Composite narrative, authoritarian discourse, and the Soviet response to the destruction of Iran air flight 655

Quarterly Journal of Speech

Volumn 87, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 305-320

  Kuypers, Jim A ^a   Young, Marilyn J ^b   Launer, Michael K ^b  

^a DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

^b FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cold war; Composite narrative; Condemnation cycle; Transcendence

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040030176     PISSN: 00335630     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00335630109384339     Document Type: Article

References (60)

1. On the night of August 31 into September 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines flight 007 flew badly off course, traversing Soviet air space over sensitive territory on the Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Island. As required by its Law on the Borders, the Soviet military scrambled fighter planes that intercepted the jetliner and shot it down, killing all 269 persons on board. Among the passengers were several Americans, including Larry McDonald, congressman from Georgia and President of the John Birch Society, an anti-Communist organization. The Reagan Administration took the opportunity to vilify the USSR and pushed through the United Nations a resolution condemning the Soviet action. Earliest reactions accused the Soviets of deliberately shooting down an aircraft which they knew was an unarmed civilian airliner. Later information revealed, however, that the Soviet fighter pilot had not identified the aircraft before shooting it down. Nevertheless, condemnation was virtually universal, and a number of countries, including the US, cancelled landing rights for Aeroflot, the state airline of die USSR.
2. See Marilyn J. Young, "When the Shoe is on the Other Foot: The Reagan Administration’s Treatment of the Shootdown of Iran Air 655," Reagan and Public Discourse in America, eds. Michael Weiler and Barnett Pearce, (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1992) 210, 211.
3. Pravda, 4 July 1988.
4. All texts were translated from the Russian by Michael Launer. Professor Launer is a Russian linguist at Florida State University and had over thirty-five years of experience with the Russian language at the time of translation. Aside from this, he frequently sojourns in Russia, acts as a translator and interpreter for the United States government, and is considered an expert in Russian technical discourse. The authors conferred regularly during, and subsequent to, the translation process; individual ambiguities within the texts, and uncertainties concerning precise renderings of individual words were addressed during these meetings.
5. Perhaps Gorbachev’s willingness to maintain an openness may be traced to his experience with Chemobyl in April of 1986. Gorbachev’s first reaction, in spite of earlier claims that he was initiating a new era of candor, was to fall back on the old Soviet response: silence and denial. When it became impossible to withhold the information any longer, it was provided, piece by piece. Gorbachev seems to have learned a hard lesson from that event-one that affected his government’s response to the destruction of Iran Air 655.
6. Peter G. Boyle, U.S.-Soviet Relations: From the Russian Revolution to the Fall of Communism (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993) 221.
7. In Robert Dalleck, "American Reactions to Changes in the USSR," Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bailer, eds., Soviet-American Relations After the Cold War (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1991) 56.
8. Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994) 357. Quote in Pravda, 3 June 1988.
9. Despite this progress, there were still problems in U.S.-Soviet relations. Strategic weapons and conventional force limits remained contentious, for example. Moreover, "many leading figures in the American government and the press continued until the late 1980s to suspect Gorbachev was simply conducting a very persuasive peace offensive which would serve traditional Soviet goals." (Boyle, 216). The U.S. government was publicly cautious as well: as late as January 1988, Secretary of State George Shultz wrote, "[I]t seems unlikely that the U.S.-Soviet relationship will ever lose what always has been and is today a strongly wary and at times adversarial element." (George Shultz, "Managing the U.S.-Soviet Relationship, February 5, 1988," State Bulletin 88 (April 1988): 40-41). This line of thought persisted even after the Moscow summit. Vice-President George Bush also doubted the depth of the change and stated that "the Cold War is not over." (David Hoffman, "Bush Doubts Soviets Have Changed… " Washington Post [June 8, 1988): A9).
10. Despite this progress, there were still problems in U.S.-Soviet relations. Strategic weapons and conventional force limits remained contentious, for example. Moreover, "many leading figures in the American government and the press continued until the late 1980s to suspect Gorbachev was simply conducting a very persuasive peace offensive which would serve traditional Soviet goals." (Boyle, 216). The U.S. government was publicly cautious as well: as late as January 1988, Secretary of State George Shultz wrote, "[I]t seems unlikely that the U.S.-Soviet relationship will ever lose what always has been and is today a strongly wary and at times adversarial element." (George Shultz, "Managing the U.S.-Soviet Relationship, February 5, 1988," State Bulletin 88 (April 1988): 40-41). This line of thought persisted even after the Moscow summit. Vice-President George Bush also doubted the depth of the change and stated that "the Cold War is not over." (David Hoffman, "Bush Doubts Soviets Have Changed… " Washington Post [June 8, 1988): A9).
11. Garthoff 369. Quote in FBIS, Soviet Union, July 5, 1988, 16.
12. This is a variant of an approach employed by Young and Launer when they argued for a view of discourse as episodic: governments, particularly in times of crisis, use many spokespersons to convey the administration’s position. These discursive episodes should be examined together in order to illuminate administrative discourse. See Marilyn J. Young and Michael K. Launer, Flights of Fancy, Flight of Doom: KAL 007 and Soviet-American Rhetoric (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988) 19-22.
13. Farrell describes the ways in which discourse "generates" expectations for future discourse. See Thomas B. Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994; and Thomas B. Farrell, "Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 62 (February 1976) 1-14.
14. Farrell describes the ways in which discourse "generates" expectations for future discourse. See Thomas B. Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994; and Thomas B. Farrell, "Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 62 (February 1976) 1-14.
15. Bruce E. Gronbeck, "Narrative, Enactment, and Television Programming," Southern Speech Communication Journal 48 (1983): 231-2. Mikhail Bakhtin discusses the concept of polyphonic voices, an idea similar to Gronbeck’s "multilevel" and "multi-vocal" discourse, in Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978).
16. Bruce E. Gronbeck, "Narrative, Enactment, and Television Programming," Southern Speech Communication Journal 48 (1983): 231-2. Mikhail Bakhtin discusses the concept of polyphonic voices, an idea similar to Gronbeck’s "multilevel" and "multi-vocal" discourse, in Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978).
17. This is a frequent strategy used by the Soviet press (read: government). It was particularly noticeable during the Korean Air crisis itself and again in the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. The Soviet press responded to Western reportage despite the fact that, in most instances, its readers had neither seen nor heard the report. A particular target of this approach was Radio Liberty, which broadcast reports behind the Iron Curtain. This strategy had the peculiar, no doubt unintended, effect of informing the Soviet public about what Western media were reporting. See, for example, Marilyn J. Young and Michael K. Launer, Flights of Fancy, Flight of Doom: KAL 007 and Soviet-American Rhetoric (University Press of America, 1989), pp. xxi, 116-117.
18. Krasnaya zvezda, 16 July 1988, 5.
19. In addition to viewing the airliner as a "spy plane," they further maintain, despite clear evidence to the contrary, that the pilot of the interceptor attempted to warn the airliner and force it to land before shooting it down.
20. Krasnaya zvezda, 16 July 1988, 5. Words in quotations are attributed to U.S. State Department officials.
21. Izvestiya, December 1990-January 1991, February-March 1991, May 1991, and October 1991 published a series of articles by Illesh and Shalnev that reveal new details concerning the Soviet role in the downing of KAL. Although these reports demonstrate that the Soviet government lied about many facts (warning flares, the aircraft’s running lights, etc.) it also reveals that the Soviets have consistently believed KAL 007 to be a spy plane. For a detailed description and analysis of the Soviet position regarding claims that KAL 007 was not a spy plane see, Young and Launer, Flights of Fancy 179-203, especially 195-203.
22. Izvestiya, December 1990-January 1991, February-March 1991, May 1991, and October 1991 published a series of articles by Illesh and Shalnev that reveal new details concerning the Soviet role in the downing of KAL. Although these reports demonstrate that the Soviet government lied about many facts (warning flares, the aircraft’s running lights, etc.) it also reveals that the Soviets have consistently believed KAL 007 to be a spy plane. For a detailed description and analysis of the Soviet position regarding claims that KAL 007 was not a spy plane see, Young and Launer, Flights of Fancy 179-203, especially 195-203.
23. New York Times, 4 July 1988, A.5.
24. Pravda, 5 July 1988. The last statement in particular ignores clear evidence to the contrary.
25. Pravda, 8 July 1988. The last mention of KAL by the Soviets is contained in Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 July 1988. This particular reference to the shootdown differentiates itself from prior KAL references in that it is a master narrative of the situation, encompassing all elements of the incident previously mentioned by the Soviets. It is a complete story, one that represents the unabridged Soviet version of the incident.
26. Pravda, 8 July 1988. The last mention of KAL by the Soviets is contained in Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 July 1988. This particular reference to the shootdown differentiates itself from prior KAL references in that it is a master narrative of the situation, encompassing all elements of the incident previously mentioned by the Soviets. It is a complete story, one that represents the unabridged Soviet version of the incident.
27. Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativity," Critical Inquiry 7 (1980): 14.
28. Sugwon Kang, Michael K. Launer, and Marilyn J. Young, "The KAL Tapes: What they Really Say About the Tragedy," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 18:3 (1986), 67-71.
29. Izvestiya, December 1990-January 1991, February-March 1991, May 1991, and October 1991.
30. James Oberg, private correspondence, February 13, 2000. Oberg’s reference is to the final report of the Soviet Union [Russia] to the ICAO in 1993. He writes, "They gave the latitude/longitude of the airliner when hit. I plotted it on detailed maps - it was well across the border, by at least half a minute."
31. Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Functional Communication: A Situational Perspective," Rhetoric in Transition: Studies in the Nature and Uses of Rhetoric, ed. Eugene E. White (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980) 26.
32. See for example, Robert J. Branham and W. Barnett Pearce, "Between Text and Context: Toward a Rhetoric of Contextual Reconstruction," Quarterly Journal of Speech 71:1 (February 1985) 19-36.
33. This phrase originated with Raymie McKerrow (private communication). Here the idea focuses upon the difference between domestic and international rhetoric. The Soviets were only constrained internationally; for if they changed their story, then KAL 007 could be dredged up once again as a major issue. This problem was encountered by the Russian government after Boris Yeltsin, in October 1992, authorized the release of new information about the destruction of KAL 007. For an example of the new information being used to condemn the Soviet government, see John W.R. Lepingwell, "Opening the KAL-007 Black Box: New Documents and Old Questions," RFE-AL Research Report 1.44 (6 November 1992): 20-26. For an example of the new information being used to exonerate the Soviet government, see "Russia Report, on 1983 KAL Jet Downing" Facts on File 53 (30 September 1993): 722. A detailed and objective reconstruction of the KAL 007 incident can be found in Murray Sayle, "A Cold War Case Closed. How Flight 007 Met Its Doom," The New Yorker (13 December 1993): 90-101.
34. This phrase originated with Raymie McKerrow (private communication). Here the idea focuses upon the difference between domestic and international rhetoric. The Soviets were only constrained internationally; for if they changed their story, then KAL 007 could be dredged up once again as a major issue. This problem was encountered by the Russian government after Boris Yeltsin, in October 1992, authorized the release of new information about the destruction of KAL 007. For an example of the new information being used to condemn the Soviet government, see John W.R. Lepingwell, "Opening the KAL-007 Black Box: New Documents and Old Questions," RFE-AL Research Report 1.44 (6 November 1992): 20-26. For an example of the new information being used to exonerate the Soviet government, see "Russia Report, on 1983 KAL Jet Downing" Facts on File 53 (30 September 1993): 722. A detailed and objective reconstruction of the KAL 007 incident can be found in Murray Sayle, "A Cold War Case Closed. How Flight 007 Met Its Doom," The New Yorker (13 December 1993): 90-101.
35. This phrase originated with Raymie McKerrow (private communication). Here the idea focuses upon the difference between domestic and international rhetoric. The Soviets were only constrained internationally; for if they changed their story, then KAL 007 could be dredged up once again as a major issue. This problem was encountered by the Russian government after Boris Yeltsin, in October 1992, authorized the release of new information about the destruction of KAL 007. For an example of the new information being used to condemn the Soviet government, see John W.R. Lepingwell, "Opening the KAL-007 Black Box: New Documents and Old Questions," RFE-AL Research Report 1.44 (6 November 1992): 20-26. For an example of the new information being used to exonerate the Soviet government, see "Russia Report, on 1983 KAL Jet Downing" Facts on File 53 (30 September 1993): 722. A detailed and objective reconstruction of the KAL 007 incident can be found in Murray Sayle, "A Cold War Case Closed. How Flight 007 Met Its Doom," The New Yorker (13 December 1993): 90-101.
36. Michael Osborn, "Rhetorical Depiction," Form, Genre, and the Study of Political Discourse, eds. Herbert W. Simons and Aram A. Aghazarian (Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 1986) 82.
37. Many Americans believed the spy plane scenario. Such impressions have been reinforced in the public mind over the years by articles in respected journals, feature made-for-TV movies, and lurid paperbacks. For an analysis of one such account of the espionage scenario, see Marilyn J. Young, Michael K. Launer, and Curtis Austin, "The Need for Evaluative Criteria: Conspiracy Argument Revisited," Argumentation and Advocacy, 26 (1990): 89-107. Reprinted with revisions as "Evaluative Criteria for Conspiracy Arguments: The Case of KAL 007" in Warranting Assent: Case Studies in Argument Evaluation, ed. Edward Schiappa, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995) 3-32.
38. Many Americans believed the spy plane scenario. Such impressions have been reinforced in the public mind over the years by articles in respected journals, feature made-for-TV movies, and lurid paperbacks. For an analysis of one such account of the espionage scenario, see Marilyn J. Young, Michael K. Launer, and Curtis Austin, "The Need for Evaluative Criteria: Conspiracy Argument Revisited," Argumentation and Advocacy, 26 (1990): 89-107. Reprinted with revisions as "Evaluative Criteria for Conspiracy Arguments: The Case of KAL 007" in Warranting Assent: Case Studies in Argument Evaluation, ed. Edward Schiappa, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995) 3-32.
39. Osborn 82.
40. The startegy, which is reflective of the typical Soviet response pattern, had demonstrated its utility in the past. Typically the Sovviet government approached an event that it could not control first, with silence, then with circumspect minimal comment; only later was a definitive presentation of "facts" and analysis presented. By stablishing a "true Soviet version" they were able to avoid revisiting issues. Whether one believed them or not, one accepted the Soviet version as all they were going to say on the matter. This final version was then kept in abeyance, to be trotted out as appropriate. The pattern can be found in Soviet handling of the Korean Air tragedy and in the early days following the Chernobyl accident. Later treatment of news regarding Chernobyl represented a dramatic change in the way crises and disasters were handled in the Soviet media. But it was not until the Armenian earthquake, which interrupted Gorbachev’s visit to the U.S. in late 1988, that this fundamental pattern itself began to change. In an unprecedented move, Gorbachev terminated his visit and returned home to address that disaster.
41. The specific editorials used in this section of the study are found in Krasnaya zvezda, 16 July 1988, and Pravda, two on 5 July 1988 and the remainder on 7, 8, 10, 14 July 1988. Although Izvestiya also provided editorial comments, they contained material quoted from non-Soviet sources, and thus were not included in this portion of the analysis.
42. The specific editorials used in this section of the study are found in Krasnaya zvezda, 16 July 1988, and Pravda, two on 5 July 1988 and the remainder on 7, 8, 10, 14 July 1988. Although Izvestiya also provided editorial comments, they contained material quoted from non-Soviet sources, and thus were not included in this portion of the analysis.
43. Michael Calvin McGee, "Secular Humanism: A Radical Reading of Culture ’Industry’ Productions, Critical Studies in Mass Communication 1.1 (1984): 8.
44. This argument is somewhat disingenuous on the part of the Soviets. During the aftermath of the KAL tragedy, they took the opposite position regarding the fallibility [or, in this case, infallibility) of U.S. technology. They have also used this strategy to good effect in the past, for example in the aftermath of Chernobyl. Gorbachev used the concern over spreading radiation following the explosion to argue for elimination of nuclear testing.
45. White 25. Quoted in Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (Oxford, 1967).
46. White 26.
47. Kransnaya zvezda, 8 July 1988, 3. The other newspapers echoed these sentiments, using virtually identical language. Pravda, for ezample, wrote, "If the most modern electronic equipment couldn’t distinguish a cumbersome, slow moving Airbus from a supersonic fighter, then where is the guarantee… ?" (4 July 1988, 5).
48. Michael Calvin McGee and John S. Nelson, "Narrative Reason in Public Argument," Journal of Communication 35 (1985): 149.
49. This did not go unnoticed by members of the press. See: John Horgan, " ’Starwars of the Seas’; Do the Lessons of the Iranian Iran Air Tragedy Apply to SDI?," Scientific American 259 (September 1988): 14 (2).
50. This exemplifies the bifurcated nature of the Soviet discourse. One aspect is found to deal with the technical level of experience; viz, identification signals, flights corridors, proper warnings, and the like. The discourse pertaining to KAL is found upon this level, as is the majority of the Soviet response. This micro-level is characteristic of the Western press as well. See James Oberg, "IA 655 [Does Not Equal] KAL 007" and "KAL 007: The Real Story," American Spectator 26.10 (October 1993): 37-42; George J. Church, David S. Jackson and Jay Peterzell, "High-Tech Horror," Time 132.3 (18 July 1988): 14-17. Although we report in this paper upon tje theme of an irresponsible policy only, many other secondary themes assumed this same embedded nature; for instance, "international ramifications," and "U.S. does/does not stand for peace" are other embedded themes used by the Soviets.
51. This exemplifies the bifurcated nature of the Soviet discourse. One aspect is found to deal with the technical level of experience; viz, identification signals, flights corridors, proper warnings, and the like. The discourse pertaining to KAL is found upon this level, as is the majority of the Soviet response. This micro-level is characteristic of the Western press as well. See James Oberg, "IA 655 [Does Not Equal] KAL 007" and "KAL 007: The Real Story," American Spectator 26.10 (October 1993): 37-42; George J. Church, David S. Jackson and Jay Peterzell, "High-Tech Horror," Time 132.3 (18 July 1988): 14-17. Although we report in this paper upon tje theme of an irresponsible policy only, many other secondary themes assumed this same embedded nature; for instance, "international ramifications," and "U.S. does/does not stand for peace" are other embedded themes used by the Soviets.
52. Pravda, 8 July 1988, 5.
53. Pravda, 12 July 1988, 5.
54. Krasnaya zvezda, 16 July 1988, 5.
55. Izvestiya, 8 July 1988, 5.
56. These appear throughout Pravda and use Reagan administration officials as sources.
57. For a detailed analysis of this event, see Jim A. Kuypers, Marilyn J. Young, and Michael K. Launer, "Of Mighty Mice and Meek Men: Contextual Reconstruction of the Iranian Airbus Shootdown," Southern Journal of Communication 59:4 (Summer 1994), pp. 294-306.
58. George Bush, United Nations Security Council, "Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2818 Meeting," New York Headquarters, 14 July 1988: S/PV.2818:51.
59. This is in contrast to the aftermath of Jeane Kirkpatrick’s dramatic presentation to the UN in 1983. In an overwhelming vote, that body censured the actions of the USSR in shooting down KAL 007.
60. Malcolm O. Sillars, Messages, Meanings, and Culture: Approaches to Communication Criticism (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991) 160.