Pragmatism and truth: The comparison objection to correspondence

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 51, Issue 4, 1998, Pages

  McDermid, Douglas ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0040531866     PISSN: 00346632     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (201)

1. F. C. S. Schiller, "Truth," in Humanistic Pragmatism: The Philosophy of F. C. S. Schiller, ed. Reuben Abel (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 154-70.
2. William James, The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1909).
3. John Dewey, "Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth," in Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), 331-53.
4. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
5. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
6. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
7. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
8. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
9. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
10. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
11. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
12. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
13. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
14. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
15. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
16. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
17. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
18. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
19. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
20. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
21. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
22. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
23. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966),
24. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
25. Here is a short list of those who have taken it seriously: Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2 (1677), in The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters, 2d ed., trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 43; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 4, sec. 3 (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, secs. 86-7 (1710), in Berkeley: Philosophical Works, ed. M. R. Ayers (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), 71-153; David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, sec. 12 (1748), in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Immanuel Kant, Blomberg Logic, secs. 92-3 (c. 1770), and Jäsche Logic, Introduction, sec. 50 (c. 1800), in Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5-246, and Critique of Pure Reason (1781), trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), A104-5 (all references are to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 141-2; Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836), in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982), 35-82; Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World (1864), 2 vols., trans. E. Hamilton and E. Jones (New York: Scribner's, 1894), 2:628-30; Christoph Sigwart, Logic (1873), 2 vols., trans. H. Dendy (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1895), 1:306-9; Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1885), 388; Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 1:2-3; F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 108; Franz Brentano, The True and The Evident (1917), trans. R. M. Chisholm et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 24, 111; George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923), 167-70; Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in Gesamtausgabe I: Abteilung: Veröffentliche Schriften 1914-1970 Band 9: Wegmarken, (Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 177-202; Otto Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism" (1931/32), in Philosophical Papers. 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 59-90, esp. 66; Etienne Gilson, L'Espirit de la Philosophie Médiévale (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932), 30-1; A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (New York: The Humanities Press 1933), 197-8; Carl Hempel, "On The Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 49-59; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 2:268-9; and C. J. Ducasse, "Propositions, Truth, and The Ultimate Criterion of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 317-40, esp. 334.
26. F. C. S. Schiller, "Pragmatism," in The Encyclopaedia Brittanica (1947), 18:413-4.
27. See John Dewey "The Problem of Truth" (1911), in John Dewey: The Middle Works (1899-1924), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbonville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 6:12-68, esp. 34; "Contributions to A Cyclopedia of Education" (1912/13), in John Dewey: The Middle Works (1899-1924), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbonville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1979), 7:207-365, esp. 358-9; and Essays In Experimental Logic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916), 181.
28. See John Dewey "The Problem of Truth" (1911), in John Dewey: The Middle Works (1899-1924), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbonville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 6:12-68, esp. 34; "Contributions to A Cyclopedia of Education" (1912/13), in John Dewey: The Middle Works (1899-1924), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbonville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1979), 7:207-365, esp. 358-9; and Essays In Experimental Logic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916), 181.
29. See John Dewey "The Problem of Truth" (1911), in John Dewey: The Middle Works (1899-1924), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbonville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 6:12-68, esp. 34; "Contributions to A Cyclopedia of Education" (1912/13), in John Dewey: The Middle Works (1899-1924), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbonville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1979), 7:207-365, esp. 358-9; and Essays In Experimental Logic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916), 181.
30. John Dewey, "The Logic of Verification" (1890), in John Dewey: The Early Works (1882-1898), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbonville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), 3:83-9.
31. See John Dewey, "Dewey's New Logic," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul Schilpp (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1939), 135-56; "Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth," in Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), 331-53. Ralph Sleeper chronicles the major epistemological disagreements between the two in The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 78-86; a more thorough and perceptive review of their dispute is given by T. Burke in Dewey's New Logic: A Reply To Russell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 166-76, and 240-5, who defends Dewey against Russell's objections.
32. See John Dewey, "Dewey's New Logic," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul Schilpp (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1939), 135-56; "Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth," in Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), 331-53. Ralph Sleeper chronicles the major epistemological disagreements between the two in The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 78-86; a more thorough and perceptive review of their dispute is given by T. Burke in Dewey's New Logic: A Reply To Russell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 166-76, and 240-5, who defends Dewey against Russell's objections.
33. See John Dewey, "Dewey's New Logic," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul Schilpp (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1939), 135-56; "Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth," in Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), 331-53. Ralph Sleeper chronicles the major epistemological disagreements between the two in The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 78-86; a more thorough and perceptive review of their dispute is given by T. Burke in Dewey's New Logic: A Reply To Russell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 166-76, and 240-5, who defends Dewey against Russell's objections.
34. See John Dewey, "Dewey's New Logic," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul Schilpp (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1939), 135-56; "Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth," in Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), 331-53. Ralph Sleeper chronicles the major epistemological disagreements between the two in The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 78-86; a more thorough and perceptive review of their dispute is given by T. Burke in Dewey's New Logic: A Reply To Russell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 166-76, and 240-5, who defends Dewey against Russell's objections.
35. Dewey, "Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth," 343.
36. W. V. O. Quine, "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis," in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), 65-79, esp. 79.
37. Richard Rorty, "Professionalized Philosophy and Transcendentalist Culture," in Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 60-71, esp. 67.
38. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 178.
39. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 293.
40. Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy," in Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), xviii-xix, esp. xiii-xlvii.
41. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 20.
42. Rorty, "Two Meanings of 'Logocentrism': A reply to Norris," in Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 107-18, esp. 110.
43. Rorty, "Introduction: Antirepresentationalism, Ethnocentrism, and Liberalism," in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1-20, esp. 6.
44. Rorty, "Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry?" 281-300, 281.
45. Rorty, "Robert Brandom on Social Practices and Representations," in Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers Volume III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3:122-37, esp. 127.
46. Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), 17.
47. Goodman, Reconceptions, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), 49; emphasis mine.
48. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, 4.
49. Goodman, Reconceptions, 154. These themes harken back to Goodman's influential paper, "The Way The World Is," in which he dismissed the picture theory of language as "obviously wrong," and argued that there can be no faithful representation of the way the world is, for the simple reason that "there is no such thing as the structure of the world for anything to conform to or fail to conform to"; Goodman, "The Way the World Is," in Problems and Projects (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1972), 24-32, esp. 24, 31. For a careful and sober analysis of Goodman's provocative claims, see Israel Scheffler, "The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman," Synthese 45 (1980): 201-9; "Some Responses to Goodman's Comments in Starmaking," Philosophia Scientiae 2, no. 2 (1997): 207-11.
50. Goodman, Reconceptions, 154. These themes harken back to Goodman's influential paper, "The Way The World Is," in which he dismissed the picture theory of language as "obviously wrong," and argued that there can be no faithful representation of the way the world is, for the simple reason that "there is no such thing as the structure of the world for anything to conform to or fail to conform to"; Goodman, "The Way the World Is," in Problems and Projects (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1972), 24-32, esp. 24, 31. For a careful and sober analysis of Goodman's provocative claims, see Israel Scheffler, "The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman," Synthese 45 (1980): 201-9; "Some Responses to Goodman's Comments in Starmaking," Philosophia Scientiae 2, no. 2 (1997): 207-11.
51. Goodman, Reconceptions, 154. These themes harken back to Goodman's influential paper, "The Way The World Is," in which he dismissed the picture theory of language as "obviously wrong," and argued that there can be no faithful representation of the way the world is, for the simple reason that "there is no such thing as the structure of the world for anything to conform to or fail to conform to"; Goodman, "The Way the World Is," in Problems and Projects (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1972), 24-32, esp. 24, 31. For a careful and sober analysis of Goodman's provocative claims, see Israel Scheffler, "The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman," Synthese 45 (1980): 201-9; "Some Responses to Goodman's Comments in Starmaking," Philosophia Scientiae 2, no. 2 (1997): 207-11.
52. Goodman, Reconceptions, 154. These themes harken back to Goodman's influential paper, "The Way The World Is," in which he dismissed the picture theory of language as "obviously wrong," and argued that there can be no faithful representation of the way the world is, for the simple reason that "there is no such thing as the structure of the world for anything to conform to or fail to conform to"; Goodman, "The Way the World Is," in Problems and Projects (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1972), 24-32, esp. 24, 31. For a careful and sober analysis of Goodman's provocative claims, see Israel Scheffler, "The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman," Synthese 45 (1980): 201-9; "Some Responses to Goodman's Comments in Starmaking," Philosophia Scientiae 2, no. 2 (1997): 207-11.
53. Hilary Putnam, "Convention: A Theme in Philosophy," in Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 3:170-83, esp. 177.
54. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 130.
55. Putnam, Realism With A Human Face (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 41. See McDermid, "Putnam on Kant on Truth," Idealistic Studies, forthcoming, however, where I argue that Kant (unlike Putnam) saw very clearly that the impossibility of comparison does not refute the correspondence theory of truth.
56. Putnam, Realism With A Human Face (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 41. See McDermid, "Putnam on Kant on Truth," Idealistic Studies, forthcoming, however, where I argue that Kant (unlike Putnam) saw very clearly that the impossibility of comparison does not refute the correspondence theory of truth.
57. Nicholas Rescher, Conceptual Idealism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), 10.
58. Rescher, Conceptual Idealism, 4.
59. Rescher, Conceptual Idealism, 169.
60. Rescher, Conceptual Idealism, 168. See also Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 5-9, for another presentation of the comparison objection. Note, however, that Rescher claims his goal is not to "abandon a correspondence theory of truth, but merely [to] endow it with a suitable interpretation"; Rescher, Conceptual Idealism, 169.
61. Rescher, Conceptual Idealism, 168. See also Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 5-9, for another presentation of the comparison objection. Note, however, that Rescher claims his goal is not to "abandon a correspondence theory of truth, but merely [to] endow it with a suitable interpretation"; Rescher, Conceptual Idealism, 169.
62. Rescher, Conceptual Idealism, 168. See also Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 5-9, for another presentation of the comparison objection. Note, however, that Rescher claims his goal is not to "abandon a correspondence theory of truth, but merely [to] endow it with a suitable interpretation"; Rescher, Conceptual Idealism, 169.
63. Donald Davidson, "Empirical Content," Grazer Philosophische Studien 16/17 (1982): 471-89, esp. 477.
64. Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Ernest Lepore (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 307-19, esp. 307.
65. Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," 312. He has since recanted, and no longer thinks this a sound objection against correspondence truth. Cf. Davidson "Afterthoughts," in Reading Rorty, ed. Alan Malachowski (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 134-7; and "The Structure and Content of Truth," Journal of Philosophy 87, no. 6 (1990): 279-328, for second thoughts on the position defended in his "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge."
66. Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," 312. He has since recanted, and no longer thinks this a sound objection against correspondence truth. Cf. Davidson "Afterthoughts," in Reading Rorty, ed. Alan Malachowski (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 134-7; and "The Structure and Content of Truth," Journal of Philosophy 87, no. 6 (1990): 279-328, for second thoughts on the position defended in his "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge."
67. Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," 312. He has since recanted, and no longer thinks this a sound objection against correspondence truth. Cf. Davidson "Afterthoughts," in Reading Rorty, ed. Alan Malachowski (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 134-7; and "The Structure and Content of Truth," Journal of Philosophy 87, no. 6 (1990): 279-328, for second thoughts on the position defended in his "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge."
68. Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. W. Hohengarten (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), 135.
69. Karl-Otto Apel, "Fallibilismus, Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit und Letztbegründung," in Philosophie und Begründung, ed. W. R. Köhler, et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Forum für Philosophie, Bad Homburg, 1987), 116-211, esp. 125.
70. This label is more a matter of convenience than exact scholarship, since we find the argument in earlier idealist writings - as in Fichte's The Vocation of Man, trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), not to mention Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964). See also the section on "Sense-Certainty" in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind, as well as the Introduction. Charles Taylor, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1972), 151-88, and Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel: a Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), provide helpful and instructive commentary on the arguments in these sections. Variants on the basic objection can be found in T. H. Green, Preliminary Dissertation and Notes in A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1 (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1878); F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 127-96; Michael Williams, Groundless Belief (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
71. This label is more a matter of convenience than exact scholarship, since we find the argument in earlier idealist writings - as in Fichte's The Vocation of Man, trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), not to mention Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964). See also the section on "Sense-Certainty" in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind, as well as the Introduction. Charles Taylor, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1972), 151-88, and Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel: a Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), provide helpful and instructive commentary on the arguments in these sections. Variants on the basic objection can be found in T. H. Green, Preliminary Dissertation and Notes in A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1 (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1878); F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 127-96; Michael Williams, Groundless Belief (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
72. This label is more a matter of convenience than exact scholarship, since we find the argument in earlier idealist writings - as in Fichte's The Vocation of Man, trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), not to mention Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964). See also the section on "Sense-Certainty" in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind, as well as the Introduction. Charles Taylor, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1972), 151-88, and Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel: a Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), provide helpful and instructive commentary on the arguments in these sections. Variants on the basic objection can be found in T. H. Green, Preliminary Dissertation and Notes in A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1 (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1878); F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 127-96; Michael Williams, Groundless Belief (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
73. This label is more a matter of convenience than exact scholarship, since we find the argument in earlier idealist writings - as in Fichte's The Vocation of Man, trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), not to mention Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964). See also the section on "Sense-Certainty" in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind, as well as the Introduction. Charles Taylor, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1972), 151-88, and Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel: a Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), provide helpful and instructive commentary on the arguments in these sections. Variants on the basic objection can be found in T. H. Green, Preliminary Dissertation and Notes in A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1 (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1878); F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 127-96; Michael Williams, Groundless Belief (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
74. This label is more a matter of convenience than exact scholarship, since we find the argument in earlier idealist writings - as in Fichte's The Vocation of Man, trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), not to mention Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964). See also the section on "Sense-Certainty" in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind, as well as the Introduction. Charles Taylor, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1972), 151-88, and Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel: a Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), provide helpful and instructive commentary on the arguments in these sections. Variants on the basic objection can be found in T. H. Green, Preliminary Dissertation and Notes in A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1 (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1878); F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 127-96; Michael Williams, Groundless Belief (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
75. This label is more a matter of convenience than exact scholarship, since we find the argument in earlier idealist writings - as in Fichte's The Vocation of Man, trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), not to mention Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964). See also the section on "Sense-Certainty" in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind, as well as the Introduction. Charles Taylor, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1972), 151-88, and Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel: a Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), provide helpful and instructive commentary on the arguments in these sections. Variants on the basic objection can be found in T. H. Green, Preliminary Dissertation and Notes in A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1 (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1878); F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 127-96; Michael Williams, Groundless Belief (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
76. This label is more a matter of convenience than exact scholarship, since we find the argument in earlier idealist writings - as in Fichte's The Vocation of Man, trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), not to mention Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964). See also the section on "Sense-Certainty" in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind, as well as the Introduction. Charles Taylor, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1972), 151-88, and Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel: a Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), provide helpful and instructive commentary on the arguments in these sections. Variants on the basic objection can be found in T. H. Green, Preliminary Dissertation and Notes in A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1 (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1878); F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 127-96; Michael Williams, Groundless Belief (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
77. This label is more a matter of convenience than exact scholarship, since we find the argument in earlier idealist writings - as in Fichte's The Vocation of Man, trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), not to mention Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964). See also the section on "Sense-Certainty" in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind, as well as the Introduction. Charles Taylor, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1972), 151-88, and Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel: a Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), provide helpful and instructive commentary on the arguments in these sections. Variants on the basic objection can be found in T. H. Green, Preliminary Dissertation and Notes in A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1 (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1878); F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 127-96; Michael Williams, Groundless Belief (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
78. This label is more a matter of convenience than exact scholarship, since we find the argument in earlier idealist writings - as in Fichte's The Vocation of Man, trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), not to mention Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964). See also the section on "Sense-Certainty" in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind, as well as the Introduction. Charles Taylor, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1972), 151-88, and Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel: a Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), provide helpful and instructive commentary on the arguments in these sections. Variants on the basic objection can be found in T. H. Green, Preliminary Dissertation and Notes in A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1 (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1878); F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 127-96; Michael Williams, Groundless Belief (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
79. This label is more a matter of convenience than exact scholarship, since we find the argument in earlier idealist writings - as in Fichte's The Vocation of Man, trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), not to mention Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964). See also the section on "Sense-Certainty" in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind, as well as the Introduction. Charles Taylor, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1972), 151-88, and Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel: a Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), provide helpful and instructive commentary on the arguments in these sections. Variants on the basic objection can be found in T. H. Green, Preliminary Dissertation and Notes in A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1 (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1878); F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 127-96; Michael Williams, Groundless Belief (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
80. This label is more a matter of convenience than exact scholarship, since we find the argument in earlier idealist writings - as in Fichte's The Vocation of Man, trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), not to mention Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964). See also the section on "Sense-Certainty" in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind, as well as the Introduction. Charles Taylor, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1972), 151-88, and Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel: a Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), provide helpful and instructive commentary on the arguments in these sections. Variants on the basic objection can be found in T. H. Green, Preliminary Dissertation and Notes in A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1 (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1878); F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 127-96; Michael Williams, Groundless Belief (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
81. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith (London, Macmillan, 1964), A51-2/B75-6.
82. The conflation Hegelians find in givenism can be traced back to the British Empiricists, who used "idea" in a double sense, to encompass both objects of sense experience and truth-bearers or propositional-like entities. Green, Preliminary Dissertation and Notes, made much of this, as does Jonathan Bennet, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 20-5. On the given more generally, see Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1982), 126-47.
83. The conflation Hegelians find in givenism can be traced back to the British Empiricists, who used "idea" in a double sense, to encompass both objects of sense experience and truth-bearers or propositional-like entities. Green, Preliminary Dissertation and Notes, made much of this, as does Jonathan Bennet, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 20-5. On the given more generally, see Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1982), 126-47.
84. The conflation Hegelians find in givenism can be traced back to the British Empiricists, who used "idea" in a double sense, to encompass both objects of sense experience and truth-bearers or propositional-like entities. Green, Preliminary Dissertation and Notes, made much of this, as does Jonathan Bennet, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 20-5. On the given more generally, see Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1982), 126-47.
85. C. S. Peirce, Selected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, 6 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931-1935), 5:264.
86. Peirce, Selected Papers, 1:14.
87. Peirce, Selected Papers, 1:55.
88. Peirce, Selected Papers, 5:589. Some have seen Peirce as the grandfather of modern coherentism. Thus Skagestad remarks that "[i]t is no exaggeration to say that Peirce revolutionized the theory of knowledge by rejecting foundationalism"; Skagestad, The Road of Inquiry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 18; see also 17-23. This is a verdict with which W. B. Gallie, Peirce and Pragmatism (London: Penguin, 1952), 59-83, would appear to be in substantial agreement. To my mind, however, this is an exaggeration, for reasons to be discussed below in Section IV.
89. Peirce, Selected Papers, 5:589. Some have seen Peirce as the grandfather of modern coherentism. Thus Skagestad remarks that "[i]t is no exaggeration to say that Peirce revolutionized the theory of knowledge by rejecting foundationalism"; Skagestad, The Road of Inquiry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 18; see also 17-23. This is a verdict with which W. B. Gallie, Peirce and Pragmatism (London: Penguin, 1952), 59-83, would appear to be in substantial agreement. To my mind, however, this is an exaggeration, for reasons to be discussed below in Section IV.
90. Peirce, Selected Papers, 5:589. Some have seen Peirce as the grandfather of modern coherentism. Thus Skagestad remarks that "[i]t is no exaggeration to say that Peirce revolutionized the theory of knowledge by rejecting foundationalism"; Skagestad, The Road of Inquiry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 18; see also 17-23. This is a verdict with which W. B. Gallie, Peirce and Pragmatism (London: Penguin, 1952), 59-83, would appear to be in substantial agreement. To my mind, however, this is an exaggeration, for reasons to be discussed below in Section IV.
91. On James's goal of reforming empiricism without turning Kantian, see Ralph Barton Perry's magisterial study (1935), The Thought and Character of William James, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1935), 1:543-54; 555-63; 564-72.
92. William James, The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1909), 12-3. In this area, his favorite target was T. H. Green, whose critique of empiricism (Preliminary Dissertation and Notes) James dubbed "intellectualist" (James, Pragmatism, [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1907], 111) his preferred abusive epithet for anti-pragmatists. It is significant that Dewey, whose esteem for Hegel James never shared, applauds "T. H. Green's devastating critique of sensationalism"; Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry in John Dewey: The Later Works (1925-1953), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbonville and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 12:510.
93. William James, The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1909), 12-3. In this area, his favorite target was T. H. Green, whose critique of empiricism (Preliminary Dissertation and Notes) James dubbed "intellectualist" (James, Pragmatism, [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1907], 111) his preferred abusive epithet for anti-pragmatists. It is significant that Dewey, whose esteem for Hegel James never shared, applauds "T. H. Green's devastating critique of sensationalism"; Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry in John Dewey: The Later Works (1925-1953), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbonville and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 12:510.
94. William James, The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1909), 12-3. In this area, his favorite target was T. H. Green, whose critique of empiricism (Preliminary Dissertation and Notes) James dubbed "intellectualist" (James, Pragmatism, [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1907], 111) his preferred abusive epithet for anti-pragmatists. It is significant that Dewey, whose esteem for Hegel James never shared, applauds "T. H. Green's devastating critique of sensationalism"; Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry in John Dewey: The Later Works (1925-1953), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbonville and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 12:510.
95. James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1950), 1:402.
96. Ibid., 403.
97. James, Pragmatism, 111.
98. "If to have feelings or thoughts in their immediacy were enough, babies in the cradle would be psychologists, and infallible ones. The psychologist must not only have his mental states in their absolute veritableness, however, he must report them and write about them, name them, classify and compare them and trace their own relations to other things. . . . And as in the naming, classing, and knowing of things in general we are notoriously fallible, why not also here?"; James, The Principles of Psychology, 1:189.
99. ". . . we can hardly take in an impression at all, in the absence of a preconception of what impressions there may possibly be"; James, Pragmatism, 112.
100. James, Pragmatism, 112.
101. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Mentor, 1902), 319.
102. See James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 339-40, 347, 351, and 355.
103. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 319. See also pp. 341-4.
104. This reticence, I suspect, results from James's confusingly expressed (and, I think, confused) conclusions in the lectures on mysticism. Instead of framing the discussion in terms of epistemic notions, he speaks chiefly of the authority" of mystical experiences, or of their power to "convince"; James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 78-9. Such talk has the disadvantage of blurring causal and normative questions. However, as I read James, he allows that mystical experiences causally prompt or induce one to hold certain sorts of religious beliefs; that is what he means by granting that "mystical states of a well-pronounced and emphatic sort are usually authoritative over those who have them"; James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 353. What he is dubious about, though, is whether these experiences can support or justify those beliefs; in that sense, he denies their "authority."
105. This reticence, I suspect, results from James's confusingly expressed (and, I think, confused) conclusions in the lectures on mysticism. Instead of framing the discussion in terms of epistemic notions, he speaks chiefly of the authority" of mystical experiences, or of their power to "convince"; James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 78-9. Such talk has the disadvantage of blurring causal and normative questions. However, as I read James, he allows that mystical experiences causally prompt or induce one to hold certain sorts of religious beliefs; that is what he means by granting that "mystical states of a well-pronounced and emphatic sort are usually authoritative over those who have them"; James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 353. What he is dubious about, though, is whether these experiences can support or justify those beliefs; in that sense, he denies their "authority."
106. "Our own more "rational" beliefs are based on evidence exactly similar in nature to that which mystics quote for theirs. Our senses, namely, have assured us of certain states of fact; but mystical experiences are as direct perceptions of fact for those who have them as any sensations ever were for us. The records show that even though the five senses be in abeyance in them, they are absolutely sensational in their epistemological quality, if I may be pardoned the barbarous expression, that is, they are face to face presentations of what seems immediately to exist"; James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 353.
107. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, 145.
108. Precisely what Dewey meant by the "spectator theory" is still a matter of debate, as is the extent to which his attack on it succeeded. See George Dicker, Dewey's Theory of Knowing (Philadelphia: Philosophical Monongraphs, 1977) and Christopher Kulp, The End of Epistemology: Dewey and His Current Allies on The Spectator Theory of Knowledge (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992), who disagree on both counts.
109. Precisely what Dewey meant by the "spectator theory" is still a matter of debate, as is the extent to which his attack on it succeeded. See George Dicker, Dewey's Theory of Knowing (Philadelphia: Philosophical Monongraphs, 1977) and Christopher Kulp, The End of Epistemology: Dewey and His Current Allies on The Spectator Theory of Knowledge (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992), who disagree on both counts.
110. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, in John Dewey: The Later Works (1925-1953), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbonville and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 4:19. Here we pass over the details of Dewey's complex socio-historical account of the genesis of the spectator theory and restrict ourselves to his fundamental point. See chapters 1 and 2 of his The Quest for Certainty.
111. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 4:18-9.
112. See Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, 142-60, for a critique of "immediate knowledge."
113. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 137.
114. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 142. See also chapter 7 in which Dewey makes it plain that his agreement with Kant is more negative than positive. That is, he believes Kant justly accused his empiricist and rationalist predecessors of being one-sided, of stressing one half of the receptivity/ spontaneity, sensibility/understanding, and intuitions/concepts dualisms at the expense of the other. Yet he is far from uncritical of Kant's own view; note especially pages 137-45. See Dewey's "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," in John Dewey: The Middle Works (1899-1924), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbonville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), 10:3-52, 12-3.
115. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 142. See also chapter 7 in which Dewey makes it plain that his agreement with Kant is more negative than positive. That is, he believes Kant justly accused his empiricist and rationalist predecessors of being one-sided, of stressing one half of the receptivity/ spontaneity, sensibility/understanding, and intuitions/concepts dualisms at the expense of the other. Yet he is far from uncritical of Kant's own view; note especially pages 137-45. See Dewey's "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," in John Dewey: The Middle Works (1899-1924), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbonville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), 10:3-52, 12-3.
116. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), 2:xi.
117. Quine, "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis," 78-9.
118. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 127.
119. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 52.
120. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 267.
121. See Goodman "Sense and Certainty," in Problems and Projects (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1972), 60-8.
122. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, 1, 6, and 7.
123. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, 97.
124. Goodman, Reconceptions (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), 154.
125. Putnam, "Reflections on Goodman's Ways of Worldmaking," in Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers Volume III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 3:155-69, esp. 155.
126. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 54.
127. Putnam, "The Craving For Objectivity," in Realism With A Human Face (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 120-31, esp. 121.
128. Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy," xxxix.
129. Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, Truth," 148.
130. Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 152.
131. Davidson, "Empirical Content," 488.
132. Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Ernest Lepore (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 307-19, esp. 310.
133. Davidson, "The Myth of the Subjective," in Relativism, ed. Michael Krausz (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1989), 159-72, esp. 166.
134. We should point out that Neurath rarely distinguished carefully between truth and justification.
135. Neurath had a third argument as well: since the existence of mind-independent facts is unverifiable, the realist correspondence theory, insofar as it requires their postulation, must be condemned as "metaphysical" and nonsensical, according to the positivists' verification criterion of meaningfulness.
136. Neurath, "Protocol Statements," in Philosophical Papers 1913-1946, ed. and trans. R. Cohen and M. Neurath (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 91-9, esp. 96.
137. Neurath, "Protocol Statements," 95.
138. In fairness to Neurath, we should observe that Schlick, his immediate target, accepted this assumption or something very close to it. See Schlick's conception of the foundations of knowledge in his "Über das Fundament der Erkenntniss," Erkenntnis 4 (1934): 79-99, as well as Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, 2d ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982).
139. In fairness to Neurath, we should observe that Schlick, his immediate target, accepted this assumption or something very close to it. See Schlick's conception of the foundations of knowledge in his "Über das Fundament der Erkenntniss," Erkenntnis 4 (1934): 79-99, as well as Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, 2d ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982).
140. See C. I. Lewis, The Mind and The World Order (New York: Scribners, 1929), and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1946). For a more liberal view - akin to what Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), has
141. See C. I. Lewis, The Mind and The World Order (New York: Scribners, 1929), and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1946). For a more liberal view - akin to what Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), has referred to as weak foundationalism - see Alston, Epistemic Justification (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
142. See C. I. Lewis, The Mind and The World Order (New York: Scribners, 1929), and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1946). For a more liberal view - akin to what Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), has referred to as weak foundationalism - see Alston, Epistemic Justification (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
143. See C. I. Lewis, The Mind and The World Order (New York: Scribners, 1929), and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1946). For a more liberal view - akin to what Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), has referred to as weak foundationalism - see Alston, Epistemic Justification (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
144. Note that there is good reason to suppose that what Peirce wanted to contest was not foundationalism per se, only what he thought was an overly stringent and restrictive characterization of knowledge's foundations as certain. See Robert Almeder, The Philosophy of C. S. Peirce: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), 82, and C. Delaney, Science, Knowledge and Mind: A Study in the Philosophy of C. S. Peirce (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1993), 89, both of whom maintain Peirce was only interested in opposing strong foundationalism.
145. Note that there is good reason to suppose that what Peirce wanted to contest was not foundationalism per se, only what he thought was an overly stringent and restrictive characterization of knowledge's foundations as certain. See Robert Almeder, The Philosophy of C. S. Peirce: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), 82, and C. Delaney, Science, Knowledge and Mind: A Study in the Philosophy of C. S. Peirce (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1993), 89, both of whom maintain Peirce was only interested in opposing strong foundationalism.
146. See James Van Cleve, "Epistemic Supervenience and The Circle of Belief," Monist 68 (1985): 90-104; and Ernest Sosa, "The Foundations of Foundationalism," in Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 149-64, and "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence ersus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge," in Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 165-91.
147. See James Van Cleve, "Epistemic Supervenience and The Circle of Belief," Monist 68 (1985): 90-104; and Ernest Sosa, "The Foundations of Foundationalism," in Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 149-64, and "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence ersus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge," in Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 165-91.
148. See James Van Cleve, "Epistemic Supervenience and The Circle of Belief," Monist 68 (1985): 90-104; and Ernest Sosa, "The Foundations of Foundationalism," in Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 149-64, and "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence ersus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge," in Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 165-91.
149. Some might object that this is not strong enough. For what I have described corresponds to what Jaegwon Kim has called weak supervenience in his "Concepts of Supervenience," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1987): 315-26. Kim argues that we need a stronger notion of supervenience which can do justice to the intuition that the relation of determination or dependence must be constant over possible words. However, the point I am trying to make does not hinge on the precise characterization of supervenience; I have chosen the weaker formulation because it is widely accepted and so not likely to provoke needles disagreement.
150. Here I follow the terminology of Van Cleve in "Epistemic Supervenience and The Circle of Belief."
151. At least it is not an argument for what Sosa calls substantive foundationalism, though it could be used to support formal foundationalism. See Sosa, "The Foundations of Foundationalism."
152. See Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959). Chapter 5 of Susan Haack's Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993) contains a vigorous critique.
153. See Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959). Chapter 5 of Susan Haack's Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993) contains a vigorous critique.
154. "The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says"; Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," 169. There is some indication (for example his remarks, on p. 131, about the epistemological analogue of the naturalistic fallacy) that Sellars subscribes to our principle (1) because he feared that to do otherwise would be to maintain that the normative could be reduced to the descriptive. A similar desire to safeguard the logical space of reasons from reduction informs the other positions mentioned, but it seems misguided: supervenience does not entail the reducibility of the supervenient properties to the subvenient base. Indeed, it was this feature of the concept which originally made it attractive to those seeking to defend some form of nonreductive physicalism. See Davidson, "Mental Events," in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 207-25.
155. "The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says"; Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," 169. There is some indication (for example his remarks, on p. 131, about the epistemological analogue of the naturalistic fallacy) that Sellars subscribes to our principle (1) because he feared that to do otherwise would be to maintain that the normative could be reduced to the descriptive. A similar desire to safeguard the logical space of reasons from reduction informs the other positions mentioned, but it seems misguided: supervenience does not entail the reducibility of the supervenient properties to the subvenient base. Indeed, it was this feature of the concept which originally made it attractive to those seeking to defend some form of nonreductive physicalism. See Davidson, "Mental Events," in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 207-25.
156. Locke's seminal error, according to Rorty, was to suppose that "a quasi-mechanical account of the way in which our immaterial tablets are dented by the material world will help us know what we are entitled to believe"; Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature, 143. This theme is prominent in his recent writings, and I believe that it is Rorty's fundamental objection to foundationalism. See Rorty, "The Very Idea of Human Answerability to the World: John McDowell's Version of Empiricism," in Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers Volume III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 138-152, which is critical of John McDowell's sophisticated attempt to revive the core of empiricism in a way that can accomodate the Sellarsian claim that all awareness is a linguistic affair. Rorty claims that McDowell's resolution, though ingenious, is unnecessary: we should just give up on the idea that experience exerts rational control over inquiry, and "turn away from the very idea of human answerability to the world"; Rorty "The Very Idea of Human Answerability," 142-3. This is something Rorty applauds Robert Brandom for doing: Brandom, he says, "helps us to tell a story about our knowledge of objects that makes almost no reference to experience"; Rorty, "Robert Brandom on Social Practices," 122.
157. Locke's seminal error, according to Rorty, was to suppose that "a quasi-mechanical account of the way in which our immaterial tablets are dented by the material world will help us know what we are entitled to believe"; Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature, 143. This theme is prominent in his recent writings, and I believe that it is Rorty's fundamental objection to foundationalism. See Rorty, "The Very Idea of Human Answerability to the World: John McDowell's Version of Empiricism," in Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers Volume III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 138-152, which is critical of John McDowell's sophisticated attempt to revive the core of empiricism in a way that can accomodate the Sellarsian claim that all awareness is a linguistic affair. Rorty claims that McDowell's resolution, though ingenious, is unnecessary: we should just give up on the idea that experience exerts rational control over inquiry, and "turn away from the very idea of human answerability to the world"; Rorty "The Very Idea of Human Answerability," 142-3. This is something Rorty applauds Robert Brandom for doing: Brandom, he says, "helps us to tell a story about our knowledge of objects that makes almost no reference to experience"; Rorty, "Robert Brandom on Social Practices," 122.
158. Locke's seminal error, according to Rorty, was to suppose that "a quasi-mechanical account of the way in which our immaterial tablets are dented by the material world will help us know what we are entitled to believe"; Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature, 143. This theme is prominent in his recent writings, and I believe that it is Rorty's fundamental objection to foundationalism. See Rorty, "The Very Idea of Human Answerability to the World: John McDowell's Version of Empiricism," in Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers Volume III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 138-152, which is critical of John McDowell's sophisticated attempt to revive the core of empiricism in a way that can accomodate the Sellarsian claim that all awareness is a linguistic affair. Rorty claims that McDowell's resolution, though ingenious, is unnecessary: we should just give up on the idea that experience exerts rational control over inquiry, and "turn away from the very idea of human answerability to the world"; Rorty "The Very Idea of Human Answerability," 142-3. This is something Rorty applauds Robert Brandom for doing: Brandom, he says, "helps us to tell a story about our knowledge of objects that makes almost no reference to experience"; Rorty, "Robert Brandom on Social Practices," 122.
159. Locke's seminal error, according to Rorty, was to suppose that "a quasi-mechanical account of the way in which our immaterial tablets are dented by the material world will help us know what we are entitled to believe"; Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature, 143. This theme is prominent in his recent writings, and I believe that it is Rorty's fundamental objection to foundationalism. See Rorty, "The Very Idea of Human Answerability to the World: John McDowell's Version of Empiricism," in Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers Volume III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 138-152, which is critical of John McDowell's sophisticated attempt to revive the core of empiricism in a way that can accomodate the Sellarsian claim that all awareness is a linguistic affair. Rorty claims that McDowell's resolution, though ingenious, is unnecessary: we should just give up on the idea that experience exerts rational control over inquiry, and "turn away from the very idea of human answerability to the world"; Rorty "The Very Idea of Human Answerability," 142-3. This is something Rorty applauds Robert Brandom for doing: Brandom, he says, "helps us to tell a story about our knowledge of objects that makes almost no reference to experience"; Rorty, "Robert Brandom on Social Practices," 122.
160. "The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes. What then is the relation? The answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. A causal explanation, however, does not show how or why the belief is justified. The difficulty of transmuting a cause into a reason plagues the anti-coherentist"; Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," 311.
161. See Rescher's The Coherence Theory of Truth, esp. chaps. 1 and 2, for a detailed account of this distinction, repeatedly stressed by Russell in "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood," in Philosophical Essays (London: Routledge, 1910), 147-59; "William James's Conception of Truth," in Philosophical Essays (London: Routledge, 1910), 112-30; and The Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford: University Press, 1912). (Ironically, Rescher's book, entitled The Coherence Theory of Truth, offers only a coherence theory of justification.)
162. See Rescher's The Coherence Theory of Truth, esp. chaps. 1 and 2, for a detailed account of this distinction, repeatedly stressed by Russell in "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood," in Philosophical Essays (London: Routledge, 1910), 147-59; "William James's Conception of Truth," in Philosophical Essays (London: Routledge, 1910), 112-30; and The Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford: University Press, 1912). (Ironically, Rescher's book, entitled The Coherence Theory of Truth, offers only a coherence theory of justification.)
163. See Rescher's The Coherence Theory of Truth, esp. chaps. 1 and 2, for a detailed account of this distinction, repeatedly stressed by Russell in "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood," in Philosophical Essays (London: Routledge, 1910), 147-59; "William James's Conception of Truth," in Philosophical Essays (London: Routledge, 1910), 112-30; and The Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford: University Press, 1912). (Ironically, Rescher's book, entitled The Coherence Theory of Truth, offers only a coherence theory of justification.)
164. See Rescher's The Coherence Theory of Truth, esp. chaps. 1 and 2, for a detailed account of this distinction, repeatedly stressed by Russell in "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood," in Philosophical Essays (London: Routledge, 1910), 147-59; "William James's Conception of Truth," in Philosophical Essays (London: Routledge, 1910), 112-30; and The Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford: University Press, 1912). (Ironically, Rescher's book, entitled The Coherence Theory of Truth, offers only a coherence theory of justification.)
165. Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 178.
166. Unless, that is, we refuse to acknowledge the distinction between questions about truth and questions about justification (something we have been given no reason to do). Rorty, however, is undeterred by all this: he asserts that "there is no pragmatic difference between the nature of truth and the test of truth, and . . . the test of truth . . . [is] not 'comparison with reality'"; Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy," xxix. See also his "Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Davidson vs. Wright," Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 180 (1995): 281-2. He still stands by this view: he says that he finds "the nature-criterion distinction a broken reed. . . . What is the point of the pragmatist maxim about 'making a difference' if not that a nature that doesn't hook up with a criterion is just a flatus vocis - an empty gesture?" (Personal communication with the author).
167. Unless, that is, we refuse to acknowledge the distinction between questions about truth and questions about justification (something we have been given no reason to do). Rorty, however, is undeterred by all this: he asserts that "there is no pragmatic difference between the nature of truth and the test of truth, and . . . the test of truth . . . [is] not 'comparison with reality'"; Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy," xxix. See also his "Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Davidson vs. Wright," Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 180 (1995): 281-2. He still stands by this view: he says that he finds "the nature-criterion distinction a broken reed. . . . What is the point of the pragmatist maxim about 'making a difference' if not that a nature that doesn't hook up with a criterion is just a flatus vocis - an empty gesture?" (Personal communication with the author).
168. Here I follow the characterization of intemalism put forward by Roderick Chisholm: "The internalist assumes that, merely by reflecting on his own conscious state, he can formulate a set of epistemic principles that will enable him to find out, with respect to any possible belief he has, whether he is justified in having that belief. The epistemic principles that he formulates are principles that one may come upon and apply merely by sitting in one's armchair, so to speak, and without calling for outside assistance. In a word, one need consider only one's state of mind"; Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989), 76.
169. Influential champions of externalist theories of the sort alluded to here include D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); and Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The basic idea goes back at least to F. P. Ramsey, "Knowledge," in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931), 258-9, if not to Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923). For reservations about this approach, see Chisholm's Theory of Knowledge, and Haack's Evidence and Inquiry.
170. Influential champions of externalist theories of the sort alluded to here include D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); and Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The basic idea goes back at least to F. P. Ramsey, "Knowledge," in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931), 258-9, if not to Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923). For reservations about this approach, see Chisholm's Theory of Knowledge, and Haack's Evidence and Inquiry.
171. Influential champions of externalist theories of the sort alluded to here include D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); and Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The basic idea goes back at least to F. P. Ramsey, "Knowledge," in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931), 258-9, if not to Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923). For reservations about this approach, see Chisholm's Theory of Knowledge, and Haack's Evidence and Inquiry.
172. Influential champions of externalist theories of the sort alluded to here include D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); and Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The basic idea goes back at least to F. P. Ramsey, "Knowledge," in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931), 258-9, if not to Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923). For reservations about this approach, see Chisholm's Theory of Knowledge, and Haack's Evidence and Inquiry.
173. Influential champions of externalist theories of the sort alluded to here include D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); and Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The basic idea goes back at least to F. P. Ramsey, "Knowledge," in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931), 258-9, if not to Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923). For reservations about this approach, see Chisholm's Theory of Knowledge, and Haack's Evidence and Inquiry.
174. Influential champions of externalist theories of the sort alluded to here include D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); and Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The basic idea goes back at least to F. P. Ramsey, "Knowledge," in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931), 258-9, if not to Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923). For reservations about this approach, see Chisholm's Theory of Knowledge, and Haack's Evidence and Inquiry.
175. Influential champions of externalist theories of the sort alluded to here include D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); and Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The basic idea goes back at least to F. P. Ramsey, "Knowledge," in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931), 258-9, if not to Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923). For reservations about this approach, see Chisholm's Theory of Knowledge, and Haack's Evidence and Inquiry.
176. Influential champions of externalist theories of the sort alluded to here include D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); and Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The basic idea goes back at least to F. P. Ramsey, "Knowledge," in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931), 258-9, if not to Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover, 1923). For reservations about this approach, see Chisholm's Theory of Knowledge, and Haack's Evidence and Inquiry.
177. Dewey is a notable exception. Since he denied that coherence could guarantee truth, he was never attracted by a coherence theory, even during his early idealist phase, as Morton White points out in The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), 79.
178. Neurath, "Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism," 66.
179. See chaps. 25-6 in vol. 2 of Blanshard's The Nature of Thought. It is tempting to add Rorty in this list, given his penchant for saying things such as "there is no way to get outside of our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence"; Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature, 178. This is a remark which inspired Davidson, who cited it with approval during his own coherentist phase (Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," 310). Consider, too, Rorty's more recent suggestion that we "think of the skeptic as having pressed the philosopher back from a more ambitious notion of truth as accurate representation to the more modest notion of truth as coherence among our beliefs"; Rorty, "Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism," in Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 30. Since, in Rorty's writings, "the skeptic" almost invariably means someone wielding the comparison objection, it is easy to get the impression that Rorty wants to erect a coherence theory on the ruins of correspondence. This, however, is inconsistent with the pronounced deflationary strain in his writings, according to which we (that is, neo-pragmatists) ought to resist the urge to replace the correspondence theory with a rival account, on the grounds that "truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about"; Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy," xiii. On this point, then, Rorty differs sharply from Putnam, who regards constructive theorizing about truth as a legitimate philosophical project; see the latter's critique of Rorty's attempt to get along without a substantive notion of truth in "A Comparison of Something with Something Else," New Literary Studies 17 (1985): 60-81.
180. See chaps. 25-6 in vol. 2 of Blanshard's The Nature of Thought. It is tempting to add Rorty in this list, given his penchant for saying things such as "there is no way to get outside of our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence"; Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature, 178. This is a remark which inspired Davidson, who cited it with approval during his own coherentist phase (Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," 310). Consider, too, Rorty's more recent suggestion that we "think of the skeptic as having pressed the philosopher back from a more ambitious notion of truth as accurate representation to the more modest notion of truth as coherence among our beliefs"; Rorty, "Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism," in Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 30. Since, in Rorty's writings, "the skeptic" almost invariably means someone wielding the comparison objection, it is easy to get the impression that Rorty wants to erect a coherence theory on the ruins of correspondence. This, however, is inconsistent with the pronounced deflationary strain in his writings, according to which we (that is, neo-pragmatists) ought to resist the urge to replace the correspondence theory with a rival account, on the grounds that "truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about"; Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy," xiii. On this point, then, Rorty differs sharply from Putnam, who regards constructive theorizing about truth as a legitimate philosophical project; see the latter's critique of Rorty's attempt to get along without a substantive notion of truth in "A Comparison of Something with Something Else," New Literary Studies 17 (1985): 60-81.
181. See chaps. 25-6 in vol. 2 of Blanshard's The Nature of Thought. It is tempting to add Rorty in this list, given his penchant for saying things such as "there is no way to get outside of our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence"; Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature, 178. This is a remark which inspired Davidson, who cited it with approval during his own coherentist phase (Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," 310). Consider, too, Rorty's more recent suggestion that we "think of the skeptic as having pressed the philosopher back from a more ambitious notion of truth as accurate representation to the more modest notion of truth as coherence among our beliefs"; Rorty, "Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism," in Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 30. Since, in Rorty's writings, "the skeptic" almost invariably means someone wielding the comparison objection, it is easy to get the impression that Rorty wants to erect a coherence theory on the ruins of correspondence. This, however, is inconsistent with the pronounced deflationary strain in his writings, according to which we (that is, neo-pragmatists) ought to resist the urge to replace the correspondence theory with a rival account, on the grounds that "truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about"; Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy," xiii. On this point, then, Rorty differs sharply from Putnam, who regards constructive theorizing about truth as a legitimate philosophical project; see the latter's critique of Rorty's attempt to get along without a substantive notion of truth in "A Comparison of Something with Something Else," New Literary Studies 17 (1985): 60-81.
182. See chaps. 25-6 in vol. 2 of Blanshard's The Nature of Thought. It is tempting to add Rorty in this list, given his penchant for saying things such as "there is no way to get outside of our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence"; Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature, 178. This is a remark which inspired Davidson, who cited it with approval during his own coherentist phase (Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," 310). Consider, too, Rorty's more recent suggestion that we "think of the skeptic as having pressed the philosopher back from a more ambitious notion of truth as accurate representation to the more modest notion of truth as coherence among our beliefs"; Rorty, "Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism," in Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 30. Since, in Rorty's writings, "the skeptic" almost invariably means someone wielding the comparison objection, it is easy to get the impression that Rorty wants to erect a coherence theory on the ruins of correspondence. This, however, is inconsistent with the pronounced deflationary strain in his writings, according to which we (that is, neo-pragmatists) ought to resist the urge to replace the correspondence theory with a rival account, on the grounds that "truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about"; Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy," xiii. On this point, then, Rorty differs sharply from Putnam, who regards constructive theorizing about truth as a legitimate philosophical project; see the latter's critique of Rorty's attempt to get along without a substantive notion of truth in "A Comparison of Something with Something Else," New Literary Studies 17 (1985): 60-81.
183. See chaps. 25-6 in vol. 2 of Blanshard's The Nature of Thought. It is tempting to add Rorty in this list, given his penchant for saying things such as "there is no way to get outside of our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence"; Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature, 178. This is a remark which inspired Davidson, who cited it with approval during his own coherentist phase (Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," 310). Consider, too, Rorty's more recent suggestion that we "think of the skeptic as having pressed the philosopher back from a more ambitious notion of truth as accurate representation to the more modest notion of truth as coherence among our beliefs"; Rorty, "Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism," in Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 30. Since, in Rorty's writings, "the skeptic" almost invariably means someone wielding the comparison objection, it is easy to get the impression that Rorty wants to erect a coherence theory on the ruins of correspondence. This, however, is inconsistent with the pronounced deflationary strain in his writings, according to which we (that is, neo-pragmatists) ought to resist the urge to replace the correspondence theory with a rival account, on the grounds that "truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about"; Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy," xiii. On this point, then, Rorty differs sharply from Putnam, who regards constructive theorizing about truth as a legitimate philosophical project; see the latter's critique of Rorty's attempt to get along without a substantive notion of truth in "A Comparison of Something with Something Else," New Literary Studies 17 (1985): 60-81.
184. See chaps. 25-6 in vol. 2 of Blanshard's The Nature of Thought. It is tempting to add Rorty in this list, given his penchant for saying things such as "there is no way to get outside of our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence"; Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature, 178. This is a remark which inspired Davidson, who cited it with approval during his own coherentist phase (Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," 310). Consider, too, Rorty's more recent suggestion that we "think of the skeptic as having pressed the philosopher back from a more ambitious notion of truth as accurate representation to the more modest notion of truth as coherence among our beliefs"; Rorty, "Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism," in Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 30. Since, in Rorty's writings, "the skeptic" almost invariably means someone wielding the comparison objection, it is easy to get the impression that Rorty wants to erect a coherence theory on the ruins of correspondence. This, however, is inconsistent with the pronounced deflationary strain in his writings, according to which we (that is, neo-pragmatists) ought to resist the urge to replace the correspondence theory with a rival account, on the grounds that "truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about"; Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy," xiii. On this point, then, Rorty differs sharply from Putnam, who regards constructive theorizing about truth as a legitimate philosophical project; see the latter's critique of Rorty's attempt to get along without a substantive notion of truth in "A Comparison of Something with Something Else," New Literary Studies 17 (1985): 60-81.
185. Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 130. Putnam had earlier equated rational acceptability with coherence (Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History, 55).
186. Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 130. Putnam had earlier equated rational acceptability with coherence (Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History, 55).
187. Rescher, Conceptual Idealism, 170. Though not a neo-pragmatist, Simon Blackburn describes this move with sympathy and insight: "But if no judgment or experience has a pure footing in the way things are, uncontaminated by our powers of thought and imagination . . . is it even possible to think of our beliefs as responding to facts, let alone corresponding to them? Or are we left with a kind of majority tyranny in which any odd judgment, formed on an occasion, but surrounded by occasions which prompt conflicting judgments, is deemed false, whilst the majority are deemed true (and said to correspond to the facts)? It is this problem that leads to the coherence theory of truth"; Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Note, however, that Blackburn does not endorse this strategy.
188. Rescher, Conceptual Idealism, 170. Though not a neo-pragmatist, Simon Blackburn describes this move with sympathy and insight: "But if no judgment or experience has a pure footing in the way things are, uncontaminated by our powers of thought and imagination . . . is it even possible to think of our beliefs as responding to facts, let alone corresponding to them? Or are we left with a kind of majority tyranny in which any odd judgment, formed on an occasion, but surrounded by occasions which prompt conflicting judgments, is deemed false, whilst the majority are deemed true (and said to correspond to the facts)? It is this problem that leads to the coherence theory of truth"; Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Note, however, that Blackburn does not endorse this strategy.
189. For the record I should point out that Blanshard falls into the latter class; unlike many of his coherentist brethren (for example, Neurath), he explicitly distinguishes between criterion and essence. Nevertheless, he believed that "the only test of truth that is not misleading is the special nature or character that is itself constitutive of truth"; Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, 2:268.
190. This is a problem not just for those who take coherence as the nature of truth, but also for internalists who hold a coherence theory of justification. Bonjour (The Structure of Empirical Knowledge) has shown a fine awareness of the difficulty described here, and has attempted to meet it by invoking the "doxastic presumption," according to which a subject does in fact hold (more or less) the set of beliefs he takes himself to hold. This move has been widely criticized, however. See, for instance Sosa, "Theories of Justification: Old Doctrines Newly Defended," in Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 108-30.
191. Peirce's attitude towards the correspondence theory changed over his career, and not everything he says about it is consistent: in some places he seems to dismiss it outright, whereas elsewhere he suggests that its shortcomings are merely pragmatic or methodological as opposed to metaphysical (that is, it is acceptable as a formal definition, but useless in the context of inquiry). These ambiguities have spawned a sizable secondary literature, in which various attempts have been made to reconcile Peirce's seemingly contradictory pronouncements. Almeder ("Peirce's Thirteen Theories of Truth," Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society 21 [1985]: 77-94), who discerns thirteen distinguishable theories of truth in Peirce, makes a convincing case for the view that all such attempts are futile. On the question of cor" respondence, Altshuler ("Peirce's Theory of Truth and the Revolt Against Idealism," Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society 18 [1982]: 34-56) and Christopher Hookway (Hookway, Peirce, [London: Routledge, 1985]) argue Peirce rejected correspondence, whereas Skagestad, (The Road of Inquiry), Almeder, and Cheryl Misak (Misak, Truth and the End of Inquiry [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991]) present a more forceful case for the opposing view, acceptance of which is presupposed here.
192. Peirce's attitude towards the correspondence theory changed over his career, and not everything he says about it is consistent: in some places he seems to dismiss it outright, whereas elsewhere he suggests that its shortcomings are merely pragmatic or methodological as opposed to metaphysical (that is, it is acceptable as a formal definition, but useless in the context of inquiry). These ambiguities have spawned a sizable secondary literature, in which various attempts have been made to reconcile Peirce's seemingly contradictory pronouncements. Almeder ("Peirce's Thirteen Theories of Truth," Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society 21 [1985]: 77-94), who discerns thirteen distinguishable theories of truth in Peirce, makes a convincing case for the view that all such attempts are futile. On the question of cor" respondence, Altshuler ("Peirce's Theory of Truth and the Revolt Against Idealism," Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society 18 [1982]: 34-56) and Christopher Hookway (Hookway, Peirce, [London: Routledge, 1985]) argue Peirce rejected correspondence, whereas Skagestad, (The Road of Inquiry), Almeder, and Cheryl Misak (Misak, Truth and the End of Inquiry [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991]) present a more forceful case for the opposing view, acceptance of which is presupposed here.
193. Peirce's attitude towards the correspondence theory changed over his career, and not everything he says about it is consistent: in some places he seems to dismiss it outright, whereas elsewhere he suggests that its shortcomings are merely pragmatic or methodological as opposed to metaphysical (that is, it is acceptable as a formal definition, but useless in the context of inquiry). These ambiguities have spawned a sizable secondary literature, in which various attempts have been made to reconcile Peirce's seemingly contradictory pronouncements. Almeder ("Peirce's Thirteen Theories of Truth," Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society 21 [1985]: 77-94), who discerns thirteen distinguishable theories of truth in Peirce, makes a convincing case for the view that all such attempts are futile. On the question of cor" respondence, Altshuler ("Peirce's Theory of Truth and the Revolt Against Idealism," Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society 18 [1982]: 34-56) and Christopher Hookway (Hookway, Peirce, [London: Routledge, 1985]) argue Peirce rejected correspondence, whereas Skagestad, (The Road of Inquiry), Almeder, and Cheryl Misak (Misak, Truth and the End of Inquiry [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991]) present a more forceful case for the opposing view, acceptance of which is presupposed here.
194. Peirce's attitude towards the correspondence theory changed over his career, and not everything he says about it is consistent: in some places he seems to dismiss it outright, whereas elsewhere he suggests that its shortcomings are merely pragmatic or methodological as opposed to metaphysical (that is, it is acceptable as a formal definition, but useless in the context of inquiry). These ambiguities have spawned a sizable secondary literature, in which various attempts have been made to reconcile Peirce's seemingly contradictory pronouncements. Almeder ("Peirce's Thirteen Theories of Truth," Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society 21 [1985]: 77-94), who discerns thirteen distinguishable theories of truth in Peirce, makes a convincing case for the view that all such attempts are futile. On the question of cor" respondence, Altshuler ("Peirce's Theory of Truth and the Revolt Against Idealism," Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society 18 [1982]: 34-56) and Christopher Hookway (Hookway, Peirce, [London: Routledge, 1985]) argue Peirce rejected correspondence, whereas Skagestad, (The Road of Inquiry), Almeder, and Cheryl Misak (Misak, Truth and the End of Inquiry [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991]) present a more forceful case for the opposing view, acceptance of which is presupposed here.
195. Peirce's attitude towards the correspondence theory changed over his career, and not everything he says about it is consistent: in some places he seems to dismiss it outright, whereas elsewhere he suggests that its shortcomings are merely pragmatic or methodological as opposed to metaphysical (that is, it is acceptable as a formal definition, but useless in the context of inquiry). These ambiguities have spawned a sizable secondary literature, in which various attempts have been made to reconcile Peirce's seemingly contradictory pronouncements. Almeder ("Peirce's Thirteen Theories of Truth," Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society 21 [1985]: 77-94), who discerns thirteen distinguishable theories of truth in Peirce, makes a convincing case for the view that all such attempts are futile. On the question of cor" respondence, Altshuler ("Peirce's Theory of Truth and the Revolt Against Idealism," Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society 18 [1982]: 34-56) and Christopher Hookway (Hookway, Peirce, [London: Routledge, 1985]) argue Peirce rejected correspondence, whereas Skagestad, (The Road of Inquiry), Almeder, and Cheryl Misak (Misak, Truth and the End of Inquiry [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991]) present a more forceful case for the opposing view, acceptance of which is presupposed here.
196. When James takes up the topic of truth in lecture 6 of Pragmatism, he begins by offering a conciliatory olive-branch to his opponents: "Truth . . . is a property of our ideas. It means their 'agreement,' as falsity their disagreement, with 'reality.' Pragmatists . . . accept this definition as a matter of course"; James, Pragmatism, 91.
197. According to Dewey, pragmatism "supplied (and I should venture to say for the first time) an explanation of the traditional theory of truth as a correspondence or agreement of existence and mind or thought"; Dewey, Essays In Experimental Logic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916), 24.
198. Selected Papers, 1:578.
199. This is particularly evident in Apel who, like Peirce, does not so much reject correspondence as find that (unlike consensus) it is not methodologically useful ["methodologisch brauchbaren"; Apel, "Fallibilismus," 141]. Note, too, Misak's view: "It strikes me that the pragmatists (at least, Peirce) . . . objected to taking the correspondence definition of truth to be the important philosophical task. Peirce, I think, wasn't trying to clarify the notion of correspondence - that's a useful enough notion as it stands, for someone who hasn't come across the word 'truth' before. It is empty or unconnected to experience, however, and so cannot suffice as a full account of the notion of truth. What is needed is a pragmatic elucidation"; Personal communication.
200. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A329/B385.
201. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A671/B699.