Presidents, ruling parties, and party rules: A theory on the politics of economic reform in Latin America

Comparative Politics

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 127-149

  Corrales, Javier ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040630045     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/422394     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. Statist parties are political parties that advocate state intervention in the economy for populist purposes, that is, to mobilize support among urban groups, domestically oriented industrialists, and organized workers. See Robert R. Kaufman and Barbara Stallings, "The Political Economy of Latin American Populism," in Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, eds., The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
2. Anne O. Krueger, Economic Policy Reform in Developing Countries: The Kuznets Memorial Lectures at the Economic Growth Center, Yale University (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992);
3. Joan Nelson, "The Political Economy of Stabilization: Commitment, Capacity, and Public Response," in Robert H. Bates, ed., Toward a Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
4. John Williamson, "In Search of a Manual for Technopols," in John Williamson, ed., The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994);
5. John Williamson, ed., Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990).
6. Jorge I. Domínguez , ed., Technopols: Ideas and Leaders Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s (University Park: Penn State Press, 1997);
7. Verónica Montesinos, "El valor simbólico de los economistas en la democratización de la política chilena," Nueva Sociedad, 152 (November-December 1997), 108-26.
8. Anders Åslund, "The Case for Radical Reform," Journal of Democracy, 5 (October 1994), 63-74;
9. Dani Rodrik, "Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signalling," The Economic Journal, 99 (1989), 756-72.
10. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy, 5 (January 1994), 55-69.
11. Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen, "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, 81 (1991), 1170-88.
12. Silvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds., Business and the State in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997);
13. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995);
14. Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, eds., State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
15. Leslie Elliott Armijo, "Inflation and Insouciance: The Peculiar Brazilian Game," Latin American Research Revieiv, 31 (1997), 7-46.
16. Aaron Tornell, "Are Economic Crises Necessary for Trade Liberalization and Fiscal Reform? The Mexican Experience," in Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, eds., Reform, Recovery and Growth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995);
17. Kurt Weyland, "Risk Taking in Latin American Economic Restructuring: Lessons from Prospect Theory," International Studies Quarterly, 40 (1996), 185-208;
18. John T. S. Keeler, "Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates, Crises and Extraordinary Policy-making," Comparative Political Studies, 25 (1993), 433-86;
19. Allan Drazen and Vittorio Grilli, "The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms," American Economic Review, 83 (1993), 598-607.
20. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995);
21. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).
22. See Susan Stokes, "Are Parties What's Wrong with Democracy in Latin America?," paper presented at the Twentieth International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Guadalajara, Mexico, 1997.
23. For a cartography of internal structures of AD and the PJ, see Michael Coppedge, Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994);
24. James W. McGuire, Peronism without Perón: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997);
25. and Steven Levitsky, "Institutionalization and Peronism," Party Politics, 4 (1998), 77-92.
26. I interviewed twelve party leaders in Venezuela and ten in Argentina. All were members of the party's central committee (Comité Ejecutivo Nacional, CEN, in AD and the Mesa Ejecutiva in the PJ). None was a cabinet member at the time of the interview.
27. Barbara Geddes, Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
28. O'Donnell.
29. Carlos H. Acuña, "Politics and Economics in the Argentina of the Nineties (or Why the Future No Longer Is What It Used to Be)," in William C. Smith et al., eds. Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (New Brunswick: North-South Center/Transaction, 1994).
30. Jennifer McCoy and William C. Smith, "From Deconsolidation to Reequilibration? Prospects for Democratic Renewal in Venezuela," in Jennifer McCoy, Andrés Serbin, William C. Smith, and Andrés Stambouli, eds, Venezuelan Democracy under Stress (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1995).
31. See Miriam Kornblith, "Deuda y democracia en Venezuela: Los sucesos del 27 y 28 de febrero," Cuadernos del CENDES, 10 (1989), 17-34.
32. Javier Corrales, "Do Economic Crises Contribute to Economic Reforms? Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s," Political Science Quarterly, 112 (Winter 1997-98), 617-43.
33. Others see crises as contributing (not sufficient) factors in Argentina's turnaround. Juan Carlos Torre, "Critical Junctures and Economic Change: Launching Market Reforms in Argentina," in Joseph S. Tulchin with Allison M. Garland, Argentina: the Challenges of Modernization (Wilmington: SR Book, 1998);
34. Vicente Palermo and Marcos Navarro, Política y poder en el gobierno de Menem (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Norma, 1996).
35. Geddes.
36. See Martha de Melo, Cevdet Denizer, and Alan Gelb, "Patterns of Transition from Plan to Market," The World Bank Economic Review, 10 (September 1996), 397-424;
37. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
38. Edward Gibson, "The Populist Road to Market Reform, Policy and Electoral Coalition in Mexico and Argentina," World Politics, 49 (April 1997), 339-70;
39. Kurt Weyland, "Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America," Studies in Comparative International Development, 31 (Fall 1996), 3-31;
40. Kenneth M. Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case," World Politics, 48 (October 1995), 82-116.
41. Acción Democrática, Acción Democrática: Doctrina y programa (Caracas: Secretaría Nacional de Organización del Partido Acción Democrática and Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, ILDIS, 1993).
42. Javier Corrales, "El Presidente y su gente," Nueva Sociedad, 152 (November-December 1997), 93-107.
43. Octavio Lepage, Política, democracia, partidos (Caracas: Editorial Centauro, 1991), p. 61.
44. El Nacional, Jan. 5, 1991, p. D2.
45. Página/12, Dec. 12, 1990.
46. Delia Ferreira Rubio and Matteo Goretti, "Gobierno por decreto en Argentina (1989-1993)," El Derecho (Universidad Católica Argentina), 32 (1994), 1-8.
47. Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
48. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).
49. Miriam Kornblith and Daniel H. Levine, "Venezuela: The Life and Times of the Party System," in Mainwaring and Scully, eds.;
50. Daniel H. Levine, "Venezuela since 1958: The Consolidation of Democratic Politics," in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978);
51. John D. Martz, "Party Elites and Leadership in Colombia and Venezuela," Journal of Latin American Studies, 24 ( 1992), 87-121.
52. Corrales, "El Presidente y su gente."
53. Clarin, Aug. 27, 1991, p. 21.
54. Antonio Cafiero was the president of the PJ and governor of the province of Buenos Aires (the largest bastion of Peronist voters) at the start of the reforms.
55. See Coppedge.
56. See Merilee Grindle, Challenging the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997);
57. Stephanie Golob, "'Making Possible What Is Necessary': Pedro Aspe, the Salinas Team and the Next Mexican 'Miracle,'" in Dominguez, ed.;
58. Edward L. Gibson, "The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina," World Politics, 49 (April 1997), 339-70.
59. See M. Delal Baer, "Mexico's Second Revolution: Pathways to Liberalization," in Riordan Roett, ed., Political and Economic Liberalization in Mexico: At a Critical Juncture? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 53-54.
60. Miguel Ángel Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (University Park: Penn State Press, 1994), p. 15;
61. Larissa Adler Lomnitz, Claudio Lomnitz-Adler, and Hay Adler, "El fondo de la forma: Actos públicos de la campaña presidencial del Partido Revolucionario Institucional" (Notre Dame: Working Paper No. 135, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, March 1990), p. 20.
62. See Baer, p. 57; and Jorge Buendia, "Economic Reform, Public Opinion and Presidential Approval in Mexico, 1988-1993," Comparative Political Studies, 29 (October 1996), 559.
63. Luis Donaldo Colosio, "Why the PRI Won the 1991 Elections," in Roett, ed.
64. Luis Donaldo Colosio, "Why the PRI Won the 1991 ElectionsIbid., pp. 93-104.
65. Wayne Cornelius, Mexican Politics in Transition: The Breakdown of a One-Party Dominant Regime (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1996), p. 58.
66. Denise Dresser, "Bringing the Poor Back In: National Solidarity as a Strategy of Regime Legitimation," in Wayne A. Cornelius, Ann L. Craig, and Jonathan Fox, eds., Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico: The National Solidarity Strategy (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego 1991).
67. Centeno, p. 65; Cornelius, p. 59. Some PRI traditionalists resent PRONASOL because it appears to be a "parallel political party." See Baer, pp. 57-60; Dresser, p. 157.
68. One legacy of Alfredo Stroessner's dictatorship (1954-1989) was an alliance between Colorado leaders, state bureaucrats (who were required to be affiliated with the party), and military officers (also required to be affiliated with the party). See Domingo Rivarola, "Recomposición Interna del Partido Colorado," in Domingo Rivarola, Marcelo Cavarozzi, and Manuel Antonio Garretón, eds., Militares y políticos en una transición atípica (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 1991).