Bargaining and Search with Incomplete Information about Outside Options

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 203-237

  Chatterjee, Kalyan ^a   Lee, Ching Chyi ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040678586     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0586     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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