The political economy of publicly provided private goods

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 73, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 31-54

  Blomquist, Sören ^a   Christiansen, Vidar ^b  

^a UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

Author keywords

D72; H21; H42; I38; In kind transfers; Political economy; Private goods; Public provision

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040391869     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00002-X     Document Type: Article

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