Quasi-rights: Participatory citizenship and negative liberties in democratic Athens

Social Philosophy and Policy

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 27-61

  Ober, Josiah ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040443833     PISSN: 02650525     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0265052500002521     Document Type: Article

References (97)

1. Barry R. Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (June 1997): 245-63, develops the game-theoretic basis for a rational choice model along these lines. Although my argument here focuses on social practices and values rather than on rational choice, it is compatible with Weingast's model. I received very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper delivered at New York University, the University of California at Santa Cruz, Stanford University, and Princeton University's Center for Human Values. Special thanks to Barry Strauss and Phillip Mitsis, for discussions that led to the writing of this paper, and to Emily Mackil for editorial assistance and substantive comments.
2. Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (November/ December 1997): 23-43. For a good discussion of the traditional conflict between the liberal "rights of the moderns" (religious liberty; liberty of conscience, thought, and expression; rights of person and property) and the democratic "rights of the ancients" (freedom of political speech, and participation rights), and an argument that these can be conjoined within a conception of deliberative democracy based on reasonable plurality, see Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 94-119.
3. Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (November/ December 1997): 23-43. For a good discussion of the traditional conflict between the liberal "rights of the moderns" (religious liberty; liberty of conscience, thought, and expression; rights of person and property) and the democratic "rights of the ancients" (freedom of political speech, and participation rights), and an argument that these can be conjoined within a conception of deliberative democracy based on reasonable plurality, see Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 94-119.
4. Zakaria, "Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 28. Zakaria's examples of constitutional liberalism leading to democracy include nineteenth-century Britain, Hong Kong, and contemporary "semi-democratic" East Asian regimes. His examples of democracy failing to bring about constitutional liberalism include sub-Saharan Africa, Haiti, Central Asia, and "the Islamic world" (ibid., 26-29).
5. Zakaria, "Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 28. Zakaria's examples of constitutional liberalism leading to democracy include nineteenth-century Britain, Hong Kong, and contemporary "semi-democratic" East Asian regimes. His examples of democracy failing to bring about constitutional liberalism include sub-Saharan Africa, Haiti, Central Asia, and "the Islamic world" (ibid., 26-29).
6. Ibid., 26.
7. Benjamin Constant, "The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns," in Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 307-28; Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 163ff., esp. 164f. On Berlin's conception of negative liberty and his debt to Constant, see John Gray, Isaiah Berlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 5-37, esp. 20. The Berlin quotes in this paragraph are drawn from "Two Concepts of Liberty," 14, 56, cited by Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 115.
8. Benjamin Constant, "The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns," in Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 307-28; Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 163ff., esp. 164f. On Berlin's conception of negative liberty and his debt to Constant, see John Gray, Isaiah Berlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 5-37, esp. 20. The Berlin quotes in this paragraph are drawn from "Two Concepts of Liberty," 14, 56, cited by Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 115.
9. Benjamin Constant, "The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns," in Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 307-28; Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 163ff., esp. 164f. On Berlin's conception of negative liberty and his debt to Constant, see John Gray, Isaiah Berlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 5-37, esp. 20. The Berlin quotes in this paragraph are drawn from "Two Concepts of Liberty," 14, 56, cited by Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 115.
10. Benjamin Constant, "The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns," in Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 307-28; Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 163ff., esp. 164f. On Berlin's conception of negative liberty and his debt to Constant, see John Gray, Isaiah Berlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 5-37, esp. 20. The Berlin quotes in this paragraph are drawn from "Two Concepts of Liberty," 14, 56, cited by Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 115.
11. Benjamin Constant, "The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns," in Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 307-28; Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 163ff., esp. 164f. On Berlin's conception of negative liberty and his debt to Constant, see John Gray, Isaiah Berlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 5-37, esp. 20. The Berlin quotes in this paragraph are drawn from "Two Concepts of Liberty," 14, 56, cited by Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 115.
12. See David Whitehead, The Demes of Attica 508/7-ca. 250 B.C.: A Political and Social Study (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 67.
13. For a general discussion of Athenian democratic equality, see Kurt A. Raaflaub, "Equalities and Inequalities in Athenian Democracy," in Demokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern, ed. Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 139-74.
14. Aristotle, Politics 1291b3-34.
15. The story of how the dêmos came to be defined in terms of "non-leisured" Athenians (or, conversely all native adult males) rather than in terms of the elite is important and interesting but is not my main focus here: cf. Josiah Ober, The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996), esp. ch. 6; Victor D. Hanson, "Hoplites into Democrats: The Changing Ideology of Athenian Infantry," in Demokratia, ed. Ober and Hedrick, 289-312; Barry S. Strauss, "The Athenian Trireme School of Democracy," in ibid., 313-26; and my exchange with Kurt Raaflaub in Democracy 2500? Questions and Challenges, ed. K. Raaflaub and I. Morris, Archaeological Institute of America, Colloquia and Conference Papers 2 (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1998), 67-85.
16. The story of how the dêmos came to be defined in terms of "non-leisured" Athenians (or, conversely all native adult males) rather than in terms of the elite is important and interesting but is not my main focus here: cf. Josiah Ober, The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996), esp. ch. 6; Victor D. Hanson, "Hoplites into Democrats: The Changing Ideology of Athenian Infantry," in Demokratia, ed. Ober and Hedrick, 289-312; Barry S. Strauss, "The Athenian Trireme School of Democracy," in ibid., 313-26; and my exchange with Kurt Raaflaub in Democracy 2500? Questions and Challenges, ed. K. Raaflaub and I. Morris, Archaeological Institute of America, Colloquia and Conference Papers 2 (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1998), 67-85.
17. The story of how the dêmos came to be defined in terms of "non-leisured" Athenians (or, conversely all native adult males) rather than in terms of the elite is important and interesting but is not my main focus here: cf. Josiah Ober, The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996), esp. ch. 6; Victor D. Hanson, "Hoplites into Democrats: The Changing Ideology of Athenian Infantry," in Demokratia, ed. Ober and Hedrick, 289-312; Barry S. Strauss, "The Athenian Trireme School of Democracy," in ibid., 313-26; and my exchange with Kurt Raaflaub in Democracy 2500? Questions and Challenges, ed. K. Raaflaub and I. Morris, Archaeological Institute of America, Colloquia and Conference Papers 2 (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1998), 67-85.
18. The story of how the dêmos came to be defined in terms of "non-leisured" Athenians (or, conversely all native adult males) rather than in terms of the elite is important and interesting but is not my main focus here: cf. Josiah Ober, The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996), esp. ch. 6; Victor D. Hanson, "Hoplites into Democrats: The Changing Ideology of Athenian Infantry," in Demokratia, ed. Ober and Hedrick, 289-312; Barry S. Strauss, "The Athenian Trireme School of Democracy," in ibid., 313-26; and my exchange with Kurt Raaflaub in Democracy 2500? Questions and Challenges, ed. K. Raaflaub and I. Morris, Archaeological Institute of America, Colloquia and Conference Papers 2 (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1998), 67-85.
19. See Virginia J. Hunter, Policing Athens: Social Control in the Attic Lawsuits, 420-320 B.C. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and David Cohen, Law, Sexuality, and Society: The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
20. See Virginia J. Hunter, Policing Athens: Social Control in the Attic Lawsuits, 420-320 B.C. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and David Cohen, Law, Sexuality, and Society: The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
21. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, ed. and trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881), with revisions of Simon Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 2.37.2.
22. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, ed. and trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881), with revisions of Simon Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 2.37.2.
23. On Athenian demographics, see Mogens H. Hansen, Demography and Democracy: The Number of Athenian Citizens in the Fourth Century B.C. (Herning, Denmark: Systime, 1985). The number of foreign residents and slaves was large, but cannot be accurately estimated. In any event, citizens cannot have been more than about one-fifth of the total population at any time during the democracy.
24. On this distinction, see Ober, Athenian Revolution, ch. 11, and the literature cited therein.
25. On the bipolarity of Athenians and others, see Paul Cartledge, The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); on the link between this bipolarity and democracy, see Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, "Athenian Equality: A Constant Surrounded by Flux," in Demokratia, ed. Ober and Hedrick, 187-202; on racism and misogyny, see Ian Morris, Archaeology as Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
26. On the bipolarity of Athenians and others, see Paul Cartledge, The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); on the link between this bipolarity and democracy, see Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, "Athenian Equality: A Constant Surrounded by Flux," in Demokratia, ed. Ober and Hedrick, 187-202; on racism and misogyny, see Ian Morris, Archaeology as Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
27. On the bipolarity of Athenians and others, see Paul Cartledge, The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); on the link between this bipolarity and democracy, see Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, "Athenian Equality: A Constant Surrounded by Flux," in Demokratia, ed. Ober and Hedrick, 187-202; on racism and misogyny, see Ian Morris, Archaeology as Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
28. See Ober, Athenian Revolution, ch. 11.
29. The distinctions between what people say and what they do, and between what people say in official circumstances and what they say among intimates, is relevant here, but hard to specify.
30. See, for example, Ober, Athenian Revolution, ch. 5, on the inevitability of criticism.
31. Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997), offers one account of the relationship between performance and culture; my thanks to Susan Lape for clarifying for me how Butler's work can be applied to Athens. My own understanding of how dominant ideologies are challenged by alternative performances is sketched in Athenian Revolution, 148-54.
32. Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997), offers one account of the relationship between performance and culture; my thanks to Susan Lape for clarifying for me how Butler's work can be applied to Athens. My own understanding of how dominant ideologies are challenged by alternative performances is sketched in Athenian Revolution, 148-54.
33. See Morris, Archaeology as Cultural History.
34. Ibid., ch. 4. In my own work, I have tended to use the term "ideology" to cover aspects of both thought and practice, and it is important to keep in mind that there is no practical way to segregate "mentality" from "ideology" in the thought of any given person at any given time.
35. Chattel slaves, either Greek prisoners of war or (more often) non-Greeks imported specifically to serve as slaves, could be bought and sold as ordinary property. Helots and other unfree "serfs" were tied to the land; they could not be bought or sold, but otherwise lacked liberties and immunities.
36. See Ian Morris, "The Strong Principle of Equality and the Archaic Origins of Greek Democracy," in Demokratia, ed. Ober and Hedrick, 19-48; Leslie Kurke, "The Politics of Habrosunê in Archaic Greece," Classical Antiquity 11 (1992): 91-120; and (believing the metrios ideal to be a reality rather than an ideology) Hanson, "Hoplites into Democrats."
37. See Ian Morris, "The Strong Principle of Equality and the Archaic Origins of Greek Democracy," in Demokratia, ed. Ober and Hedrick, 19-48; Leslie Kurke, "The Politics of Habrosunê in Archaic Greece," Classical Antiquity 11 (1992): 91-120; and (believing the metrios ideal to be a reality rather than an ideology) Hanson, "Hoplites into Democrats."
38. See Ian Morris, "The Strong Principle of Equality and the Archaic Origins of Greek Democracy," in Demokratia, ed. Ober and Hedrick, 19-48; Leslie Kurke, "The Politics of Habrosunê in Archaic Greece," Classical Antiquity 11 (1992): 91-120; and (believing the metrios ideal to be a reality rather than an ideology) Hanson, "Hoplites into Democrats."
39. Philip Brook Manville, The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
40. Ober, Athenian Revolution, ch. 4.
41. For the struggle between the habrosunê mentality and the metrios mentality, see Morris, "Strong Principle of Equality"; Kurke, "Politics of Habrosunê"; and Kurke, The Politics of Meaning in Archaic Greece: Coinage, Bodies, Games, and Gold (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
42. For the struggle between the habrosunê mentality and the metrios mentality, see Morris, "Strong Principle of Equality"; Kurke, "Politics of Habrosunê"; and Kurke, The Politics of Meaning in Archaic Greece: Coinage, Bodies, Games, and Gold (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
43. For the struggle between the habrosunê mentality and the metrios mentality, see Morris, "Strong Principle of Equality"; Kurke, "Politics of Habrosunê"; and Kurke, The Politics of Meaning in Archaic Greece: Coinage, Bodies, Games, and Gold (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
44. On the centrality of politics, see Pierre Lèvêque and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Cleisthenes the Athenian: An Essay on the Representation of Space and Time in Greek Political Thought from the End of the Sixth Century to the Death of Plato, ed. and trans. David Ames Curtis (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996); Christian Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics, trans. David McLintock (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982). My argument does not embrace extreme claims about the "primacy of politics" in Greek culture (see, e.g., Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992]), but it likewise rejects the attempt to read Athens as primarily family- and cult-centered (see, e.g., Cynthia Patterson, The Family in Greek History [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998]).
45. On the centrality of politics, see Pierre Lèvêque and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Cleisthenes the Athenian: An Essay on the Representation of Space and Time in Greek Political Thought from the End of the Sixth Century to the Death of Plato, ed. and trans. David Ames Curtis (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996); Christian Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics, trans. David McLintock (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982). My argument does not embrace extreme claims about the "primacy of politics" in Greek culture (see, e.g., Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992]), but it likewise rejects the attempt to read Athens as primarily family- and cult-centered (see, e.g., Cynthia Patterson, The Family in Greek History [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998]).
46. On the centrality of politics, see Pierre Lèvêque and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Cleisthenes the Athenian: An Essay on the Representation of Space and Time in Greek Political Thought from the End of the Sixth Century to the Death of Plato, ed. and trans. David Ames Curtis (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996); Christian Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics, trans. David McLintock (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982). My argument does not embrace extreme claims about the "primacy of politics" in Greek culture (see, e.g., Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992]), but it likewise rejects the attempt to read Athens as primarily family- and cult-centered (see, e.g., Cynthia Patterson, The Family in Greek History [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998]).
47. On the centrality of politics, see Pierre Lèvêque and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Cleisthenes the Athenian: An Essay on the Representation of Space and Time in Greek Political Thought from the End of the Sixth Century to the Death of Plato, ed. and trans. David Ames Curtis (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996); Christian Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics, trans. David McLintock (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982). My argument does not embrace extreme claims about the "primacy of politics" in Greek culture (see, e.g., Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992]), but it likewise rejects the attempt to read Athens as primarily family- and cult-centered (see, e.g., Cynthia Patterson, The Family in Greek History [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998]).
48. On the centrality of politics, see Pierre Lèvêque and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Cleisthenes the Athenian: An Essay on the Representation of Space and Time in Greek Political Thought from the End of the Sixth Century to the Death of Plato, ed. and trans. David Ames Curtis (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996); Christian Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics, trans. David McLintock (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982). My argument does not embrace extreme claims about the "primacy of politics" in Greek culture (see, e.g., Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992]), but it likewise rejects the attempt to read Athens as primarily family- and cult-centered (see, e.g., Cynthia Patterson, The Family in Greek History [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998]).
49. See Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Ober, Athenian Revolution.
50. See Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Ober, Athenian Revolution.
51. On inscriptions, see David Whitehead, "Cardinal Virtues: The Language of Public Approbation in Democratic Athens," Classica et Mediaevalia 34 (1983): 55-74. On speeches, see Ober, Mass and Elite.
52. On inscriptions, see David Whitehead, "Cardinal Virtues: The Language of Public Approbation in Democratic Athens," Classica et Mediaevalia 34 (1983): 55-74. On speeches, see Ober, Mass and Elite.
53. The contrast, among republics, is with societies like that of ancient Rome, in which religious, social, economic, and political power were concentrated in the hands of an aristocratic oligarchy. I know much less about monarchical societies (e.g., classical China), but I suppose that they might manifest an even more fully developed isomorphism between various sorts of power, and consequently fewer obvious contradictions or opportunities for ideological confusion.
54. On democracy in post-classical Athens, see Christian Habicht, Athens from Alexander to Antony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). On the ways in which post-classical Athenian political culture may have resorted to essentializing ideological tactics, see Susan Lape, "Community and Politics in Menander," Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1998.
55. Pseudo-Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians, ed. G. W. Bowersock (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
56. On this passage of Pseudo-Xenophon, cf. Arnold W. Gomme, "The Old Oligarch," in Gomme, More Essays in Greek History and Literature, ed. David A. Campbell (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 61-62, 67-68; originally published in Athenian Studies Presented to W. S. Ferguson: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, supplementary vol. 1 (1940), 211-45. The association of revolutionary change in the politeia with a change in the dominant element in the citizen body (politeuma) is a key issue for Aristotle in the Politics; see below.
57. On this passage of Pseudo-Xenophon, cf. Arnold W. Gomme, "The Old Oligarch," in Gomme, More Essays in Greek History and Literature, ed. David A. Campbell (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 61-62, 67-68; originally published in Athenian Studies Presented to W. S. Ferguson: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, supplementary vol. 1 (1940), 211-45. The association of revolutionary change in the politeia with a change in the dominant element in the citizen body (politeuma) is a key issue for Aristotle in the Politics; see below.
58. On this passage of Pseudo-Xenophon, cf. Arnold W. Gomme, "The Old Oligarch," in Gomme, More Essays in Greek History and Literature, ed. David A. Campbell (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 61-62, 67-68; originally published in Athenian Studies Presented to W. S. Ferguson: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, supplementary vol. 1 (1940), 211-45. The association of revolutionary change in the politeia with a change in the dominant element in the citizen body (politeuma) is a key issue for Aristotle in the Politics; see below.
59. For a fuller account, see Ober, Athenian Revolution, ch. 11.
60. For Aristotle's doctrine of natural slavery, see Aristotle, Politics 1252a24-1256b40, and the discussion of Peter Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and the literature cited therein.
61. For Aristotle's doctrine of natural slavery, see Aristotle, Politics 1252a24-1256b40, and the discussion of Peter Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and the literature cited therein.
62. The Greek text is partially corrupt here; see Gerald Bechtle, "A Note on Pseudo-Xenophon, The Constitution of the Athenians 1.11," Classical Quarterly 46, no. 2 (1996): 564-66, where Bechtle discusses the difficulties and offers a sensible solution. The point, for Pseudo-Xenophon, is that because the Athenians enter into legally binding financial agreements with their slaves, under the terms of which the slaves are eventually able to manumit themselves, the free Athenians are not able to do whatever they wish with respect to slaves and are therefore "slaves to slaves."
63. N. R. E. Fisher, Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1992).
64. See note 38 for a modern edition of Demosthenes' speech. I offer a detailed analysis of the speech in Athenian Revolution, ch. 7.
65. Douglas M. MacDowell, Demosthenes, Against Meidias (Oration 21) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 21.47.
66. On enktêsis and isoteleia, see David Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic (Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society, 1977). On wealthy metics and slaves, see Edward E. Cohen, Athenian Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
67. On enktêsis and isoteleia, see David Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic (Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society, 1977). On wealthy metics and slaves, see Edward E. Cohen, Athenian Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
68. See Edward E. Cohen, Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); and Cohen, Athenian Nation.
69. See Edward E. Cohen, Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); and Cohen, Athenian Nation.
70. On the question of religious freedom and the law against impiety, see Robert Parker, Athenian Religion: A History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 207-11, 214-15. On metics and slaves in Athenian religious life, see Cohen, Athenian Nation. The Eleusinian Mysteries were celebrated each year with a grand procession from Athens to the deme of Eleusis, where initiates were shown and told secret things that led them to have hopes for the afterlife.
71. On the question of religious freedom and the law against impiety, see Robert Parker, Athenian Religion: A History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 207-11, 214-15. On metics and slaves in Athenian religious life, see Cohen, Athenian Nation. The Eleusinian Mysteries were celebrated each year with a grand procession from Athens to the deme of Eleusis, where initiates were shown and told secret things that led them to have hopes for the afterlife.
72. On Periclean citizenship law, see Alan L. Boegehold, "Perikles' Citizenship Law of 451/0 B.C.," in Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology, ed. Alan L. Boegehold and Adele C. Scafuro (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 57-66, and the literature cited therein. On the move from autochthony to patriotism, see Ober, Mass and Elite, 261-66. In Athenian Nation, Cohen discusses the evidence for naturalization in detail. He also argues that the citizenship law potentially allows any individual to be legally accepted as a citizen so long as he was born of two long-term noncitizen residents of Attica, but I do not believe that the evidence he cites supports the sharp legal distinction between the terms astos and politês upon which his argument depends.
73. On Periclean citizenship law, see Alan L. Boegehold, "Perikles' Citizenship Law of 451/0 B.C.," in Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology, ed. Alan L. Boegehold and Adele C. Scafuro (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 57-66, and the literature cited therein. On the move from autochthony to patriotism, see Ober, Mass and Elite, 261-66. In Athenian Nation, Cohen discusses the evidence for naturalization in detail. He also argues that the citizenship law potentially allows any individual to be legally accepted as a citizen so long as he was born of two long-term noncitizen residents of Attica, but I do not believe that the evidence he cites supports the sharp legal distinction between the terms astos and politês upon which his argument depends.
74. On Periclean citizenship law, see Alan L. Boegehold, "Perikles' Citizenship Law of 451/0 B.C.," in Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology, ed. Alan L. Boegehold and Adele C. Scafuro (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 57-66, and the literature cited therein. On the move from autochthony to patriotism, see Ober, Mass and Elite, 261-66. In Athenian Nation, Cohen discusses the evidence for naturalization in detail. He also argues that the citizenship law potentially allows any individual to be legally accepted as a citizen so long as he was born of two long-term noncitizen residents of Attica, but I do not believe that the evidence he cites supports the sharp legal distinction between the terms astos and politês upon which his argument depends.
75. On the procedure for enfranchisement and its relative rarity, see M. J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens (Brussels: AWLSK, Klasse der Lettern, Jaargang 43, Nr. 98, 1981). On the house of Pasion and Apollodorus, see Ober, Mass and Elite, 212-14. See also Jeremy Trevett, Apollodoros the Son of Pasion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
76. On the procedure for enfranchisement and its relative rarity, see M. J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens (Brussels: AWLSK, Klasse der Lettern, Jaargang 43, Nr. 98, 1981). On the house of Pasion and Apollodorus, see Ober, Mass and Elite, 212-14. See also Jeremy Trevett, Apollodoros the Son of Pasion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
77. On the procedure for enfranchisement and its relative rarity, see M. J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens (Brussels: AWLSK, Klasse der Lettern, Jaargang 43, Nr. 98, 1981). On the house of Pasion and Apollodorus, see Ober, Mass and Elite, 212-14. See also Jeremy Trevett, Apollodoros the Son of Pasion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
78. On metic service in Athenian armed forces, see Whitehead, Ideology of the Athenian Metic, 82-86. On slaves in military service, see Peter Hunt, Slaves, Warfare, and Ideology in the Greek Historians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
79. On metic service in Athenian armed forces, see Whitehead, Ideology of the Athenian Metic, 82-86. On slaves in military service, see Peter Hunt, Slaves, Warfare, and Ideology in the Greek Historians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
80. Cohen, in Athenian Nation, discusses the evidence in detail.
81. For the claim that women in democratic Athens were actually less free than in aristo-cratic poleis, couched in negative terms, see Roberts, "Athenian Equality."
82. On gunaikonomoi at Athens and elsewhere, see B. J. Garland, "Gynaikonomoi: An Investigation of Greek Censors of Women," Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1981.
83. See David Cohen, Law, Sexuality, and Society: The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), on the myth of seclusion of women at Athens.
84. Cf. Thucydides 2.45.2: "If I may speak also about the women who will now be widows, I shall define it all in a brief admonition. For great is the glory for you not to be worse than your existing nature, and not to be talked about for good or evil among men" (trans. J. S. Rusten, Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Book II [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], with adaptations suggested by Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides).
85. Cf. Thucydides 2.45.2: "If I may speak also about the women who will now be widows, I shall define it all in a brief admonition. For great is the glory for you not to be worse than your existing nature, and not to be talked about for good or evil among men" (trans. J. S. Rusten, Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Book II [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], with adaptations suggested by Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides).
86. See also Josiah Ober, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 122-55.
87. The argument here is made in more detail in Ober, "How to Criticize Democracy in Late Fifth- and Fourth-Century Athens," in Athenian Revolution.
88. Although Aristotle's concept of aristocracy is a complicated philosophical contrivance, the fact that some nondemocratic poleis did indeed have "controllers of women" allows us to use the term "aristocracy" rather more broadly than Aristotle (sometimes) did. Some scholars have supposed (although it is not provable) that the hubris law was enacted by Solon, to whom are also attributed laws restricting the behavior of Athenian women at funerals (Plutarch, Solon 21.5). But the point here concerns what laws are enforced under the democratic regime.
89. On Plato's Crito, see Richard Kraut, Socrates and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
90. This would be a problematic procedure if the primary concern was the intention of the original lawmaker, but since that is unknowable and undatable (per note 51 above), I am concerned here with the way the law was used and understood in fourth-century practice.
91. On the phrase kataluein ton dêmon (or similar phrases) and its association with hubris, see Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae 453; and Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 3.81.4 (civil war on Corcyra).
92. On the phrase kataluein ton dêmon (or similar phrases) and its association with hubris, see Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae 453; and Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 3.81.4 (civil war on Corcyra).
93. Demosthenes' description of the various bad things done to him in private life by Meidias and his cronies illustrates the potential harms that could arise from challenging the powerful, even in Athens.
94. The Athenians annually appointed many magistrates (by election or, more often, by lot) to undertake various aspects of public business; see Mogens H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 225-45. But the work of magistrates was subordinate to the popular Assemblies and lawcourts, and did not include moral policing.
95. A good deal of recent work is summed up in Peter Euben, Corrupting Youth: Political Education, Democratic Culture, and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Demokratia, ed. Ober and Hedrick; and the bibliographies of both books point to more.
96. A good deal of recent work is summed up in Peter Euben, Corrupting Youth: Political Education, Democratic Culture, and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Demokratia, ed. Ober and Hedrick; and the bibliographies of both books point to more.
97. See, for example, Charles Taylor et al., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).