Building a Power Base: Jiang Zemin and the Post-Deng Succession

Issues and Studies

Volumn 33, Issue 11, 1997, Pages 1-34

  Cavey, Paul ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Appointment of loyalists; Bureaucratic politics; Bureaucratic reform; Legitimacy; Power base

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040323117     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (179)

1. Jiang's ineffectiveness in Shanghai reportedly earned him the nickname of "flowerpot," as he apparently devoted most of his energy to attending ribbon-cutting functions, going on well-publicized walkabouts, and giving long, empty speeches. See R. N. Schiele, "A Portrait of a Powerful Man," Eastern Express (Hong Kong), December 27, 1994, 3.
2. Tang Tsou, "Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-of-Power Politics or a Game to Win All?" The China Journal, no. 34 (July 1995): 154.
3. Deng Xiaoping admitted that "there should be a core in any collective. A leadership without a core is unreliable." "'Full Text of Gists' of Deng Xiaoping's Speech to Members of the New Politburo Standing Committee on July 16," Dongfang ribao (Oriental Daily) (Hong Kong), July 15, 1989, 6, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China [henceforth FBIS-CHI]-89-136 (July 18, 1989): 13.
4. Deng Xiaoping admitted that "there should be a core in any collective. A leadership without a core is unreliable." "'Full Text of Gists' of Deng Xiaoping's Speech to Members of the New Politburo Standing Committee on July 16," Dongfang ribao (Oriental Daily) (Hong Kong), July 15, 1989, 6, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China [henceforth FBIS-CHI]-89-136 (July 18, 1989): 13.
5. Tsou, "Chinese Politics at the Top," 102.
6. Hu Yaobang in fact was a first-generation revolutionary, having participated in the Long March. The important point, however, is that he played a relatively minor role in this struggle. The previous top leaders of China-Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping-had both been leaders of the revolution. For details of Hu's contributions, see Yang Zhongmei, Hu Yaobang: A Chinese Biography (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1988).
7. For a comprehensive overview of China's bureaucratic system, on which this explanation is largely based, see Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York: Norton, 1995), 192-207.
8. Lowell Dittmer, "Chinese Informal Politics," The China Journal, no. 34 (July 1995): 11.
9. Lieberthal, Governing China, 203-4.
10. Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 88. This distribution not only creates clients and shores up the positions of loyalists; it also keeps existing clients. In China, an individual may have more than one client, so it is important for loyalists to be "cultivated."
11. David Shambaugh, The Making of a Premier: Zhao Ziyang's Provincial Career (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), 83.
12. Hua Guofeng's speech to the Fifth NPC, in FBIS-CHI-78-050 (March 16, 1978): 18.
13. See note 9 above.
14. David Shambaugh, "China's Commander-in-Chief: Jiang Zemin and the PLA," in Chinese Military Modernization, ed. Dennison Lane, Mark Weisenbloom, and Dimon Liu (London: Kegan Paul International, 1996), 212-13.
15. On a practical level, Zhao showed policy documents to Bo Yibo. See Frederick C. Teiwes, "The Paradoxical Post-Mao Transition: From Obeying the Leader to 'Normal Polities'," The China Journal, no. 34 (July 1995): 82.
16. Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China: Perspectives from Insiders (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), xxxvi.
17. The Organization Department is also referred to as the "First Department Under Heaven." Such is its power that it is "no pro forma approval, even for personal recommendations from Deng Xiaoping or Chen Yun." Yan Huai, cited in ibid., xxxvii.
18. See note 5 above. The appendix contains a table of those from the CYL holding positions of power in 1987.
19. In particular, Bao Tong and Rui Xingwen were given positions on the Propaganda and Ideology Leading Group.
20. Frederick C. Teiwes, Leadership, Legitimacy and Conflict in China: From a Charismatic Mao to the Politics of Succession (London: Macmillan, 1984), 94.
21. Prudential rules are the "rules or requirements for political success." Ibid.
22. According to Shirk, "the leaders of communist parties structure decision-making processes so that the groups on whom they depend for support have a strong voice." Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform, 107.
23. The three main Zhao think-tanks were the Research Center for Development; the Research Center for Rural Policy; and the Economic Reform Institute. For further details regarding these, see Wu Guoguang, "'Documentary Politics': Hypotheses, Process, and Case Studies," in Hamrin and Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China, 24-35; and Nina Halpern, "Information Flows and Policy Coordination in the Chinese Bureaucracy," in Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), 126-48.
24. The three main Zhao think-tanks were the Research Center for Development; the Research Center for Rural Policy; and the Economic Reform Institute. For further details regarding these, see Wu Guoguang, "'Documentary Politics': Hypotheses, Process, and Case Studies," in Hamrin and Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China, 24-35; and Nina Halpern, "Information Flows and Policy Coordination in the Chinese Bureaucracy," in Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), 126-48.
25. Wu, "'Documentary Polities'," 24-35.
26. Li was head of a Leading Group for Reforming Central Government Institutions.
27. Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao report that the SPC only formally listened to Zhao Ziyang. In practice, it remained loyal to Chen Yun and ignored Zhao's instructions. See Wang Lixin and Joseph Fewsmith, "Bulwark of the Planned Economy: The Structure and Role of the State Planning Commission," in Hamrin and Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China, 51-65.
28. New China News Agency (Xinhua), Beijing, December 14, 1976, in FBIS-CHI-16-242 (December 15, 1976): E4.
29. Xinhua, Beijing, December 17, 1976, in FBIS-CHI-76-248 (December 18, 1976): E6.
30. Teiwes, Leadership, Legitimacy and Conflict in China, 80.
31. Jiang worked under Wu Xueqian and Qiao Shi at this time, both of whom were later to become his subordinates in the official hierarchy.
32. For an interesting account of Jiang's exploits in Changchun, see Jasper Becker, "Long Road from Factory Worker to President," South China Morning Post International Weekly, for the weekend beginning May 25, 1996, 6.
33. Deng Xiaoping had worked in a factory in France for a few months, but was heavily involved in political work, even at this time.
34. This definition of a technocrat comes from Li Cheng and Lynn White "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends," Asian Survey 33, no. 8 (August 1993): 786.
35. Li Peng was head of the Leading Group for the Electronics Industry under the State Council, a committee Jiang would have been a member of as head of the ministry. In fact, it was commonly believed that Jiang and Li had established a very close working relationship. Protesters in Shanghai in 1989 thus referred to Li and Jiang as "two men, one pair of trousers." See Geoffrey Crothall, "Reaction to Shanghai Protests Viewed," South China Morning Post, May 24, 1989, 2.
36. See note 1 above.
37. "Jiang Zemin on Party Building," Xinhua, Beijing, July 2, 1989, in FBIS-CHI-89-126 (July 3, 1989): 12.
38. "Jiang Zemin on Modernization at Party Building Seminar," Xinhua, Beijing, April 27, 1991, in FBIS-CHI-91-082 (April 28, 1991): 23.
39. "Jiang Zemin: Enhancing the Party's Theoretical Building," Xinhua, Beijing, June 14, 1991, in FBIS-CHI-91-116 (June 17, 1991): 22.
40. "Jiang Zemin's Speech Delivered at the National Working Conference on Propaganda and Ideological Work," Xinhua, Beijing, March 6, 1994, in FBIS-CHI-94-044 (March 7, 1994): 33.
41. Jiang Zemin, "Leading Cadres Must Pay Attention to Politics," Xinhua, Beijing, January 17, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-011 (January 17, 1996): 15.
42. Editorial, "Leading Cadres Must Pay Attention to Politics," People's Daily, April 1, 1996, 1, 3, in Summary of World Broadcasts: Far East [hereafter SWB:FE] 2579 (April 3, 1996): G/9.
43. Editorial, "Leading Cadres Must Pay Attention to Politics," People's Daily, April 1, 1996, 1, 3, in Summary of World Broadcasts: Far East [hereafter SWB:FE] 2579 (April 3, 1996): G/9.
44. "CCP Steps Up Ideological and Political Work by Restoring Party Organizations in State Departments," Xin wanbao (New Evening Post) (Hong Kong), February 7, 1991, 3, in FBIS- CHI-91-027 (February 8, 1991): 21.
45. "CCP Steps Up Ideological and Political Work by Restoring Party Organizations in State Departments," Xin wanbao (New Evening Post) (Hong Kong), February 7, 1991, 3, in FBIS-CHI-91-027 (February 8, 1991): 21.
46. See "Text of Jiang Zemin Speech to the National Working Conference on Building Grass-Roots Organizations in Rural Areas," Xinhua, Beijing, October 29,1994, in FBIS-CHI-94-210 (October 31, 1994): 60.
47. Speech by Jiang Zemin on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the CCP (July 1, 1991), in FBIS-CHI-91-129-S (July 5, 1991): 12.
48. "Communiqué of the Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth CCPCC," Xinhua, Beijing, September 28, 1994, in FBIS-CHI-94-189 (September 29, 1994): 23.
49. Commentator, '"Party Secretaries Forming Cabinets' Must Never Be Allowed," People's Daily, April 4, 1995, 3, in FBIS-CHI-95-068 (April 10, 1995): 28.
50. Commentator, '"Party Secretaries Forming Cabinets' Must Never Be Allowed," People's Daily, April 4, 1995, 3, in FBIS-CHI-95-068 (April 10, 1995): 28.
51. See notes 39 and 40 above; and Li Boyang (minister of labor), "To Attach Importance to Politics, One Must Practice What One Preaches," People's Daily, February 8, 1996, 9, in FBIS- CHI-96-054 (March 19, 1996): 50.
52. See notes 39 and 40 above; and Li Boyang (minister of labor), "To Attach Importance to Politics, One Must Practice What One Preaches," People's Daily, February 8, 1996, 9, in FBIS-CHI-96-054 (March 19, 1996): 50.
53. "Jiang Zemin On Corruption," Xinhua, Beijing, July 22, 1989, in FBIS-CHI-89-140 (July 24, 1989): 28.
54. "Jiang, Li Lead Anti-Corruption Efforts," Xin bao (Hong Kong Economic Journal), August 12, 1994, 5, in FBIS-CHI-94-151 (August 15, 1994): 8.
55. "Jiang, Li Lead Anti-Corruption Efforts," Xin bao (Hong Kong Economic Journal), August 12, 1994, 5, in FBIS-CHI-94-151 (August 15, 1994): 8.
56. See, for example: Jasper Becker, "Heads Expected to Roll in Beijing for Scandal," South China Morning Post, May 1. 1995, 1, 7; "Jiang Graft Drive at Cross-Roads," The Standard (Hong Kong), April 29, 1995, 14.
57. See, for example: Jasper Becker, "Heads Expected to Roll in Beijing for Scandal," South China Morning Post, May 1. 1995, 1, 7; "Jiang Graft Drive at Cross-Roads," The Standard (Hong Kong), April 29, 1995, 14.
58. "Jiang Zemin Gives Speech on Mass Media Work," Xinhua, Beijing, November 29, 1989, in FBIS-CHI-89-234 (December 7, 1989): 10.
59. See Jiang Zemin's speech cited in note 43, 13.
60. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Article Views Jiang Zemin 'Personality Cult'," South China Morning Post, February 15, 1995, 19.
61. R. N. Schiele, "Part Three of 4-Part Series on Jiang Zemin," Eastern Express, December 29, 1994, 4. This was most notable when the editors of the Liberation Army Daily were dismissed because a CNN interview with Jiang Zemin was not shown on the front page.
62. R. N. Schiele, "Part Three of 4-Part Series on Jiang Zemin," Eastern Express, December 29, 1994, 4. This was most notable when the editors of the Liberation Army Daily were dismissed because a CNN interview with Jiang Zemin was not shown on the front page.
63. Jiang had no preexisting ties with Hu. However, according to David Shambaugh, Jiang was impressed with Hu when he met him on an inspection tour of Tibet. See Shambaugh, "China's Commander-in-Chief," 218.
64. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Jiang Zemin Promotes Protégés to Consolidate Power," South China Morning Post, November 15, 1994, 1.
65. See An-chia Wu, "Leadership Changes at the Fourth Plenum," Issues & Studies 30, no. 10 (October 1994): 132; "Shanghai Faction Enormously Increases Ability to Control the Politburo; Jiang Zemin Expands Power by Strengthening the Secretariat," Lianhe bao (United Daily News) (Hong Kong), September 30, 1994, 1, in FBIS-CHI-94-190 (September 30, 1994): 16.
66. See An-chia Wu, "Leadership Changes at the Fourth Plenum," Issues & Studies 30, no. 10 (October 1994): 132; "Shanghai Faction Enormously Increases Ability to Control the Politburo; Jiang Zemin Expands Power by Strengthening the Secretariat," Lianhe bao (United Daily News) (Hong Kong), September 30, 1994, 1, in FBIS-CHI-94-190 (September 30, 1994): 16.
67. See An-chia Wu, "Leadership Changes at the Fourth Plenum," Issues & Studies 30, no. 10 (October 1994): 132; "Shanghai Faction Enormously Increases Ability to Control the Politburo; Jiang Zemin Expands Power by Strengthening the Secretariat," Lianhe bao (United Daily News) (Hong Kong), September 30, 1994, 1, in FBIS-CHI-94-190 (September 30, 1994): 16.
68. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Jiang, 'Shanghai Faction' Expanding Influence," South China Morning Post, January 2, 1992, 10.
69. Zeng acquired other roles as well. He became a secretary of the Work Committee for Organs Under the Central Committee, political secretary of the Politburo, and a member of the Leading Group for Party Building Work. Zeng has become even more prominent since this time.
70. "'Inside Story' of Drafting of Ninth Five-Year Plan Outline," Xinhua, Beijing, March 9, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-049 (March 12, 1996): 38.
71. "CCP Delegates Said Facing Jiang Loyalty Test," South China Morning Post, July 19, 1996, 10.
72. "Jiang Zemin Establishes Network of 'Agents'," Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), no. 206 (December 1996): 9-10, in FBIS-CHI-94-249 (December 28, 1994): 31.
73. "Jiang Zemin Establishes Network of 'Agents'," Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), no. 206 (December 1996): 9-10, in FBIS-CHI-94-249 (December 28, 1994): 31.
74. Hu Yaobang in fact tried to extend his influence from party to economic affairs. However, after Zhao complained to Deng Xiaoping, Deng told Hu privately to stay out of economics. See Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform, 240.
75. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Jiang Zemin, Li Peng Twin Roles Stressed," South China Morning Post, February 14, 1991, 8.
76. In 1991, Jiang stated that "without stable rural areas, we cannot have a stable country." See "Jiang Visits Hebei, Emphasizes Rural Work," Xinhua, Beijing, September 23, 1991, in FBIS-CHI-91-185 (September 24, 1991): 25.
77. "Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Song Ping on Rural Work," Xinhua, Beijing, June 25, 1990, in FBIS-CHI-90-123 (June 25, 1990): 13.
78. "Economy, Agriculture Discussed," Xinhua, Beijing, July 30,1990, in FBIS-CHI-90-146 (July 30, 1990): 30.
79. For example, Jiang stated that local governments must pay back IOUs, fully implement the policies of the center toward agriculture, and should not impose additional burdens on the peasants. See "The Six-Province Forum on Agriculture and Rural Work Opens in Wuhan: Jiang Zemin Makes an Important Speech," Xinhua, Beijing, December 26, 1992, in FBIS-CHI-92-249 (December 28, 1992): 39-44.
80. "Li Peng Chairs State Council Executive Meeting," Xinhua, Beijing, January 29, 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-018 (January 29, 1993): 7.
81. Li Shuzhang, "Jiang Zemin Inspects Sichuan Province," Xinhua, Beijing, April 23, 1991, in FBIS-CHI-91-079 (April 23, 1991): 18.
82. Yu Yiming, Pan Didu, and Huang Zhongsheng, "Jiang Zemin Inspects Fujian, June 22-27," Xinhua, Beijing, June 27, 1994, in FBIS-CHI-94-124 (June 28, 1994): 21.
83. For example, Jiang said that "more efforts must be made to take full advantage of new technical achievements to speed up the technical transformation of enterprises." See "Jiang, Li Peng Inspect Beijing High-Tech Zone," Xinhua, Beijing, May 16, 1992, in FBIS-CHI-92-097 (May 19, 1992): 25.
84. Jiang said: "Science and technology are indispensable for increasing agricultural production." See Zou Aiguo and Cao Guanghui, "The General Secretary's Day in Chengdu," Xinhua, Beijing, March 30, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-062 (March 31, 1995): 13.
85. Chen Maodi and Sun Benya, "A Great Blueprint and a Glorious Mission," Xinhua, Beijing, March 29, 1991, in FBIS-CHI-91-062 (April 1, 1991): 17.
86. "Political Report Delivered by General Secretary Jiang Zemin on Behalf of the Thirteenth Central Committee to the Fourteenth National Congress in Beijing," Beijing Central Television Program One Network in Mandarin, October 12, 1992, in FBIS-CHI-92-198-S (October 12, 1992): 33.
87. Ibid., 31.
88. Willy Wo-Lap Lam and Zhang Yuan, "'More Power' Given to SPC," South China Morning Post, May 25, 1994, 12.
89. Sun Shangwu, "Think-Tank to Steer Economy," China Daily, July 12, 1995, 2.
90. Huang Qifan came to Beijing with his immediate patron, Wu Bangguo, whose personal office he headed. As Wu is considered to be an ally of Jiang, Huang must also be viewed as a supporter.
91. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Jiang 'Hopes' Articles 'Expand His Strength'," South China Morning Post, June 28, 1993, 7.
92. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Jiang Zemin Replaces Yuan Mu with Protégé," ibid., May 19, 1995,9.
93. "Speech by Jiang Zemin to the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth CCP Central Committee on November 14," People's Daily, January 17, 1994, 1, 4, in FBIS-CHI-94-012 (January 19, 1994): 28.
94. "Speech by Jiang Zemin to the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth CCP Central Committee on November 14," People's Daily, January 17, 1994, 1, 4, in FBIS-CHI-94-012 (January 19, 1994): 28.
95. "New State Security Measures Implemented," AFP, July 13, 1994, in FBIS-CHI-94-135 (July 13, 1994): 19.
96. Ren became head of the Politics and Law Committee and director of the Central Commission for the Comprehensive Management of Public Security. See "Qiao Shi Replaced in Two Posts by Ren Jianxin," Xinhua, Beijing, December 9, 1992, in FBIS-CHI-92-237 (December 9, 1992): 14.
97. See, for example, Yang Zhenwu and Zou Aiguo, "Jiang Zemin Views Armed Police Training Demonstration," Xinhua, Beijing, September 19, 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-180 (September 20, 1993): 39-40.
98. Zhou Guangting, Li Xunzhou, and Wang Guocai, "Temper an Army of Steel-Chronicle of General Secretary Jiang Zemin's Concern for Building Armed Police Force Units," Liberation Army Daily, January 3, 1994, 1, in FBIS-CHI-94-008 (January 12, 1994): 25.
99. Zhou Guangting, Li Xunzhou, and Wang Guocai, "Temper an Army of Steel-Chronicle of General Secretary Jiang Zemin's Concern for Building Armed Police Force Units," Liberation Army Daily, January 3, 1994, 1, in FBIS-CHI-94-008 (January 12, 1994): 25.
100. Shambaugh, "China's Commander-in-Chief," 230.
101. It was also reported that four hundred PAP personnel were being used to reinforce the Central Guards Unit and that Jiang was hoping to promote Ba Zhongtan to the rank of full general.
102. In 1996, Li Peiyao, vice-chairman of the NPC, was murdered by his PAP bodyguard.
103. For a detailed study of Jiang's attempts to build a power base within the military, see Shambaugh, "China's Commander-in-Chief," 209-45.
104. Shambaugh notes that "no leader can rule China without support of the armed forces." Ibid., 210.
105. It was reported that Jiang reads one-third more military documents than he does party materials See Lu Yushan, "Jiang Zemin Hits Out in All Directions to Consolidate His Strength," Dangdai (Contemporary) (Hong Kong), no. 411 (July 15, 1994): 11-13, in FBIS-CHI-94-159 (August 17, 1994): 14.
106. It was reported that Jiang reads one-third more military documents than he does party materials See Lu Yushan, "Jiang Zemin Hits Out in All Directions to Consolidate His Strength," Dangdai (Contemporary) (Hong Kong), no. 411 (July 15, 1994): 11-13, in FBIS-CHI-94-159 (August 17, 1994): 14.
107. Zhang Dongbi, "Fu Quanyou on Ideological, Political Education," Xinhua, Beijing, June 22, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-126 (June 30, 1995): 33.
108. For example, the revised "Regulations on Political Work in the Chinese PLA" included new experiences, and "manifested the guidelines of the series of important instructions given by Jiang Zemin and other leading cadres." See "Regulations Promulgated on Army Political Work," Xinhua, Beijing, May 28, 1995, in SWB:FE 2321 (June 5, 1995): G/9. Political and ideological work was to form the basis for Jiang's personality cult within the military.
109. For example, the revised "Regulations on Political Work in the Chinese PLA" included new experiences, and "manifested the guidelines of the series of important instructions given by Jiang Zemin and other leading cadres." See "Regulations Promulgated on Army Political Work," Xinhua, Beijing, May 28, 1995, in SWB:FE 2321 (June 5, 1995): G/9. Political and ideological work was to form the basis for Jiang's personality cult within the military.
110. "Jiang Zemin on Political Work, Taiwan," Xinhua, Beijing, March 11, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-049 (March 12, 1996): 50.
111. Jiang said: "Party committees at all levels must strengthen their leadership . . . and truly do solid management work." See Ma Xiaochun, "Jiang Zemin Calls for Improving PLA Management," Xinhua, Beijing, September 15, 1994, in FBIS-CHI-94-181 (September 19, 1994): 41.
112. The four regulations were: "Temporary Regulations on Auditing Economic Responsibilities of Leading Army Cadres"; "Temporary Regulations on Auditing Distribution and Use of the Profits from Production and Operation by the Army"; "Regulations on Auditing Payments for PLA Equipment"; and "Temporary Regulations on Auditing the Army's Financial Balance and Funds Redistribution." See Jen Hui-wen, "How Does Jiang Zemin Control the Army?" Xin boo, March 24, 1995, 21, in FBIS-CHI-95-057 (March 24, 1995): 28.
113. The four regulations were: "Temporary Regulations on Auditing Economic Responsibilities of Leading Army Cadres"; "Temporary Regulations on Auditing Distribution and Use of the Profits from Production and Operation by the Army"; "Regulations on Auditing Payments for PLA Equipment"; and "Temporary Regulations on Auditing the Army's Financial Balance and Funds Redistribution." See Jen Hui-wen, "How Does Jiang Zemin Control the Army?" Xin boo, March 24, 1995, 21, in FBIS-CHI-95-057 (March 24, 1995): 28.
114. Ibid., 29.
115. See Shambaugh. "China's Commander-in-Chief," 233.
116. Ibid., 214.
117. The army gained 22 percent of Central Committee seats; General Liu Huaqing was appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee; and ten other generals were allowed to attend Politburo meetings in a non-voting capacity. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China After Deng Xiaoping: The Power Struggle in Beijing Since Tiananmen (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), 196-97.
118. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Army Wants Tougher Jiang Stance on U.S., Taiwan," South China Morning Post, July 17, 1995, 1.
119. Interestingly, so was Qiao Shi. See Bruce Gilley, "Personnel Reshuffle Viewed," Eastern Express, September 28, 1995, 13.
120. In June 1993, Zhang Wannian, Yu Yongbo, Fu Quanyou, Zhu Dunfa, Zhang Lianzhong, and Cao Shuangming were promoted to the rank of general. The first two were to become members of the CMC and are now considered key Jiang loyalists. The second round, with the promotion of seventeen officers, occurred in 1994, including Zhou Keyu and all seven Military Region commanders and four political commissars. In January 1996, there were further promotions, with the two top officers of the Air Force, Yu Zhenwu and Ding Wenchang, being made generals, along with Zhou Ziyu (deputy director of the General Political Department) and Sui Yongju (political commissar of the 2nd Artillery Corps).
121. Chen Chien-ping, "Personnel Reshuffles in Major Military Regions Under Jiang Zemin's Auspices," Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), December 15, 1992, 2, in FBIS-CHI-92-241 (December 15, 1992): 31.
122. Chen Chien-ping, "Personnel Reshuffles in Major Military Regions Under Jiang Zemin's Auspices," Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), December 15, 1992, 2, in FBIS-CHI-92-241 (December 15, 1992): 31.
123. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Reasons for Military Reshuffling Examined," South China Morning Post, September 5, 1995, 1.
124. Matt Forney, "Man in the Middle," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 28, 1996, 14-16.
125. Although these two men were initially very useful in Jiang's efforts to establish a power base within the military, in later years their loyalty to Jiang was not as reliable as that of other military leaders. They were eventually replaced as vice-chairmen of the CMC by Chi Haotian and Zhang Wannian.
126. Jiang apparently admitted to Percy Cradock in 1991 that he was "out of the loop" on foreign affairs. By 1994, however, it was being reported that Li Peng had lost influence and "President Jiang Zemin [had] instead taken the lead in foreign affairs." See Danny Gittings, "Jiang Tantrum' Reportedly Delays Mending of Ties," South China Sunday Morning Post, January 1, 1995, 12; and Philippe Massonnet, "Li Peng: Mitterrand Invitation to Jiang an 'Affront'," AFP, Hong Kong, June 26, 1994, in FBIS-CHI-94-123 (June 27, 1994): 30.
127. Jiang apparently admitted to Percy Cradock in 1991 that he was "out of the loop" on foreign affairs. By 1994, however, it was being reported that Li Peng had lost influence and "President Jiang Zemin [had] instead taken the lead in foreign affairs." See Danny Gittings, "Jiang Tantrum' Reportedly Delays Mending of Ties," South China Sunday Morning Post, January 1, 1995, 12; and Philippe Massonnet, "Li Peng: Mitterrand Invitation to Jiang an 'Affront'," AFP, Hong Kong, June 26, 1994, in FBIS-CHI-94-123 (June 27, 1994): 30.
128. This would not be classed as foreign affairs in the Chinese categorization of the state. The discussion on Taiwan and Hong Kong is included here because no domestic bureaucracy is involved (although there are Hong Kong and Taiwan affairs offices of the Central Committee), and the advantages gained by a leader by having influence in this area are similar to those gained from foreign affairs.
129. It was reported that Jiang "threw a fit" when it looked like China was forgiving Britain too quickly over the political reforms of Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten. This apparently led to a delay in Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's visit to Britain. See Gittings, "Jiang 'Tantrum' Reportedly Delays Mending of Ties." Jiang's speeches at the handover ceremonies for Hong Kong have also received much publicity.
130. "On an inspection tour, Jiang said: "It is beyond any doubt that the central government will give more support to a province like Guizhou." See "Jiang Zemin on Development of Central, Western Areas," Xinhua, Beijing, March 9, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-049 (March 12, 1996): 25.
131. For example, Jiang said, "We must unify our thinking and actions to make sure that orders and prohibitions of central authorities are carried out to the letter and that various policies and measures taken by central authorities are implemented thoroughly." See "Jiang Urges Deepened Reform, Macroeconomic Regulation," Xinhua, Beijing, August 31, 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-167 (August 31, 1993): 15.
132. This is called to biaotai (make known one's stand) to the central authorities. The minutes of the meetings at which this occurred were recorded by the confidential secretaries and sent to Jiang Zemin and the General Office. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Top Cadres to Pledge Allegiance to Central Authorities," South China Morning Post, December 6, 1994, 1, 11.
133. In the first four months of 1993, new party or government chiefs were appointed in several provinces including Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hunan, Henan, Shanxi, Guizhou, Gansu, Liaoning, Xinjiang Fujian and Hubei. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Locking Up the Floodgates: Striking a Balance Between Reform and Repression," in China Review 1994, ed. Maurice Brosseau and Lo Chi Kin (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1994), 2-9.
134. For example, in 1990, he visited Bose in Guanxi. In 1992, he visited the Yimeng base area in Shandong.
135. Jiang said: "Comrade Mao Zedong was the great leader of our party and people. He and comrades Shaoqi and [Ren] Bishi were all great founders of New China." See "Jiang Zemin Inspects Work in Hunan Province," Xinhua, Beijing, March 8, 1991, in FBIS-CHI-91-053 (March 19, 1991): 17.
136. "Jiang Zemin Speech at Chen Yun Anniversary Forum," Xinhua, Beijing, June 14, 1995, in SWB:FE/2330 (June 15, 1995): G/5.
137. Jiang Zemin, "Correctly Handle Some Major Relationships in the Socialist Modernization Drive," Xinhua, Beijing, October 8, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-195 (October 10, 1995): 29-36.
138. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Jiang Prepares to Take over as Fears Grow for Deng's Health," South China Morning Post, June 11, 1996, 8.
139. "Works on Patriotism by Mao, Deng, Jiang Published," Xinhua, Beijing, September 6, 1994, in FBIS-CHI-94-174 (September 8, 1994): 21.
140. Contained in a series of editorials in the Liberation Army Daily outlining "New Guidelines on Political Education for Senior and Middle-Ranking Army Cadres," in SWB:FE/2608 (May 10, 1996): G/4.
141. Most notable was Jiang's comments on becoming CMC chairman: "I have no experience in military work, and I feel my abilities fall far short of what the position demands. But, since the party has assigned the work to me, I must make every effort to learn about military affairs, familiarize myself as soon as possible with the armed forces and carry out my duty conscientiously and actively." See "Jiang Zemin Speech at Plenum," Xinhua, Beijing, November 21, 1989 in FBIS-CHI-89-223 (November 21, 1989): 29.
142. For example, on his return from a trip to Cuba, it was said that Jiang and his entourage attempted to "recover from fatigue... by singing and laughing together See "Party in the Air," Beijing Central Television Program One Network, December 1, 1993, in BIS-CHI-93-230 (December 2, 1993): 22.
143. Yang Chungui, "Make Efforts to Grasp the Dialectics of Socialist Modernization: Studying Comrade Jiang Zemin on 'Correctly Handling Several Major Relationships in the Socialist Modernization Drive'," People's Daily, November 6, 1995, 1, 2, in FBIS-CHI-95-241 (December 15, 1995): 14.
144. Yang Chungui, "Make Efforts to Grasp the Dialectics of Socialist Modernization: Studying Comrade Jiang Zemin on 'Correctly Handling Several Major Relationships in the Socialist Modernization Drive'," People's Daily, November 6, 1995, 1, 2, in FBIS-CHI-95-241 (December 15, 1995): 14.
145. Commentator, "Learn from Lei Feng Spirit, Carry Forward the Healthy Tendencies of the Times," Liberation Army Daily, March 5, 1996, 3, in FBIS-CHI-96-058 (March 25, 1996): 21.
146. Commentator, "Learn from Lei Feng Spirit, Carry Forward the Healthy Tendencies of the Times," Liberation Army Daily, March 5, 1996, 3, in FBIS-CHI-96-058 (March 25, 1996): 21.
147. "Chinese Army Cadres Begin Class on Deng Xiaoping Theory," Xinhua, Beijing, April 17, 1996, in SWB:FE/2601 (May 2, 1996): G/6.
148. Tiffany Brown, "Jiang Zemin 'Dominated' New Year Press Coverage," AFP, Hong Kong, January 31, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-020 (January 31, 1995): 4.
149. Masaru Soma, "Jiang Said 'To Strengthen' Post-Deng Position," Sankei Shimbun (Tokyo), February 12, 1995, 5, in FBIS-CHI-95-029 (February 13, 1995): 18.
150. Masaru Soma, "Jiang Said 'To Strengthen' Post-Deng Position," Sankei Shimbun (Tokyo), February 12, 1995, 5, in FBIS-CHI-95-029 (February 13, 1995): 18.
151. For example, see Editorial, "A Visit of Great Significance: Congratulating President Jiang Zemin on His Successful Visit to Three European Countries," People's Daily, September 13, 1994, 1, 2, in FBIS-CHI-41-178 (September 14, 1994): 2.
152. For example, see Editorial, "A Visit of Great Significance: Congratulating President Jiang Zemin on His Successful Visit to Three European Countries," People's Daily, September 13, 1994, 1, 2, in FBIS-CHI-41-178 (September 14, 1994): 2.
153. See note 52 above.
154. Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 384.
155. David Shambaugh, "Deng Xiaoping: The Politician," The China Quarterly, no. 135 (September 1993): 460.
156. See, for example, "People in various localities think that the three things made clear to all in Jiang Zemin's speech have provided much food for thought, expressed the readmess to seize the opportunity of Hong Kong's return to promote the development of various undertakings, and hailed the convening of the Fifteenth National Congress with a new face." Xinhua, Beijing July 4, 1997, in SWB:FE/2969 (July 12, 1997): G/1-3.
157. Lam refers to this as "de-Dengification." See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Jiang's Crusade," South China Morning Post, May 3, 1995, 10.
158. Jiang was said to have "heaped praise" on the neo-conservative book Looking at China with a Third Eye. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Book Says Peasants Are 'Active Volcano'," South China Morning Post, August 10, 1994, 15. He also appeared with an important figure in this movement, Chen Yuan, while on an inspection tour of Henan in 1996.
159. Jiang was said to have "heaped praise" on the neo-conservative book Looking at China with a Third Eye. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Book Says Peasants Are 'Active Volcano'," South China Morning Post, August 10, 1994, 15. He also appeared with an important figure in this movement, Chen Yuan, while on an inspection tour of Henan in 1996.
160. The continued interest of Deng Xiaoping in leadership issues in China was alluded to in a People's Daily eulogy to the patriarch: "Though retired from his leading posts. Comrade Deng Xiaoping paid close attention to reform, opening up, and the modernization drive." Xinhua, Beijing, February 19, 1997, in SWB:FE/2849 (February 21, 1997): G/9.
161. The continued interest of Deng Xiaoping in leadership issues in China was alluded to in a People's Daily eulogy to the patriarch: "Though retired from his leading posts. Comrade Deng Xiaoping paid close attention to reform, opening up, and the modernization drive." Xinhua, Beijing, February 19, 1997, in SWB:FE/2849 (February 21, 1997): G/9.
162. This concept was initially introduced by Zhao Ziyang at the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987. By stressing that in this stage the most important task is to develop "productive forces," this concept allowed China to move away from a planned economy without apparently abandoning socialism.
163. Deng's thought will be used to provide justification for all policy initiatives. Jiang put significant stress on the need to "unwaveringly [hold] high the banner of Deng Xiaoping theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics." Text of Jiang Zemin speech, Xinhua, Beijing, May 29, 1997, in SWB:FE/2934 (June 2, 1997): G/7-10. At the Fifteenth Party Congress, Deng Xiaoping theory was added to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought in the party constitution as the guiding ideology.
164. Xinhua, Beijing, May 29, 1997, in SWB:FE/2934 (June 2, 1997): G/9.
165. However, it must be noted that the largest enterprises will remain in state hands, and will even be strengthened. Ownership reform will focus on small and medium-sized enterprises.
166. Jiang Zemin's Political Report at the Fifteenth Party Congress, China Central Television, Beijing, September 12, 1997, in SWB:/FE/3023 (September 13, 1997): S1/10.
167. SWB-FE/3024 (September 15, 1997): S2/13.
168. Text of Jiang Zemin speech made at the Eighth Plenum of the CCP Central Discipline Inspection Commission on January 29, 1997. Xinhua, Beijing, May 15, 1997, in SWB:FE/2921 (May 17, 1997): G/5-7.
169. Jiang noted in his January speech that senior officials must behave well, and be responsible for their spouses, children, and staff. Other anti-corruption measures included: "Norms for Leading Communist Party Cadres to Honestly Perform Official Duties"; "Interim Regulations on Selecting and Appointing Party and Government Leading Cadres"; and "Regulations of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Practicing Thrift and Banning Extravagance."
170. Deng was reported to have told Li Peng and Yao Yilin: "It is hoped that all people can very satisfactorily consider Jiang Zemin as the core and unite. Do not take it amiss with each other and consume each other's strength." Dongfang ribao, July 14, 1989, 5, in FBIS-CHI-89-135 (July 17, 1989): 17.
171. Deng was reported to have told Li Peng and Yao Yilin: "It is hoped that all people can very satisfactorily consider Jiang Zemin as the core and unite. Do not take it amiss with each other and consume each other's strength." Dongfang ribao, July 14, 1989, 5, in FBIS-CHI-89-135 (July 17, 1989): 17.
172. For example, it was reported that in 1993, Deng said to Jiang: "I know that you have to attend to many things, but you must devote energy and time to the military work and be courageous enough to attend to military work." See Jen Hui-wen, "Measures Taken by Jiang Zemin to Remove Hidden Troubles in Army," Xin bao, December 23, 1994, 33, in FBIS-CHI-94-247 (December 23, 1994): 35.
173. For example, it was reported that in 1993, Deng said to Jiang: "I know that you have to attend to many things, but you must devote energy and time to the military work and be courageous enough to attend to military work." See Jen Hui-wen, "Measures Taken by Jiang Zemin to Remove Hidden Troubles in Army," Xin bao, December 23, 1994, 33, in FBIS-CHI-94-247 (December 23, 1994): 35.
174. Shambaugh, "China's Commander-in-Chief," 214.
175. Ibid., 215.
176. Most notable is his continued promotions of allies, especially the "Shanghai faction," and the personality cult.
177. The level of support that this gives Jiang over the lower ranks of the military may be less certain, however. This is reflected in the National Defense Law recently passed, and continued calls for the army to be under the "absolute leadership of the party."
178. See "Zhao's View of Crackdown to Be Probed," South China Morning Post (Internet Edition), September 23, 1997.
179. For example, Deng Xiaoping blamed Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang for student demonstrations, rather than taking responsibility himself.