The Burden of Eastern Orthodoxy

Orbis

Volumn 42, Issue 2 SPEC. ISS., 1998, Pages 283-300

  Radu, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040005843     PISSN: 00304387     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0030-4387(98)90007-2     Document Type: Article

References (53)

1. These are, in decreasing order of their population Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Bulgaria, Belarus, Greece, Moldova, Georgia, and Macedonia. Total population exceeds 250 million, with an Orthodox majority ranging from over 90 percent (in Greece and Yugoslavia) to 70 percent in Romania and Ukraine.
2. Hélène Ahrweiler, L'Ideologie politique de l'empire byzantin (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1975), p. 33.
3. There were two exceptions to this general rule: when the very existence of the Church was in question, during the Iconoclast crisis of the eighth and ninth centuries, and during the fifteenth-century issue of ecclesiastic union with (and under) Rome. In both instances the church won at the expense of the emperor.
4. Peter F. Sugar, "Roots of Eastern European Nationalism," in Nationalism in Eastern Europe, ed. Peter F. Sugar and Ivo John Lederer (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), p. 25.
5. Associated Press, Internet, June 23, 1997.
6. Boris Uspensky, "Schism and Cultural Conflict in the Seventeenth Century," in Seeking God: The Recovery of Religious Identity in Orthodox Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia, ed. Stephen K. Batalden (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993), pp. 113-17.
7. Bartholomaios I, interview in Christian History, Mar. 2, 1997, p. 2.
8. Christianity Today, Apr. 29, 1996, p. 55.
9. th Century, ed. Peter F. Sugar (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), pp. 273-304.
10. th Century, ed. Peter F. Sugar (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), pp. 273-304.
11. th Century, ed. Peter F. Sugar (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), pp. 273-304.
12. Mark Rhodes, "Religious believers in Russia," RFE/RL Research Report, Apr. 3, 1992, p. 61. Rhodes quotes similar results from a simultaneous survey by the Russian Institute of Sociology.
13. Nathaniel Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 12-13.
14. See Frank E. Sysyn, "Third Rebirth of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Religious Situation in Ukraine, 1989-91," in Seeking God, pp. 191-93; and Alexander Webster, The Price of Prophecy, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1995), pp. 194-203.
15. See Frank E. Sysyn, "Third Rebirth of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Religious Situation in Ukraine, 1989-91," in Seeking God, pp. 191-93; and Alexander Webster, The Price of Prophecy, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1995), pp. 194-203.
16. Davis, Long Walk to Church, p. 33.
17. To those Ukrainian parishes one should also add some one thousand others in Moldova and other non-Russian republics. See John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), p. 159.
18. The Romanian Orthodox Church also took jurisdiction over Serbian parishes in the Banat region.
19. Oxana Antic, "Orthodox Church Reacts to Criticism of KGB Links," RFE/RL Research Report, June 5, 1992, pp. 61-63.
20. For details and a lucid analysis, see Webster, Price of Prophecy, pp. 39-46.
21. Dunlop, Rise of Russia, pp. 225-27. According to Davis, Long Walk to Church, p. 90, the other hierarchs actually supported the coup.
22. Dunlop, Rise of Russia, pp. 225-27. According to Davis, Long Walk to Church, p. 90, the other hierarchs actually supported the coup.
23. Galina Sabeva, Reuters, Internet (Sofia), Nov. 6, 1997.
24. Cf. Webster, Price of Prophecy, p. 112; see pp. 89-130 for a detailed account of the Romanian Orthodox Church's subservient relations with the Communist regime.
25. Antonie Plǎmǎdealǎ, interview by Sorin Comoroşan, in Romania. Societate cu rǎspundere limitatǎ (Bucharest [Bucuresti]: Editura Cartea Romaneascǎ, 1995), p. 79.
26. Antic, "Orthodox Church Reacts," p. 62.
27. For Filaret's interesting career, see Webster, Price of Prophecy, pp. 44-46; and Davis, Long Walk to Church, pp. 80-95.
28. For Filaret's interesting career, see Webster, Price of Prophecy, pp. 44-46; and Davis, Long Walk to Church, pp. 80-95.
29. Antic, "Orthodox Church Reacts," p. 62; Davis, Long Walk to Church, pp. 95-96.
30. Antic, "Orthodox Church Reacts," p. 62; Davis, Long Walk to Church, pp. 95-96.
31. Quoted in Webster, Price of Prophecy, p. 103.
32. See Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996). Ramet points out that during the initial and apparently successful years of Milosevic's nationalist policies and war in Croatia and Bosnia, the Serbian Church supported him just as much as he used it for his own purposes. It was not until the 1995 Serbian loss of the war in Croatia that the Orthodox Church once again came in conflict with the neocommunist regime in Belgrade, which it blamed for the defeat.
33. Nebojsa Popov, "Serbian Populism and the Fall of Yugoslavia," Uncaptive Minds, Fall/Winter 1995-96, pp. 86-87.
34. Fairy von Lilienfeld, "Reflections on the Current State of the Georgian Church and Nation," in Seeking God, pp. 225-26.
35. For an early overview of the postindependence position of the Lithuanian Catholic Church see Saulius Girnius, "The Catholic Church in Post-Soviet Lithuania," RFE/RL Research Report, Oct. 15, 1993, pp. 43-46.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 109.
38. "Liderii UDMR vor solicita in CoCo restructurarea Secretariatului de Stat pentru Culte," in Ziua (Bucharest), Dec. 15, 1997.
39. Karin Popescu, Reuters, Internet, Sept 26, 1997.
40. A good example is former Romanian political prisoner and dissident Orthodox priest Gheorghe Calciu, for whom the Uniates' demand for the return of their properties is "unbrotherly." For Calciu's duplicitous position and a Uniate response, see Ziua, Dec. 20 and 24, 1997.
41. Popov, "Serbian Populism," p. 104.
42. Christianity Today, p. 5.
43. Sysyn, "Third Rebirth," p. 191.
44. Davis, Long Walk to Church, p. 72
45. Ibid., p. 97.
46. For the truly Byzantine politics of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, see Davis, Long Walk to Church, pp. 97-102; and Webster, Price of Prophecy, pp. 61-69.
47. For the truly Byzantine politics of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, see Davis, Long Walk to Church, pp. 97-102; and Webster, Price of Prophecy, pp. 61-69.
48. For still unclear reasons, in the forties Stalin allowed the reestablishment of the office of Georgian patriarch (catholicos). As for the Russian Church, it was accurately described as an "Empire-saving Institution" in Dunlop, Rise of Russia, pp. 158-63.
49. Christianity Today, p. 55.
50. Unusual for an Orthodox patriarch, Teoctist of Romania has publicly asserted that Moldova is under his, not Moscow's, jurisdiction, a position he further affirmed by appointing as metropolitan of Basarabia a member of the Romanian Orthodox Synod. It became dear that the Bucharest government was prepared to support Teoctist when the chairman of Romania's Senate Security and Defense Commission declared that the Moldovan court's decision was part of an anti-Romanian plot. See Ziua, Dec. 19, 1997.
51. Ramet, Balkan Babel, pp. 175-77.
52. For details see the sympathetic analysis of Webster, Price of Prophecy, pp. 259-73.
53. Quoted in ibid, p. 263.