Angola's elusive peace: The collapse of the Lusaka accord

International Journal

Volumn 54, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 562-580

  Spears, Ian S ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040248903     PISSN: 00207020     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/40203416     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. Respectively União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola - and Movimento Popular do Libertação de Angola - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
2. Cited in Angola Peace Monitor, 30 June 1999.
3. See Hermann Hanekom, 'The Sub-Saharan African arc of conflict: the urgent need for an African peace-keeping capacity,' Africa Insight 28(no 3/4, 1998), 154-9.
4. Lynne Duke, 'Angola's chaos liberates forces of corruption,' Washington Post, 1 January 1999, A27.
5. Ibid; Christine Gordon, Savimbi can't win the next Angolan war,' Daily Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), 26 June 1998.
6. Ibid; Christine Gordon, Savimbi can't win the next Angolan war,' Daily Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), 26 June 1998.
7. Interview with author, 25 1999. It is also possible that off-shore diamonds -those that are washed down rivers and into oceans and beaches - may be found off the shores of Angola. The giant diamond-mining company, De Beers, is currently lobbying the Angolan government to exploit these diamonds.
8. Global Witness adds that, in terms of world production, only 5-10 per cent of the world' gems are of gem quality. See 'A rough trade: the role of companies and governments in the Angolan conflict,' 15 December 1998.
9. The MPLA, arguably the most ethnically diverse of the three movements, includes the Kimbundu-speaking peoples surrounding Luanda, mestiços (ethnically mixed), and educated urbanites. UNITA gains its support largely from the Ovimbundu of the piano alto in central Angola. The third movement (whose political significance has declined) is Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), centred on the Bakongo of northern Angola and southern Zaire. The smallest and most regional liberation movement, the Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC), seeks independence for the oil rich region of Cabinda.
10. In 1997 rumours circulated in Luanda that the government had been involved in a failed coup attempt against the Chiluba regime. While Angolan officials freely admitted Angola's involvement in other nefarious activities in the two Congos, they claimed genuine surprise at the coup attempt in Zambia. More recently, however, Luanda did mount a clumsy effort to blow up certain targets in Lusaka and reportedly had a plan to launch direct military action against Zambia until it was dissuaded by the United States.
11. The United States ambassador to the peace process, Paul Hare, notes that 'in his darker moments, Savimbi would ask, What leader had ever given up his army and survived?' Paul Hare, Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace (Washington: United States Institute of Peace 1998), 105.
12. Confidential interview with author, 22 November 1997.
13. Cited in 'Angola UNITA says govt offensive driven back,' Reuters, 9 December 1998.
14. Cited in 'Angola: government gives bleak military analysis,' Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), 10 May 1999.
15. When public opinion indicated that Angolans believed the international community had failed in its commitments, the government asked the United Nations to withdraw MONUA and the new special representative to the secretary general, Isak Dialo, at the end of February 1999. More recently, the United Nations has been authorized to open a small office in Angola to serve as a liaison between government and rebel authorities in an effort to restore peace.
16. Margaret Joan Anstee, Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-3 (New York: St Martin's 1996), 519.
17. Ibid, 147. Of course, the disdain on all sides goes beyond the presidency. In one of the more humorous exchanges during an interview with MPLA hardliner, Paulo Jorge, the former foreign minister stated, 'You said Dr Savimbi, but Savimbi is not a doctor. He's nothing. It's entirely false. Maybe in lies - he's a doctor of lies!' Interview with author, 29 November 1997.
18. Abel Chivukuvuku, interview with author, 24 November 1997.
19. The MPLA, of course, did accept a power-sharing agreement with UNITA, but only after considerable international pressure was applied on the government to do so.
20. Interview with author, 7 July 1999. Because of sanctions against it, UNITA no longer has official representation in Washington. Muekalia spoke as a 'concerned Angolan citizen.'
21. On Mozambique, see John Saul, 'Inside from the outside? The roots and resolution of Mozambique's un/civil war,' in Taisier Ali and Robert O. Matthews, eds, Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 1998).
22. Assis Malaquias, 'The UN in Mozambique and Angola: lessons learned,' in Jeremy Ginifer, ed, Beyond the Emergency: Development Within UN Peace Missions (London: Frank Cass 1997), 91.
23. Hare, Angola's Last Best Chance, 126.
24. Interview with author.
25. Cited in Paul Richardson, 'Interview - UNITA ready to intensify war in Angola,' Reuters, 22 December 1998. The attack left eight people dead, 24 wounded, and 10 missing.
26. Confidential interview with author. Although the DiamondWorks mine at Yetwene was shut down for four months following the UNITA attacks, it has since reopened -with a significantly larger security force.
27. Observers maintain that UNITA is also unlikely to target the oil companies or their installations because it would need their expertise if it ever ousts the MPLA from Luanda. The same is not true for diamonds, however. The mining of high quality alluvial diamonds does not necessarily require high technology and, indeed, diamonds are often extracted by UNITA or by local freelance miners called garimpeiros. Consequently, when the opportunity arises, diamond mines have been attacked.
28. Interview with author, 25 June 1999.
29. Press conference, Alrosa Company and De Beers Corporation, 21 October 1997 (transcript).
30. Lynne Duke, 'Angola's chaos liberates forces of corruption.' One diplomat noted in an interview that only about 50 per cent of Angola's oil revenue can be accounted for.
31. Global Witness, 'A rough trade.'
32. Cited in Sam Mujuda, 'UNITA"controls" Zambian border,' Daily Mail and Guardian, 12 May 1999.
33. Cited in Human Rights Watch, Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War since the 1992 Elections (New York: Human Rights Watch 1994), 25-6.
34. Cited in 'Angola: SADC to underwrite a peace deal,' IRIN, 14 July 1999.
35. Confidential interview with author.
36. 'Angola: all about power,' Africa Confidential 40(5 February 1999).
37. Interview with author, 13 November 1998.
38. 'Angola II: deadly diamonds,' Africa Confidential 40(16 April 1999).
39. Confidential interview with author.
40. Global Witness, 'A rough trade.'
41. Cited in Steven Edwards, 'Mission to stop Angola's diamond war,' National Post (Toronto), 10 March 1999, A12.