Transnational and international exploitation

Political Studies

Volumn 46, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 693-708

  De Shalit, Avner ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

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EID: 0039992053     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00162     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Freedom and Trade conference, Manchester, March 1996. I have benefitted a lot from comments by Jonathan Wolff, Daniel Attas and the two referees. I would also like to thank Simon Caney, Jerry Cohen, Peter Jones, Peter Ingram, William Lucy, David Milman, Geraint Parry, Hillel Steiner, and Bhaskar Vira. While writing this paper I enjoyed the hospitality of Mansfield College, Oxford, and the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics and Society, where I was a Visiting Research Fellow.
2. By 'transnational exploitation' I mean exploitative exchange that takes place between bodies and individuals in different societies; by 'international exploitation' I mean exploitative exchange that takes place between states.
3. For some very interesting works see J. Galtung, The True Worlds (New York, Free, 1980); I. Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), especially chapter 6 ('Marx, Marxism-Leninism and Socialist Experience in the Modern World-System', pp. 65-84); I. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979); T. Hopkins, 'Notes in Class Analysis and the World System', in T. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein (eds), World-Systems Analysis (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1982), pp. 83-91; and R. Barnet, Global Reach: the Power of Multinational Corporations (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1974), especially chapter 6 in which he discusses the global corporations and the 'underdeveloped' world.
4. For some very interesting works see J. Galtung, The True Worlds (New York, Free, 1980); I. Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), especially chapter 6 ('Marx, Marxism-Leninism and Socialist Experience in the Modern World-System', pp. 65-84); I. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979); T. Hopkins, 'Notes in Class Analysis and the World System', in T. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein (eds), World-Systems Analysis (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1982), pp. 83-91; and R. Barnet, Global Reach: the Power of Multinational Corporations (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1974), especially chapter 6 in which he discusses the global corporations and the 'underdeveloped' world.
5. For some very interesting works see J. Galtung, The True Worlds (New York, Free, 1980); I. Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), especially chapter 6 ('Marx, Marxism-Leninism and Socialist Experience in the Modern World-System', pp. 65-84); I. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979); T. Hopkins, 'Notes in Class Analysis and the World System', in T. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein (eds), World-Systems Analysis (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1982), pp. 83-91; and R. Barnet, Global Reach: the Power of Multinational Corporations (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1974), especially chapter 6 in which he discusses the global corporations and the 'underdeveloped' world.
6. For some very interesting works see J. Galtung, The True Worlds (New York, Free, 1980); I. Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), especially chapter 6 ('Marx, Marxism-Leninism and Socialist Experience in the Modern World-System', pp. 65-84); I. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979); T. Hopkins, 'Notes in Class Analysis and the World System', in T. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein (eds), World-Systems Analysis (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1982), pp. 83-91; and R. Barnet, Global Reach: the Power of Multinational Corporations (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1974), especially chapter 6 in which he discusses the global corporations and the 'underdeveloped' world.
7. For some very interesting works see J. Galtung, The True Worlds (New York, Free, 1980); I. Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), especially chapter 6 ('Marx, Marxism-Leninism and Socialist Experience in the Modern World-System', pp. 65-84); I. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979); T. Hopkins, 'Notes in Class Analysis and the World System', in T. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein (eds), World-Systems Analysis (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1982), pp. 83-91; and R. Barnet, Global Reach: the Power of Multinational Corporations (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1974), especially chapter 6 in which he discusses the global corporations and the 'underdeveloped' world.
8. For some very interesting works see J. Galtung, The True Worlds (New York, Free, 1980); I. Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), especially chapter 6 ('Marx, Marxism-Leninism and Socialist Experience in the Modern World-System', pp. 65-84); I. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979); T. Hopkins, 'Notes in Class Analysis and the World System', in T. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein (eds), World-Systems Analysis (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1982), pp. 83-91; and R. Barnet, Global Reach: the Power of Multinational Corporations (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1974), especially chapter 6 in which he discusses the global corporations and the 'underdeveloped' world.
9. See A. Reeve, Modern Theories of Exploitation (London, Sage, 1987), p. 6.
10. I am assuming that playing tricks in order to avoid taxes is another way of exploiting the poor, who cannot avoid taxation by the same means.
11. A good example is coffee, which is often grown and picked in Third World countries in which the gaps between the rich and the poor are enormous, but is processed in northern countries which may be proud of diminishing exploitation in their own societies.
12. See J. Galtung, 'A Structural theory of imperialism', Journal of Peace Research, 8 (1971), (1971), 81-118.
13. I shall later discuss whether they are forced or even coerced to sell their labour power.
14. Another case in the same category is when an international corporation exploits a state. See R. Barnet, Global Reach.
15. J. Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 167.
16. G. A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 195.
17. I take Hillel Steiner's 'A theory of exploitation', Ethics, 94 (1984) to be the only one, and therefore I shall discuss it here as the liberal theory of exploitation.
18. Steiner, 'A liberal theory of exploitation', p. 227. I wonder whether this is right, because a 'hard-line capitalist would not engage in a deal from which s/he cannot get more than s/he gives; in other words s/he is looking for the surplus value, or for exploitation, as a motivation to enter a deal. Now Steiner could answer that what s/he gets may be more important for her or him than what s/he gives, but the only criteria for a 'hard-line' capitalist is the market value rather than a subjective notion of value. In that case, it seems to me wrong to argue that the 'exploiters and exploited would voluntarily become exchangers'. But this is beyond the interest of this paper.
19. There is a wide critique of the inadequacy of Marxian theory of exploitation to encompass a variety of forms of domination and exploitation. (See A. Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990) and R. Murphy, 'Exploitation or exclusion', Sociology, 19 (1985).) But 1 would like to emphasize the inadequacy with regard to the international domination. It should also be mentioned that Marx did think about exploitation in the international arena. Marx wrote that 'the richer country exploits the poorer one, even where the latter gains by the exchange' (Theories of Surplus Value, cited in Elster, Making Sense of Marx, 181). Elster notes that 'Marx certainly did not mean that the rich country does so by hiring the workers of the poor', mainly because this phenomenon developed after Marx's death. This implies that he meant exploitation between states.
20. There is a wide critique of the inadequacy of Marxian theory of exploitation to encompass a variety of forms of domination and exploitation. (See A. Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990) and R. Murphy, 'Exploitation or exclusion', Sociology, 19 (1985).) But 1 would like to emphasize the inadequacy with regard to the international domination. It should also be mentioned that Marx did think about exploitation in the international arena. Marx wrote that 'the richer country exploits the poorer one, even where the latter gains by the exchange' (Theories of Surplus Value, cited in Elster, Making Sense of Marx, 181). Elster notes that 'Marx certainly did not mean that the rich country does so by hiring the workers of the poor', mainly because this phenomenon developed after Marx's death. This implies that he meant exploitation between states.
21. There is a wide critique of the inadequacy of Marxian theory of exploitation to encompass a variety of forms of domination and exploitation. (See A. Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990) and R. Murphy, 'Exploitation or exclusion', Sociology, 19 (1985).) But 1 would like to emphasize the inadequacy with regard to the international domination. It should also be mentioned that Marx did think about exploitation in the international arena. Marx wrote that 'the richer country exploits the poorer one, even where the latter gains by the exchange' (Theories of Surplus Value, cited in Elster, Making Sense of Marx, 181). Elster notes that 'Marx certainly did not mean that the rich country does so by hiring the workers of the poor', mainly because this phenomenon developed after Marx's death. This implies that he meant exploitation between states.
22. In fact the main challenge to Steiner's theory in general is that since it is a trilateral matter it is sensitive to irrelevant factors. As Miller argues, suppose A prevents C from offering B a better deal by other means, e.g. bribe rather than threat. Does this make the same exchange between A and B different from B's point of view? See D. Miller, 'Exploitation in the market' and Steiner's reply 'Exploitation: a liberal theory amended, defended and extended', both in A. Reeve (ed.), Modern Theories of Exploitation.
23. In fact the main challenge to Steiner's theory in general is that since it is a trilateral matter it is sensitive to irrelevant factors. As Miller argues, suppose A prevents C from offering B a better deal by other means, e.g. bribe rather than threat. Does this make the same exchange between A and B different from B's point of view? See D. Miller, 'Exploitation in the market' and Steiner's reply 'Exploitation: a liberal theory amended, defended and extended', both in A. Reeve (ed.), Modern Theories of Exploitation.
24. By 'capable' I mean that it is also willing to do so. A more powerful state may still restrain itself, either for internal reasons or because although its militaristic powers are greater, it does not enjoy strategic superiority over the other state.
25. It should be noted that within the state forcing someone to trade on your terms by threatening does not imply exploitation, because the threatened party can rely on the police or the judicial system to prevent the threatening party from actually doing what it threatens to do. These institutions are absent in the international arena.
26. J. Elster, 'Exploitation, Freedom and Justice', in J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (eds), Marxism (Nomos XXVI) (New York, New York University Press, 1983); and Making Sense of Marx, p. 168. The slave example poses a similar difficulty for the liberal theory - for it is the slave's rights rather than a third party's that are violated. I owe this point to Daniel Attas.
27. J. Elster, 'Exploitation, Freedom and Justice', in J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (eds), Marxism (Nomos XXVI) (New York, New York University Press, 1983); and Making Sense of Marx, p. 168. The slave example poses a similar difficulty for the liberal theory - for it is the slave's rights rather than a third party's that are violated. I owe this point to Daniel Attas.
28. Elster, Making Sense of Marx, p. 170.
29. K. Marx, Capital, col. 1 (New York, International Publishers, 1967), p. 332.
30. J. Roemer, 'Property relations vs. surplus value Marxian exploitation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 11 (1982), 285.
31. Notice that some of these Palestinians argue that they are not better off even in political terms, since the new autonomous regime is so undemocratic. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they were not exploited by Israel. This points to the possibility that exploitation has no relation at all to the alternative of being better off, but rather to the lack of autonomy, or to being treated as having no autonomy.
32. See I. Young, 'Five faces of oppression', The Philosophical Forum, 29 (1988), 270-90.
33. Elster, Making Sense of Marx, p. 197.
34. Except for cases of occupation. Then the occupier tends to capture the natural resources or means of production, and may use force (the police or the army) to prevent the occupied people from autonomous (or any) use of these means of production.
35. Elster ('Exploitation, Freedom and Justice,' p. 278) does mention treating others merely as means, but thinks that it is more akin to alienation than to exploitation.
36. I assume that the reader is familiar with the Kantian imperative and with the works of Dworkin about treating as equals (as distinguished from equal treatment).
37. On the difference between exploiting circumstances and exploiting a person, see J. Wolff, 'Exploitation', unpublished M.A. Thesis (University College, 1985), pp 24-41. Similarly, Goodin distinguishes between exploiting a situation and exploiting a person although he accepts that exploiting a person is a particular case of exploiting a situation, where the situation describes personal characteristics as well. See R. Goodin, 'Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person', in A. Reeve (ed.), Modern Theories of Exploitation (London, Sage, 1987), pp. 149-66.
38. On the difference between exploiting circumstances and exploiting a person, see J. Wolff, 'Exploitation', unpublished M.A. Thesis (University College, 1985), pp 24-41. Similarly, Goodin distinguishes between exploiting a situation and exploiting a person although he accepts that exploiting a person is a particular case of exploiting a situation, where the situation describes personal characteristics as well. See R. Goodin, 'Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person', in A. Reeve (ed.), Modern Theories of Exploitation (London, Sage, 1987), pp. 149-66.
39. I do not wish to discuss this further. The interested reader may refer to Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality.
40. Another version is that it would be in the interest of his or her descendants (future generations), and hence in his or her interest as well. I have discussed this in my Why Posterity Matters (London, Routledge, 1995).
41. However, the fact that the exploiter is aware of his/her actions and their consequences, should not imply that the potential victim is aware of him/herself being exploited. The workers' false consciousness, described by Marx, is a good example of such a case.
42. A. Wood, 'Exploitation', Social Theory and Practice, 12 (1995), 150-1.
43. Cohen (Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, p. 241) dismisses this claim forcefully. However, in case the reader still believes so, it is safer to stick to the Dworkinian formula.
44. Since Wood adopts a totally objective definition he runs into difficulties. For example, he writes that 'some instances of exploitation (exploiting the weakness of one's opponent in a game) can be regarded as innocent. One would not enter into the game with good sportmanship if one did not expect (or even want) one's opponent to use one's weakness wherever possible' (p. 152). Indeed, our intuition is that sport games cannot be regarded as exploitation. But notice that in my definition this is not exploitation at all. Assuming that both competitors respect each other, there is no intention (in the game) to benefit by treating not as equals. The fact that objectively Oxford United are much weaker than Newcastle United does not mastter. All players respect each other equally, and therefore Newcastles's players do not exploit Oxford's players when they beat them 5-0.
45. J. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, pp. 167, 195.
46. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, pp. 197, 199.
47. Coercion implies the presence of an intentional agent or coercer, while force need not imply more than the presence of constraints that leave no room for choice: 'I am forced to live in my native town if I cannot get a job elsewhere, but I am coerced to live there if I would be arrested were I to try to leave'. Elster, Making Sense of Marx, p. 212.
48. The distinction between entering the situation of exploitative exchange and the absence of a way out of it is important for all theories of exploitation. Many authors regard exploitation as not necessarily involuntary. Joel Feinberg claims that exploitation may follow a voluntary consent (Harmless Wrongdoing (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 176), and Wertheimer even claims that the exploited party benefits more than the exploiter does, and that this is the reason that the exploited party's bargaining position is so weak ('Two questions about surrogacy and exploitation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (1992), p. 223). Allen Wood quotes the two and adds that people can often be eager to be exploited since 'being benefited and exploited are often merely two sides of the same coin, and people may often be in dire need of the benefits in question' (Wood, 'Exploitation', p. 149). In my view this attitude discounts the immorality of exploitation. The exploited one is exploited, but also benefits. But benefits in relation to what? Not in relation to his or her original status (the one prior to the new circumstances which have led to this exploitative exchange), but rather in relation to his new position. The exploiting party manipulates the exploited one to a position in which he is desperate, and then offers him a generous way out of it, namely by exploiting him. See, for instance, the example which Wood raises. A gambler who owes a large amount of money to ruthless and violent characters will be in desperate need of the loan from the shark who offers the needed funds at a usurious rate of interest. Such a person will be more than willing under these conditions to consent to virtually any terms of payment (Wood, 'Exploitation', p. 149). Shouldn't we consider also the dignity, self-esteem, etc., of the gambler? And does he continue to be in this position because he wants to?
49. The distinction between entering the situation of exploitative exchange and the absence of a way out of it is important for all theories of exploitation. Many authors regard exploitation as not necessarily involuntary. Joel Feinberg claims that exploitation may follow a voluntary consent (Harmless Wrongdoing (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 176), and Wertheimer even claims that the exploited party benefits more than the exploiter does, and that this is the reason that the exploited party's bargaining position is so weak ('Two questions about surrogacy and exploitation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (1992), p. 223). Allen Wood quotes the two and adds that people can often be eager to be exploited since 'being benefited and exploited are often merely two sides of the same coin, and people may often be in dire need of the benefits in question' (Wood, 'Exploitation', p. 149). In my view this attitude discounts the immorality of exploitation. The exploited one is exploited, but also benefits. But benefits in relation to what? Not in relation to his or her original status (the one prior to the new circumstances which have led to this exploitative exchange), but rather in relation to his new position. The exploiting party manipulates the exploited one to a position in which he is desperate, and then offers him a generous way out of it, namely by exploiting him. See, for instance, the example which Wood raises. A gambler who owes a large amount of money to ruthless and violent characters will be in desperate need of the loan from the shark who offers the needed funds at a usurious rate of interest. Such a person will be more than willing under these conditions to consent to virtually any terms of payment (Wood, 'Exploitation', p. 149). Shouldn't we consider also the dignity, self-esteem, etc., of the gambler? And does he continue to be in this position because he wants to?
50. The distinction between entering the situation of exploitative exchange and the absence of a way out of it is important for all theories of exploitation. Many authors regard exploitation as not necessarily involuntary. Joel Feinberg claims that exploitation may follow a voluntary consent (Harmless Wrongdoing (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 176), and Wertheimer even claims that the exploited party benefits more than the exploiter does, and that this is the reason that the exploited party's bargaining position is so weak ('Two questions about surrogacy and exploitation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (1992), p. 223). Allen Wood quotes the two and adds that people can often be eager to be exploited since 'being benefited and exploited are often merely two sides of the same coin, and people may often be in dire need of the benefits in question' (Wood, 'Exploitation', p. 149). In my view this attitude discounts the immorality of exploitation. The exploited one is exploited, but also benefits. But benefits in relation to what? Not in relation to his or her original status (the one prior to the new circumstances which have led to this exploitative exchange), but rather in relation to his new position. The exploiting party manipulates the exploited one to a position in which he is desperate, and then offers him a generous way out of it, namely by exploiting him. See, for instance, the example which Wood raises. A gambler who owes a large amount of money to ruthless and violent characters will be in desperate need of the loan from the shark who offers the needed funds at a usurious rate of interest. Such a person will be more than willing under these conditions to consent to virtually any terms of payment (Wood, 'Exploitation', p. 149). Shouldn't we consider also the dignity, self-esteem, etc., of the gambler? And does he continue to be in this position because he wants to?
51. The distinction between entering the situation of exploitative exchange and the absence of a way out of it is important for all theories of exploitation. Many authors regard exploitation as not necessarily involuntary. Joel Feinberg claims that exploitation may follow a voluntary consent (Harmless Wrongdoing (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 176), and Wertheimer even claims that the exploited party benefits more than the exploiter does, and that this is the reason that the exploited party's bargaining position is so weak ('Two questions about surrogacy and exploitation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (1992), p. 223). Allen Wood quotes the two and adds that people can often be eager to be exploited since 'being benefited and exploited are often merely two sides of the same coin, and people may often be in dire need of the benefits in question' (Wood, 'Exploitation', p. 149). In my view this attitude discounts the immorality of exploitation. The exploited one is exploited, but also benefits. But benefits in relation to what? Not in relation to his or her original status (the one prior to the new circumstances which have led to this exploitative exchange), but rather in relation to his new position. The exploiting party manipulates the exploited one to a position in which he is desperate, and then offers him a generous way out of it, namely by exploiting him. See, for instance, the example which Wood raises. A gambler who owes a large amount of money to ruthless and violent characters will be in desperate need of the loan from the shark who offers the needed funds at a usurious rate of interest. Such a person will be more than willing under these conditions to consent to virtually any terms of payment (Wood, 'Exploitation', p. 149). Shouldn't we consider also the dignity, self-esteem, etc., of the gambler? And does he continue to be in this position because he wants to?