Pricing bank stocks: The contribution of bank examinations

New England Economic Review

Volumn , Issue 3, 1999, Pages 38-53

  Jordan, John S ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040318847     PISSN: 00284726     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Berger, Allen N. and Sally M. Davies. 1994. "The Information Content of Bank Examinations." Proceedings, Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, pp. 615-28.
2. Berger, Allen N., Sally M. Davies, and Mark J. Flannery. 1998. "Comparing Market and Supervisory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who Knows What When?" Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Working Paper no. 32.
3. DeYoung, Robert, Mark J. Flannery, William W. Lang, and Sorin M. Sorescu. 1998. "The Informational Advantage of Specialized Monitors: The Case of Bank Examiners." Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper no. 4.
4. Flannery, Mark J. and Joel F. Houston. 1998. "The Value of a Government Monitor for U.S. Banking Firms." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, February, pp. 14-34.
5. Flannery, Mark J., Simon Kwan, and M. Nimalendran. 1998. "Market Evidence on the Opaqueness of Banking Firms' Assets." Unpublished working paper.
6. Flannery, Mark J. and Sorin M. Sorescu. 1996. "Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983-1991." Journal of Finance, 51, pp. 1347-77.
7. Hirtle, Beverly J. and Jose A. Lopez. 1998. "Supervisory Information and the Frequency of Bank Examinations." Unpublished working paper.
8. Jordan, John S. 1997. "Insiders' Assessments of the Stock Market's Pricing of New England Bank Stocks." New England Economic Review, July/August, pp. 3-16.
9. _. 1998. "Problem Loans at New England Banks: Evidence of Aggressive Loan Policies." New England Economic Review, January/February, pp. 23-38.
10. Jordan, John S., Joe Peek, and Eric S. Rosengren. 1999. "The Impact of Greater Bank Disclosure Amidst a Banking Crisis." Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No. 99-1.
11. Morgan, Donald. 1998. "Judging the Risk of Banks: What Makes Banks Opaque." Federal Reserve Bank of New York Research Paper no. 9805.
12. Peek, Joe and Eric S. Rosengren. 1997. "The Importance of Timely Dissemination of Information for Market Discipline: The Case of Bank of New England Corporation." Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, unpublished working paper.
13. Simons, Katerina, and Stephan Cross. 1991. "Do Capital Markets Predict Problems in Large Commercial Banks?" New England Economic Review, May/June, pp. 51-56.