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Volumn 39, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 275-293

Repeated signalling games and dynamic trading relationships

(1)  Vincent, Daniel R a  

a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 0040680038     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2527293     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (16)

References (13)
  • 1
    • 0000446403 scopus 로고
    • Signalling and renegotiation in contractual relationships
    • BEAUDRY, P. AND M. POITEVIN, "Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships," Econometrica 61 (1993), 745-782.
    • (1993) Econometrica , vol.61 , pp. 745-782
    • Beaudry, P.1    Poitevin, M.2
  • 2
    • 0001139863 scopus 로고
    • Signalling games and stable equilibria
    • CHO, I.K. AND D. KREPS, "Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria," Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (1987), 179-221.
    • (1987) Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.102 , pp. 179-221
    • Cho, I.K.1    Kreps, D.2
  • 3
    • 0000232757 scopus 로고
    • Strategic stability and uniqueness in signalling games
    • _ AND J. SOBEL, "Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory 50 (1990), 381-413.
    • (1990) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.50 , pp. 381-413
    • Sobel, J.1
  • 4
    • 0000867173 scopus 로고
    • Planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect
    • FREIXAS, X., GUESNERIE, R., AND J. TIROLE, "Planning Under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies LII (1985), 173-191.
    • (1985) Review of Economic Studies , vol.52 , pp. 173-191
    • Freixas, X.1    Guesnerie, R.2    Tirole, J.3
  • 5
    • 0000090836 scopus 로고
    • Perfect bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
    • FUDENBERG, D. AND J. TIROLE, "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium" Journal of Economic Theory 53 (1991), 236-260.
    • (1991) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.53 , pp. 236-260
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Tirole, J.2
  • 6
    • 46149130096 scopus 로고
    • Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
    • GROSSMAN, S. AND M. PERRY, "Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986), 120-154.
    • (1986) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.39 , pp. 120-154
    • Grossman, S.1    Perry, M.2
  • 7
    • 84962992220 scopus 로고
    • Contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics
    • HART, O. AND J. TIROLE, "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies LV(4) (1988), 509-540.
    • (1988) Review of Economic Studies , vol.55 , Issue.4 , pp. 509-540
    • Hart, O.1    Tirole, J.2
  • 8
    • 44149093434 scopus 로고
    • Reputation and imperfect information
    • KREPS, D.M. AND R. WILSON, "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982), 253-279.
    • (1982) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.27 , pp. 253-279
    • Kreps, D.M.1    Wilson, R.2
  • 9
    • 38249033262 scopus 로고
    • Comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract
    • LAFFONT, J.J. AND J. TIROLE, "Comparative Statics of the Optimal Dynamic Incentive Contract," European Economic Review 31 (1987), 901-926.
    • (1987) European Economic Review , vol.31 , pp. 901-926
    • Laffont, J.J.1    Tirole, J.2
  • 12
    • 0003019549 scopus 로고
    • Perfect equilibria in bargaining models
    • RUBINSTEIN, A., "Perfect Equilibria in Bargaining Models," Econometrica 50 (1982), 97-109.
    • (1982) Econometrica , vol.50 , pp. 97-109
    • Rubinstein, A.1


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