Are there natural rights in Aristotle?

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 49, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 755-774

  Kraut, Richard ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0040157299     PISSN: 00346632     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (43)

1. Fred D. Miller, Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics (hereafter, NJR) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Miller argues not only that Aristotle has a concept or theory of rights (though he adds a caveat regarding the word "theory"; ibid., 90 ), but also that "rights have a central place in Aristotle's politics"; ibid., 17.
2. Fred D. Miller, Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics (hereafter, NJR) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Miller argues not only that Aristotle has a concept or theory of rights (though he adds a caveat regarding the word "theory"; ibid., 90 ), but also that "rights have a central place in Aristotle's politics"; ibid., 17.
3. Fred D. Miller, Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics (hereafter, NJR) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Miller argues not only that Aristotle has a concept or theory of rights (though he adds a caveat regarding the word "theory"; ibid., 90 ), but also that "rights have a central place in Aristotle's politics"; ibid., 17.
4. See Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter, NE) 5.7.1134b18-27.
5. See Miller, NJR, 16-17, 74-9, 88-90, 122-3.
6. For a recent challenge to the traditional reading followed by Miller, see Bernard Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 59, 140-9. I find Yack's argument unconvincing, but will not address the issue here.
7. See Miller, NJR, 91, 115-7.
8. Miller recognizes that according to Aristotle there are "non-political forms of justice" (NJR, 84), but he takes NE 5.7.1134b18-19 to mean that "natural justice is . . . inherently political" (ibid., 122; cf. 74-5). This is why he refuses to attribute to Aristotle the idea that there is natural justice and injustice in a state of nature. However, the passage cited merely divides political justice into natural and legal parts; it does not rule out the possibility of natural justice outside the polis. At 5.6.1134a29-30 (cited by Miller, NJR, 86), Aristotle takes political justice to be primary, and other forms of justice to be related to it by similarity; but this allows him to hold that natural justice and injustice exist prior to the formation of the polis. He must hold this, since he claims that whenever a natural slave serves a natural master, slavery is both advantageous and just; see Politics 1.5.1255a1-3. It would be implausible to take Aristotle to mean that slavery accords with justice only within the polis and not outside it. And why should such justice not be called natural when master and slave are natural?
9. Miller recognizes that according to Aristotle there are "non-political forms of justice" (NJR, 84), but he takes NE 5.7.1134b18-19 to mean that "natural justice is . . . inherently political" (ibid., 122; cf. 74-5). This is why he refuses to attribute to Aristotle the idea that there is natural justice and injustice in a state of nature. However, the passage cited merely divides political justice into natural and legal parts; it does not rule out the possibility of natural justice outside the polis. At 5.6.1134a29-30 (cited by Miller, NJR, 86), Aristotle takes political justice to be primary, and other forms of justice to be related to it by similarity; but this allows him to hold that natural justice and injustice exist prior to the formation of the polis. He must hold this, since he claims that whenever a natural slave serves a natural master, slavery is both advantageous and just; see Politics 1.5.1255a1-3. It would be implausible to take Aristotle to mean that slavery accords with justice only within the polis and not outside it. And why should such justice not be called natural when master and slave are natural?
10. Miller recognizes that according to Aristotle there are "non-political forms of justice" (NJR, 84), but he takes NE 5.7.1134b18-19 to mean that "natural justice is . . . inherently political" (ibid., 122; cf. 74-5). This is why he refuses to attribute to Aristotle the idea that there is natural justice and injustice in a state of nature. However, the passage cited merely divides political justice into natural and legal parts; it does not rule out the possibility of natural justice outside the polis. At 5.6.1134a29-30 (cited by Miller, NJR, 86), Aristotle takes political justice to be primary, and other forms of justice to be related to it by similarity; but this allows him to hold that natural justice and injustice exist prior to the formation of the polis. He must hold this, since he claims that whenever a natural slave serves a natural master, slavery is both advantageous and just; see Politics 1.5.1255a1-3. It would be implausible to take Aristotle to mean that slavery accords with justice only within the polis and not outside it. And why should such justice not be called natural when master and slave are natural?
11. Miller recognizes that according to Aristotle there are "non-political forms of justice" (NJR, 84), but he takes NE 5.7.1134b18-19 to mean that "natural justice is . . . inherently political" (ibid., 122; cf. 74-5). This is why he refuses to attribute to Aristotle the idea that there is natural justice and injustice in a state of nature. However, the passage cited merely divides political justice into natural and legal parts; it does not rule out the possibility of natural justice outside the polis. At 5.6.1134a29-30 (cited by Miller, NJR, 86), Aristotle takes political justice to be primary, and other forms of justice to be related to it by similarity; but this allows him to hold that natural justice and injustice exist prior to the formation of the polis. He must hold this, since he claims that whenever a natural slave serves a natural master, slavery is both advantageous and just; see Politics 1.5.1255a1-3. It would be implausible to take Aristotle to mean that slavery accords with justice only within the polis and not outside it. And why should such justice not be called natural when master and slave are natural?
12. Miller recognizes that according to Aristotle there are "non-political forms of justice" (NJR, 84), but he takes NE 5.7.1134b18-19 to mean that "natural justice is . . . inherently political" (ibid., 122; cf. 74-5). This is why he refuses to attribute to Aristotle the idea that there is natural justice and injustice in a state of nature. However, the passage cited merely divides political justice into natural and legal parts; it does not rule out the possibility of natural justice outside the polis. At 5.6.1134a29-30 (cited by Miller, NJR, 86), Aristotle takes political justice to be primary, and other forms of justice to be related to it by similarity; but this allows him to hold that natural justice and injustice exist prior to the formation of the polis. He must hold this, since he claims that whenever a natural slave serves a natural master, slavery is both advantageous and just; see Politics 1.5.1255a1-3. It would be implausible to take Aristotle to mean that slavery accords with justice only within the polis and not outside it. And why should such justice not be called natural when master and slave are natural?
13. Although Miller focuses on political and property rights, he also attributes to Aristotle the thesis that certain human beings have a right not to be treated with violence and disrespect; Miller, NJR, 280-98. I do not see how Aristotle could believe that insolent treatment is contrary to natural justice when it occurs among members of a polis, but not otherwise. Of course, political rights cannot be possessed when there is no polis; but the basic restraints certain people owe each other do not presuppose political institutions.
14. Those who are in a state of nature are "all equal and independent" The Second Treatise of Government, chap. 2, sec. 6. The conditions under which slavery is permissible are treated in chapter 4, but no one is a natural slave.
15. See Politics 7.2.1324b39-41.
16. For a fuller discussion, see Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton University Press, 1970), 55-87, especially 86.
17. This feature of Aristotle's thinking is especially prominent in Politics 3.12-13; note especially the analogy he makes in 3.12 between assigning the best flutes to the best flute-players and awarding political offices to qualified citizens.
18. Miller tries to address the point I am making on p. 98 of NJR. He agrees that "someone can deserve a job . . . without have a 'right' to it." But he points out that Aristotle applies the concept of justice (to dikaion) to disputes over property, and claims that in these cases the question to be decided by the judge is not who deserves it but who has a right to it. I do not think this adequately addresses the problem with which I am concerned. Miller thinks that Aristotle attributes natural political rights to certain persons and must therefore confront the difficulty presented by the fact that for Aristotle political offices should be filled by those who best deserve them. Pointing out that property rights are not for Aristotle a matter of desert does not address this difficulty. (I will turn to the topic of property rights later.)
19. At Politics 3.2.1275b22-34 Aristotle notes that ancestry cannot serve as a universal criterion of citizenship and is used by cities merely as a convenience. At 6.4,1319b6-18 he notes the democratic device of lowering the ancestral requirement in order to increase the citizen rolls, but advises against taking it to an extreme.
20. On the paucity of excellent men, see Politics 3.7.1279a40-b2, 5.4. 1304b5; it is this paucity that underlies Aristotle's willingness to grant citizenship to those who are less than fully qualified. I take Aristotle to be saying at 3.11.1281b15-31 that some (for example, unskilled workers) should never be enrolled as citizens, whereas others (for example, farmers and artisans) can perform basic civic functions well but should not be selected for high office.
21. See Politics 7.9.1328b38-9 for Aristotle's distinction between being unconditionally just and being just-relative-to-one's political system. The background to this distinction is the discussion of the difference between being a good person and a good citizen (3.4): it takes less to possess the virtues that make one a good citizen of a certain community than it does to be a virtuous person simpliciter. (This should not be taken to mean that being a good citizen is not a worthwhile accomplishment.)
22. See Politics 2.5.
23. See Politics 1.8-10.
24. See NE 5.1.1129b3-6, 5.9.1137a26-30; Eudemian Ethics 3.1. 1228b19-22, 7.2.1235b31-5, 7.2.1236b35-1237a3, 8.3.1249a12-13; Politics 7.13.1332a19-25.
25. See NE 5.1.1129b3-6, 5.9.1137a26-30; Eudemian Ethics 3.1. 1228b19-22, 7.2.1235b31-5, 7.2.1236b35-1237a3, 8.3.1249a12-13; Politics 7.13.1332a19-25.
26. See NE 5.1.1129b3-6, 5.9.1137a26-30; Eudemian Ethics 3.1. 1228b19-22, 7.2.1235b31-5, 7.2.1236b35-1237a3, 8.3.1249a12-13; Politics 7.13.1332a19-25.
27. See Politics 1.9.1257b25-1258a10.
28. See NE 5.4.1132a2-6.
29. Miller, NJR, 95.
30. Miller, NJR, 329.
31. See Politics 7.10.1330a14-25.
32. As Miller notes (see NJR, 312, 322-3), Aristotle says that a possession is one's own (oikeion) if it is up to one whether or not to sell it or give it away; see Rhetoric 1.5.1361a21-2. So, on Aristotle's own definition, not all possessions ought to be entirely one's own. In chapter 9, Miller takes Aristotle to be arguing in favor of property rights, where property rights are taken to include the right to give away or sell (p. 310); but he overlooks the need to restrict this right in the ideal city. I think it is fair to generalize and say that Aristotle is willing to restrict ownership of property whenever doing so would serve the common good.
33. As Miller notes (see NJR, 312, 322-3), Aristotle says that a possession is one's own (oikeion) if it is up to one whether or not to sell it or give it away; see Rhetoric 1.5.1361a21-2. So, on Aristotle's own definition, not all possessions ought to be entirely one's own. In chapter 9, Miller takes Aristotle to be arguing in favor of property rights, where property rights are taken to include the right to give away or sell (p. 310); but he overlooks the need to restrict this right in the ideal city. I think it is fair to generalize and say that Aristotle is willing to restrict ownership of property whenever doing so would serve the common good.
34. See especially chapter 6 of NJR, where Miller argues that Aristotle is concerned with protecting strong rights claims in the sense that "the interest of the individual may not be sacrificed in order to advance the interests of others"; NJR, 193; cf. 16, 137). On Miller's reading, Aristotle thinks it is never necessary to require even a small sacrifice for the sake of others, because "the ends of individuals are compossibly realizable, i.e. . . . it is possible for every member to attain perfection without impeding anyone else from doing the same"; ibid., 199.
35. See especially chapter 6 of NJR, where Miller argues that Aristotle is concerned with protecting strong rights claims in the sense that "the interest of the individual may not be sacrificed in order to advance the interests of others"; NJR, 193; cf. 16, 137). On Miller's reading, Aristotle thinks it is never necessary to require even a small sacrifice for the sake of others, because "the ends of individuals are compossibly realizable, i.e. . . . it is possible for every member to attain perfection without impeding anyone else from doing the same"; ibid., 199.
36. See especially chapter 6 of NJR, where Miller argues that Aristotle is concerned with protecting strong rights claims in the sense that "the interest of the individual may not be sacrificed in order to advance the interests of others"; NJR, 193; cf. 16, 137). On Miller's reading, Aristotle thinks it is never necessary to require even a small sacrifice for the sake of others, because "the ends of individuals are compossibly realizable, i.e. . . . it is possible for every member to attain perfection without impeding anyone else from doing the same"; ibid., 199.
37. The concept of the common good is introduced in order to distinguish between correct and deviant political systems: the former aim at the good of all citizens, whereas defective systems aim only at the good of those in power; see Politics 3.7.
38. See Republic 420b-421a.
39. See Politics 3.17.1288a15-32.
40. Can the person who has extraordinary virtue refuse to accept the kingship? As Miller points out (NJR, 250), Aristotle does not recognize this "liberty right"; refusing to rule is not an option. See Politics 2.9.1271a11-12; cf. 4.9.1294a35-b1, 4.13.1297a17-20.
41. Can the person who has extraordinary virtue refuse to accept the kingship? As Miller points out (NJR, 250), Aristotle does not recognize this "liberty right"; refusing to rule is not an option. See Politics 2.9.1271a11-12; cf. 4.9.1294a35-b1, 4.13.1297a17-20.
42. We could confidently say that Aristotle has the concept of a right if he explicitly held that no human being should be hunted for food even in cases where it would maximize the good to do so. But of course he says no such thing. We are left to wonder if he has thought about the question whether one should refrain from hunting people even if doing so accomplished maximal good. All we have from him is the thought that no one should be treated in this way. That is what a rights theorist would say - but does this mean that Aristotle has the concept of a right? We might reply that it is essential to the concept of a right that rights are not to be infringed merely in order to maximize the good, and that anyone who does not express this thought does not have the concept. But as I said earlier, I am suspicious of this essentialism. If Locke fails to express the thought that rights are not to be infringed merely in order to maximize the good, does that show that he does not have the concept of rights? We are sure that he does have the concept, even though we may have no idea whether he expresses this thought. It would be equally questionable to say that no one should be credited with the concept of a right who fails to hold that when rights are infringed compensation is due. (Note that Aristotle never hints that those who are legitimately taken off the citizen rolls are due compensation.)
43. I am grateful to John Deigh for his criticism of an earlier draft.