes on the basis of independence (AT, 7:165-6, CSM, 2:117, Principles, 1:51), to suggest that God literally recreates the world at every moment would seem to collapse the distinction between finite substance and mode. If both a finite substance and the modes that clothe it depend solely on a God that recreates them every moment, neither is more independent than the other the substance-mode complex is reduced to a series of temporal slices and a finite substance, as such, would be nothing more than an abstraction from such a series of temporal slices. On such a view, the temporal slices, as such, would possess a greater degree of independence (reality) than the finite substances abstracted from them. Of course Descartes' official ontology provides no slot for a temporal slice as such. For these reasons, while granting that we have little understanding of the Cartesian God as an efficient cause, we would reject occasionalism as a plausible option.
273. Some will argue that even if we have shown that one can read Descartes' discussions of mind-body interaction in terms of formal causes, we have not solved the problem of mind-body or even body-body interaction in Descartes, since the problem of interaction presupposes the notion of efficient causality. Insofar as Descartes claimed that there is only a conceptual distinction between creation and preservation (AT, 7:49, 109, 110; CSM, 2:33, 79), we must at least explain how God continually recreates these laws, that is, how God acts in such a way that the relations between created entities appear to be lawful. Does not our account, we would be asked, follow Garber's views (Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 299-305, "Descartes and Occasionalism") and turn Descartes into at least a quasi-occasionalist? No. First, if one takes seriously Descartes' claim that the best model we have for divine will is human will (AT, 5:347, CSM, 3:375), and if one recognizes Cartesian beliefs are subject to the will, then a belief is the result of an act of the will, and any given belief will be retained until such a time as it is rescinded by some other act. If one applies this will-it-and-forget-it-forever theory of belief in the divine case, there is no reason to assume that God is continually acting behind the scenes to make sure all the laws are followed. This also fits nicely with the notion that God is immutable. Second, the question, "What is God doing?" is properly a theological question, and Descartes regularly indicates that theological questions, properly so called, are beyond the scope of his investigations. Third, Descartes claims he did not explain the nature of the unity between body and soul. Notice what he wrote to Clerselier: "These questions [how can the soul move the body if it is in no way material, and how can it receive the forms (espèces) of corporeal objects?] presuppose amongst other things an explanation of the union between the soul and the body, which I have not yet dealt with at all. But I will say, for your benefit at least, that the whole problem contained in such questions arises simply from a supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on each other. Yet those who admit of real accidents like heat, weight and so on, have no doubt that these accidents act on the body; but there is much more of a difference between them and it, i.e., between accidents and a substance, than there is between two substances"; AT, 9A:213, CSM, 2:275-6. Finally, occasionalism seems to be inconsistent with Descartes' theory of substance. Insofar as he draws a distinction between infinite substance, finite substance, and modes on the basis of independence (AT, 7:165-6, CSM, 2:117, Principles, 1:51), to suggest that God literally recreates the world at every moment would seem to collapse the distinction between finite substance and mode. If both a finite substance and the modes that clothe it depend solely on a God that recreates them every moment, neither is more independent than the other the substance-mode complex is reduced to a series of temporal slices and a finite substance, as such, would be nothing more than an abstraction from such a series of temporal slices. On such a view, the temporal slices, as such, would possess a greater degree of independence (reality) than the finite substances abstracted from them. Of course Descartes' official ontology provides no slot for a temporal slice as such. For these reasons, while granting that we have little understanding of the Cartesian God as an efficient cause, we would reject occasionalism as a plausible option.
274. Some will argue that even if we have shown that one can read Descartes' discussions of mind-body interaction in terms of formal causes, we have not solved the problem of mind-body or even body-body interaction in Descartes, since the problem of interaction presupposes the notion of efficient causality. Insofar as Descartes claimed that there is only a conceptual distinction between creation and preservation (AT, 7:49, 109, 110; CSM, 2:33, 79), we must at least explain how God continually recreates these laws, that is, how God acts in such a way that the relations between created entities appear to be lawful. Does not our account, we would be asked, follow Garber's views (Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 299-305, "Descartes and Occasionalism") and turn Descartes into at least a quasi-occasionalist? No. First, if one takes seriously Descartes' claim that the best model we have for divine will is human will (AT, 5:347, CSM, 3:375), and if one recognizes Cartesian beliefs are subject to the will, then a belief is the result of an act of the will, and any given belief will be retained until such a time as it is rescinded by some other act. If one applies this will-it-and-forget-it-forever theory of belief in the divine case, there is no reason to assume that God is continually acting behind the scenes to make sure all the laws are followed. This also fits nicely with the notion that God is immutable. Second, the question, "What is God doing?" is properly a theological question, and Descartes regularly indicates that theological questions, properly so called, are beyond the scope of his investigations. Third, Descartes claims he did not explain the nature of the unity between body and soul. Notice what he wrote to Clerselier: "These questions [how can the soul move the body if it is in no way material, and how can it receive the forms (espèces) of corporeal objects?] presuppose amongst other things an explanation of the union between the soul and the body, which I have not yet dealt with at all. But I will say, for your benefit at least, that the whole problem contained in such questions arises simply from a supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on each other. Yet those who admit of real accidents like heat, weight and so on, have no doubt that these accidents act on the body; but there is much more of a difference between them and it, i.e., between accidents and a substance, than there is between two substances"; AT, 9A:213, CSM, 2:275-6. Finally, occasionalism seems to be inconsistent with Descartes' theory of substance. Insofar as he draws a distinction between infinite substance, finite substance, and modes on the basis of independence (AT, 7:165-6, CSM, 2:117, Principles, 1:51), to suggest that God literally recreates the world at every moment would seem to collapse the distinction between finite substance and mode. If both a finite substance and the modes that clothe it depend solely on a God that recreates them every moment, neither is more independent than the other the substance-mode complex is reduced to a series of temporal slices and a finite substance, as such, would be nothing more than an abstraction from such a series of temporal slices. On such a view, the temporal slices, as such, would possess a greater degree of independence (reality) than the finite substances abstracted from them. Of course Descartes' official ontology provides no slot for a temporal slice as such. For these reasons, while granting that we have little understanding of the Cartesian God as an efficient cause, we would reject occasionalism as a plausible option.
275. Some will argue that even if we have shown that one can read Descartes' discussions of mind-body interaction in terms of formal causes, we have not solved the problem of mind-body or even body-body interaction in Descartes, since the problem of interaction presupposes the notion of efficient causality. Insofar as Descartes claimed that there is only a conceptual distinction between creation and preservation (AT, 7:49, 109, 110; CSM, 2:33, 79), we must at least explain how God continually recreates these laws, that is, how God acts in such a way that the relations between created entities appear to be lawful. Does not our account, we would be asked, follow Garber's views (Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 299-305, "Descartes and Occasionalism") and turn Descartes into at least a quasi-occasionalist? No. First, if one takes seriously Descartes' claim that the best model we have for divine will is human will (AT, 5:347, CSM, 3:375), and if one recognizes Cartesian beliefs are subject to the will, then a belief is the result of an act of the will, and any given belief will be retained until such a time as it is rescinded by some other act. If one applies this will-it-and-forget-it-forever theory of belief in the divine case, there is no reason to assume that God is continually acting behind the scenes to make sure all the laws are followed. This also fits nicely with the notion that God is immutable. Second, the question, "What is God doing?" is properly a theological question, and Descartes regularly indicates that theological questions, properly so called, are beyond the scope of his investigations. Third, Descartes claims he did not explain the nature of the unity between body and soul. Notice what he wrote to Clerselier: "These questions [how can the soul move the body if it is in no way material, and how can it receive the forms (espèces) of corporeal objects?] presuppose amongst other things an explanation of the union between the soul and the body, which I have not yet dealt with at all. But I will say, for your benefit at least, that the whole problem contained in such questions arises simply from a supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on each other. Yet those who admit of real accidents like heat, weight and so on, have no doubt that these accidents act on the body; but there is much more of a difference between them and it, i.e., between accidents and a substance, than there is between two substances"; AT, 9A:213, CSM, 2:275-6. Finally, occasionalism seems to be inconsistent with Descartes' theory of substance. Insofar as he draws a distinction between infinite substance, finite substance, and modes on the basis of independence (AT, 7:165-6, CSM, 2:117, Principles, 1:51), to suggest that God literally recreates the world at every moment would seem to collapse the distinction between finite substance and mode. If both a finite substance and the modes that clothe it depend solely on a God that recreates them every moment, neither is more independent than the other the substance-mode complex is reduced to a series of temporal slices and a finite substance, as such, would be nothing more than an abstraction from such a series of temporal slices. On such a view, the temporal slices, as such, would possess a greater degree of independence (reality) than the finite substances abstracted from them. Of course Descartes' official ontology provides no slot for a temporal slice as such. For these reasons, while granting that we have little understanding of the Cartesian God as an efficient cause, we would reject occasionalism as a plausible option.
276. Some will argue that even if we have shown that one can read Descartes' discussions of mind-body interaction in terms of formal causes, we have not solved the problem of mind-body or even body-body interaction in Descartes, since the problem of interaction presupposes the notion of efficient causality. Insofar as Descartes claimed that there is only a conceptual distinction between creation and preservation (AT, 7:49, 109, 110; CSM, 2:33, 79), we must at least explain how God continually recreates these laws, that is, how God acts in such a way that the relations between created entities appear to be lawful. Does not our account, we would be asked, follow Garber's views (Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 299-305, "Descartes and Occasionalism") and turn Descartes into at least a quasi-occasionalist? No. First, if one takes seriously Descartes' claim that the best model we have for divine will is human will (AT, 5:347, CSM, 3:375), and if one recognizes Cartesian beliefs are subject to the will, then a belief is the result of an act of the will, and any given belief will be retained until such a time as it is rescinded by some other act. If one applies this will-it-and-forget-it-forever theory of belief in the divine case, there is no reason to assume that God is continually acting behind the scenes to make sure all the laws are followed. This also fits nicely with the notion that God is immutable. Second, the question, "What is God doing?" is properly a theological question, and Descartes regularly indicates that theological questions, properly so called, are beyond the scope of his investigations. Third, Descartes claims he did not explain the nature of the unity between body and soul. Notice what he wrote to Clerselier: "These questions [how can the soul move the body if it is in no way material, and how can it receive the forms (espèces) of corporeal objects?] presuppose amongst other things an explanation of the union between the soul and the body, which I have not yet dealt with at all. But I will say, for your benefit at least, that the whole problem contained in such questions arises simply from a supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on each other. Yet those who admit of real accidents like heat, weight and so on, have no doubt that these accidents act on the body; but there is much more of a difference between them and it, i.e., between accidents and a substance, than there is between two substances"; AT, 9A:213, CSM, 2:275-6. Finally, occasionalism seems to be inconsistent with Descartes' theory of substance. Insofar as he draws a distinction between infinite substance, finite substance, and modes on the basis of independence (AT, 7:165-6, CSM, 2:117, Principles, 1:51), to suggest that God literally recreates the world at every moment would seem to collapse the distinction between finite substance and mode. If both a finite substance and the modes that clothe it depend solely on a God that recreates them every moment, neither is more independent than the other the substance-mode complex is reduced to a series of temporal slices and a finite substance, as such, would be nothing more than an abstraction from such a series of temporal slices. On such a view, the temporal slices, as such, would possess a greater degree of independence (reality) than the finite substances abstracted from them. Of course Descartes' official ontology provides no slot for a temporal slice as such. For these reasons, while granting that we have little understanding of the Cartesian God as an efficient cause, we would reject occasionalism as a plausible option.
277. Some will argue that even if we have shown that one can read Descartes' discussions of mind-body interaction in terms of formal causes, we have not solved the problem of mind-body or even body-body interaction in Descartes, since the problem of interaction presupposes the notion of efficient causality. Insofar as Descartes claimed that there is only a conceptual distinction between creation and preservation (AT, 7:49, 109, 110; CSM, 2:33, 79), we must at least explain how God continually recreates these laws, that is, how God acts in such a way that the relations between created entities appear to be lawful. Does not our account, we would be asked, follow Garber's views (Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 299-305, "Descartes and Occasionalism") and turn Descartes into at least a quasi-occasionalist? No. First, if one takes seriously Descartes' claim that the best model we have for divine will is human will (AT, 5:347, CSM, 3:375), and if one recognizes Cartesian beliefs are subject to the will, then a belief is the result of an act of the will, and any given belief will be retained until such a time as it is rescinded by some other act. If one applies this will-it-and-forget-it-forever theory of belief in the divine case, there is no reason to assume that God is continually acting behind the scenes to make sure all the laws are followed. This also fits nicely with the notion that God is immutable. Second, the question, "What is God doing?" is properly a theological question, and Descartes regularly indicates that theological questions, properly so called, are beyond the scope of his investigations. Third, Descartes claims he did not explain the nature of the unity between body and soul. Notice what he wrote to Clerselier: "These questions [how can the soul move the body if it is in no way material, and how can it receive the forms (espèces) of corporeal objects?] presuppose amongst other things an explanation of the union between the soul and the body, which I have not yet dealt with at all. But I will say, for your benefit at least, that the whole problem contained in such questions arises simply from a supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on each other. Yet those who admit of real accidents like heat, weight and so on, have no doubt that these accidents act on the body; but there is much more of a difference between them and it, i.e., between accidents and a substance, than there is between two substances"; AT, 9A:213, CSM, 2:275-6. Finally, occasionalism seems to be inconsistent with Descartes' theory of substance. Insofar as he draws a distinction between infinite substance, finite substance, and modes on the basis of independence (AT, 7:165-6, CSM, 2:117, Principles, 1:51), to suggest that God literally recreates the world at every moment would seem to collapse the distinction between finite substance and mode. If both a finite substance and the modes that clothe it depend solely on a God that recreates them every moment, neither is more independent than the other the substance-mode complex is reduced to a series of temporal slices and a finite substance, as such, would be nothing more than an abstraction from such a series of temporal slices. On such a view, the temporal slices, as such, would possess a greater degree of independence (reality) than the finite substances abstracted from them. Of course Descartes' official ontology provides no slot for a temporal slice as such. For these reasons, while granting that we have little understanding of the Cartesian God as an efficient cause, we would reject occasionalism as a plausible option.
278. Some will argue that even if we have shown that one can read Descartes' discussions of mind-body interaction in terms of formal causes, we have not solved the problem of mind-body or even body-body interaction in Descartes, since the problem of interaction presupposes the notion of efficient causality. Insofar as Descartes claimed that there is only a conceptual distinction between creation and preservation (AT, 7:49, 109, 110; CSM, 2:33, 79), we must at least explain how God continually recreates these laws, that is, how God acts in such a way that the relations between created entities appear to be lawful. Does not our account, we would be asked, follow Garber's views (Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 299-305, "Descartes and Occasionalism") and turn Descartes into at least a quasi-occasionalist? No. First, if one takes seriously Descartes' claim that the best model we have for divine will is human will (AT, 5:347, CSM, 3:375), and if one recognizes Cartesian beliefs are subject to the will, then a belief is the result of an act of the will, and any given belief will be retained until such a time as it is rescinded by some other act. If one applies this will-it-and-forget-it-forever theory of belief in the divine case, there is no reason to assume that God is continually acting behind the scenes to make sure all the laws are followed. This also fits nicely with the notion that God is immutable. Second, the question, "What is God doing?" is properly a theological question, and Descartes regularly indicates that theological questions, properly so called, are beyond the scope of his investigations. Third, Descartes claims he did not explain the nature of the unity between body and soul. Notice what he wrote to Clerselier: "These questions [how can the soul move the body if it is in no way material, and how can it receive the forms (espèces) of corporeal objects?] presuppose amongst other things an explanation of the union between the soul and the body, which I have not yet dealt with at all. But I will say, for your benefit at least, that the whole problem contained in such questions arises simply from a supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on each other. Yet those who admit of real accidents like heat, weight and so on, have no doubt that these accidents act on the body; but there is much more of a difference between them and it, i.e., between accidents and a substance, than there is between two substances"; AT, 9A:213, CSM, 2:275-6. Finally, occasionalism seems to be inconsistent with Descartes' theory of substance. Insofar as he draws a distinction between infinite substance, finite substance, and modes on the basis of independence (AT, 7:165-6, CSM, 2:117, Principles, 1:51), to suggest that God literally recreates the world at every moment would seem to collapse the distinction between finite substance and mode. If both a finite substance and the modes that clothe it depend solely on a God that recreates them every moment, neither is more independent than the other the substance-mode complex is reduced to a series of temporal slices and a finite substance, as such, would be nothing more than an abstraction from such a series of temporal slices. On such a view, the temporal slices, as such, would possess a greater degree of independence (reality) than the finite substances abstracted from them. Of course Descartes' official ontology provides no slot for a temporal slice as such. For these reasons, while granting that we have little understanding of the Cartesian God as an efficient cause, we would reject occasionalism as a plausible option.