Merger as a form of investment

Kyklos

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 127-153

  Bittlingmayer, George ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT DAVIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040306809     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1996.tb01389.x     Document Type: Article

References (36)

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