Reclaiming The LóGos, Considering The Consequences, And Restoring Context

Educational Theory

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 317-337

  Garrison, Jim ^a  

^a VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0040400528     PISSN: 00132004     EISSN: 17415446     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-5446.1999.00317.x     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Harvey Siegel, Rationality Redeemed: Further Dialogues on an Educational Ideal (New York: Routledge, 1997),.
2. This book will be cited as RR in the text for all subsequent references.
3. John Dewey, "Time and Individuality" iN John Dewey: The Later Works, vol. 12, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), 98-114.
4. John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty in John Dewey: The Later Works, vol. 4, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 240-41.
5. John Dewey, "Experience and Nature" In John Dewey: The Later Works, vol. 1, Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981), 269.
6. Dewcy's sexism is less serious than this passage might suggest and many have found him easy to reconstruct for feminist projects. See Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Pragmatism and Feminism: Reweaving the Social Fabric (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
7. Hence the significance of the subtitle of Dcwey's treatise on logic. Logic: The Theory of ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press), 17. This work will be cited as LTI in the text for ail subsequent references. Inquiry, in John Dewey: The Later Works, 12, 1986.
8. Jim Garrison, "Deweyan Practical Reasoning as Creative Action"Educational Philosophy and Theory, forthcoming.
9. John Dewey, "Construction and Criticism" In John Dewey: The Later Works, vol. 5, Ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondaie: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), 138.
10. John Passmore, "On Teaching to be Critical" In Education and Reason: Part 3 of Education and the Development of Reason, ed. R.F. Dearden, Paul H. Hirst and R.S. Peters (London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul, 1972 33.
11. I am not saying that one field might not discover principles or criteria it needs in another field, or that two fields in conflict may not find neutral criteria to mediate between them. I am saying we do not need antecedent criteria known only to those super-scientists called epistemologists. Fields and domains of inquiry can do just fine rending for, and between, themselves. Thus far literature,.science, and history seem to have done just fine without epistemology; the pragmatist is not surprised.
12. The phrase "habits of mind" is a strange locution. Habits are generally used in association with the body. Oddly, for all of his concern in this book with the agent being "appropriately motivated by reasons" bodily desires are not mentioned. This is not a small matter, for as Aristotle observed in the Nicomachean Ethics (1139a37-1139b7), 'Thought by itself...moves nothing; what moves us is thought aiming at some goal and concerned with action,...Now desire is for the goal (end or value]. Hence decision is either understanding combined with dcs;re or desire combined with thought; and what originates movement in this way is a human being." This passage indicates the intrinsic connection between being moved by reasons, ems, and value (some end, goal, or ideal).
13. Nicholas C. Burbules, "Rationality and Reasonableness: A Discussion of Harvey Siegel's Relatisim Refuted and Educating Reason" Educational Theory 41, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 235-52.
14. John Dewey, Philosophy and Democracy, in John Dewey: The Middle Works, Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), 43.11.
15. Dewey, "Experience and Nature" 305.
16. Dewey, Ethics, 270.
17. Dewey, Art as Experience, in John Dewey: The Middle Works, 10 Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 291.
18. Siegei's favorable references to Thomas Nagel's, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press) provides some circumstantial evidence. The resonances with Kant provide more substantial evidence.1986.
19. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press). For an explication of the transcendental function of space and time see 65-82.
20. For an explication of the function of the transcendental concepts see Causality, for instance, is a "moment" of relation.103-19.
21. Richard Rorty, The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays In Philosophical Method (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1967.
22. Rorty understands That Dewey took the linguistic turn in much the same way as Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein. What Rorty fails to understand is what Dewey meant by experience and why, for instance, Dewey could take the linguistic turn and still have a descriptive metaphysics that was not a transcendental deduction of anything. That, though, is another story.
23. Siegel's insistence on a neo-Kantian regulative ideal of truth and fondness for transcendental deductions testify to his idealism.
24. Mark Weinstein, "Reason and Refutation: A Review of Two Recent Books by Harvey Siegel" Studies in Philosophy and Education 11, no. 3 (1992), 239.
25. This is the sine qua non of any form of pragmatism. As originally formulated by Peirce it reads: "Consider what effects [consequences], that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." See Charles S. Peirce "How To Make Our Ideas Clear" in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press Siegel's own position regarding these ideas is probably very close to that of the later neo-Schoiastic Peirce.51965258.
26. Dewey, "Experience and Nature" 34.
27. John Dewey, Context and Thought, in John Dewey: The Later Works,6, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondnle: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 5.
28. Those who construe non-inferential justification as self-justification arc commonly called "modert" foundationalists. Modest foundationalists tend to favor prepositional (as opposed to psychological) justification and do not seek foundational beliefs that are indubitable or infallible. Nonetheless, the quest for certainty is what fuels those who desire absolute, supernal regulative ideals.
29. As a point of erotetic logic, this claim is not exactly correct. Answers to "why" questions in general do not need to be reasons. For "what" questions answers are typically objects or kinds of objects and answers to "when" questions are typically times, for "where" questions answers are locations in space. Answers to "why" questions typically involve reasons and explanations, although explanations are not necessarily identical with rational arguments. It depends on the context. See Jaakko Hintikka, The Semantics of Questions and the Question of Semantics Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976), 24-25.
30. Hintikka's analysis by the way, treats all "why" questions as contextual. For an extensive application of Hintikka's analysis to teaching see C.J.B. Macmiilan and James W. Garrison, The Erotetic Logic of Teaching (Dordrcct: Kluwcr Academic Publishers, 1988.
31. Douglas N. Walton, "Begging the Question as a Pragmatic Fallacy" Synthese 100 (1994): 95-131.
32. Jaakko Hintikka, "The Fallacy of Fallacies"Argumentation I (1987): 219.
33. Walton, "Begging the Question as a Pragmatic Fallacy" 108-9. For a similar argument see page 121.
34. John Dewey, "Propositions, Warranted Assertibility and Truth" ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), 171. The dogmatism comes out when Siegel assigns his interlocutor his own presuppositions instead of striving to listen to hers. In John Dewey: The Later Works, vol. 14,.
35. Walton, "Begging the Question as a Pragmatic Fallacy" 111.