America and the Twentieth Century: Continuity and Change

Diplomatic History

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 219-238

  Jervis, Robert ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040397672     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-7709.00164     Document Type: Review

References (94)

1. See Henry R. Luce, "The American Century," in this issue.
2. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, "Has Democracy a Future?" Foreign Affairs 76 (September-October 1997): 5-6.
3. For recent statements of this position from different perspectives see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, 1979) and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York, 1987).
4. For recent statements of this position from different perspectives see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, 1979) and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York, 1987).
5. It is frequently argued that the influence of all countries, including the United States, is diminishing in comparison to that of global economic forces: see, for example, Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (New York, 1996).
6. For a good discussion of the uses of counterfactuals see Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton, 1996).
7. Michael Sherry, In The Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven, 1995), x.
8. See, for example, Ronald Schaffer, America in the Great War (New York, 1991); Bartholomew Sparrow, From the Outside In: World War II and the American State (Princeton, 1996); John Morton Blum, V was for Victory (New York, 1976); Sherry, Shadow of War, and John Kenneth White, Still Seeing Red: How the Cold War Shapes the New American Politics (Boulder, 1997).
9. See, for example, Ronald Schaffer, America in the Great War (New York, 1991); Bartholomew Sparrow, From the Outside In: World War II and the American State (Princeton, 1996); John Morton Blum, V was for Victory (New York, 1976); Sherry, Shadow of War, and John Kenneth White, Still Seeing Red: How the Cold War Shapes the New American Politics (Boulder, 1997).
10. See, for example, Ronald Schaffer, America in the Great War (New York, 1991); Bartholomew Sparrow, From the Outside In: World War II and the American State (Princeton, 1996); John Morton Blum, V was for Victory (New York, 1976); Sherry, Shadow of War, and John Kenneth White, Still Seeing Red: How the Cold War Shapes the New American Politics (Boulder, 1997).
11. See, for example, Ronald Schaffer, America in the Great War (New York, 1991); Bartholomew Sparrow, From the Outside In: World War II and the American State (Princeton, 1996); John Morton Blum, V was for Victory (New York, 1976); Sherry, Shadow of War, and John Kenneth White, Still Seeing Red: How the Cold War Shapes the New American Politics (Boulder, 1997).
12. See, for example, Ronald Schaffer, America in the Great War (New York, 1991); Bartholomew Sparrow, From the Outside In: World War II and the American State (Princeton, 1996); John Morton Blum, V was for Victory (New York, 1976); Sherry, Shadow of War, and John Kenneth White, Still Seeing Red: How the Cold War Shapes the New American Politics (Boulder, 1997).
13. Quoted in Sherry, Shadow of War, 146.
14. Herbert Muschamp, "Form Follows Function into Ideal Circles," New York Times, 28 March 1997.
15. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955), 9, 3, 5. Hartz's thesis has been subject to vigorous dispute, but I believe his essential point remains valid. For a parallel argument about the deficiencies of liberal thought see Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man versus Power Politics (Chicago, 1946).
16. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955), 9, 3, 5. Hartz's thesis has been subject to vigorous dispute, but I believe his essential point remains valid. For a parallel argument about the deficiencies of liberal thought see Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man versus Power Politics (Chicago, 1946).
17. Hartz, Liberal Tradition, 308.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 309.
20. Quoted in Walter McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776 (Boston, 1997), 52.
21. For a dissent from the consensus view that American security was deeply menaced before World War II see Bruce Russett, No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the United States Entry into World War II (New York, 1972); revisionists argue that American power was so overwhelming and Soviet goals so limited that there was no major threat to American security after the war. But if the more Marxist-oriented of the revisionists are correct that the USSR and instability did indeed threaten the ability of American capitalism to expand overseas and if such expansion was necessary for the maintenance of the American domestic system, then the American ruling class indeed did face a threat so severe as to compel a strong and active foreign policy.
22. See Eric Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century (Princeton, 1995), and the literature cited in footnote 53 below.
23. But for a well-developed argument that the U.S. willingness to use force to oppose Iraq in 1990-91 would not have been different had that state possessed nuclear weapons see Barry Posen, "U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear-Armed World, Or: What if Iraq Had Had Nuclear Weapons?" Security Studies 6 (Spring 1977): 1-31. For a general discussion of the threat from WMD see Richard Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs 77 (January-February 1998): 26-41.
24. But for a well-developed argument that the U.S. willingness to use force to oppose Iraq in 1990-91 would not have been different had that state possessed nuclear weapons see Barry Posen, "U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear-Armed World, Or: What if Iraq Had Had Nuclear Weapons?" Security Studies 6 (Spring 1977): 1-31. For a general discussion of the threat from WMD see Richard Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs 77 (January-February 1998): 26-41.
25. Paul Schroeder, "Does Murphy's Law Apply to History?" Wilson Quarterly 9 (New Year's 1985): 88; Joseph Nyejr, "The Long-Term Future of Nuclear Deterrence," in The Logic of Nuclear Terror, ed. Roman Kolkowicz (Boston, 1987), 283; Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, 1989), 23-58. Of course one can argue about exactly what constitutes a great-power war: Soviet and American pilots shot each other down during the Korean War and if we count China as a Great Power, the United States and PRC fought in Korea and, less directly, in Vietnam.
26. Paul Schroeder, "Does Murphy's Law Apply to History?" Wilson Quarterly 9 (New Year's 1985): 88; Joseph Nyejr, "The Long-Term Future of Nuclear Deterrence," in The Logic of Nuclear Terror, ed. Roman Kolkowicz (Boston, 1987), 283; Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, 1989), 23-58. Of course one can argue about exactly what constitutes a great-power war: Soviet and American pilots shot each other down during the Korean War and if we count China as a Great Power, the United States and PRC fought in Korea and, less directly, in Vietnam.
27. Paul Schroeder, "Does Murphy's Law Apply to History?" Wilson Quarterly 9 (New Year's 1985): 88; Joseph Nyejr, "The Long-Term Future of Nuclear Deterrence," in The Logic of Nuclear Terror, ed. Roman Kolkowicz (Boston, 1987), 283; Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, 1989), 23-58. Of course one can argue about exactly what constitutes a great-power war: Soviet and American pilots shot each other down during the Korean War and if we count China as a Great Power, the United States and PRC fought in Korea and, less directly, in Vietnam.
28. Quoted in Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York, 1962), 114-15.
29. The classic statement of this position is Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Also see Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations (Princeton, 1977); Robert Jervis, System Efects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, 1997), 110-24; and Dale Copeland, "Neo-Realism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability," Security Studies 5 (Spring 1996): 29-47.
30. The classic statement of this position is Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Also see Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations (Princeton, 1977); Robert Jervis, System Efects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, 1997), 110-24; and Dale Copeland, "Neo-Realism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability," Security Studies 5 (Spring 1996): 29-47.
31. The classic statement of this position is Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Also see Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations (Princeton, 1977); Robert Jervis, System Efects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, 1997), 110-24; and Dale Copeland, "Neo-Realism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability," Security Studies 5 (Spring 1996): 29-47.
32. George Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1951); Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, 1962), chap. 15.
33. George Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1951); Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, 1962), chap. 15.
34. Luce, "The American Century."
35. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1995).
36. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know Rethinking Cold War History (New York, 1997), 285. See also Ole Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances (New York, 1975).
37. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know Rethinking Cold War History (New York, 1997), 285. See also Ole Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances (New York, 1975).
38. The literature of course is voluminous: the first statement, which anticipated much later thought, was Bernard Brodie et al., The Absolute Weapon (New York, 1946). Also central are Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, 1961) and Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, 1966).
39. The literature of course is voluminous: the first statement, which anticipated much later thought, was Bernard Brodie et al., The Absolute Weapon (New York, 1946). Also central are Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, 1961) and Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, 1966).
40. The literature of course is voluminous: the first statement, which anticipated much later thought, was Bernard Brodie et al., The Absolute Weapon (New York, 1946). Also central are Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, 1961) and Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, 1966).
41. Quoted in Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: from the Cold War to a New Era (New York, 1991), 153.
42. John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," International Security 13 (Fall 1988): 55-79; for a rebuttal see Robert Jervis, "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons," ibid., 80-90.
43. John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," International Security 13 (Fall 1988): 55-79; for a rebuttal see Robert Jervis, "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons," ibid., 80-90.
44. For further discussion see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, 1989).
45. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York, 1987), chap. 8.
46. Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," American Journal of Sociology 46 (January 1941): 455-68; for an excellent discussion of how the United States avoided this feared outcome see Aaron Friedberg, "Why Didn't the U.S. Become a Garrison State? International Security 16 (Spring 1992): 109-42.
47. Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," American Journal of Sociology 46 (January 1941): 455-68; for an excellent discussion of how the United States avoided this feared outcome see Aaron Friedberg, "Why Didn't the U.S. Become a Garrison State? International Security 16 (Spring 1992): 109-42.
48. Ronald Reagan was perhaps the president with the least faith in deterrence and this helps explain both his commitment to missile defense and his interest in Gorbachev s Reykjavik proposal to abolish nuclear weapons, which would have overturned American defense policy in Kurope.
49. George Kennan, "International Control of Atomic Energy," 20 January 1950, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 (Washington, 1977), 1:57. Kennan later called this "one of the most important, if not the most important, of all the documents I ever wrote in government": Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), 472. Kennan's prophecy may well have been accurate: Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York, 1974).
50. George Kennan, "International Control of Atomic Energy," 20 January 1950, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 (Washington, 1977), 1:57. Kennan later called this "one of the most important, if not the most important, of all the documents I ever wrote in government": Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), 472. Kennan's prophecy may well have been accurate: Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York, 1974).
51. George Kennan, "International Control of Atomic Energy," 20 January 1950, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 (Washington, 1977), 1:57. Kennan later called this "one of the most important, if not the most important, of all the documents I ever wrote in government": Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), 472. Kennan's prophecy may well have been accurate: Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York, 1974).
52. George Kennan, "International Control of Atomic Energy," 20 January 1950, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 (Washington, 1977), 1:57. Kennan later called this "one of the most important, if not the most important, of all the documents I ever wrote in government": Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), 472. Kennan's prophecy may well have been accurate: Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York, 1974).
53. The classic study is Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston, 1973).
54. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, 1991), chap. 5.
55. This practice was begun under Eisenhower and its exact extent, the degree to which his successors altered the authority, and the ability of the president to keep control if it ever became clear that an attack was imminent or under way all are unclear: for a good discussion see Bruce Blair, Strategic Command and Control (Washington, 1985). Recently released documents are available on the National Security Archive website: http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/news/ 19980319.htm.
56. Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca, 1992).
57. For a general discussion of the relationships between nuclear weapons and democracy see Robert Dahl, Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Democracy versus Guardianship (Syracuse, 1985).
58. Quoted in Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York, 1983), 72.
59. The best discussion, albeit somewhat exaggerated, is Jonathan Schell, The Time of Illusion (New York, 1975).
60. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 36-43.
61. Daniel Ellsberg, "The Theory and Practice of Blackmail," in Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation, ed. Oran Young (Urbana, 1975), 343-63 (reprint of RAND memo P-3883, 1959).
62. Daniel Ellsberg, "The Theory and Practice of Blackmail," in Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation, ed. Oran Young (Urbana, 1975), 343-63 (reprint of RAND memo P-3883, 1959).
63. H. Robert Haldeman, The Ends of Power (New York, 1968), 82-83, 98. Llewellyn Thompson, U.S. ambassador to Moscow, reports a conversation over Berlin in 1961 in which Khrushchev sought to neutralize this kind of tactic: "I told him . . . that if he signed a separate treaty [with East Germany] and force was used to interfere with our communications it would be met with force. He replied that if we wanted war we would get it but he was convinced only madmen would want war and western leaders [were] not mad." Quoted in Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (NeW York, 1995), 136; also see 169.
64. H. Robert Haldeman, The Ends of Power (New York, 1968), 82-83, 98. Llewellyn Thompson, U.S. ambassador to Moscow, reports a conversation over Berlin in 1961 in which Khrushchev sought to neutralize this kind of tactic: "I told him . . . that if he signed a separate treaty [with East Germany] and force was used to interfere with our communications it would be met with force. He replied that if we wanted war we would get it but he was convinced only madmen would want war and western leaders [were] not mad." Quoted in Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (NeW York, 1995), 136; also see 169.
65. The seminal statement is Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA, 1960). Commitment has always played a role in world politics, but it is particularly important with nuclear weapons because the threat to use them is both crucial and inherently incredible. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American Natiotial Security Policy (New York, 1982) shows that one important determinant of the extent to which an administration was willing to rely on threats of nuclear war to protect American interests around the world was the degree of faith it put in the deterrent power of commitment and reputation.
66. The seminal statement is Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA, 1960). Commitment has always played a role in world politics, but it is particularly important with nuclear weapons because the threat to use them is both crucial and inherently incredible. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American Natiotial Security Policy (New York, 1982) shows that one important determinant of the extent to which an administration was willing to rely on threats of nuclear war to protect American interests around the world was the degree of faith it put in the deterrent power of commitment and reputation.
67. At the start of Anglo-French conversations before World War I, General Wilson asked his French counterpart what would be the smallest British force that would be of any practical use. "One single private soldier," General Foch replied, "and we would take good care that he was killed" Charles Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. His Life and Diaries (New York, 1927), 1:78.
68. The most well-developed analysis is James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88 (September 1994): 577-92.
69. A. F. Dobrynin, "Record of the Conversation with the Secretary of State of the USA C. Vance," 21 March 1977, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995): 154.
70. A. F. Dobrynin, "Record of the Conversation with the Secretary of State of the USA C. Vance," 21 March 1977, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995): 154.
71. Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, 187-89.
72. Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and Soviet Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor, 1994); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, 1996). For a discussion of the latter see the symposium, "What's in a Name? Debating Jonathan Mercer's Reputation and International Politics? Security Studies 7 (Autumn 1997): 31-113. Also see Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, 1961), chap.1: John Orme, Deterrence, Reputation, and Cold-War Cycles (London 1992)-Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4 (Summer 1995): 833-92; Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, 1988); and Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York, 1991), 20-50.
73. Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and Soviet Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor, 1994); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, 1996). For a discussion of the latter see the symposium, "What's in a Name? Debating Jonathan Mercer's Reputation and International Politics? Security Studies 7 (Autumn 1997): 31-113. Also see Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, 1961), chap.1: John Orme, Deterrence, Reputation, and Cold-War Cycles (London 1992)-Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4 (Summer 1995): 833-92; Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, 1988); and Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York, 1991), 20-50.
74. Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and Soviet Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor, 1994); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, 1996). For a discussion of the latter see the symposium, "What's in a Name? Debating Jonathan Mercer's Reputation and International Politics? Security Studies 7 (Autumn 1997): 31-113. Also see Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, 1961), chap.1: John Orme, Deterrence, Reputation, and Cold-War Cycles (London 1992)-Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4 (Summer 1995): 833-92; Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, 1988); and Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York, 1991), 20-50.
75. Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and Soviet Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor, 1994); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, 1996). For a discussion of the latter see the symposium, "What's in a Name? Debating Jonathan Mercer's Reputation and International Politics? Security Studies 7 (Autumn 1997): 31-113. Also see Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, 1961), chap.1: John Orme, Deterrence, Reputation, and Cold-War Cycles (London 1992)-Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4 (Summer 1995): 833-92; Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, 1988); and Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York, 1991), 20-50.
76. Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and Soviet Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor, 1994); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, 1996). For a discussion of the latter see the symposium, "What's in a Name? Debating Jonathan Mercer's Reputation and International Politics? Security Studies 7 (Autumn 1997): 31-113. Also see Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, 1961), chap.1: John Orme, Deterrence, Reputation, and Cold-War Cycles (London 1992)-Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4 (Summer 1995): 833-92; Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, 1988); and Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York, 1991), 20-50.
77. Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and Soviet Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor, 1994); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, 1996). For a discussion of the latter see the symposium, "What's in a Name? Debating Jonathan Mercer's Reputation and International Politics? Security Studies 7 (Autumn 1997): 31-113. Also see Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, 1961), chap.1: John Orme, Deterrence, Reputation, and Cold-War Cycles (London 1992)-Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4 (Summer 1995): 833-92; Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, 1988); and Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York, 1991), 20-50.
78. Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and Soviet Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor, 1994); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, 1996). For a discussion of the latter see the symposium, "What's in a Name? Debating Jonathan Mercer's Reputation and International Politics? Security Studies 7 (Autumn 1997): 31-113. Also see Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, 1961), chap.1: John Orme, Deterrence, Reputation, and Cold-War Cycles (London 1992)-Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4 (Summer 1995): 833-92; Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, 1988); and Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York, 1991), 20-50.
79. Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and Soviet Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor, 1994); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, 1996). For a discussion of the latter see the symposium, "What's in a Name? Debating Jonathan Mercer's Reputation and International Politics? Security Studies 7 (Autumn 1997): 31-113. Also see Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, 1961), chap.1: John Orme, Deterrence, Reputation, and Cold-War Cycles (London 1992)-Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4 (Summer 1995): 833-92; Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, 1988); and Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York, 1991), 20-50.
80. See, for example, Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, 2d ed. (New York, 1989).
81. Patrick Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Psychology and Deterrence, ed. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore, 1985), 148-51.
82. Secretary of State Albright's defense of the American threats to attack Iraq in early 1998 unless it allowed a resumption of UN inspection is interesting in this regard: "If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future." Quoted in Bob Herbert, "War Games," New York Times, 22 February 1998.
83. Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, 1957).
84. For further discussion see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York, 1989); Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Winter 1990-91): 7-57; Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" ibid. 16 (Winter 1991/92): 39-73; James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 467-91; and Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order. Zones of Peace/ Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, NJ, 1995). For gloomier views see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," ibid. 17 (Spring 1993): 5-51; Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," ibid. 18 (Fall 1993): 44-79;
85. For further discussion see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York, 1989); Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Winter 1990-91): 7-57; Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" ibid. 16 (Winter 1991/92): 39-73; James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 467-91; and Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order. Zones of Peace/ Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, NJ, 1995). For gloomier views see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," ibid. 17 (Spring 1993): 5-51; Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," ibid. 18 (Fall 1993): 44-79;
86. For further discussion see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York, 1989); Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Winter 1990-91): 7-57; Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" ibid. 16 (Winter 1991/92): 39-73; James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 467-91; and Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order. Zones of Peace/ Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, NJ, 1995). For gloomier views see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," ibid. 17 (Spring 1993): 5-51; Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," ibid. 18 (Fall 1993): 44-79;
87. For further discussion see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York, 1989); Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Winter 1990-91): 7-57; Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" ibid. 16 (Winter 1991/92): 39-73; James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 467-91; and Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order. Zones of Peace/ Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, NJ, 1995). For gloomier views see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," ibid. 17 (Spring 1993): 5-51; Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," ibid. 18 (Fall 1993): 44-79;
88. For further discussion see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York, 1989); Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Winter 1990-91): 7-57; Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" ibid. 16 (Winter 1991/92): 39-73; James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 467-91; and Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order. Zones of Peace/ Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, NJ, 1995). For gloomier views see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," ibid. 17 (Spring 1993): 5-51; Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," ibid. 18 (Fall 1993): 44-79;
89. For further discussion see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York, 1989); Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Winter 1990-91): 7-57; Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" ibid. 16 (Winter 1991/92): 39-73; James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 467-91; and Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order. Zones of Peace/ Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, NJ, 1995). For gloomier views see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," ibid. 17 (Spring 1993): 5-51; Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," ibid. 18 (Fall 1993): 44-79;
90. For further discussion see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York, 1989); Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Winter 1990-91): 7-57; Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" ibid. 16 (Winter 1991/92): 39-73; James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 467-91; and Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order. Zones of Peace/ Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, NJ, 1995). For gloomier views see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," ibid. 17 (Spring 1993): 5-51; Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," ibid. 18 (Fall 1993): 44-79;
91. For further discussion see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York, 1989); Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Winter 1990-91): 7-57; Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" ibid. 16 (Winter 1991/92): 39-73; James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 467-91; and Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order. Zones of Peace/ Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, NJ, 1995). For gloomier views see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," ibid. 17 (Spring 1993): 5-51; Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," ibid. 18 (Fall 1993): 44-79;
92. and idem, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review 91 (December 1997): 915-16. For discussion of why people do not feel as reassured as this analysis indicates that they should see John Mueller, "The Catastrophe Quota: Trouble after the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38 (September 1994): 355-75.
93. and idem, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review 91 (December 1997): 915-16. For discussion of why people do not feel as reassured as this analysis indicates that they should see John Mueller, "The Catastrophe Quota: Trouble after the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38 (September 1994): 355-75.
94. For an interesting discussion see Joseph Joffe, "How America Does It," Foreign Affairs 76 (September-October 1997): 13-27.