Historical kinds and the "special sciences"

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 95, Issue 1-2, 1999, Pages 45-65

  Millikan, Ruth Garrett ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040062412     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004532016219     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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3. Elder, C. (1995): 'A Different kind of Natural Kind', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73(4), 516-531.
4. Enç, B. (1983): 'In Defense of the Identity Theory', The Journal of Philosophy 80(5), 279-298.
5. Foder, J. (1968): Psychological Explanation, an Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology, New York: Random House.
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13. Macdonald, G.(1992): 'Reduction and Evolutionary Biology', in D. Charles and K. Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 69-96.
14. Mott, P. (1992): 'Fodor and Ceteris Paribus Laws', Mind 101, 336-345.
15. Millikan, R. (1996): 'On Swamplands', Mind and Language 11.1, pp. 103-117.
16. Papineau, D. (1992): 'Irreducibility and Teleology', in D. Charles and K. Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 45-68.
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19. Schwartz, J. (1992) 'Who's Afraid of Multiple Realizability?' in J. Dinsmore (ed.), Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum.