Rights and the political process: Physician-assisted suicide in the aftermath of Washington v. Glucksberg

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 1-20

  Dinan, John ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0040484953     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a004912     Document Type: Article

References (165)

1. See, among others, Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Erwin Chemerinsky, Interpreting the Constitution (New York: Praeger, 1987).
2. See, among others, Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Erwin Chemerinsky, Interpreting the Constitution (New York: Praeger, 1987).
3. See, among others, Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Erwin Chemerinsky, Interpreting the Constitution (New York: Praeger, 1987).
4. See, among others, Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Erwin Chemerinsky, Interpreting the Constitution (New York: Praeger, 1987).
5. See, among others, Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1962); Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1977); Robert F. Nagel, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Consequences of Judicial Review (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
6. See, among others, Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1962); Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1977); Robert F. Nagel, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Consequences of Judicial Review (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
7. See, among others, Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1962); Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1977); Robert F. Nagel, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Consequences of Judicial Review (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
8. See, among others, Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1962); Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1977); Robert F. Nagel, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Consequences of Judicial Review (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
9. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. With regard to the school-prayer decisions, see, for instance, William K. Muir, Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond, The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). On the effects of the school desegregation and busing decisions, see Jack Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Howard Kalodner and James Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts' Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978); Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); David J. Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). On the effects of the abortion decisions, see Barbara Hinkson Craig and David M. O'Brien, Abortion and American Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (New York: Macmillan, 1994). Scholars have also given significant attention to federal court decisions that have defined rights to which prisoners are entitled. See, for instance, Larry W. Yackle, Reform and Regret: The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama Prison System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Dilulio, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
14. With regard to the school-prayer decisions, see, for instance, William K. Muir, Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond, The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). On the effects of the school desegregation and busing decisions, see Jack Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Howard Kalodner and James Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts' Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978); Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); David J. Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). On the effects of the abortion decisions, see Barbara Hinkson Craig and David M. O'Brien, Abortion and American Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (New York: Macmillan, 1994). Scholars have also given significant attention to federal court decisions that have defined rights to which prisoners are entitled. See, for instance, Larry W. Yackle, Reform and Regret: The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama Prison System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Dilulio, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
15. With regard to the school-prayer decisions, see, for instance, William K. Muir, Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond, The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). On the effects of the school desegregation and busing decisions, see Jack Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Howard Kalodner and James Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts' Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978); Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); David J. Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). On the effects of the abortion decisions, see Barbara Hinkson Craig and David M. O'Brien, Abortion and American Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (New York: Macmillan, 1994). Scholars have also given significant attention to federal court decisions that have defined rights to which prisoners are entitled. See, for instance, Larry W. Yackle, Reform and Regret: The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama Prison System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Dilulio, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
16. With regard to the school-prayer decisions, see, for instance, William K. Muir, Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond, The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). On the effects of the school desegregation and busing decisions, see Jack Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Howard Kalodner and James Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts' Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978); Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); David J. Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). On the effects of the abortion decisions, see Barbara Hinkson Craig and David M. O'Brien, Abortion and American Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (New York: Macmillan, 1994). Scholars have also given significant attention to federal court decisions that have defined rights to which prisoners are entitled. See, for instance, Larry W. Yackle, Reform and Regret: The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama Prison System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Dilulio, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
17. With regard to the school-prayer decisions, see, for instance, William K. Muir, Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond, The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). On the effects of the school desegregation and busing decisions, see Jack Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Howard Kalodner and James Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts' Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978); Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); David J. Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). On the effects of the abortion decisions, see Barbara Hinkson Craig and David M. O'Brien, Abortion and American Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (New York: Macmillan, 1994). Scholars have also given significant attention to federal court decisions that have defined rights to which prisoners are entitled. See, for instance, Larry W. Yackle, Reform and Regret: The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama Prison System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Dilulio, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
18. With regard to the school-prayer decisions, see, for instance, William K. Muir, Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond, The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). On the effects of the school desegregation and busing decisions, see Jack Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Howard Kalodner and James Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts' Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978); Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); David J. Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). On the effects of the abortion decisions, see Barbara Hinkson Craig and David M. O'Brien, Abortion and American Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (New York: Macmillan, 1994). Scholars have also given significant attention to federal court decisions that have defined rights to which prisoners are entitled. See, for instance, Larry W. Yackle, Reform and Regret: The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama Prison System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Dilulio, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
19. With regard to the school-prayer decisions, see, for instance, William K. Muir, Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond, The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). On the effects of the school desegregation and busing decisions, see Jack Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Howard Kalodner and James Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts' Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978); Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); David J. Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). On the effects of the abortion decisions, see Barbara Hinkson Craig and David M. O'Brien, Abortion and American Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (New York: Macmillan, 1994). Scholars have also given significant attention to federal court decisions that have defined rights to which prisoners are entitled. See, for instance, Larry W. Yackle, Reform and Regret: The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama Prison System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Dilulio, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
20. With regard to the school-prayer decisions, see, for instance, William K. Muir, Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond, The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). On the effects of the school desegregation and busing decisions, see Jack Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Howard Kalodner and James Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts' Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978); Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); David J. Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). On the effects of the abortion decisions, see Barbara Hinkson Craig and David M. O'Brien, Abortion and American Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (New York: Macmillan, 1994). Scholars have also given significant attention to federal court decisions that have defined rights to which prisoners are entitled. See, for instance, Larry W. Yackle, Reform and Regret: The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama Prison System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Dilulio, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
21. With regard to the school-prayer decisions, see, for instance, William K. Muir, Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond, The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). On the effects of the school desegregation and busing decisions, see Jack Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Howard Kalodner and James Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts' Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978); Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); David J. Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). On the effects of the abortion decisions, see Barbara Hinkson Craig and David M. O'Brien, Abortion and American Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (New York: Macmillan, 1994). Scholars have also given significant attention to federal court decisions that have defined rights to which prisoners are entitled. See, for instance, Larry W. Yackle, Reform and Regret: The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama Prison System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Dilulio, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
22. With regard to the school-prayer decisions, see, for instance, William K. Muir, Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond, The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). On the effects of the school desegregation and busing decisions, see Jack Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Howard Kalodner and James Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts' Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978); Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); David J. Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). On the effects of the abortion decisions, see Barbara Hinkson Craig and David M. O'Brien, Abortion and American Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (New York: Macmillan, 1994). Scholars have also given significant attention to federal court decisions that have defined rights to which prisoners are entitled. See, for instance, Larry W. Yackle, Reform and Regret: The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama Prison System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Dilulio, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
23. With regard to the school-prayer decisions, see, for instance, William K. Muir, Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond, The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). On the effects of the school desegregation and busing decisions, see Jack Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Howard Kalodner and James Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts' Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978); Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); David J. Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). On the effects of the abortion decisions, see Barbara Hinkson Craig and David M. O'Brien, Abortion and American Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (New York: Macmillan, 1994). Scholars have also given significant attention to federal court decisions that have defined rights to which prisoners are entitled. See, for instance, Larry W. Yackle, Reform and Regret: The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama Prison System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Dilulio, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
24. With regard to the school-prayer decisions, see, for instance, William K. Muir, Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond, The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). On the effects of the school desegregation and busing decisions, see Jack Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Howard Kalodner and James Fishman, eds., Limits of Justice: The Courts' Role in School Desegregation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978); Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); David J. Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). On the effects of the abortion decisions, see Barbara Hinkson Craig and David M. O'Brien, Abortion and American Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (New York: Macmillan, 1994). Scholars have also given significant attention to federal court decisions that have defined rights to which prisoners are entitled. See, for instance, Larry W. Yackle, Reform and Regret: The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama Prison System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Dilulio, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
25. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
26. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
27. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
28. The virtues of relying on the political process in these sorts of cases have been outlined recently by Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Keith J. Bybee, "The Supreme Court, Affirmative Action, and the Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity," (paper presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, Sept, 1999).
29. The virtues of relying on the political process in these sorts of cases have been outlined recently by Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Keith J. Bybee, "The Supreme Court, Affirmative Action, and the Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity," (paper presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, Sept, 1999).
30. The virtues of relying on the political process in these sorts of cases have been outlined recently by Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Keith J. Bybee, "The Supreme Court, Affirmative Action, and the Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity," (paper presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, Sept, 1999).
31. 70 NJ 10 (1976).
32. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
33. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
34. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
35. Ibid., 735.
36. Ibid., 737 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. Ibid., 788 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
38. Commentators have been no less divided about the consequences of judicial deferral of the assisted-suicide issue than they have been about the deferral of other issues. Laurence Tribe, for instance, has emphasized the drawbacks of permitting state legislatures to bear responsibility for resolving the issue. When he was arguing the case of Vacco v. Quill before the Supreme Court and was asked by Justice Stephen Breyer whether state legislatures might not be better positioned to address the issue, Tribe responded that "although in a sense there are 50 laboratories out there . . . these laboratories are now operating largely with the lights out." (Transcript of Oral Argument, Quill, in 1997 LW 13671 at 11 [Jan. 8, 1997], quoted by Yale Kamisar, "On the Meaning and Impact of the Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases," Law at the End of Life: The Supreme Court and Assisted Suicide, ed. Carl E. Schneider [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000], p. 56) Other scholars have called attention to the deficiencies of courts as policymakers in this area, as well as the corresponding benefits of permitting the issue to be resolved by state legislatures. Carl Schneider, for instance, has argued that "constitutional adjudication is ill-equipped to make good bioethical policy" and that "other institutions are better placed to make - and indeed are already making - policy governing assisted suicide than are courts." (Schneider, "Making Biomedical Policy through Constitutional Adjudication: The Example of Physician-Assisted Suicide," in ibid., 166). In similar fashion, Larry Palmer has argued that "[l]egislatures provide a process that adjudication cannot," and that "legislatures are the appropriate forum" for resolving the issue. (Larry I. Palmer, Endings and Beginnings: Law, Medicine, and Society in Assisted Life and Death [Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000], pps. xiv, xvi)
39. Commentators have been no less divided about the consequences of judicial deferral of the assisted-suicide issue than they have been about the deferral of other issues. Laurence Tribe, for instance, has emphasized the drawbacks of permitting state legislatures to bear responsibility for resolving the issue. When he was arguing the case of Vacco v. Quill before the Supreme Court and was asked by Justice Stephen Breyer whether state legislatures might not be better positioned to address the issue, Tribe responded that "although in a sense there are 50 laboratories out there . . . these laboratories are now operating largely with the lights out." (Transcript of Oral Argument, Quill, in 1997 LW 13671 at 11 [Jan. 8, 1997], quoted by Yale Kamisar, "On the Meaning and Impact of the Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases," Law at the End of Life: The Supreme Court and Assisted Suicide, ed. Carl E. Schneider [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000], p. 56) Other scholars have called attention to the deficiencies of courts as policymakers in this area, as well as the corresponding benefits of permitting the issue to be resolved by state legislatures. Carl Schneider, for instance, has argued that "constitutional adjudication is ill-equipped to make good bioethical policy" and that "other institutions are better placed to make - and indeed are already making - policy governing assisted suicide than are courts." (Schneider, "Making Biomedical Policy through Constitutional Adjudication: The Example of Physician-Assisted Suicide," in ibid., 166). In similar fashion, Larry Palmer has argued that "[l]egislatures provide a process that adjudication cannot," and that "legislatures are the appropriate forum" for resolving the issue. (Larry I. Palmer, Endings and Beginnings: Law, Medicine, and Society in Assisted Life and Death [Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000], pps. xiv, xvi)
40. Commentators have been no less divided about the consequences of judicial deferral of the assisted-suicide issue than they have been about the deferral of other issues. Laurence Tribe, for instance, has emphasized the drawbacks of permitting state legislatures to bear responsibility for resolving the issue. When he was arguing the case of Vacco v. Quill before the Supreme Court and was asked by Justice Stephen Breyer whether state legislatures might not be better positioned to address the issue, Tribe responded that "although in a sense there are 50 laboratories out there . . . these laboratories are now operating largely with the lights out." (Transcript of Oral Argument, Quill, in 1997 LW 13671 at 11 [Jan. 8, 1997], quoted by Yale Kamisar, "On the Meaning and Impact of the Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases," Law at the End of Life: The Supreme Court and Assisted Suicide, ed. Carl E. Schneider [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000], p. 56) Other scholars have called attention to the deficiencies of courts as policymakers in this area, as well as the corresponding benefits of permitting the issue to be resolved by state legislatures. Carl Schneider, for instance, has argued that "constitutional adjudication is ill-equipped to make good bioethical policy" and that "other institutions are better placed to make - and indeed are already making - policy governing assisted suicide than are courts." (Schneider, "Making Biomedical Policy through Constitutional Adjudication: The Example of Physician-Assisted Suicide," in ibid., 166). In similar fashion, Larry Palmer has argued that "[l]egislatures provide a process that adjudication cannot," and that "legislatures are the appropriate forum" for resolving the issue. (Larry I. Palmer, Endings and Beginnings: Law, Medicine, and Society in Assisted Life and Death [Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000], pps. xiv, xvi)
41. The classic defense of resolving rights claims through democratic institutions is James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law," Harvard Law Review 7 (1893): 129-156. More recent discussions of legislators' capability for deliberating about constitutional issues include Donald G. Morgan, Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1966), pp. 331-362; Louis Fisher, "Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress," North Carolina Law Review 63 (1985): 707-747; Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, pp. 54-71; Sunstein, One Case at a Time, pp. 24-45.
42. The classic defense of resolving rights claims through democratic institutions is James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law," Harvard Law Review 7 (1893): 129-156. More recent discussions of legislators' capability for deliberating about constitutional issues include Donald G. Morgan, Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1966), pp. 331-362; Louis Fisher, "Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress," North Carolina Law Review 63 (1985): 707-747; Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, pp. 54-71; Sunstein, One Case at a Time, pp. 24-45.
43. The classic defense of resolving rights claims through democratic institutions is James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law," Harvard Law Review 7 (1893): 129-156. More recent discussions of legislators' capability for deliberating about constitutional issues include Donald G. Morgan, Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1966), pp. 331-362; Louis Fisher, "Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress," North Carolina Law Review 63 (1985): 707-747; Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, pp. 54-71; Sunstein, One Case at a Time, pp. 24-45.
44. The classic defense of resolving rights claims through democratic institutions is James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law," Harvard Law Review 7 (1893): 129-156. More recent discussions of legislators' capability for deliberating about constitutional issues include Donald G. Morgan, Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1966), pp. 331-362; Louis Fisher, "Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress," North Carolina Law Review 63 (1985): 707-747; Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, pp. 54-71; Sunstein, One Case at a Time, pp. 24-45.
45. The classic defense of resolving rights claims through democratic institutions is James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law," Harvard Law Review 7 (1893): 129-156. More recent discussions of legislators' capability for deliberating about constitutional issues include Donald G. Morgan, Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1966), pp. 331-362; Louis Fisher, "Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress," North Carolina Law Review 63 (1985): 707-747; Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, pp. 54-71; Sunstein, One Case at a Time, pp. 24-45.
46. For the argument that legislators are ill suited for the role, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 177-178; Abner J. Mikva, "How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?" North Carolina Law Review 61 (1983): 587-611; Paul Brest, "Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine," Georgia Law Review 21 (1986): 57-105. For an argument that legislators occasionally fail to take up issues because they fall prey to inertia, see Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 6-7; Richard Neely, How Courts Govern America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 15; Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights, pp. 152-153.
47. For the argument that legislators are ill suited for the role, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 177-178; Abner J. Mikva, "How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?" North Carolina Law Review 61 (1983): 587-611; Paul Brest, "Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine," Georgia Law Review 21 (1986): 57-105. For an argument that legislators occasionally fail to take up issues because they fall prey to inertia, see Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 6-7; Richard Neely, How Courts Govern America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 15; Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights, pp. 152-153.
48. For the argument that legislators are ill suited for the role, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 177-178; Abner J. Mikva, "How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?" North Carolina Law Review 61 (1983): 587-611; Paul Brest, "Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine," Georgia Law Review 21 (1986): 57-105. For an argument that legislators occasionally fail to take up issues because they fall prey to inertia, see Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 6-7; Richard Neely, How Courts Govern America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 15; Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights, pp. 152-153.
49. For the argument that legislators are ill suited for the role, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 177-178; Abner J. Mikva, "How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?" North Carolina Law Review 61 (1983): 587-611; Paul Brest, "Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine," Georgia Law Review 21 (1986): 57-105. For an argument that legislators occasionally fail to take up issues because they fall prey to inertia, see Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 6-7; Richard Neely, How Courts Govern America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 15; Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights, pp. 152-153.
50. For the argument that legislators are ill suited for the role, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 177-178; Abner J. Mikva, "How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?" North Carolina Law Review 61 (1983): 587-611; Paul Brest, "Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine," Georgia Law Review 21 (1986): 57-105. For an argument that legislators occasionally fail to take up issues because they fall prey to inertia, see Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 6-7; Richard Neely, How Courts Govern America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 15; Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights, pp. 152-153.
51. For the argument that legislators are ill suited for the role, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 177-178; Abner J. Mikva, "How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?" North Carolina Law Review 61 (1983): 587-611; Paul Brest, "Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine," Georgia Law Review 21 (1986): 57-105. For an argument that legislators occasionally fail to take up issues because they fall prey to inertia, see Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 6-7; Richard Neely, How Courts Govern America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 15; Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights, pp. 152-153.
52. For a sampling of the voluminous commentary on this topic, see Hans A. Linde, "First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights," University of Baltimore Law Review 9 (1980): 379-396; Robert F. Williams, "In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Court Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result," South Carolina Law Review 35 (1984): 353-404; John Kincaid, "The New Judicial Federalism," Journal of State Government 61 (1988): 163-169; G. Alan Tarr, "The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 24 (Spring 1994): 63-79. State supreme courts have been particularly active in recent years in securing a greater degree of protection in the areas of search-and-seizure guarantees, abortion rights, and anti-sodomy laws. For a sampling of these recent decisions, see David M. O'Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics: Struggle for Power and Governmental Accountability, 4th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), pp. 212-217.
53. For a sampling of the voluminous commentary on this topic, see Hans A. Linde, "First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights," University of Baltimore Law Review 9 (1980): 379-396; Robert F. Williams, "In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Court Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result," South Carolina Law Review 35 (1984): 353-404; John Kincaid, "The New Judicial Federalism," Journal of State Government 61 (1988): 163-169; G. Alan Tarr, "The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 24 (Spring 1994): 63-79. State supreme courts have been particularly active in recent years in securing a greater degree of protection in the areas of search-and-seizure guarantees, abortion rights, and anti-sodomy laws. For a sampling of these recent decisions, see David M. O'Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics: Struggle for Power and Governmental Accountability, 4th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), pp. 212-217.
54. For a sampling of the voluminous commentary on this topic, see Hans A. Linde, "First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights," University of Baltimore Law Review 9 (1980): 379-396; Robert F. Williams, "In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Court Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result," South Carolina Law Review 35 (1984): 353-404; John Kincaid, "The New Judicial Federalism," Journal of State Government 61 (1988): 163-169; G. Alan Tarr, "The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 24 (Spring 1994): 63-79. State supreme courts have been particularly active in recent years in securing a greater degree of protection in the areas of search-and-seizure guarantees, abortion rights, and anti-sodomy laws. For a sampling of these recent decisions, see David M. O'Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics: Struggle for Power and Governmental Accountability, 4th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), pp. 212-217.
55. For a sampling of the voluminous commentary on this topic, see Hans A. Linde, "First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights," University of Baltimore Law Review 9 (1980): 379-396; Robert F. Williams, "In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Court Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result," South Carolina Law Review 35 (1984): 353-404; John Kincaid, "The New Judicial Federalism," Journal of State Government 61 (1988): 163-169; G. Alan Tarr, "The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 24 (Spring 1994): 63-79. State supreme courts have been particularly active in recent years in securing a greater degree of protection in the areas of search-and-seizure guarantees, abortion rights, and anti-sodomy laws. For a sampling of these recent decisions, see David M. O'Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics: Struggle for Power and Governmental Accountability, 4th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), pp. 212-217.
56. For a sampling of the voluminous commentary on this topic, see Hans A. Linde, "First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights," University of Baltimore Law Review 9 (1980): 379-396; Robert F. Williams, "In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Court Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result," South Carolina Law Review 35 (1984): 353-404; John Kincaid, "The New Judicial Federalism," Journal of State Government 61 (1988): 163-169; G. Alan Tarr, "The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 24 (Spring 1994): 63-79. State supreme courts have been particularly active in recent years in securing a greater degree of protection in the areas of search-and-seizure guarantees, abortion rights, and anti-sodomy laws. For a sampling of these recent decisions, see David M. O'Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics: Struggle for Power and Governmental Accountability, 4th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), pp. 212-217.
57. For discussions of state courts' treatment of this issue, see Kathryn L. Tucker, "The Death with Dignity Movement: Protecting Rights and Expanding Options After Glucksberg and Quill," Minnesota Law Review 82 (1998): 923-938; John A. Brennan, "A State Based Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide," Boston University Law Review 79 (1999): 231-261. Although the supreme courts of Michigan and Florida were the only ones to address this issue in the two years following Glucksberg, the question was also considered later by the courts in Alaska. In September 1999, Superior Court Judge Eric Sanders rejected a claim that a right to assisted suicide was inherent in the privacy provision of the Alaska Constitution, and in September 2001 the Alaska Supreme Court upheld this ruling by a unanimous vote. See Mike Chambers, "High Court Rules Against Assisted-Suicide Case," Associated Press State and Local Wire (Juneau, Alaska), 21 September 2001.
58. For discussions of state courts' treatment of this issue, see Kathryn L. Tucker, "The Death with Dignity Movement: Protecting Rights and Expanding Options After Glucksberg and Quill," Minnesota Law Review 82 (1998): 923-938; John A. Brennan, "A State Based Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide," Boston University Law Review 79 (1999): 231-261. Although the supreme courts of Michigan and Florida were the only ones to address this issue in the two years following Glucksberg, the question was also considered later by the courts in Alaska. In September 1999, Superior Court Judge Eric Sanders rejected a claim that a right to assisted suicide was inherent in the privacy provision of the Alaska Constitution, and in September 2001 the Alaska Supreme Court upheld this ruling by a unanimous vote. See Mike Chambers, "High Court Rules Against Assisted-Suicide Case," Associated Press State and Local Wire (Juneau, Alaska), 21 September 2001.
59. For discussions of state courts' treatment of this issue, see Kathryn L. Tucker, "The Death with Dignity Movement: Protecting Rights and Expanding Options After Glucksberg and Quill," Minnesota Law Review 82 (1998): 923-938; John A. Brennan, "A State Based Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide," Boston University Law Review 79 (1999): 231-261. Although the supreme courts of Michigan and Florida were the only ones to address this issue in the two years following Glucksberg, the question was also considered later by the courts in Alaska. In September 1999, Superior Court Judge Eric Sanders rejected a claim that a right to assisted suicide was inherent in the privacy provision of the Alaska Constitution, and in September 2001 the Alaska Supreme Court upheld this ruling by a unanimous vote. See Mike Chambers, "High Court Rules Against Assisted-Suicide Case," Associated Press State and Local Wire (Juneau, Alaska), 21 September 2001.
60. These rulings are discussed in Hobbins v. Attorney General, 205 Mich. App. 194, 198 (1994).
61. 447 Mich. 436 (1994). Although the Michigan Supreme Court therefore sustained the recently enacted state statute banning assisted suicide, the ban ultimately expired (only to be reenacted several years later), on account of the fact that the legislature had provided that the ban would be temporary and would stay in effect only until six months after a special commission had issued recommendations to the legislature on how it might deal with the issue on a permanent basis. The court ruled, nevertheless, that assisted suicide could still be prosecuted as a common law felony, even in the absence of a statutory prohibition. See Palmer, Endings and Beginnings, pp. 57-60.
62. 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997).
63. See John J. Dinan, Keeping the People's Liberties: Legislators, Citizens, and Judges as Guardians of Rights (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 32-59, 151-166.
64. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, "Why Now?" Regulating How We Die: The Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues Surrounding Physician-Assisted Suicide, ed. Linda L. Emanuel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 185-186; Jennifer M. Scherer and Rita J. Simon, Euthanasia and the Right to Die: A Comparative View (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p. 4.
65. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, "Why Now?" Regulating How We Die: The Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues Surrounding Physician-Assisted Suicide, ed. Linda L. Emanuel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 185-186; Jennifer M. Scherer and Rita J. Simon, Euthanasia and the Right to Die: A Comparative View (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p. 4.
66. The states that reconsidered their assisted suicide laws in the years prior to Glucksberg are detailed at 521 U.S. 702, 717-718. The status of each of the state laws at the time of the Glucksberg decision is detailed in Scherer and Simon, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, pp. 41-46.
67. This survey is based on a LEXIS-NEXIS search of the news databases for each of the fifty states during the two years following Glucksberg.
68. Karen Peterson, "N.M. Activists Vow to Continue Fight," Santa Fe New Mexican, 27 June 1997, p. A1.
69. On the influnce of the Glucksberg decision on Aroner's decision to introduce the bill, see Robert Sallady, "Assisted Suicide Bill Moved onto the Back Burner," San Francisco Examiner, 28 May 1999, p. A8. On the political maneuvering that took place in the committee votes, see Robert Sallady, "Right-to-die Bill Clears Committee," San Francisco Examiner, 21 April 1999, p. A2;
70. On the influnce of the Glucksberg decision on Aroner's decision to introduce the bill, see Robert Sallady, "Assisted Suicide Bill Moved onto the Back Burner," San Francisco Examiner, 28 May 1999, p. A8. On the political maneuvering that took place in the committee votes, see Robert Sallady, "Right-to-die Bill Clears Committee," San Francisco Examiner, 21 April 1999, p. A2;
71. Maureen West, "Bill for the Dying Conks Out in House," Arizona Republic, 30 April 1998, p. B1.
72. "Maine Lawmakers Reject Bill Allowing Doctor-Assisted Suicides," New York Times, 12 February 1998, p. A25.
73. Derek Rose, "Assisted Suicide NH Debate Rages," Manchester Union-Leader, 2 March 1998, p. A1; Warren Hastings, "Senate Committee Hears Legislation on Assisted Suicide," Manchester Union-Leader, 10 March 1999, p. C5.
74. Derek Rose, "Assisted Suicide NH Debate Rages," Manchester Union-Leader, 2 March 1998, p. A1; Warren Hastings, "Senate Committee Hears Legislation on Assisted Suicide," Manchester Union-Leader, 10 March 1999, p. C5.
75. "House Committee Kills Physician-Assisted Suicide Bill," Associated Press State and Local Wire (Honolulu, Hawaii), 7 February 1999; "Dying with Dignity Proposals Dead at Legislature," Associated Press State and Local Wire (Honolulu, Hawaii), 20 February 1999.
76. "House Committee Kills Physician-Assisted Suicide Bill," Associated Press State and Local Wire (Honolulu, Hawaii), 7 February 1999; "Dying with Dignity Proposals Dead at Legislature," Associated Press State and Local Wire (Honolulu, Hawaii), 20 February 1999.
77. Ed Anderson, "Dean: Let Doctors Assist in Suicides," New Orleans Times-Picayune, 26 February 1999, p. A1; Robynn Tysver, "Lawmakers Debate When Life Begins," Omaha World-Herald, 5 March 1999, p. 15; Steven Walters, "Sponsors Cite Kevorkian as Good Reason for Bill," Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, 15 April 1999, p. 2.
78. Ed Anderson, "Dean: Let Doctors Assist in Suicides," New Orleans Times-Picayune, 26 February 1999, p. A1; Robynn Tysver, "Lawmakers Debate When Life Begins," Omaha World-Herald, 5 March 1999, p. 15; Steven Walters, "Sponsors Cite Kevorkian as Good Reason for Bill," Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, 15 April 1999, p. 2.
79. Ed Anderson, "Dean: Let Doctors Assist in Suicides," New Orleans Times-Picayune, 26 February 1999, p. A1; Robynn Tysver, "Lawmakers Debate When Life Begins," Omaha World-Herald, 5 March 1999, p. 15; Steven Walters, "Sponsors Cite Kevorkian as Good Reason for Bill," Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, 15 April 1999, p. 2.
80. Tyler Whitley, "Assisted-Suicide Penalty Bill Passes House," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 20 February 1997, p. A12; Spencer S. Hsu, "Gilmore Vows to Veto Children's Health Bill," Washington Post, 12 March 1998, p. B1.
81. Tyler Whitley, "Assisted-Suicide Penalty Bill Passes House," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 20 February 1997, p. A12; Spencer S. Hsu, "Gilmore Vows to Veto Children's Health Bill," Washington Post, 12 March 1998, p. B1.
82. Laurie Winslow, "New Law Toughens Penalties in Assisted Suicide Cases," Tulsa World, 2 June 1998.
83. "What Passed this Year," Detroit News, 6 July 1998, p. C6.
84. John Petterson and John A. Dvorak, "Senate Approves Abortion Measure," Kansas City Star, 10 April 1998, p. C1.
85. Noel Oman, "Bill Would Ban Aid by Doctors for Suicides," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 20 February 1999, p. B1; "State Laws to Take Effect on Friday," Arkansas Democrat-Gazelle, 26 July 1999, p. A7.
86. Noel Oman, "Bill Would Ban Aid by Doctors for Suicides," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 20 February 1999, p. B1; "State Laws to Take Effect on Friday," Arkansas Democrat-Gazelle, 26 July 1999, p. A7.
87. "Annapolis in Brief," Washington Post, 9 April 1999, p. B4.
88. Bill Poovey, "House Votes to Make Assisted Suicide a Felony," Associated Press State and Local Wire (Montgomery, Ala.), 21 May 1999.
89. "Lawmakers Reject Bill Outlawing Assisted Suicide," Associated Press State and Local Wire (Cheyenne, Wyo.), 13 January 1999.
90. See Janice C. May, "The Constitutional Initiative: A Threat to Rights?" Human Rights in the States, ed. Stanley H. Friedelbaum (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988); Dinan, Keeping the People's Liberties, pp. 96-115. For discussions of recent initiative activity, see Barbara S. Gamble, "Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote," American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 245-269; Todd Donovan and Shaun Bowler, "Responsive or Responsible Government?" Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States, eds. Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Caroline J. Tolbert (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998), pp. 249-273.
91. See Janice C. May, "The Constitutional Initiative: A Threat to Rights?" Human Rights in the States, ed. Stanley H. Friedelbaum (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988); Dinan, Keeping the People's Liberties, pp. 96-115. For discussions of recent initiative activity, see Barbara S. Gamble, "Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote," American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 245-269; Todd Donovan and Shaun Bowler, "Responsive or Responsible Government?" Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States, eds. Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Caroline J. Tolbert (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998), pp. 249-273.
92. See Janice C. May, "The Constitutional Initiative: A Threat to Rights?" Human Rights in the States, ed. Stanley H. Friedelbaum (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988); Dinan, Keeping the People's Liberties, pp. 96-115. For discussions of recent initiative activity, see Barbara S. Gamble, "Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote," American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 245-269; Todd Donovan and Shaun Bowler, "Responsive or Responsible Government?" Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States, eds. Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Caroline J. Tolbert (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998), pp. 249-273.
93. See Janice C. May, "The Constitutional Initiative: A Threat to Rights?" Human Rights in the States, ed. Stanley H. Friedelbaum (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988); Dinan, Keeping the People's Liberties, pp. 96-115. For discussions of recent initiative activity, see Barbara S. Gamble, "Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote," American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 245-269; Todd Donovan and Shaun Bowler, "Responsive or Responsible Government?" Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States, eds. Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Caroline J. Tolbert (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998), pp. 249-273.
94. For the argument that the initiative process is seen by assisted-suicide proponents as a means of bypassing interest-dominated legislatures, see Palmer, Endings and Beginnings, p. 108. For the argument that legalization proponents have turned to the initiative process because legislators are not inclined to address such a controversial issue, see Arthur A. Povelones, Jr., "When the Majority Says You May Die: Aidin-Dying Initiatives," Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy 9 (1995): 537, 545-546.
95. For the argument that the initiative process is seen by assisted-suicide proponents as a means of bypassing interest-dominated legislatures, see Palmer, Endings and Beginnings, p. 108. For the argument that legalization proponents have turned to the initiative process because legislators are not inclined to address such a controversial issue, see Arthur A. Povelones, Jr., "When the Majority Says You May Die: Aidin-Dying Initiatives," Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy 9 (1995): 537, 545-546.
96. On the various initiative campaigns for assisted-suicide legalization, see Nina Clark, The Politics of Physician Assisted Suicide (New York: Garland Publishing, 1997), pp. 65-87.
97. For a discussion of these two initiatives, each of which was defeated by a 54-46 margin, see James M. Hoefler, with Brian E. Kamoie, Deathright: Culture, Medicine, Politics, and the Right to Die (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 146-148.
98. David Brown, "Medical Community Still Divided on Oregon's Assisted Suicide Act," Washington Post, 13 November 1994, p. A20.
99. OR Rev Stat 127.800-127.897. The text of the law is reprinted in Margaret P. Battin, Rosamond Rhodes, and Anita Silvers, eds., Physician Assisted Suicide: Expanding the Debate (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 443-448.
100. For a comprehensive discussion, see Derek Humphry and Mary Clement, Freedom to Die: People, Politics, and the Right-to-Die Movement (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 237-255.
101. Maine residents later had an opportunity to vote on a legalization initiative in November 2000, and narrowly defeated it, by a 51-49 percent margin. See Beth Daley, "Suicide Question Defeat is Indicated," Boston Globe, 8 November 2000, p. B7.
102. See Richard Burr, "Oregon's Decision on Assisted Dying May Be Aberration, Not Start of a Trend," Detroit News, 9 November 1997, p. B5; Charlie Cain and Tim Kiska, "Voters Overwhelmingly Reject Assisted Suicide," Detroit News, 4 November 1998, p. A1.
103. See Richard Burr, "Oregon's Decision on Assisted Dying May Be Aberration, Not Start of a Trend," Detroit News, 9 November 1997, p. B5; Charlie Cain and Tim Kiska, "Voters Overwhelmingly Reject Assisted Suicide," Detroit News, 4 November 1998, p. A1.
104. The most detailed statement of this position can be found in Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy, pp. 28-45. See also Colin Diver, "The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions," Virginia Law Review 65 (1979): 43-106; Lon L. Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication," Harvard Law Review 92 (1978): 353.
105. The most detailed statement of this position can be found in Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy, pp. 28-45. See also Colin Diver, "The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions," Virginia Law Review 65 (1979): 43-106; Lon L. Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication," Harvard Law Review 92 (1978): 353.
106. The most detailed statement of this position can be found in Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy, pp. 28-45. See also Colin Diver, "The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions," Virginia Law Review 65 (1979): 43-106; Lon L. Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication," Harvard Law Review 92 (1978): 353.
107. For statements of this position, see Abram Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation," Harvard Law Review 89 (1976): 1281-1316; Owen Fiss, "The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice," Harvard Law Review 93 (1979): 1-58.
108. For statements of this position, see Abram Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation," Harvard Law Review 89 (1976): 1281-1316; Owen Fiss, "The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice," Harvard Law Review 93 (1979): 1-58.
109. For a general discussion, see Humphry and Clement, Freedom to Die, pp. 100-116
110. See generally William Claiborne, "Doctor-Aided Suicide Is Backed in Poll," Washington Post, 30 July 1998, p. A3.
111. See Humphry and Clement, Freedom to Die, pp. 227-231.
112. Charlie Cain and Mark Hornbeck, "Assisted Suicide Backers Focus on Petition Drive," Detroit News, 13 March 1998, p. A2.
113. "Petitions Advance Right-to-Die Proposal," Boston Globe, 27 September 1999, p. B5.
114. Amy Goldstein, "Pro-Life Activists Take On Death; Movement Mobilizes Against Issues Such as Assisted Suicide," Washington Post, 10 November 1998, p. A1.
115. Humphry and Clement, Freedom to Die, pp. 167-185.
116. Ibid., 178-179.
117. See Timothy E. Quill, "Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making," New England Journal of Medicine 324 (1991): 691-694. See also Melvin I. Urofsky, Letting Go: Death, Dying and the Law (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), pp. 69-71.
118. See Timothy E. Quill, "Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making," New England Journal of Medicine 324 (1991): 691-694. See also Melvin I. Urofsky, Letting Go: Death, Dying and the Law (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), pp. 69-71.
119. For a sample of Kevorkian's concerns, which went farther than many others, insofar as he was also seeking to secure acceptance of voluntary active euthanasia, see Jack Kevorkian, "A Fail-safe Method for Justifiable Medically Assisted Suicide," Last Rights? Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia Debated, ed. Michael H. Uhlmann (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1998), pp. 263-295. See also Urofsky, Letting Go, pp. 63-67.
120. For a sample of Kevorkian's concerns, which went farther than many others, insofar as he was also seeking to secure acceptance of voluntary active euthanasia, see Jack Kevorkian, "A Fail-safe Method for Justifiable Medically Assisted Suicide," Last Rights? Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia Debated, ed. Michael H. Uhlmann (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1998), pp. 263-295. See also Urofsky, Letting Go, pp. 63-67.
121. See, for instance, J.G. Bachman, et al., "Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public Toward Legalizing Physcian-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia," New England Journal of Medicine 334 (1996): 303-309; M.A. Lee, et al., "Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of Physicians in Oregon," New England Journal of Medicine 334 (1996): 310-315. For additional polling results, see Palmer, Endings and Beginnings, p. 89 n29.
122. See, for instance, J.G. Bachman, et al., "Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public Toward Legalizing Physcian-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia," New England Journal of Medicine 334 (1996): 303-309; M.A. Lee, et al., "Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of Physicians in Oregon," New England Journal of Medicine 334 (1996): 310-315. For additional polling results, see Palmer, Endings and Beginnings, p. 89 n29.
123. See, for instance, J.G. Bachman, et al., "Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public Toward Legalizing Physcian-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia," New England Journal of Medicine 334 (1996): 303-309; M.A. Lee, et al., "Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of Physicians in Oregon," New England Journal of Medicine 334 (1996): 310-315. For additional polling results, see Palmer, Endings and Beginnings, p. 89 n29.
124. On the opposition of the American Medical Association, see Susan Duerksen, "AMA Backs Regulation of Pain Relievers; Divisive Vote Supports U.S. Bill Aimed at Doctor-assisted Suicide," San Diego Union-Tribune, 9 December 1999, p. B3. On the more complex situation regarding the views of state medical associations - in the mid-1990s, for instance, the Oregon Medical Association maintained a position of neutrality toward assisted-suicide legalization, but by the late 1990s it had declared its opposition to legalization - see Humphry and Clement, Freedom to Die, pp. 189-190. On the support for legalization within the American Medical Students Association, see ibid., 191.
125. On the opposition of the American Medical Association, see Susan Duerksen, "AMA Backs Regulation of Pain Relievers; Divisive Vote Supports U.S. Bill Aimed at Doctor-assisted Suicide," San Diego Union-Tribune, 9 December 1999, p. B3. On the more complex situation regarding the views of state medical associations - in the mid-1990s, for instance, the Oregon Medical Association maintained a position of neutrality toward assisted-suicide legalization, but by the late 1990s it had declared its opposition to legalization - see Humphry and Clement, Freedom to Die, pp. 189-190. On the support for legalization within the American Medical Students Association, see ibid., 191.
126. On the opposition of the American Medical Association, see Susan Duerksen, "AMA Backs Regulation of Pain Relievers; Divisive Vote Supports U.S. Bill Aimed at Doctor-assisted Suicide," San Diego Union-Tribune, 9 December 1999, p. B3. On the more complex situation regarding the views of state medical associations - in the mid-1990s, for instance, the Oregon Medical Association maintained a position of neutrality toward assisted-suicide legalization, but by the late 1990s it had declared its opposition to legalization - see Humphry and Clement, Freedom to Die, pp. 189-190. On the support for legalization within the American Medical Students Association, see ibid., 191.
127. On hospice associations, see Urofsky, Lethal Judgments, pp. 79-80. On nurses associations, see Humphry and Clement, Freedom to Die, p. 191. On the role of Catholic hospitals, see ibid., 249.
128. On hospice associations, see Urofsky, Lethal Judgments, pp. 79-80. On nurses associations, see Humphry and Clement, Freedom to Die, p. 191. On the role of Catholic hospitals, see ibid., 249.
129. On hospice associations, see Urofsky, Lethal Judgments, pp. 79-80. On nurses associations, see Humphry and Clement, Freedom to Die, p. 191. On the role of Catholic hospitals, see ibid., 249.
130. On the Silver Haired Legislature, see Mireya Navarro, "Elderly Wield Their Might in Florida," New York Times, 19 October 1997, p. A16. On the Congress of California Seniors, see James P. Sweeney, "Assembly Panel Narrowly Passes Euthanasia Bill," San Diego Union-Tribune, 21 April 1999, p. A3.
131. On the Silver Haired Legislature, see Mireya Navarro, "Elderly Wield Their Might in Florida," New York Times, 19 October 1997, p. A16. On the Congress of California Seniors, see James P. Sweeney, "Assembly Panel Narrowly Passes Euthanasia Bill," San Diego Union-Tribune, 21 April 1999, p. A3.
132. See Leslie Pickering Francis, "Assisted Suicide: Are the Elderly a Special Case?" in Battin, Rhodes, and Silvers, Physician Assisted Suicide, p. 76. The relative ambivalence of senior citizen groups on right-to-die issues is discussed in Henry R. Glick, The Right to Die: Policy Innovation and its Consequences (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 194-202.
133. See Leslie Pickering Francis, "Assisted Suicide: Are the Elderly a Special Case?" in Battin, Rhodes, and Silvers, Physician Assisted Suicide, p. 76. The relative ambivalence of senior citizen groups on right-to-die issues is discussed in Henry R. Glick, The Right to Die: Policy Innovation and its Consequences (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 194-202.
134. On the views of American disability groups, and in particular the group Not Dead Yet, see Wesley J. Smith, Forced Exit: The Slippery Slope from Assisted Suicide to Legalized Murder (New York: Times Books, 1997), pp. 181-184; Jerome E. Bickenbach, "Disability and Life-Ending Decisions," in Battin, Rhodes, and Silvers, Physician Assisted Suicide, pp. 125-126.
135. On the views of American disability groups, and in particular the group Not Dead Yet, see Wesley J. Smith, Forced Exit: The Slippery Slope from Assisted Suicide to Legalized Murder (New York: Times Books, 1997), pp. 181-184; Jerome E. Bickenbach, "Disability and Life-Ending Decisions," in Battin, Rhodes, and Silvers, Physician Assisted Suicide, pp. 125-126.
136. Among the seventy amici briefs filed to the Court were submissions from assisted-suicide advocacy groups such as Choice in Dying and Americans for Death with Dignity. Religious organizations were represented by briefs filed by the U.S. Catholic Conference, Evangelical Lutheran Church, and Institute for Public Affairs of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations, among others. The views of medical associations were represented in briefs filed by the American Medical Association, Medical Society of New Jersey, American Hospital Association, National Hospice Organization, American Medical Students Association, and National Women's Health Network (the last two of which urged the recognition of a right to assisted suicide), among others. The views of the elderly and disabled were set out in briefs submitted by the National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent and Disabled, Inc., and Not Dead Yet, among others. In addition, amici briefs provided a vehicle for the presentation of the views of a whole host of other groups and individuals, ranging from the American Civil Liberties Union and the Family Research Council to Senator Orrin Hatch and Law Professor Ronald Dworkin. See 521 U.S. 702, 704-706.
137. On the reaction of Compassion in Dying officials, see Carol M. Ostrom and Danny Westneat, "Next Target of Assisted-Suicide Efforts: State Laws," Seattle Times, 27 June 1997, p. A2 (taking note of Executive Director Barbara Coombs Lee's "plans to expand nationally, starting local affiliates that will work for state-by-state change"). On the Hemlock Society's increased attention to political lobbying in the years after Glucksberg, see Humphry and Clement, Freedom to Die, p. 115 (noting that "[b]y 1998 a revitalized organization had branched more heavily into political work to change the law in several states").
138. On the reaction of Compassion in Dying officials, see Carol M. Ostrom and Danny Westneat, "Next Target of Assisted-Suicide Efforts: State Laws," Seattle Times, 27 June 1997, p. A2 (taking note of Executive Director Barbara Coombs Lee's "plans to expand nationally, starting local affiliates that will work for state-by-state change"). On the Hemlock Society's increased attention to political lobbying in the years after Glucksberg, see Humphry and Clement, Freedom to Die, p. 115 (noting that "[b]y 1998 a revitalized organization had branched more heavily into political work to change the law in several states").
139. On the reaction of the National Right to Life Committee to Glucksberg and the intent to mobilize additional resources for the purpose of defeating anticipated legalization efforts, see Terrence Monmaney, "Suicide Issue Now in Court of Public Opinion," Los Angeles Times, 27 June 1997, p. A1 (quoting Executive Director David O'Steen's promise to "mobilize in all 50 states to fight efforts to legalize direct killing of the vulnerable through state courts, state legislatures and referenda.") On the similar reaction of the American Medical Association and its vow to step up efforts to secure legislative prohibitions on assisted suicide, see Delia De Lafuente, "Physicians Group Praises Ruling," Chicago Sun-Times, 27 June 1997, p. 26 (taking note, in the aftermath of the decision, of the intention of AMA officials to "work to assist states considering legislation that would ban physician-assisted suicide.")
140. On the reaction of the National Right to Life Committee to Glucksberg and the intent to mobilize additional resources for the purpose of defeating anticipated legalization efforts, see Terrence Monmaney, "Suicide Issue Now in Court of Public Opinion," Los Angeles Times, 27 June 1997, p. A1 (quoting Executive Director David O'Steen's promise to "mobilize in all 50 states to fight efforts to legalize direct killing of the vulnerable through state courts, state legislatures and referenda.") On the similar reaction of the American Medical Association and its vow to step up efforts to secure legislative prohibitions on assisted suicide, see Delia De Lafuente, "Physicians Group Praises Ruling," Chicago Sun-Times, 27 June 1997, p. 26 (taking note, in the aftermath of the decision, of the intention of AMA officials to "work to assist states considering legislation that would ban physician-assisted suicide.")
141. PubIic opinion polls consistently reveal a higher degree of support for legalization among individuals in upper-income brackets than in middle-to lower-income brackets. When asked in a 1996 National Gallup Poll whether a person who is dying of an illness should be permitted to receive assistance in taking his or her own life, 70% of voters making over $45,000 answered yes, as compared with 62% of those in the $30,000-$45,000 bracket, 55% of those making between $15,000 and $30,000, and 56% of those making less than $15,000. This data is reported in Mary J. Loftus, "A Final Choice: Assisted Suicide Stirs Passionate Debates From Both Sides," The Ledger (Lakeland, Fla.), 14 February 1998, p. A1.
142. Humphry and Clement, Freedom to Die, pp. 250-251. Among opponents of the Oregon initiative campaign, no individual gave over $100,000. The most generous donor to the opposition campaign was Domino's Pizza founder Tom Monaghan, who gave $50,000.
143. Ibid., 251. Among the supporters of the Oregon initiative, the Hemlock Society, which gave $142,000, was the only group to exceed $100,000.
144. This data is reported in George Bullard, "Prop B Foes in Last-Minute Push: Religious Leaders Speak against Assisted Suicide Issue on the Ballot," Detroit News, 1 November 1998, p. D6.
145. For an argument that the political process provides opportunities for policy experimentation and flexibility, see Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy, pp. 51-56. The classic statement of this position is Louis Brandeis's dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, where he argued that: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment . . . . But in the exercise of this high power, we must ever be on guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles." (285 U.S. 262, 311 [1932] [Brandeis, J., dissenting])
146. For the argument that individual rights will receive less protection in the political process than in the federal judiciary, see Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process, pp. 79-127; Erwin Chemerinsky "The Supreme Court 1988 Term: Foreword-The Vanishing Constitution," Harvard Law Review 103 (1989): 43, 83-87.
147. For the argument that individual rights will receive less protection in the political process than in the federal judiciary, see Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process, pp. 79-127; Erwin Chemerinsky "The Supreme Court 1988 Term: Foreword-The Vanishing Constitution," Harvard Law Review 103 (1989): 43, 83-87.
148. It is important to note, in this regard, that the extent of state experimentation is influenced not only by U.S. Supreme Court decisions, but also by actions taken by other branches of the national government. In particular, Congress has given serious consideration to enacting a Pain Relief Promotion Act, which would amend the Controlled Substances Act to make it illegal to prescribe drugs for the purpose of hastening death, and which would have the effect, for all practical purposes, of preventing further state experimentation in this area. Although such a bill passed the House of Representatives by an overwhelming margin in 1999, it failed in the Senate in 2000, thereby permitting state experimentation to continue. On Congressional consideration of this bill, see "2000 Legislative Summary: Assisted Suicide," CQ Weekly 58, 16 December 2000, p. 2886.
149. On the law enacted by the Northern Territory of Australia, which permitted physician-assisted suicide as well as voluntary euthanasia but which was overturned by the Australian Parliament, see Scherer and Simon, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, pp. 75-83. On the Netherlands, where the Parliament voted to legalize a practice that had been utilized with some frequency over the course of the last decade, see "Dutch Upper House Backs Assisted Suicide," New York Times, 11 April 2001, p. A3.
150. On the law enacted by the Northern Territory of Australia, which permitted physician-assisted suicide as well as voluntary euthanasia but which was overturned by the Australian Parliament, see Scherer and Simon, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, pp. 75-83. On the Netherlands, where the Parliament voted to legalize a practice that had been utilized with some frequency over the course of the last decade, see "Dutch Upper House Backs Assisted Suicide," New York Times, 11 April 2001, p. A3.
151. These statutes can be found at: Ark Code Ann 5-10-106; Kan Stat Ann 21-3406; Md Ann Code art. 27, s. 416; Mich Stat 28.561; Ann Okla Stat Ann tit. 63, s. 3141; Va Code Ann 54.1-2990.
152. OR Rev Stat 127.800-127.897, Section 3.11.
153. See A.E. Chin, et al., "Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon-The First Year's Experience," New England Journal of Medicine 340 (1999): 577-583. For a sampling of the media coverage of the report, see Sam Howe Verhovek, "Oregon Reporting 15 Deaths in 1998 Under Suicide Law," New York Times, 18 February 1999, p. A1; "Oregon Suicide-Law Study Finds No Rush to End Lives," Boston Globe, 18 February 1999, p. A3.
154. See A.E. Chin, et al., "Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon-The First Year's Experience," New England Journal of Medicine 340 (1999): 577-583. For a sampling of the media coverage of the report, see Sam Howe Verhovek, "Oregon Reporting 15 Deaths in 1998 Under Suicide Law," New York Times, 18 February 1999, p. A1; "Oregon Suicide-Law Study Finds No Rush to End Lives," Boston Globe, 18 February 1999, p. A3.
155. See A.E. Chin, et al., "Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon-The First Year's Experience," New England Journal of Medicine 340 (1999): 577-583. For a sampling of the media coverage of the report, see Sam Howe Verhovek, "Oregon Reporting 15 Deaths in 1998 Under Suicide Law," New York Times, 18 February 1999, p. A1; "Oregon Suicide-Law Study Finds No Rush to End Lives," Boston Globe, 18 February 1999, p. A3.
156. Chin, et al., "Legalised Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon," 577.
157. A.D. Sullivan, et al., "Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon-The Second Year," New England Journal of Medicine 342 (2000): 598-604. Out of a total of thirty-three individuals who received lethal-drug prescriptions, twenty-six died from taking the drugs; five died from other causes; two were still alive at the end of the year; and another individual died from taking a prescription that had been obtained the previous year.
158. Urofsky, Lethal Judgments, p. 159.
159. Sweeney, "Assembly Panel Narrowly Passes Euthanasia Bill."
160. Humphry and Clement, Freedom to Die, p. 267.
161. For additional examples of satisfaction with the Oregon experience and reliance on the Oregon statute in drafting other state's proposals, see the discussion of Senator Lynn Dean's proposal in the 1999 session of the Louisiana Legislature (James Gill, "Guidelines to Die For," New Orleans Times-Picayune, 28 February 1999, p. B7), as well as former Representative Fred Richardson's efforts in Maine to draft an initiative proposal (Wyatt Olson, "Drive for Assisted Suicide Statute Continuing," Bangor Daily News, 26 March 1999).
162. For additional examples of satisfaction with the Oregon experience and reliance on the Oregon statute in drafting other state's proposals, see the discussion of Senator Lynn Dean's proposal in the 1999 session of the Louisiana Legislature (James Gill, "Guidelines to Die For," New Orleans Times-Picayune, 28 February 1999, p. B7), as well as former Representative Fred Richardson's efforts in Maine to draft an initiative proposal (Wyatt Olson, "Drive for Assisted Suicide Statute Continuing," Bangor Daily News, 26 March 1999).
163. For a general critique of the findings detailed in the first annual report, see Wesley J. Smith, "Dependency or Death? Oregonians Make a Chilling Choice," Wall Street Journal, 25 February 1999, p. A18. For a specific discussion of the potential for individuals to be coerced by family members, see Smith, "Suicide Unlimited in Oregon," The Weekly Standard, 8 November 1999, p. 11.
164. For a general critique of the findings detailed in the first annual report, see Wesley J. Smith, "Dependency or Death? Oregonians Make a Chilling Choice," Wall Street Journal, 25 February 1999, p. A18. For a specific discussion of the potential for individuals to be coerced by family members, see Smith, "Suicide Unlimited in Oregon," The Weekly Standard, 8 November 1999, p. 11.
165. See, for instance, the critical comments on the Oregon experience by Anne Hendershott, Chair of the Department of Sociology at the University of San Diego, in the midst of the California debate. Hendershott, "Questions, Questions, Troubling Questions; Choosing Death for Those Unable to Choose," San Diego Union-Tribune, 5 May 1999, p. B7.