Chapter 9 Predation, monopolization, and antitrust

Handbook of Industrial Organization

Volumn 1, Issue , 1989, Pages 537-596

  Ordover, Janusz A ^a   Saloner, Garth ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040419158     PISSN: 1573448X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)01012-5     Document Type: Review

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