Corruption cycles

Political Studies

Volumn 45, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 477-495

  Bicchieri, Cristina ^a   Duffy, John ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040151667     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00092     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. The classic statement of this definition of corruption has been given by Nye. According to him, a political act is corrupt when it 'deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains: or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence'. Cf. J. Nye, 'Corruption and political development: a cost-benefit analysis', American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), p. 416.
2. An analysis of how a corrupt political system may suddenly collapse is found in C. Bicchieri and C. Rovelli, 'Evolution and revolution: the dynamics of corruption', Rationality and Society, 7 (1995).
3. Cf. G. Myrdal, 'Corruption: its Causes and Effects', in Asian Drama: an Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations, vol. 2 (New York, Twentieth Century, 1968), and also R. Wraith and E. Simpkins, Corruption in Developing Nations (London, Allen and Unwin, 1963).
4. Cf. G. Myrdal, 'Corruption: its Causes and Effects', in Asian Drama: an Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations, vol. 2 (New York, Twentieth Century, 1968), and also R. Wraith and E. Simpkins, Corruption in Developing Nations (London, Allen and Unwin, 1963).
5. Cf. J. Abueva, 'The contribution of nepotism, spoils and graft to political development', East-West Center Review, 3 (1966); N. Leff, 'Economic development through bureaucratic corruption', American Behavioural Scientist, 8 (1964); H. D. Bayley, 'The effects of corruption in a developing nation', Western Political Quarterly, 19 (1966).
6. Cf. J. Abueva, 'The contribution of nepotism, spoils and graft to political development', East-West Center Review, 3 (1966); N. Leff, 'Economic development through bureaucratic corruption', American Behavioural Scientist, 8 (1964); H. D. Bayley, 'The effects of corruption in a developing nation', Western Political Quarterly, 19 (1966).
7. Cf. J. Abueva, 'The contribution of nepotism, spoils and graft to political development', East-West Center Review, 3 (1966); N. Leff, 'Economic development through bureaucratic corruption', American Behavioural Scientist, 8 (1964); H. D. Bayley, 'The effects of corruption in a developing nation', Western Political Quarterly, 19 (1966).
8. Cf. G. Benson, Political Corruption in America, (Lexington, 1978); J. Dobel, 'The corruption of a state', American Political Science Review, 72 (1978); S. Mamoru and H. Auerbach, 'Political corruption and social structure in Japan', Asian Survey, 17 (1977); S. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: a Study in Political Economy (New York, Academic, 1978).
9. Cf. G. Benson, Political Corruption in America, (Lexington, 1978); J. Dobel, 'The corruption of a state', American Political Science Review, 72 (1978); S. Mamoru and H. Auerbach, 'Political corruption and social structure in Japan', Asian Survey, 17 (1977); S. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: a Study in Political Economy (New York, Academic, 1978).
10. Cf. G. Benson, Political Corruption in America, (Lexington, 1978); J. Dobel, 'The corruption of a state', American Political Science Review, 72 (1978); S. Mamoru and H. Auerbach, 'Political corruption and social structure in Japan', Asian Survey, 17 (1977); S. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: a Study in Political Economy (New York, Academic, 1978).
11. Cf. G. Benson, Political Corruption in America, (Lexington, 1978); J. Dobel, 'The corruption of a state', American Political Science Review, 72 (1978); S. Mamoru and H. Auerbach, 'Political corruption and social structure in Japan', Asian Survey, 17 (1977); S. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: a Study in Political Economy (New York, Academic, 1978).
12. In Italy, for example, by the 1970s the state sector had become a political instrument at the hands of the Christian Democrats. Its economic functions were subordinated to the policies of enabling the survival of that party. Cf. Donald Sassoon, Contemporary Italty (London, Longman, 1988).
13. Cf. K. Gillespie and G. Okrulik, 'The political dimensions of corruption cleanups', Comparative Politics (1991).
14. Cf. H. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967).
15. J. Scott, 'Corruption, machine politics and political change', The American Political Science Review, 62 (1969).
16. In a small experiment done with students in 1977, Rundquist, Strom and Peters report that certain kinds of information induce more voting for the corrupt candidate: in that particular experiment, it was information on the candidate's Vietnam position. Subjects who received this information had a probability of 0.44 of voting for the corrupt candidate, whereas subjects who received no information had a zero probability of voting for him. Intensity of preference matters, though, since the experiment shows that the more important the policy issue is to a voter, the higher the probability of voting for the corrupt politician that has a similar view on that issue. This analysis suggests that corrupt incumbents may owe re-election to implicit trading with voters, and predicts that corrupt candidates may have extra incentives to take distinct issue positions than do non-corrupt candidates. Corruption would thus accentuate the tendency to move away from the modal position. Also, this hypothesis may account for the tendency of voters to focus on corruption during periods of economic stagnation, as their expectations of policy satisfaction are low. Cf. B. Rundquist, G. Strom and J. Peters, 'Corrupt politicians and their electoral support: some experimental observations', The American Political Science Review, 71 (1977).
17. This hypothesis is supported by historical evidence from, among other things, the demise of political machines. It is well acknowledged that support generated by machine rewards is based on the continuing distributive capacity of the regime. Since the machine has to buy its popularity, and to the extent it faces competition, the cost of popularity increases and resources may not be sufficient to meet the demands. Machines, both in the US and in new nations such as India. Malaysia, and many West African countries, tend to live beyond their means. When disposable rewards cease or sizably diminish in the absence of economic expansion, support ceases, too.
18. This assumption is an extreme simplification. Typically, a political party controls public agencies that extract payments from local companies in exchange for granting public works contracts. In Italy, for example, public agencies such as ANAS (National Roadways Agency), ATM (Milan Transport Agency), AMSA (Municipal Agency for Environmental services) acted as intermediaries between the parties and private firms. In Italy alone there are 60,000 enti pubblici (special agencies) that are dominated by parties and function as mechanisms for the distribution of contracts. Cf. David Hine, 'Italy', in F. F. Ridley (ed.), Government and Administration in Western Europe (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1979); cf. also J. LaPalombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1964).
19. This assumption is an extreme simplification. Typically, a political party controls public agencies that extract payments from local companies in exchange for granting public works contracts. In Italy, for example, public agencies such as ANAS (National Roadways Agency), ATM (Milan Transport Agency), AMSA (Municipal Agency for Environmental services) acted as intermediaries between the parties and private firms. In Italy alone there are 60,000 enti pubblici (special agencies) that are dominated by parties and function as mechanisms for the distribution of contracts. Cf. David Hine, 'Italy', in F. F. Ridley (ed.), Government and Administration in Western Europe (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1979); cf. also J. LaPalombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1964).
20. This has been the case in Japan, as reported by W. Holstein, The Japanese Power Game (New York, Macmillan, 1990).
21. t at t ≥ T is made for simplicity, and we relax this assumption later on in section 4.
22. Note that, were m > n, politicians would only need to compensate a subset of contractors in order to win re-election.
23. This compensation amount is not guaranteed to contractors. In fact, as we shall see, compensation of contractors by politicians will not continue indefinitely. For this reason, the compensation amount does not appear in the contractors' payoff matrix.