Transforming European forces

Survival

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 117-132

  Binnendijk, Hans ^a   Kugler, Richard ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040150399     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/survival/44.3.117     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. See 'Statement on Capabilities' issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session; Brussels, Belgium; 6 June 2002. In his speech to the German Bundestag, President Bush called upon NATO to develop mobile deployable forces, new capabilities, and a new strategy for dealing with terrorism and other threats. See 'President Bush Thanks Germany for Support Against Terror', 23 May 2002, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House.
2. See 'Statement on Capabilities' issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session; Brussels, Belgium; 6 June 2002. In his speech to the German Bundestag, President Bush called upon NATO to develop mobile deployable forces, new capabilities, and a new strategy for dealing with terrorism and other threats. See 'President Bush Thanks Germany for Support Against Terror', 23 May 2002, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House.
3. Articles 4 and 5 are contained in the Washington Treaty that established NATO in the late 1940's. While Article 5 established NATO's collective defence pledge for border defence, Article 4 provided a framework for common action against lesser threats. See NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO, 2001).
4. For more analysis of NATO's military assets and limitations, see David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs (Washington DC: NDU Press, 1999). Together, the European members of NATO deploy about 2.4 million active troops, 55 divisions, 3,600 combat aircraft, and 300 naval combatants. For more details of European forces and budgets, see The Military Balance, 2001-2002 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2002).
5. For more analysis of NATO's military assets and limitations, see David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs (Washington DC: NDU Press, 1999). Together, the European members of NATO deploy about 2.4 million active troops, 55 divisions, 3,600 combat aircraft, and 300 naval combatants. For more details of European forces and budgets, see The Military Balance, 2001-2002 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2002).
6. For an analysis of the ERRF's composition, missions, and implications, see Kori N. Schake, 'Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO?', Strategic Forum, no. 184, 2001 (Institute for National Strategic Studies). The ERRF is mainly a ground force supported by air and naval units: its total manpower is about 100,000 troops. By contrast, a NATO spearhead response force would be led by air and naval units, with ground forces playing a supplementary role: its manpower would be less than one-half that of the ERRF.
7. For an analysis of the new US defence strategy and programme, see Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, 'Sound Vision, Unfinished Business: The Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001', The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter/Spring 2002, vol. 26, no. 1, pp.123-140.
8. Many analysts judge that future US-European security operations will be carried out by 'coalitions of the willing' rather than NATO's integrated command. For example, the Gulf War of 1990-1991 was waged by a multinational coalition. The key point about such coalitions is that while they can be 'ad hoc' (i.e. created for a single event), they cannot be improvised. If they are to succeed, their military forces must be well-prepared before the event. Hence, NATO will continue to have the critical role of preparing European forces even if the integrated command is not used often to carry out actual operations.
9. st Century' and 'Defense Capabilities Initiative', NATO press release, 24-25 April 1999.
10. See Hans Binnendijk, 'A European Spearhead Force Would Bridge the Gap', International Herald Tribune, 16-17 February 2002.
11. NATO's 'high readiness forces' include the ARRC, several multinational ground and air formations in Central Europe, select naval strike assets, and other units: essentially a compilation of NATO's reaction forces and high-readiness national defence forces.
12. Poland might be a good candidate for a NATO transformation facility because of its available land-space, convenient location, infrastructure, and willingness to host such a facility. Of course, other countries, including new members, could be considered as well. The key point is that if multinational exercises and experiments in transformation are to succeed, most must be conducted on European soil, not in the United States.
13. This cost figure is an authors' estimate based on standard US and NATO planning factors regarding likely expenses for new equipment, infrastructure, personnel, training, and exercises. The costs will be low because most of the forces and equipment already exist in European inventories, and the number of forces being prepared for spearhead response missions is small.