Investment policy and exit-exchange offers within financially distressed firms

Journal of Finance

Volumn 51, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 871-888

  Bernardo, Antonio E ^a   Talley, Eric L ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040656027     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb02710.x     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. Altman, Edward I., 1993, Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy, 2nd ed., John Wiley and Sons.
2. Baird, Douglas, 1986, The uneasy case for corporate reorganizations, Journal of Legal Studies 15, 127-147.
3. Baird, Douglas, and Randal Picker, 1991, A simple noncooperative bargaining model of corporate reorganization, Journal of Legal Studies, 20, 311-349.
4. Beneish, Messod, and Eric Press, 1995, The resolution of technical default, The Accounting Review 70, 337-353.
5. Bergman, Yaacov Z., and Jeffrey L. Callen, 1991, Opportunistic underinvestment in debt renegotiation and capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics 29, 137-171.
6. Bulow, Jeremy I., and John B. Shoven, 1978, The bankruptcy decision, Bell Journal of Economics 9, 437-456.
7. Chatterjee, Sris, Upinder Dhillon, and Gabriel Ramírez, 1995, Coercive tender offers in distressed high-yield debt restructurings: An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 38, 333-360.
8. Chen, Yehning, J. Fred Weston, and Edward Altman, 1995, Financial distress and restructuring models, Financial Management 24, 57-75.
9. Coase, Ronald H., 1960, The problem of social cost, Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1-44.
10. Coffee, John, and William Klein, 1991, Protection of bondholders from unfair constrained-choice tender offers (Mimeo, UCLA Law School).
11. Franks, Julian, and Walter Torous, 1989, An empirical investigation of U.S. firms in reorganization, Journal of Finance 44, 747-769.
12. Franks, Julian, and Walter Torous, 1994, A comparison of financial recontracting in distressed exchanges and chapter 11 reorganizations, Journal of Financial Economics 35, 349-370.
13. Gertner, Robert, and David Scharfstein, 1991, A theory of workouts and the effects of reorganization law, Journal of Finance 44, 1189-1222.
14. Giammarino, Ronald M., 1989, The resolution of financial distress, Review of Financial Studies 2, 25-47.
15. Gilson, Stuart, Kose, John, and Larry Lang, 1990, Troubled debt restructurings: An empirical study of private reorganizations of firms in default, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 315-353.
16. Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart, 1980, Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of corporation, Bell Journal of Economics 11, 42-64.
17. Haugen, Robert, and Lemma Senbet, 1978, The insignificance of bankruptcy costs to the theory of optimal capital structure, Journal of Finance 35, 383-393.
18. Jensen, Michael, 1986, Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers, American Economic Review 76, 323-329.
19. Jensen, Michael, and William Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
20. Kahan, Marcel, and Bruce Tuckman, 1993, Do bondholders lose from junk bond covenant changes?, Journal of Business 66, 499-516.
21. Mooradian, Robert M., 1994, The effect of bankruptcy protection on investment: Chapter 11 as a screening device, Journal of Finance 49, 1403-1430.
22. Myers, Stewart, 1977, Determinants of corporate borrowing, Journal Financial Economics 5, 147-175.
23. Roe, Mark, 1983, Bankruptcy and debt: A new model for corporate reorganization, Columbia Law Review 83, 528-602.
24. Roe, Mark, 1987, The voting prohibition in bond workouts, Yale Law Journal 97, 232-279.
25. Schwartz, Alan, 1993, Bankruptcy workouts and debt contracts, Journal of Law and Economics 36, 595-632.
26. Smith, Clifford W. Jr., and Jerold B. Warner, 1979, On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants, Journal of Financial Economics 7, 117-161.
27. Welch, Ivo, 1996, Why Is bank debt senior? A theory of priority among creditors, Working paper, UCLA, 18-94.