Justice and rights in Aristotle's politics

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 49, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 859-872

  Cooper, John M ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0040153530     PISSN: 00346632     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (45)

1. Ernest Barker, ed. and trans., The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946).
2. See Politics 4.4.1291a40; 4.15.1299a11; Barker, Politics, 166, 194.
3. See Politics 4.4.1291a40; 4.15.1299a11; Barker, Politics, 166, 194.
4. Politics 3.1.1275b18-20; Barker, Politics, 95.
5. Politics 3.1.1275b18-20; Barker, Politics, 95.
6. Barker, Politics, 145 (emphasis added).
7. Carnes Lord, trans., Aristotle: The Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
8. Lord, Aristotle, 276.
9. See, for example, Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 182-3. Fred D. Miller cites and discusses Strauss's views in Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics (hereafter, NJR) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 92-3 and 114-15.
10. See, for example, Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 182-3. Fred D. Miller cites and discusses Strauss's views in Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics (hereafter, NJR) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 92-3 and 114-15.
11. Miller, NJR, sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4, surveys selected prominent authors' views on this topic.
12. See W. N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923). Miller argues convincingly that Aristotle employs ε+(combining comma above)ξουσία and ε+(combining comma above)ξει̂υαι to refer to what Hohfeld defines as "liberties" or "privileges."
13. His response can be found in NJR, 112-15.
14. Since these good activities are actions of the virtues, they can also be thought of as acts of duty or service to the community. This thought is one expression of the idea that Aristotle, like other ancient thinkers, placed priority on "duty," instead of "right": his very conception of the good of the individual persons making up the community is of such (personally fulfilling, excellent) community service. Miller responds to Strauss's version of this idea, but without seeing its roots in this part of Aristotle's theory (NJR, 115). His response is therefore inconclusive.
15. Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), par. 185, Addition.
16. Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, ed. and trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simpson (London: Routledge, 1894), 2:208.
17. Of the authors Miller discusses, this may not be so for Alasdair MacIntyre, but certainly it applies to Strauss and many if not all the others.
18. Miller, NJR, 114.
19. Miller collects and analyzes clearly and usefully the different linguistic means that, lacking any unifying term for "rights," Aristotle employs for these four distinct types of rights recognized in Hohfeld's analysis; he is persuasive in arguing that Aristotle does clearly recognize rights of all Hohfeld's four sorts, and has a good grasp on what they each involve; NJR, section 4.3.
20. Miller, NJR, 90.
21. Miller assumes that Aristotle's ideal state, which is to serve as a regulative ideal and not to describe any actually realizable constitution, is one where the citizens (all of whom engage in turn in holding office and ruling) are also all the native-born free persons resident within it: male adults who are subject to the laws but have no political function at all are exclusively slaves, barbarian subjects (περίοιοι), and resident aliens ("metics"); see, for example, Miller, NJR, section 6.9. Depending upon the particular circumstances in a given instance, the actually realizable state that is best - as determined by applying this ideal under those circumstances - will be one or another of the "mixed" constitutions, including the various forms of "polity" that Aristotle discusses in book 4. Even though I agree that Aristotle's ideal state, serving only as a regulative ideal, is not bound by historically or other "practically" determined limitations, I doubt that Miller is right that in it there are no native-born free persons apart from the ones who exercise the functions of citizenship. About this, the text is indecisive. In Politics 7.10.1330a23-31, Aristotle does say that ideally the farmers should all be slaves or barbarian subjects, working the lands for the owners (individual citizens or the state), and conceivably he intends that all the nonslaves engaged, even at the highest levels, in trade, manufacture, and the crafts will be resident aliens (but he does not distinctly say so). However, he can hardly have seriously intended that somehow or other all the native-born free persons, even in some specially favored Greek population, should attain through the educational and other institutions of his city the extremely high levels of moral and intellectual accomplishment that he requires for the exercise of the rights of citizenship: that would be more than we could wish for even in our "prayers," and his Greek readers could not be expected to grasp such an intention on his part without its being distinctly expressed. (Perhaps he is thinking of a new city founded, like the Magnesia of Plato's Laws, by specially selected colonists, but the standards of virtue to be maintained at Magnesia by the successive generations of ordinary citizens are quite low, compared with Aristotle's.) So, without being explicit about it one way or the other, he may be making the normal assumption that there will be some free native-born residents of his city, recognized by the virtuous elite as fellow-citizens, not participating in the rights of citizenship beyond being regarded as parts of the community at whose mutual advantage the laws and the rulers aim - the slaves, barbarian subjects, and resident aliens would not be part of the community even in this minimal sense, of course. (If so, the idea that in a "correct" constitution those holding political power rule for the common, not for their own personal, advantage would apply to this case, as of course it ought to-but would not on Miller's interpretation, except in a Pickwickian sense.) This was my own assumption in "Political Animals and Civic Friendship," in Aristoteles' 'Politik', ed. Günther Patzig (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1990), 221-48.
22. Miller assumes that Aristotle's ideal state, which is to serve as a regulative ideal and not to describe any actually realizable constitution, is one where the citizens (all of whom engage in turn in holding office and ruling) are also all the native-born free persons resident within it: male adults who are subject to the laws but have no political function at all are exclusively slaves, barbarian subjects (περίοιοι), and resident aliens ("metics"); see, for example, Miller, NJR, section 6.9. Depending upon the particular circumstances in a given instance, the actually realizable state that is best - as determined by applying this ideal under those circumstances - will be one or another of the "mixed" constitutions, including the various forms of "polity" that Aristotle discusses in book 4. Even though I agree that Aristotle's ideal state, serving only as a regulative ideal, is not bound by historically or other "practically" determined limitations, I doubt that Miller is right that in it there are no native-born free persons apart from the ones who exercise the functions of citizenship. About this, the text is indecisive. In Politics 7.10.1330a23-31, Aristotle does say that ideally the farmers should all be slaves or barbarian subjects, working the lands for the owners (individual citizens or the state), and conceivably he intends that all the nonslaves engaged, even at the highest levels, in trade, manufacture, and the crafts will be resident aliens (but he does not distinctly say so). However, he can hardly have seriously intended that somehow or other all the native-born free persons, even in some specially favored Greek population, should attain through the educational and other institutions of his city the extremely high levels of moral and intellectual accomplishment that he requires for the exercise of the rights of citizenship: that would be more than we could wish for even in our "prayers," and his Greek readers could not be expected to grasp such an intention on his part without its being distinctly expressed. (Perhaps he is thinking of a new city founded, like the Magnesia of Plato's Laws, by specially selected colonists, but the standards of virtue to be maintained at Magnesia by the successive generations of ordinary citizens are quite low, compared with Aristotle's.) So, without being explicit about it one way or the other, he may be making the normal assumption that there will be some free native-born residents of his city, recognized by the virtuous elite as fellow-citizens, not participating in the rights of citizenship beyond being regarded as parts of the community at whose mutual advantage the laws and the rulers aim - the slaves, barbarian subjects, and resident aliens would not be part of the community even in this minimal sense, of course. (If so, the idea that in a "correct" constitution those holding political power rule for the common, not for their own personal, advantage would apply to this case, as of course it ought to-but would not on Miller's interpretation, except in a Pickwickian sense.) This was my own assumption in "Political Animals and Civic Friendship," in Aristoteles' 'Politik', ed. Günther Patzig (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1990), 221-48.
23. Miller assumes that Aristotle's ideal state, which is to serve as a regulative ideal and not to describe any actually realizable constitution, is one where the citizens (all of whom engage in turn in holding office and ruling) are also all the native-born free persons resident within it: male adults who are subject to the laws but have no political function at all are exclusively slaves, barbarian subjects (περίοιοι), and resident aliens ("metics"); see, for example, Miller, NJR, section 6.9. Depending upon the particular circumstances in a given instance, the actually realizable state that is best - as determined by applying this ideal under those circumstances - will be one or another of the "mixed" constitutions, including the various forms of "polity" that Aristotle discusses in book 4. Even though I agree that Aristotle's ideal state, serving only as a regulative ideal, is not bound by historically or other "practically" determined limitations, I doubt that Miller is right that in it there are no native-born free persons apart from the ones who exercise the functions of citizenship. About this, the text is indecisive. In Politics 7.10.1330a23-31, Aristotle does say that ideally the farmers should all be slaves or barbarian subjects, working the lands for the owners (individual citizens or the state), and conceivably he intends that all the nonslaves engaged, even at the highest levels, in trade, manufacture, and the crafts will be resident aliens (but he does not distinctly say so). However, he can hardly have seriously intended that somehow or other all the native-born free persons, even in some specially favored Greek population, should attain through the educational and other institutions of his city the extremely high levels of moral and intellectual accomplishment that he requires for the exercise of the rights of citizenship: that would be more than we could wish for even in our "prayers," and his Greek readers could not be expected to grasp such an intention on his part without its being distinctly expressed. (Perhaps he is thinking of a new city founded, like the Magnesia of Plato's Laws, by specially selected colonists, but the standards of virtue to be maintained at Magnesia by the successive generations of ordinary citizens are quite low, compared with Aristotle's.) So, without being explicit about it one way or the other, he may be making the normal assumption that there will be some free native-born residents of his city, recognized by the virtuous elite as fellow-citizens, not participating in the rights of citizenship beyond being regarded as parts of the community at whose mutual advantage the laws and the rulers aim - the slaves, barbarian subjects, and resident aliens would not be part of the community even in this minimal sense, of course. (If so, the idea that in a "correct" constitution those holding political power rule for the common, not for their own personal, advantage would apply to this case, as of course it ought to-but would not on Miller's interpretation, except in a Pickwickian sense.) This was my own assumption in "Political Animals and Civic Friendship," in Aristoteles' 'Politik', ed. Günther Patzig (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1990), 221-48.
24. See Republic 345e, 519c-521b.
25. See Miller, NJR, 97-101.
26. Literally, "what deliberates and decides about the things that are just for disputants." Here and in what follows, discussion of the Greek is based on the text as given in Aristotelis Politica, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957).
27. See Miller, NJR, 98.
28. See Politics 7.4.1326b14-15. (Perhaps he only means that in order to determine what justice requires the judges have to know whether the people before them are to be trusted in their evidence, but more seems intended than that.) In any case, in this and other passages also not mentioned by Miller where Aristotle refers to deciding about τὰ δίαια (7.8.1328b14, and 9.1329a4) he is plainly to be taken as referring to decisions in court about questions of justice in general, not especially or necessarily merely ones having to do with "just-claim" rights. On the other hand, the reference at 6.8.1322a5-6 to δίας περί τω̂ν διαίων appears, from the context, to concern disputes specifically over money and property, so there (though strictly the language speaks again simply of "suits over questions of justice") Barker's translation "suits for the determination of rights" would certainly not be wrong. (Miller omits to mention this passage, too.)
29. Politics 3.1.1275a8-10.
30. Miller, NJR, 98. Miller misconstrues the Greek of the continuation, introducing a further reference to rights into his translation: "for this also belongs to those who have a community as a result of treaties (for these [rights] also belong to these persons)." ("This" plainly refers back to partaking of "just things.") He says that in 1275a11 (where he follows Dreizehnter in retaining the phrase bracketed by Ross) he is taking ταυ̂τα ("these [rights]") to refer back to τω̂ν just διαίων (literally, "just things") and τούτοις ("these persons") to οι . . . μετέχοντες ("those who partake of 'just things' "); see Aristotele's Politik, ed. Alois Dreizehnter (Munchen: W. Fink, 1970). Then, however, the parenthetical clause says emptily and pointlessly that these rights (also!?) belong to those who participate in these rights. Miller could avoid making this clause empty and pointless by taking "these persons" to refer to τοι̂ς . . . οινωνου̂σιν ("those who have a community as a result of treaties"). But in fact, given that του̂το("this") refers to the partaking of just things, the order of the Greek demonstratives pretty clearly makes ταυ̂τα refer to undergoing and bringing lawsuits (as well as τούτοις refer to "those who have a community as a result of treaties"). Furthermore, only so do we get satisfactory inferential relationships asserted by the two occurrences of γὰρ ("for"). Aristotle is giving reasons to accept his claim that it is not a satisfactory criterion of citizenship that someone partakes of "just things" in a city: he says, sensibly, that (in addition to native-born people who have access to the city's courts) non-citizens also bring and undergo suits in the courts because of treaties with other cities, so that they too partake in the city's "just things."
31. Miller, NJR, 98. Miller misconstrues the Greek of the continuation, introducing a further reference to rights into his translation: "for this also belongs to those who have a community as a result of treaties (for these [rights] also belong to these persons)." ("This" plainly refers back to partaking of "just things.") He says that in 1275a11 (where he follows Dreizehnter in retaining the phrase bracketed by Ross) he is taking ταυ̂τα ("these [rights]") to refer back to τω̂ν just διαίων (literally, "just things") and τούτοις ("these persons") to οι . . . μετέχοντες ("those who partake of 'just things' "); see Aristotele's Politik, ed. Alois Dreizehnter (Munchen: W. Fink, 1970). Then, however, the parenthetical clause says emptily and pointlessly that these rights (also!?) belong to those who participate in these rights. Miller could avoid making this clause empty and pointless by taking "these persons" to refer to τοι̂ς . . . οινωνου̂σιν ("those who have a community as a result of treaties"). But in fact, given that του̂το("this") refers to the partaking of just things, the order of the Greek demonstratives pretty clearly makes ταυ̂τα refer to undergoing and bringing lawsuits (as well as τούτοις refer to "those who have a community as a result of treaties"). Furthermore, only so do we get satisfactory inferential relationships asserted by the two occurrences of γὰρ ("for"). Aristotle is giving reasons to accept his claim that it is not a satisfactory criterion of citizenship that someone partakes of "just things" in a city: he says, sensibly, that (in addition to native-born people who have access to the city's courts) non-citizens also bring and undergo suits in the courts because of treaties with other cities, so that they too partake in the city's "just things."
32. For the distinction between "public" and "private" suits in the courts of Athens, see for example Douglas M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).
33. See Miller, NJR, 100.
34. Αρχαι 1282b24-5, 1283a11. Literally, "offices for ruling."
35. See Politics 3.13.1283a16-20.
36. See Politics 3.13.1283a15-17.
37. Note especially δει̂ν, Politics 3.13.1282b24.
38. See Politics 1282b23-30.
39. Politics 1282b26-7.
40. At Politics 3.13.1283b17-18 and 21-3, he similarly translates ατὰ τὸ δίαιον as "based on the same just-claim right" where I would say it is clear that the meaning is rather "based on the same conception of justice." The context is a dispute between the champions of oligarchy, rule by the most ancient families, and rule by the free-born natives - each with their own theory of what qualities the just assignment of offices is based on. Likewise, ατὰ τὸ ο+(combining comma above)λιγαρχιὸ ν διαιον at 6.3.1318a24 surely means "according to the oligarchic conception of justice" not, as Miller has it, "based on the oligarchic just-claim right"; Miller, NJR, 100.
41. At Politics 3.13.1283b17-18 and 21-3, he similarly translates ατὰ τὸ δίαιον as "based on the same just-claim right" where I would say it is clear that the meaning is rather "based on the same conception of justice." The context is a dispute between the champions of oligarchy, rule by the most ancient families, and rule by the free-born natives - each with their own theory of what qualities the just assignment of offices is based on. Likewise, ατὰ τὸ ο+(combining comma above)λιγαρχιὸ ν διαιον at 6.3.1318a24 surely means "according to the oligarchic conception of justice" not, as Miller has it, "based on the oligarchic just-claim right"; Miller, NJR, 100.
42. See Politics, 3.12.1282b29-30.
43. Similarly, I would say that the phrase α+(combining comma above)ρχει̂ν δίαιος at Politics 3.16.1287b12-13 and 6.3.1318a24 does not mean merely "has a right to rule" or a "just-claim right to rule" (see Miller, NJR, 101), but that it is "just" that he do so: the term δίαιος may carry the nuance of a requirement as well as that of an entitlement here, and the translation ought not to obscure that.
44. Similarly, I would say that the phrase α+(combining comma above)ρχει̂ν δίαιος at Politics 3.16.1287b12-13 and 6.3.1318a24 does not mean merely "has a right to rule" or a "just-claim right to rule" (see Miller, NJR, 101), but that it is "just" that he do so: the term δίαιος may carry the nuance of a requirement as well as that of an entitlement here, and the translation ought not to obscure that.
45. Since I have disputed his handling of so many of the passages he cites for the translation of τὸ δίαιον as "just-claim right," I should report that in one of these passages (see Politics 3.9.1280b11) the context does seem to me to support that translation. Princeton University