Corruption, supervision, and the structure of hierarchies

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 277-298

  Mehmet, Bac ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040062275     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023364     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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11. Klitgaart, Robert. 1991. "Gifts and Bribes," in R. J. Zechauser, ed., Strategy and Choice. Cambridge: MIT Press.
12. Major, Ivan. 1993. Privatization in Eastern Europe. Hants: Edward Elgar Publishing.
13. Myerson, Roger B. 1993. "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," 5 Games and Economic Behavior 118-32.
14. Pechlivanos, Lambros. 1995. "Sustainability of Corruption and Optimal Deterrence." Presented at the Seventh World Congress of Econometric Society, Tokyo, Japan.
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