The eighty years' crisis, 1919-1999 - Power

Review of International Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 133-148

  Hirst, Paul ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040581728     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0260210598001338     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. B. Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1938 - reprinted 1992 London: Routledge). Bertrand Russell defines power as follows: 'Power may be defined as the production of intended effects. It is thus a quantitative concept - given two men with similar desires, if one achieves all the desires that the other achieves, and also others, he has more power than the other' (p. 25). This strong dependence on intention may seem idiosyncratic, but Russell was no fool. He recognizes that this is the only way to measure effects in an actor-centred capacity-outcome view of power. To define power in terms of resources is ineffective: power does not exist unless it is used or put into contention and resources, however great, are of little value unless their use achieves the effects intended. Russell then remarks: 'There are no exact means of comparing the power of two men of whom one can achieve one group of desires, and another another . . . Nevertheless, it is easy to say, roughly, that A has more power than B, if A achieves many intended effects and B only a few'. Power thus has to be recognized as such post hoc, even if it is initially defined in terms of intended effects.
2. M. Weber, 'Class, Status, Party', in H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948), p. 180.
3. B. Hindess, 'On Three Dimensional Power,' Political Studies, 24 (3) (1976), pp. 229-333. Of the substantial but generally unsatisfactory literature on the concept of power, the best examples are S. Lukes, Power, a Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974), who serves as a foil to Hindess, and Wrong (New York: Transaction, 1979).
4. B. Hindess, 'On Three Dimensional Power,' Political Studies, 24 (3) (1976), pp. 229-333. Of the substantial but generally unsatisfactory literature on the concept of power, the best examples are S. Lukes, Power, a Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974), who serves as a foil to Hindess, and Wrong (New York: Transaction, 1979).
5. B. Hindess,) Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
6. B. Hindess,) 'Imaginary presuppositions of Democracy', Economy and Society, 20 (2), pp. 173-95.
7. This is not only true of classical realists, but also of their critics, who object to crude capacity-outcome views, but then fail to offer a coherent substitute. For an example of such criticism, see Robert O. Keohane 'Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond' in Keohane, P. (ed. 1986) Neo-Realisin and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). Susan Strange, whilst attempting to sweep away much of the theoretical furniture of conventional international relations theory, and particularly realism, retreats to the following definition of power: 'Power is simply the ability of a person or group of persons so to affect outcomes that their preferences take precedence over the preferences of others', S. Strange, The Retreat of the State - The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 17. This is virtually a paraphrase of Weber.
8. This is not only true of classical realists, but also of their critics, who object to crude capacity-outcome views, but then fail to offer a coherent substitute. For an example of such criticism, see Robert O. Keohane 'Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond' in Keohane, P. (ed. 1986) Neo-Realisin and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). Susan Strange, whilst attempting to sweep away much of the theoretical furniture of conventional international relations theory, and particularly realism, retreats to the following definition of power: 'Power is simply the ability of a person or group of persons so to affect outcomes that their preferences take precedence over the preferences of others', S. Strange, The Retreat of the State - The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 17. This is virtually a paraphrase of Weber.
9. The best account of reciprocal action and its consequences for military strategy is E. Luttwak, Strategy - The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, Harvard, 1987).
10. See T.S. Biersteker, 'The "Triumph" of Neo-classical Economics in the Developing World: Policy Convergence and Bases of Governance in the International Economic Order', in Rosenau and Czempiel, Governance without Government (1992), pp. 102-31 for an attempt to explain the conversion of most of the developing world to neo-classical economics and
11. R. Unger, 'A Really New Bretton Woods', in M. Uzan (ed.), The Finaicial System under Stress. An Architecture for the New World Economy (London: Routledge, 1996) for a serious attempt to advocate the necessity of alternative models of development in order to keep open options in economic evolution and maximize the potential for growth.
12. B. Hindess,) Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
13. T. Parsons, 'On the Concept of Political Power', in T. Parsons (ed.), Politics and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 352-404; M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish (London: Allen Lane, 1977); M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, Colin Gordon (ed.) (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); M. Foucault, 'Governmentality', in G. Burchell et al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
14. T. Parsons, 'On the Concept of Political Power', in T. Parsons (ed.), Politics and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 352-404; M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish (London: Allen Lane, 1977); M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, Colin Gordon (ed.) (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); M. Foucault, 'Governmentality', in G. Burchell et al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
15. T. Parsons, 'On the Concept of Political Power', in T. Parsons (ed.), Politics and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 352-404; M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish (London: Allen Lane, 1977); M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, Colin Gordon (ed.) (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); M. Foucault, 'Governmentality', in G. Burchell et al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
16. T. Parsons, 'On the Concept of Political Power', in T. Parsons (ed.), Politics and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 352-404; M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish (London: Allen Lane, 1977); M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, Colin Gordon (ed.) (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); M. Foucault, 'Governmentality', in G. Burchell et al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
17. N. Rose, 'Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism', Economy and Society, 22, 3 (1993), pp. 283-99.
18. B. Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1938 - reprinted 1992 London: Routledge).
19. P. Hirst, 'The Global Economy - Myths and Realities', International Affairs, 73, 3 (1997), pp. 409-25.
20. K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954).
21. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1939), p. 83.
22. Thus Russell's category of Naked Power is redefined by Carr as military power, and such categories as Priestly Power, Kingly Power, Revolutionary Power, and Creeds as Sources of Power dropped. The reason is mainly, one supposes, because they do not fit in with the discussion of international relations.
23. J.E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
24. On Clausewitz and his concept of war in its political context see P. Paret, Clausewitz and the State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), especially ch. 11.
25. R. Overy, Why the Allies Won (London: Cape, 1995).
26. B. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965).
27. B. Brodie, The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1947).
28. The best account of nuclear strategic doctrines in their context is still L. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1981).
29. M. van Greveld, On Future War (London: Brassey's, 1991).
30. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1939), p. 83.
31. K. Ohmae, The Borderless World (London: Collins. 1990); K. Ohmae, The End of the Nation State (London: HarperCollins, 1996).
32. K. Ohmae, The Borderless World (London: Collins. 1990); K. Ohmae, The End of the Nation State (London: HarperCollins, 1996).
33. P. Hirst and G. Thompson, Globalisation in Question (Cambridge: Polity, 1996).
34. P. Hirst and G. Thompson, Globalisation in Question (Cambridge: Polity, 1996); W. Ruigrok, and R. van Tulder, The Logic of International Restructuring (London: Routledge, 1995); L.W. Pauly, and S. Reich, 'National Structures and Multinational Corporate Behaviour: Enduring Differences in an Age of Globalisation', International Organisation, 51, 1 (1997), pp. 1-30.
35. P. Hirst and G. Thompson, Globalisation in Question (Cambridge: Polity, 1996); W. Ruigrok, and R. van Tulder, The Logic of International Restructuring (London: Routledge, 1995); L.W. Pauly, and S. Reich, 'National Structures and Multinational Corporate Behaviour: Enduring Differences in an Age of Globalisation', International Organisation, 51, 1 (1997), pp. 1-30.
36. P. Hirst and G. Thompson, Globalisation in Question (Cambridge: Polity, 1996); W. Ruigrok, and R. van Tulder, The Logic of International Restructuring (London: Routledge, 1995); L.W. Pauly, and S. Reich, 'National Structures and Multinational Corporate Behaviour: Enduring Differences in an Age of Globalisation', International Organisation, 51, 1 (1997), pp. 1-30.
37. The Myth of the Powerless State', Economist, 1 October 1995.
38. On the increasing tendency for trade to be concentrated within blocs and the domination of world trade by the big three blocs, APEC, EU and NAFTA, see P. Hirst, and G. Thompson, 'The Tyranny of Globalisation: Myth or Reality', Mimeo. Open University, 1998.
39. P. Bairoch and R. Kozul-Wright, 'Globalisation Myths: Some Historical Reflections on Integration, Industrialisation and Growth in the World Economy', UNCTAS Discussion Paper No 113 March 1996.
40. D. Miles, 'Globalisation: the Facts Behind the Myth', Independent, 22 December, 1997.
41. For a classic account of how such processes of national homogenisation were accomplished see E. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen (London: Chatto & Windus, 1979), on France.
42. E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After (London: Macmillan, 1945).
43. Ibid., p. 70.
44. P. Hirst and G. Thompson (1996) Globalisation in Question (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), table 2.4.
45. J.G. Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-war Economic Order', in S.D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 195-231.
46. Much of the discussion of US 'hegemony' in this period seems to miss the point, that the activities of the hegemon provided the conditions for greater rather than less autonomy by the member states of the system. See I. Clark, Globalisation and Fragmentation - International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), and B. Eichengreen and P.B. Kenen, 'Managing the World Economy under the Bretton Woods System: An Overview', in P.B. Kenen (ed.), Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years After Bretton Woods Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994, for relatively uncontentious overviews of the institutions of this period of managed multi-lateralism and their effects.
47. Much of the discussion of US 'hegemony' in this period seems to miss the point, that the activities of the hegemon provided the conditions for greater rather than less autonomy by the member states of the system. See I. Clark, Globalisation and Fragmentation - International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), and B. Eichengreen and P.B. Kenen, 'Managing the World Economy under the Bretton Woods System: An Overview', in P.B. Kenen (ed.), Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years After Bretton Woods Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994, for relatively uncontentious overviews of the institutions of this period of managed multi-lateralism and their effects.
48. A. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State (London: Routledge, 1994).
49. For a good account of the constraints of the Bretton Woods system and policy within it as capital flows built-up, see E. Helleiner, States and the Re-emergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
50. See G. Soros, 'The Capitalist Threat', Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 1997, pp. 45-58, on the dangers of instability in the international financial system and G. Soros, 'Avoiding a Breakdown: Asia's Crisis Demands a Rethink of International Regulation, Financial Times, 31 December, 1997; J. Sachs, 'IMF Orthodoxy isn't what Southeast Asia Needs' International Herald Tribune Nov. 4, 1997; J. Sachs, 'The IMF and the Asian Flu,' The American Prospect, March-April, 1998, pp. 16-21; and J. Stigliz, 'Restoring the Asian Miracle', The Wall Street Journal, February 3rd, 1998, on the nature of the East Asian crises and new strategies of international economic governance.
51. See G. Soros, 'The Capitalist Threat', Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 1997, pp. 45-58, on the dangers of instability in the international financial system and G. Soros, 'Avoiding a Breakdown: Asia's Crisis Demands a Rethink of International Regulation, Financial Times, 31 December, 1997; J. Sachs, 'IMF Orthodoxy isn't what Southeast Asia Needs' International Herald Tribune Nov. 4, 1997; J. Sachs, 'The IMF and the Asian Flu,' The American Prospect, March-April, 1998, pp. 16-21; and J. Stigliz, 'Restoring the Asian Miracle', The Wall Street Journal, February 3rd, 1998, on the nature of the East Asian crises and new strategies of international economic governance.
52. See G. Soros, 'The Capitalist Threat', Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 1997, pp. 45-58, on the dangers of instability in the international financial system and G. Soros, 'Avoiding a Breakdown: Asia's Crisis Demands a Rethink of International Regulation, Financial Times, 31 December, 1997; J. Sachs, 'IMF Orthodoxy isn't what Southeast Asia Needs' International Herald Tribune Nov. 4, 1997; J. Sachs, 'The IMF and the Asian Flu,' The American Prospect, March-April, 1998, pp. 16-21; and J. Stigliz, 'Restoring the Asian Miracle', The Wall Street Journal, February 3rd, 1998, on the nature of the East Asian crises and new strategies of international economic governance.
53. See G. Soros, 'The Capitalist Threat', Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 1997, pp. 45-58, on the dangers of instability in the international financial system and G. Soros, 'Avoiding a Breakdown: Asia's Crisis Demands a Rethink of International Regulation, Financial Times, 31 December, 1997; J. Sachs, 'IMF Orthodoxy isn't what Southeast Asia Needs' International Herald Tribune Nov. 4, 1997; J. Sachs, 'The IMF and the Asian Flu,' The American Prospect, March-April, 1998, pp. 16-21; and J. Stigliz, 'Restoring the Asian Miracle', The Wall Street Journal, February 3rd, 1998, on the nature of the East Asian crises and new strategies of international economic governance.
54. See G. Soros, 'The Capitalist Threat', Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 1997, pp. 45-58, on the dangers of instability in the international financial system and G. Soros, 'Avoiding a Breakdown: Asia's Crisis Demands a Rethink of International Regulation, Financial Times, 31 December, 1997; J. Sachs, 'IMF Orthodoxy isn't what Southeast Asia Needs' International Herald Tribune Nov. 4, 1997; J. Sachs, 'The IMF and the Asian Flu,' The American Prospect, March-April, 1998, pp. 16-21; and J. Stigliz, 'Restoring the Asian Miracle', The Wall Street Journal, February 3rd, 1998, on the nature of the East Asian crises and new strategies of international economic governance.
55. On the central role of major cities in the world economy see S. Sassen, Cities in a World Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press. 1994);
56. and on the centrality of regional economics and industrial districts; C. Sabel, 'Flexible Specialisation and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies' in P. Hirst and J. Zeitlin (eds.), Reversing Industrial Decline (Oxford: Berg, 1989).
57. P. Krugman, 'The Localisation of the World Economy' in Krugman (ed.), Pop Internationalism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) 'rediscovers' regional economies for himself, apparently blind to the vast amount of work on this topic in several countries. However, the fact that a mainstream economist has turned his attention to the issue shows how far it has become salient.
58. P. Cerny, 'Globalisation, Fragmentation and the Governance Gap: Towards a New Medievalism in World Polities' mimeo, 1997; A. Minc, Le Nouveau Moyen Age, Paris: Gallimard, 1993.
59. P. Cerny, 'Globalisation, Fragmentation and the Governance Gap: Towards a New Medievalism in World Polities' mimeo, 1997; A. Minc, Le Nouveau Moyen Age, Paris: Gallimard, 1993.
60. Clearly this argument cuts across David Held's advocacy of 'cosmopolitan democracy', D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). Whilst one may sympathize with his objectives, the scope for such measures is limited. If it is not channelled through the indirect agency of nation states, democracy has almost no purchase at the international level. Moreover, citizens continue to see states as the primary sources of loyalty and legitimation, even in such developed semi-polities as the EU. For a longer version of the account of the interaction of national and international governance advanced here, see Hirst and Thompson, Globalisation in Question (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), chs. 6-8.
61. Clearly this argument cuts across David Held's advocacy of 'cosmopolitan democracy', D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). Whilst one may sympathize with his objectives, the scope for such measures is limited. If it is not channelled through the indirect agency of nation states, democracy has almost no purchase at the international level. Moreover, citizens continue to see states as the primary sources of loyalty and legitimation, even in such developed semi-polities as the EU. For a longer version of the account of the interaction of national and international governance advanced here, see Hirst and Thompson, Globalisation in Question (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), chs. 6-8.
62. S. Strange, The Retreat of the State - The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 17.
63. H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1927).