'Inevitable and unacceptable?' Methodological Rawlsianism in Anglo-American political philosophy

Political Studies

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 276-294

  Norman, Wayne ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039938974     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00140     Document Type: Article

References (183)

1. B. Barry, Theories of Justice (Berkeley CA, University of California Press, 1989), pp. 257f.
2. G. R. Grice, 'Moral theories and received opinion', Aristotelian Society, supp. 52 (1978), 1-12, p. 12.
3. The argument would require a laborious cataloguing of published works which nobody, as far as I am aware, has had the patience to carry out. Hunches about the pervasiveness of a vaguely Rawlsian methodological influence are, however, common. See, e.g., G. Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 66 (1985), pp. 170, 176, 181, and D. Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Oxford, Blackwell, 1991), p. 476, 481f, on Rawlsian coherentism; and R. Audi, 'Ethical reflectionism', The Monist, (1993), 295-315, on the appeal to intuitions.
4. The argument would require a laborious cataloguing of published works which nobody, as far as I am aware, has had the patience to carry out. Hunches about the pervasiveness of a vaguely Rawlsian methodological influence are, however, common. See, e.g., G. Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 66 (1985), pp. 170, 176, 181, and D. Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Oxford, Blackwell, 1991), p. 476, 481f, on Rawlsian coherentism; and R. Audi, 'Ethical reflectionism', The Monist, (1993), 295-315, on the appeal to intuitions.
5. The argument would require a laborious cataloguing of published works which nobody, as far as I am aware, has had the patience to carry out. Hunches about the pervasiveness of a vaguely Rawlsian methodological influence are, however, common. See, e.g., G. Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 66 (1985), pp. 170, 176, 181, and D. Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Oxford, Blackwell, 1991), p. 476, 481f, on Rawlsian coherentism; and R. Audi, 'Ethical reflectionism', The Monist, (1993), 295-315, on the appeal to intuitions.
6. I take the mainstream to be represented by the great majority of articles in political philosophy published in journals like Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Social Philosophy and Policy, Political Studies, the Journal of Applied Philosophy and the Journal of Political Philosophy. I assert but do not here defend the claim that most writers in these journals are methodological Rawlsians. The method certainly has its detractors, even in the English-speaking world: on the one hand, there is a large minority of philosophers, such as Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, who work within a more historical, continental tradition; and on the other, there is a (perhaps growing) contingent of 'foundationalists' who employ the tools of game theory, sociobiology and cognitive science in an attempt to ground personal and political morality in human nature and rational self-interest. For a comprehensive survey of this latter approach, see P. Railton, A. Gibbard, and S. Darwall, 'Toward fin de siècle ethics; some trends', Philosophical Review, 101 (1992).
7. See J. Raz, 'Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19 (1990), 3-46, for a critique of this kind of 'epistemic abstinence' in Rawls. For a sympathetic discussion of Raz's critique see J. Hampton, 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism', in D. Copp, J. Hampton and J. Roemer (eds), The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 293.
8. See J. Raz, 'Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19 (1990), 3-46, for a critique of this kind of 'epistemic abstinence' in Rawls. For a sympathetic discussion of Raz's critique see J. Hampton, 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism', in D. Copp, J. Hampton and J. Roemer (eds), The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 293.
9. Barry, Theories of Justice, p. 258.
10. M. DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', American Philosophical Quarterly, 23 (1986), 68. In this passage Michael DePaul is referring directly to the notion of reflective equilibrium which forms the core of what I am calling methodological Rawlsianism.
11. See Carl Wellman, Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics (Carbondale IL, Southern Illinois University Press, 1971), p. 132, on this distinction. For a general discussion of the process/ product distinction for several nouns ending in 'tion' and 'ment' see D.-H. Ruben, Explaining Explanation (London, Routledge, 1991), pp. 6-9.
12. See Carl Wellman, Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics (Carbondale IL, Southern Illinois University Press, 1971), p. 132, on this distinction. For a general discussion of the process/ product distinction for several nouns ending in 'tion' and 'ment' see D.-H. Ruben, Explaining Explanation (London, Routledge, 1991), pp. 6-9.
13. J. Rawls, 'Kantian constructivism in moral theory', Journal of Philosophy, 77 (1980), p. 517.
14. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 51n, where he cites a passage from H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London, Macmillan, 1907), pp. 373f. See also H. Sidgwick, 'The establishment of ethical first principles', Mind, 4 (1879), p. 109, for another rather Rawlsian moment. For a similar interpretation of Sidgwick's method see J. Schneewind, 'First principles and common sense morality in Sidgwick's ethics', Archiv für Geschichten der Philosophie, 45 (1963). The 'Rawlsian' interpretation of Sidgwick is disputed in P. Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', The Monist, 58 (1974), 490-517, and F. Snare, 'John Rawls and the methods of ethics', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 36 (1976), 100-12. Rawls makes no similar claims in his brief introduction to a recent edition of Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis IN, Hackett, 1981), pp. v-vi. Singer is interpreting Rawls's methodology as a deep theory of justification, and finds convincing evidence that Sidgwick did not espouse the same deep theory. By Singer's own admission, however, Sidgwick does adopt an argument strategy that, I would argue, is consistent with what I am calling methodological Rawlsianism.
15. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 51n, where he cites a passage from H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London, Macmillan, 1907), pp. 373f. See also H. Sidgwick, 'The establishment of ethical first principles', Mind, 4 (1879), p. 109, for another rather Rawlsian moment. For a similar interpretation of Sidgwick's method see J. Schneewind, 'First principles and common sense morality in Sidgwick's ethics', Archiv für Geschichten der Philosophie, 45 (1963). The 'Rawlsian' interpretation of Sidgwick is disputed in P. Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', The Monist, 58 (1974), 490-517, and F. Snare, 'John Rawls and the methods of ethics', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 36 (1976), 100-12. Rawls makes no similar claims in his brief introduction to a recent edition of Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis IN, Hackett, 1981), pp. v-vi. Singer is interpreting Rawls's methodology as a deep theory of justification, and finds convincing evidence that Sidgwick did not espouse the same deep theory. By Singer's own admission, however, Sidgwick does adopt an argument strategy that, I would argue, is consistent with what I am calling methodological Rawlsianism.
16. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 51n, where he cites a passage from H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London, Macmillan, 1907), pp. 373f. See also H. Sidgwick, 'The establishment of ethical first principles', Mind, 4 (1879), p. 109, for another rather Rawlsian moment. For a similar interpretation of Sidgwick's method see J. Schneewind, 'First principles and common sense morality in Sidgwick's ethics', Archiv für Geschichten der Philosophie, 45 (1963). The 'Rawlsian' interpretation of Sidgwick is disputed in P. Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', The Monist, 58 (1974), 490-517, and F. Snare, 'John Rawls and the methods of ethics', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 36 (1976), 100-12. Rawls makes no similar claims in his brief introduction to a recent edition of Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis IN, Hackett, 1981), pp. v-vi. Singer is interpreting Rawls's methodology as a deep theory of justification, and finds convincing evidence that Sidgwick did not espouse the same deep theory. By Singer's own admission, however, Sidgwick does adopt an argument strategy that, I would argue, is consistent with what I am calling methodological Rawlsianism.
17. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 51n, where he cites a passage from H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London, Macmillan, 1907), pp. 373f. See also H. Sidgwick, 'The establishment of ethical first principles', Mind, 4 (1879), p. 109, for another rather Rawlsian moment. For a similar interpretation of Sidgwick's method see J. Schneewind, 'First principles and common sense morality in Sidgwick's ethics', Archiv für Geschichten der Philosophie, 45 (1963). The 'Rawlsian' interpretation of Sidgwick is disputed in P. Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', The Monist, 58 (1974), 490-517, and F. Snare, 'John Rawls and the methods of ethics', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 36 (1976), 100-12. Rawls makes no similar claims in his brief introduction to a recent edition of Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis IN, Hackett, 1981), pp. v-vi. Singer is interpreting Rawls's methodology as a deep theory of justification, and finds convincing evidence that Sidgwick did not espouse the same deep theory. By Singer's own admission, however, Sidgwick does adopt an argument strategy that, I would argue, is consistent with what I am calling methodological Rawlsianism.
18. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 51n, where he cites a passage from H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London, Macmillan, 1907), pp. 373f. See also H. Sidgwick, 'The establishment of ethical first principles', Mind, 4 (1879), p. 109, for another rather Rawlsian moment. For a similar interpretation of Sidgwick's method see J. Schneewind, 'First principles and common sense morality in Sidgwick's ethics', Archiv für Geschichten der Philosophie, 45 (1963). The 'Rawlsian' interpretation of Sidgwick is disputed in P. Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', The Monist, 58 (1974), 490-517, and F. Snare, 'John Rawls and the methods of ethics', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 36 (1976), 100-12. Rawls makes no similar claims in his brief introduction to a recent edition of Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis IN, Hackett, 1981), pp. v-vi. Singer is interpreting Rawls's methodology as a deep theory of justification, and finds convincing evidence that Sidgwick did not espouse the same deep theory. By Singer's own admission, however, Sidgwick does adopt an argument strategy that, I would argue, is consistent with what I am calling methodological Rawlsianism.
19. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 51n, where he cites a passage from H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London, Macmillan, 1907), pp. 373f. See also H. Sidgwick, 'The establishment of ethical first principles', Mind, 4 (1879), p. 109, for another rather Rawlsian moment. For a similar interpretation of Sidgwick's method see J. Schneewind, 'First principles and common sense morality in Sidgwick's ethics', Archiv für Geschichten der Philosophie, 45 (1963). The 'Rawlsian' interpretation of Sidgwick is disputed in P. Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', The Monist, 58 (1974), 490-517, and F. Snare, 'John Rawls and the methods of ethics', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 36 (1976), 100-12. Rawls makes no similar claims in his brief introduction to a recent edition of Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis IN, Hackett, 1981), pp. v-vi. Singer is interpreting Rawls's methodology as a deep theory of justification, and finds convincing evidence that Sidgwick did not espouse the same deep theory. By Singer's own admission, however, Sidgwick does adopt an argument strategy that, I would argue, is consistent with what I am calling methodological Rawlsianism.
20. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 51n, where he cites a passage from H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London, Macmillan, 1907), pp. 373f. See also H. Sidgwick, 'The establishment of ethical first principles', Mind, 4 (1879), p. 109, for another rather Rawlsian moment. For a similar interpretation of Sidgwick's method see J. Schneewind, 'First principles and common sense morality in Sidgwick's ethics', Archiv für Geschichten der Philosophie, 45 (1963). The 'Rawlsian' interpretation of Sidgwick is disputed in P. Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', The Monist, 58 (1974), 490-517, and F. Snare, 'John Rawls and the methods of ethics', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 36 (1976), 100-12. Rawls makes no similar claims in his brief introduction to a recent edition of Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis IN, Hackett, 1981), pp. v-vi. Singer is interpreting Rawls's methodology as a deep theory of justification, and finds convincing evidence that Sidgwick did not espouse the same deep theory. By Singer's own admission, however, Sidgwick does adopt an argument strategy that, I would argue, is consistent with what I am calling methodological Rawlsianism.
21. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 51n. Hampshire and Grice also find the roots of this method in Aristotle. See S. Hampshire, Two Theories of Morality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 5; and G. R. Grice, 'Moral theories and received opinion', p. 11.
22. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 51n. Hampshire and Grice also find the roots of this method in Aristotle. See S. Hampshire, Two Theories of Morality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 5; and G. R. Grice, 'Moral theories and received opinion', p. 11.
23. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 51n. Hampshire and Grice also find the roots of this method in Aristotle. See S. Hampshire, Two Theories of Morality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 5; and G. R. Grice, 'Moral theories and received opinion', p. 11.
24. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 49. See also K. Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', Analyse & Kritik, 13 (1991); K. Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy: contextualist justice and wide reflective equilibrium', Queen's Law Journal, 20 (1994), 101-5; and R. Rorty, 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', in A. Malachowski (ed.), Reading Rorty (Oxford, Blackwell, 1990), p. 291.
25. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 49. See also K. Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', Analyse & Kritik, 13 (1991); K. Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy: contextualist justice and wide reflective equilibrium', Queen's Law Journal, 20 (1994), 101-5; and R. Rorty, 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', in A. Malachowski (ed.), Reading Rorty (Oxford, Blackwell, 1990), p. 291.
26. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 49. See also K. Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', Analyse & Kritik, 13 (1991); K. Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy: contextualist justice and wide reflective equilibrium', Queen's Law Journal, 20 (1994), 101-5; and R. Rorty, 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', in A. Malachowski (ed.), Reading Rorty (Oxford, Blackwell, 1990), p. 291.
27. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 49. See also K. Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', Analyse & Kritik, 13 (1991); K. Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy: contextualist justice and wide reflective equilibrium', Queen's Law Journal, 20 (1994), 101-5; and R. Rorty, 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', in A. Malachowski (ed.), Reading Rorty (Oxford, Blackwell, 1990), p. 291.
28. Both David Lyons and Barry question whether Rawls's practice is consistent with his methodological pronouncements, even in A Theory of Justice. See D. Lyons, 'Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments', in N. Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 141-67: and Barry, Theories of Justice, pp. 278-82. Barry thinks that Rawls' actual practice in A Theory of Justice and later is best understood in terms of the method of constructivism, 'in spite of recurrent intrusions by the methodological claims first made [by Rawls] in [J. Rawls, "Outline of a decision procedure for ethics", Philosophical Review, 60 (1951), 177-97]'. Constructivism, according to Barry, is 'dependent on but not reducible to intuitionism' (Theories of Justice, p. 282). (By 'intuitionism' here, I believe he means reflective equilibrium, the central feature of methodological Rawlsianism.) The question of whether Rawls is a consistent methodological Rawlsian will depend on how loosely the method is characterized. Rawls himself, as we shall see, has several ways of describing the method, some of which are not at all incompatible with constructivism.
29. Both David Lyons and Barry question whether Rawls's practice is consistent with his methodological pronouncements, even in A Theory of Justice. See D. Lyons, 'Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments', in N. Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 141-67: and Barry, Theories of Justice, pp. 278-82. Barry thinks that Rawls' actual practice in A Theory of Justice and later is best understood in terms of the method of constructivism, 'in spite of recurrent intrusions by the methodological claims first made [by Rawls] in [J. Rawls, "Outline of a decision procedure for ethics", Philosophical Review, 60 (1951), 177-97]'. Constructivism, according to Barry, is 'dependent on but not reducible to intuitionism' (Theories of Justice, p. 282). (By 'intuitionism' here, I believe he means reflective equilibrium, the central feature of methodological Rawlsianism.) The question of whether Rawls is a consistent methodological Rawlsian will depend on how loosely the method is characterized. Rawls himself, as we shall see, has several ways of describing the method, some of which are not at all incompatible with constructivism.
30. Both David Lyons and Barry question whether Rawls's practice is consistent with his methodological pronouncements, even in A Theory of Justice. See D. Lyons, 'Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments', in N. Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 141-67: and Barry, Theories of Justice, pp. 278-82. Barry thinks that Rawls' actual practice in A Theory of Justice and later is best understood in terms of the method of constructivism, 'in spite of recurrent intrusions by the methodological claims first made [by Rawls] in [J. Rawls, "Outline of a decision procedure for ethics", Philosophical Review, 60 (1951), 177-97]'. Constructivism, according to Barry, is 'dependent on but not reducible to intuitionism' (Theories of Justice, p. 282). (By 'intuitionism' here, I believe he means reflective equilibrium, the central feature of methodological Rawlsianism.) The question of whether Rawls is a consistent methodological Rawlsian will depend on how loosely the method is characterized. Rawls himself, as we shall see, has several ways of describing the method, some of which are not at all incompatible with constructivism.
31. Both David Lyons and Barry question whether Rawls's practice is consistent with his methodological pronouncements, even in A Theory of Justice. See D. Lyons, 'Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments', in N. Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 141-67: and Barry, Theories of Justice, pp. 278-82. Barry thinks that Rawls' actual practice in A Theory of Justice and later is best understood in terms of the method of constructivism, 'in spite of recurrent intrusions by the methodological claims first made [by Rawls] in [J. Rawls, "Outline of a decision procedure for ethics", Philosophical Review, 60 (1951), 177-97]'. Constructivism, according to Barry, is 'dependent on but not reducible to intuitionism' (Theories of Justice, p. 282). (By 'intuitionism' here, I believe he means reflective equilibrium, the central feature of methodological Rawlsianism.) The question of whether Rawls is a consistent methodological Rawlsian will depend on how loosely the method is characterized. Rawls himself, as we shall see, has several ways of describing the method, some of which are not at all incompatible with constructivism.
32. Both David Lyons and Barry question whether Rawls's practice is consistent with his methodological pronouncements, even in A Theory of Justice. See D. Lyons, 'Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments', in N. Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 141-67: and Barry, Theories of Justice, pp. 278-82. Barry thinks that Rawls' actual practice in A Theory of Justice and later is best understood in terms of the method of constructivism, 'in spite of recurrent intrusions by the methodological claims first made [by Rawls] in [J. Rawls, "Outline of a decision procedure for ethics", Philosophical Review, 60 (1951), 177-97]'. Constructivism, according to Barry, is 'dependent on but not reducible to intuitionism' (Theories of Justice, p. 282). (By 'intuitionism' here, I believe he means reflective equilibrium, the central feature of methodological Rawlsianism.) The question of whether Rawls is a consistent methodological Rawlsian will depend on how loosely the method is characterized. Rawls himself, as we shall see, has several ways of describing the method, some of which are not at all incompatible with constructivism.
33. Both David Lyons and Barry question whether Rawls's practice is consistent with his methodological pronouncements, even in A Theory of Justice. See D. Lyons, 'Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments', in N. Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 141-67: and Barry, Theories of Justice, pp. 278-82. Barry thinks that Rawls' actual practice in A Theory of Justice and later is best understood in terms of the method of constructivism, 'in spite of recurrent intrusions by the methodological claims first made [by Rawls] in [J. Rawls, "Outline of a decision procedure for ethics", Philosophical Review, 60 (1951), 177-97]'. Constructivism, according to Barry, is 'dependent on but not reducible to intuitionism' (Theories of Justice, p. 282). (By 'intuitionism' here, I believe he means reflective equilibrium, the central feature of methodological Rawlsianism.) The question of whether Rawls is a consistent methodological Rawlsian will depend on how loosely the method is characterized. Rawls himself, as we shall see, has several ways of describing the method, some of which are not at all incompatible with constructivism.
34. There are vastly more methodological than substantive Rawlsians, so this is arguably Rawls's most enduring legacy.
35. Contemporary debates about political liberalism were launched by J. Rawls, 'Justice as fairness: political not metaphysical', Philosophy and Public Affair, 14 (1985). See C. Larmore, 'Political liberalism', Political Theory, 18 (1990), 339-60, for an analysis of these debates.
36. Contemporary debates about political liberalism were launched by J. Rawls, 'Justice as fairness: political not metaphysical', Philosophy and Public Affair, 14 (1985). See C. Larmore, 'Political liberalism', Political Theory, 18 (1990), 339-60, for an analysis of these debates.
37. See K. Baier, 'Justice and the aims of political philosophy', Ethics, 99 (1989), p. 781 on the relation between ethics and political philosophy in Rawls's recent work.
38. O. O'Neill, 'The power of example', Philosophy, 61 (1986), p. 5.
39. For a case against their even being of much instrumental value for normative political theory, see W. Norman, Taking Freedom Too Seriously? An Essay on Analytic and Post-Analytic Political Philosophy (New York, Garland, 1991), and 'Taking "free action" too seriously', Ethics, 101 (1991), 505-20.
40. For a case against their even being of much instrumental value for normative political theory, see W. Norman, Taking Freedom Too Seriously? An Essay on Analytic and Post-Analytic Political Philosophy (New York, Garland, 1991), and 'Taking "free action" too seriously', Ethics, 101 (1991), 505-20.
41. Scholarship and polemic seem so deeply entrenched in Franco-German circles of political philosophy that the Belgian methodological Rawlsian, Philippe van Parijs, felt it necessary to begin his recent introductory text with the bold assertion that 'L'invective et l'exégèse ne sont pas les seuls registres de la philosophie politique' (P. van Parijs, Qu'est-ce qu'une société juste? (Paris, Seuil, 1991), p. 9). For a brief plea in favour of what I am calling methodological Rawlsianism, directed at continental philosophers, see P. van Parijs, 'Bref plaidoyer pour la philosophie politique, manière Anglo-Saxonne', Revue de métaphysique et de morale, (1988), 69-79.
42. Scholarship and polemic seem so deeply entrenched in Franco-German circles of political philosophy that the Belgian methodological Rawlsian, Philippe van Parijs, felt it necessary to begin his recent introductory text with the bold assertion that 'L'invective et l'exégèse ne sont pas les seuls registres de la philosophie politique' (P. van Parijs, Qu'est-ce qu'une société juste? (Paris, Seuil, 1991), p. 9). For a brief plea in favour of what I am calling methodological Rawlsianism, directed at continental philosophers, see P. van Parijs, 'Bref plaidoyer pour la philosophie politique, manière Anglo-Saxonne', Revue de métaphysique et de morale, (1988), 69-79.
43. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 580f. See also J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York NY, Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 100; and C. Perelman, Justice (New York, Random House, 1967), p. 64.
44. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 580f. See also J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York NY, Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 100; and C. Perelman, Justice (New York, Random House, 1967), p. 64.
45. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 580f. See also J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York NY, Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 100; and C. Perelman, Justice (New York, Random House, 1967), p. 64.
46. Singer calls this an ad hominem argument (a usage at odds with the standard definition in informal logic texts), and notes that it is widely used by Sidgwick (Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', pp. 495-509). In this sense, Sidgwick wrote like a methodological Rawlsian, which is tantamount to saying he was one, at least much of the time. The same might be said of J. S. Mill, who went to great lengths to employ arguments to lead his conservative readers to his liberal conclusions, and of many other non-dogmatic writers in the history of political thought.
47. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21; see Isaiah Berlin, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 32). Richard Rorty and Kai Nielsen are strong supporters both of this interpretation of Rawls and of this pragmatic view of justification more generally. See Rorty. 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'. Others interpret Rawls as being neutral about the prospects of deeper foundations (see, e.g., Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', p. 177; M. Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 20 (1994), p. 29). It is widely granted that Rawls has a coherentist, anti-foundationalist theory of justification. See, e.g., N. Daniels, 'Retlective equilibrium and Archimedean points', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980), p. 102; N. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), p. 256; K. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', The Monist, (1993), p. 323; Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 323; Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 482; Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', p. 176; R. Dworkin, 'The Original Position', in N. Daniels, (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 27-37; J. Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', Inquiry, 25 (1982), 308. Not surprisingly, the critical literature makes room for a 'moderate foundationalist' interpretation of Rawls in R. Ebertz, 'Is reflective equilibrium a coherentist model?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1993), 193-214. I am sympathetic with Michael DePaul's view that the justificatory model in Rawls, on the one hand, and the kinds of epistemic theories in the foundationalism/coherentism debate, on the other, 'are not really positions on the same topic, although they are surely positions on related topics' (DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', p. 68).
48. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21; see Isaiah Berlin, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 32). Richard Rorty and Kai Nielsen are strong supporters both of this interpretation of Rawls and of this pragmatic view of justification more generally. See Rorty. 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'. Others interpret Rawls as being neutral about the prospects of deeper foundations (see, e.g., Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', p. 177; M. Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 20 (1994), p. 29). It is widely granted that Rawls has a coherentist, anti-foundationalist theory of justification. See, e.g., N. Daniels, 'Retlective equilibrium and Archimedean points', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980), p. 102; N. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), p. 256; K. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', The Monist, (1993), p. 323; Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 323; Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 482; Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', p. 176; R. Dworkin, 'The Original Position', in N. Daniels, (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 27-37; J. Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', Inquiry, 25 (1982), 308. Not surprisingly, the critical literature makes room for a 'moderate foundationalist' interpretation of Rawls in R. Ebertz, 'Is reflective equilibrium a coherentist model?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1993), 193-214. I am sympathetic with Michael DePaul's view that the justificatory model in Rawls, on the one hand, and the kinds of epistemic theories in the foundationalism/coherentism debate, on the other, 'are not really positions on the same topic, although they are surely positions on related topics' (DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', p. 68).
49. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21; see Isaiah Berlin, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 32). Richard Rorty and Kai Nielsen are strong supporters both of this interpretation of Rawls and of this pragmatic view of justification more generally. See Rorty. 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'. Others interpret Rawls as being neutral about the prospects of deeper foundations (see, e.g., Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', p. 177; M. Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 20 (1994), p. 29). It is widely granted that Rawls has a coherentist, anti-foundationalist theory of justification. See, e.g., N. Daniels, 'Retlective equilibrium and Archimedean points', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980), p. 102; N. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), p. 256; K. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', The Monist, (1993), p. 323; Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 323; Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 482; Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', p. 176; R. Dworkin, 'The Original Position', in N. Daniels, (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 27-37; J. Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', Inquiry, 25 (1982), 308. Not surprisingly, the critical literature makes room for a 'moderate foundationalist' interpretation of Rawls in R. Ebertz, 'Is reflective equilibrium a coherentist model?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1993), 193-214. I am sympathetic with Michael DePaul's view that the justificatory model in Rawls, on the one hand, and the kinds of epistemic theories in the foundationalism/coherentism debate, on the other, 'are not really positions on the same topic, although they are surely positions on related topics' (DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', p. 68).
50. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21; see Isaiah Berlin, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 32). Richard Rorty and Kai Nielsen are strong supporters both of this interpretation of Rawls and of this pragmatic view of justification more generally. See Rorty. 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'. Others interpret Rawls as being neutral about the prospects of deeper foundations (see, e.g., Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', p. 177; M. Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 20 (1994), p. 29). It is widely granted that Rawls has a coherentist, anti-foundationalist theory of justification. See, e.g., N. Daniels, 'Retlective equilibrium and Archimedean points', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980), p. 102; N. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), p. 256; K. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', The Monist, (1993), p. 323; Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 323; Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 482; Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', p. 176; R. Dworkin, 'The Original Position', in N. Daniels, (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 27-37; J. Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', Inquiry, 25 (1982), 308. Not surprisingly, the critical literature makes room for a 'moderate foundationalist' interpretation of Rawls in R. Ebertz, 'Is reflective equilibrium a coherentist model?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1993), 193-214. I am sympathetic with Michael DePaul's view that the justificatory model in Rawls, on the one hand, and the kinds of epistemic theories in the foundationalism/coherentism debate, on the other, 'are not really positions on the same topic, although they are surely positions on related topics' (DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', p. 68).
51. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21; see Isaiah Berlin, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 32). Richard Rorty and Kai Nielsen are strong supporters both of this interpretation of Rawls and of this pragmatic view of justification more generally. See Rorty. 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'. Others interpret Rawls as being neutral about the prospects of deeper foundations (see, e.g., Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', p. 177; M. Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 20 (1994), p. 29). It is widely granted that Rawls has a coherentist, anti-foundationalist theory of justification. See, e.g., N. Daniels, 'Retlective equilibrium and Archimedean points', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980), p. 102; N. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), p. 256; K. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', The Monist, (1993), p. 323; Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 323; Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 482; Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', p. 176; R. Dworkin, 'The Original Position', in N. Daniels, (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 27-37; J. Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', Inquiry, 25 (1982), 308. Not surprisingly, the critical literature makes room for a 'moderate foundationalist' interpretation of Rawls in R. Ebertz, 'Is reflective equilibrium a coherentist model?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1993), 193-214. I am sympathetic with Michael DePaul's view that the justificatory model in Rawls, on the one hand, and the kinds of epistemic theories in the foundationalism/coherentism debate, on the other, 'are not really positions on the same topic, although they are surely positions on related topics' (DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', p. 68).
52. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21; see Isaiah Berlin, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 32). Richard Rorty and Kai Nielsen are strong supporters both of this interpretation of Rawls and of this pragmatic view of justification more generally. See Rorty. 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'. Others interpret Rawls as being neutral about the prospects of deeper foundations (see, e.g., Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', p. 177; M. Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 20 (1994), p. 29). It is widely granted that Rawls has a coherentist, anti-foundationalist theory of justification. See, e.g., N. Daniels, 'Retlective equilibrium and Archimedean points', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980), p. 102; N. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), p. 256; K. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', The Monist, (1993), p. 323; Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 323; Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 482; Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', p. 176; R. Dworkin, 'The Original Position', in N. Daniels, (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 27-37; J. Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', Inquiry, 25 (1982), 308. Not surprisingly, the critical literature makes room for a 'moderate foundationalist' interpretation of Rawls in R. Ebertz, 'Is reflective equilibrium a coherentist model?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1993), 193-214. I am sympathetic with Michael DePaul's view that the justificatory model in Rawls, on the one hand, and the kinds of epistemic theories in the foundationalism/coherentism debate, on the other, 'are not really positions on the same topic, although they are surely positions on related topics' (DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', p. 68).
53. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21; see Isaiah Berlin, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 32). Richard Rorty and Kai Nielsen are strong supporters both of this interpretation of Rawls and of this pragmatic view of justification more generally. See Rorty. 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'. Others interpret Rawls as being neutral about the prospects of deeper foundations (see, e.g., Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', p. 177; M. Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 20 (1994), p. 29). It is widely granted that Rawls has a coherentist, anti-foundationalist theory of justification. See, e.g., N. Daniels, 'Retlective equilibrium and Archimedean points', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980), p. 102; N. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), p. 256; K. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', The Monist, (1993), p. 323; Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 323; Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 482; Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', p. 176; R. Dworkin, 'The Original Position', in N. Daniels, (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 27-37; J. Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', Inquiry, 25 (1982), 308. Not surprisingly, the critical literature makes room for a 'moderate foundationalist' interpretation of Rawls in R. Ebertz, 'Is reflective equilibrium a coherentist model?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1993), 193-214. I am sympathetic with Michael DePaul's view that the justificatory model in Rawls, on the one hand, and the kinds of epistemic theories in the foundationalism/coherentism debate, on the other, 'are not really positions on the same topic, although they are surely positions on related topics' (DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', p. 68).
54. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21; see Isaiah Berlin, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 32). Richard Rorty and Kai Nielsen are strong supporters both of this interpretation of Rawls and of this pragmatic view of justification more generally. See Rorty. 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'. Others interpret Rawls as being neutral about the prospects of deeper foundations (see, e.g., Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', p. 177; M. Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 20 (1994), p. 29). It is widely granted that Rawls has a coherentist, anti-foundationalist theory of justification. See, e.g., N. Daniels, 'Retlective equilibrium and Archimedean points', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980), p. 102; N. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), p. 256; K. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', The Monist, (1993), p. 323; Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 323; Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 482; Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', p. 176; R. Dworkin, 'The Original Position', in N. Daniels, (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 27-37; J. Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', Inquiry, 25 (1982), 308. Not surprisingly, the critical literature makes room for a 'moderate foundationalist' interpretation of Rawls in R. Ebertz, 'Is reflective equilibrium a coherentist model?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1993), 193-214. I am sympathetic with Michael DePaul's view that the justificatory model in Rawls, on the one hand, and the kinds of epistemic theories in the foundationalism/coherentism debate, on the other, 'are not really positions on the same topic, although they are surely positions on related topics' (DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', p. 68).
55. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21; see Isaiah Berlin, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 32). Richard Rorty and Kai Nielsen are strong supporters both of this interpretation of Rawls and of this pragmatic view of justification more generally. See Rorty. 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'. Others interpret Rawls as being neutral about the prospects of deeper foundations (see, e.g., Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', p. 177; M. Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 20 (1994), p. 29). It is widely granted that Rawls has a coherentist, anti-foundationalist theory of justification. See, e.g., N. Daniels, 'Retlective equilibrium and Archimedean points', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980), p. 102; N. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), p. 256; K. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', The Monist, (1993), p. 323; Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 323; Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 482; Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', p. 176; R. Dworkin, 'The Original Position', in N. Daniels, (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 27-37; J. Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', Inquiry, 25 (1982), 308. Not surprisingly, the critical literature makes room for a 'moderate foundationalist' interpretation of Rawls in R. Ebertz, 'Is reflective equilibrium a coherentist model?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1993), 193-214. I am sympathetic with Michael DePaul's view that the justificatory model in Rawls, on the one hand, and the kinds of epistemic theories in the foundationalism/coherentism debate, on the other, 'are not really positions on the same topic, although they are surely positions on related topics' (DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', p. 68).
56. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21; see Isaiah Berlin, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 32). Richard Rorty and Kai Nielsen are strong supporters both of this interpretation of Rawls and of this pragmatic view of justification more generally. See Rorty. 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'. Others interpret Rawls as being neutral about the prospects of deeper foundations (see, e.g., Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', p. 177; M. Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 20 (1994), p. 29). It is widely granted that Rawls has a coherentist, anti-foundationalist theory of justification. See, e.g., N. Daniels, 'Retlective equilibrium and Archimedean points', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980), p. 102; N. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), p. 256; K. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', The Monist, (1993), p. 323; Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 323; Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 482; Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', p. 176; R. Dworkin, 'The Original Position', in N. Daniels, (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 27-37; J. Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', Inquiry, 25 (1982), 308. Not surprisingly, the critical literature makes room for a 'moderate foundationalist' interpretation of Rawls in R. Ebertz, 'Is reflective equilibrium a coherentist model?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1993), 193-214. I am sympathetic with Michael DePaul's view that the justificatory model in Rawls, on the one hand, and the kinds of epistemic theories in the foundationalism/coherentism debate, on the other, 'are not really positions on the same topic, although they are surely positions on related topics' (DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', p. 68).
57. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21; see Isaiah Berlin, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 32). Richard Rorty and Kai Nielsen are strong supporters both of this interpretation of Rawls and of this pragmatic view of justification more generally. See Rorty. 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'. Others interpret Rawls as being neutral about the prospects of deeper foundations (see, e.g., Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', p. 177; M. Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 20 (1994), p. 29). It is widely granted that Rawls has a coherentist, anti-foundationalist theory of justification. See, e.g., N. Daniels, 'Retlective equilibrium and Archimedean points', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980), p. 102; N. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), p. 256; K. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', The Monist, (1993), p. 323; Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 323; Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 482; Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', p. 176; R. Dworkin, 'The Original Position', in N. Daniels, (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 27-37; J. Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', Inquiry, 25 (1982), 308. Not surprisingly, the critical literature makes room for a 'moderate foundationalist' interpretation of Rawls in R. Ebertz, 'Is reflective equilibrium a coherentist model?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1993), 193-214. I am sympathetic with Michael DePaul's view that the justificatory model in Rawls, on the one hand, and the kinds of epistemic theories in the foundationalism/coherentism debate, on the other, 'are not really positions on the same topic, although they are surely positions on related topics' (DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', p. 68).
58. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21; see Isaiah Berlin, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 32). Richard Rorty and Kai Nielsen are strong supporters both of this interpretation of Rawls and of this pragmatic view of justification more generally. See Rorty. 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'. Others interpret Rawls as being neutral about the prospects of deeper foundations (see, e.g., Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', p. 177; M. Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 20 (1994), p. 29). It is widely granted that Rawls has a coherentist, anti-foundationalist theory of justification. See, e.g., N. Daniels, 'Retlective equilibrium and Archimedean points', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980), p. 102; N. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), p. 256; K. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', The Monist, (1993), p. 323; Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 323; Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 482; Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', p. 176; R. Dworkin, 'The Original Position', in N. Daniels, (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 27-37; J. Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', Inquiry, 25 (1982), 308. Not surprisingly, the critical literature makes room for a 'moderate foundationalist' interpretation of Rawls in R. Ebertz, 'Is reflective equilibrium a coherentist model?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1993), 193-214. I am sympathetic with Michael DePaul's view that the justificatory model in Rawls, on the one hand, and the kinds of epistemic theories in the foundationalism/coherentism debate, on the other, 'are not really positions on the same topic, although they are surely positions on related topics' (DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', p. 68).
59. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21; see Isaiah Berlin, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 32). Richard Rorty and Kai Nielsen are strong supporters both of this interpretation of Rawls and of this pragmatic view of justification more generally. See Rorty. 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'. Others interpret Rawls as being neutral about the prospects of deeper foundations (see, e.g., Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', p. 177; M. Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 20 (1994), p. 29). It is widely granted that Rawls has a coherentist, anti-foundationalist theory of justification. See, e.g., N. Daniels, 'Retlective equilibrium and Archimedean points', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980), p. 102; N. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), p. 256; K. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', The Monist, (1993), p. 323; Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 323; Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 482; Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', p. 176; R. Dworkin, 'The Original Position', in N. Daniels, (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 27-37; J. Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', Inquiry, 25 (1982), 308. Not surprisingly, the critical literature makes room for a 'moderate foundationalist' interpretation of Rawls in R. Ebertz, 'Is reflective equilibrium a coherentist model?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1993), 193-214. I am sympathetic with Michael DePaul's view that the justificatory model in Rawls, on the one hand, and the kinds of epistemic theories in the foundationalism/coherentism debate, on the other, 'are not really positions on the same topic, although they are surely positions on related topics' (DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', p. 68).
60. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21; see Isaiah Berlin, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 32). Richard Rorty and Kai Nielsen are strong supporters both of this interpretation of Rawls and of this pragmatic view of justification more generally. See Rorty. 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal', and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'. Others interpret Rawls as being neutral about the prospects of deeper foundations (see, e.g., Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', p. 177; M. Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 20 (1994), p. 29). It is widely granted that Rawls has a coherentist, anti-foundationalist theory of justification. See, e.g., N. Daniels, 'Retlective equilibrium and Archimedean points', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980), p. 102; N. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), p. 256; K. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', The Monist, (1993), p. 323; Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 323; Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 482; Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing', p. 176; R. Dworkin, 'The Original Position', in N. Daniels, (ed.), Reading Rawls (New York NY, Basic, 1975), pp. 27-37; J. Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', Inquiry, 25 (1982), 308. Not surprisingly, the critical literature makes room for a 'moderate foundationalist' interpretation of Rawls in R. Ebertz, 'Is reflective equilibrium a coherentist model?', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23 (1993), 193-214. I am sympathetic with Michael DePaul's view that the justificatory model in Rawls, on the one hand, and the kinds of epistemic theories in the foundationalism/coherentism debate, on the other, 'are not really positions on the same topic, although they are surely positions on related topics' (DePaul, 'Reflective equilibrium and foundationalism', p. 68).
61. 'A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual
62. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 50. This claim is disputed by Raz in 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', pp. 314f.
63. According to Wellman (Challenge and Response, p. 138) one needs to justify only when one is challenged, and '[m]eeting a challenge is responding to it in a way that would, after indefinite criticism, cause any normal person to withdraw that challenge'. See also T. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982).
64. According to Wellman (Challenge and Response, p. 138) one needs to justify only when one is challenged, and '[m]eeting a challenge is responding to it in a way that would, after indefinite criticism, cause any normal person to withdraw that challenge'. See also T. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982).
65. See S. Bok, 'What basis for morality? A minimalist approach', The Monist, (1993), p. 353; David Miller and G. Klosko argue that Rawlsians should use empirical studies to discover what moral and political beliefs are actually shared. See D. Miller, 'Review of K. R. Scherer (ed.), Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives', Social Justice Research, 7 (1994), 171-181; D. Miller, 'Distributive justice: What the people think?', Ethics, 102/3 (1992); and G. Klosko, 'Rawls' "political" philosophy and American democracy', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), p. 184.
66. See S. Bok, 'What basis for morality? A minimalist approach', The Monist, (1993), p. 353; David Miller and G. Klosko argue that Rawlsians should use empirical studies to discover what moral and political beliefs are actually shared. See D. Miller, 'Review of K. R. Scherer (ed.), Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives', Social Justice Research, 7 (1994), 171-181; D. Miller, 'Distributive justice: What the people think?', Ethics, 102/3 (1992); and G. Klosko, 'Rawls' "political" philosophy and American democracy', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), p. 184.
67. See S. Bok, 'What basis for morality? A minimalist approach', The Monist, (1993), p. 353; David Miller and G. Klosko argue that Rawlsians should use empirical studies to discover what moral and political beliefs are actually shared. See D. Miller, 'Review of K. R. Scherer (ed.), Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives', Social Justice Research, 7 (1994), 171-181; D. Miller, 'Distributive justice: What the people think?', Ethics, 102/3 (1992); and G. Klosko, 'Rawls' "political" philosophy and American democracy', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), p. 184.
68. See S. Bok, 'What basis for morality? A minimalist approach', The Monist, (1993), p. 353; David Miller and G. Klosko argue that Rawlsians should use empirical studies to discover what moral and political beliefs are actually shared. See D. Miller, 'Review of K. R. Scherer (ed.), Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives', Social Justice Research, 7 (1994), 171-181; D. Miller, 'Distributive justice: What the people think?', Ethics, 102/3 (1992); and G. Klosko, 'Rawls' "political" philosophy and American democracy', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), p. 184.
69. A. Buchanan, Secession: the Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder CO, Westview, 1991), p. xii.
70. Rawls, for example, assumes that moral knowledge is accessible to every person who is normally reasonable and conscientious, and that we have in our nature sufficient motives to lead us to act as we ought without the need of external threats and inducements (Political Liberalism, pp. xxvi-xxvii). Hence, moral theories are 'commonly regarded as abstract structures whose role is to supply justification rather than motivation' (Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 476).
71. Rawls, for example, assumes that moral knowledge is accessible to every person who is normally reasonable and conscientious, and that we have in our nature sufficient motives to lead us to act as we ought without the need of external threats and inducements (Political Liberalism, pp. xxvi-xxvii). Hence, moral theories are 'commonly regarded as abstract structures whose role is to supply justification rather than motivation' (Jamieson, 'Method and Moral Theory', p. 476).
72. This last assumption is so widely shared amongst methodological Rawlsians that I doubt many have even questioned it. In the heyday of linguistic analysis and meta-ethics, during the 1950s, philosophers did discuss the question 'Why be moral?'. But in the end most found it to be deceptively uninteresting, perhaps even meaningless: proffering moral reasons for being moral would be circular; and wholly self-interested reasons for being moral would be inappropriate, since the question 'Why be moral?' is only germane in cases when being moral is not to one's advantage. See, e.g., K. Nielsen, 'Is "why should I be moral?" an absurdity?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 36 (1958). Of course, such analytic arguments are wholly irrelevant to the much more complex project of trying to provide an evolutionary or game-theoretic explanation for the emergence of moral norms among rational agents - see D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986); T. Scanlon, 'Moral theory: understanding and disagreement', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55 (1995), 346f; and K. Nielsen, 'Justice as a kind of impartiality', Laval théologique et philosophique, 50 (1994), p. 527. Methodological Rawlsians do not, for the most part, engage in this project (cp. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 503); but they need not deny its importance to various meta-ethical issues.
73. This last assumption is so widely shared amongst methodological Rawlsians that I doubt many have even questioned it. In the heyday of linguistic analysis and meta-ethics, during the 1950s, philosophers did discuss the question 'Why be moral?'. But in the end most found it to be deceptively uninteresting, perhaps even meaningless: proffering moral reasons for being moral would be circular; and wholly self-interested reasons for being moral would be inappropriate, since the question 'Why be moral?' is only germane in cases when being moral is not to one's advantage. See, e.g., K. Nielsen, 'Is "why should I be moral?" an absurdity?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 36 (1958). Of course, such analytic arguments are wholly irrelevant to the much more complex project of trying to provide an evolutionary or game-theoretic explanation for the emergence of moral norms among rational agents - see D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986); T. Scanlon, 'Moral theory: understanding and disagreement', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55 (1995), 346f; and K. Nielsen, 'Justice as a kind of impartiality', Laval théologique et philosophique, 50 (1994), p. 527. Methodological Rawlsians do not, for the most part, engage in this project (cp. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 503); but they need not deny its importance to various meta-ethical issues.
74. This last assumption is so widely shared amongst methodological Rawlsians that I doubt many have even questioned it. In the heyday of linguistic analysis and meta-ethics, during the 1950s, philosophers did discuss the question 'Why be moral?'. But in the end most found it to be deceptively uninteresting, perhaps even meaningless: proffering moral reasons for being moral would be circular; and wholly self-interested reasons for being moral would be inappropriate, since the question 'Why be moral?' is only germane in cases when being moral is not to one's advantage. See, e.g., K. Nielsen, 'Is "why should I be moral?" an absurdity?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 36 (1958). Of course, such analytic arguments are wholly irrelevant to the much more complex project of trying to provide an evolutionary or game-theoretic explanation for the emergence of moral norms among rational agents - see D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986); T. Scanlon, 'Moral theory: understanding and disagreement', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55 (1995), 346f; and K. Nielsen, 'Justice as a kind of impartiality', Laval théologique et philosophique, 50 (1994), p. 527. Methodological Rawlsians do not, for the most part, engage in this project (cp. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 503); but they need not deny its importance to various meta-ethical issues.
75. This last assumption is so widely shared amongst methodological Rawlsians that I doubt many have even questioned it. In the heyday of linguistic analysis and meta-ethics, during the 1950s, philosophers did discuss the question 'Why be moral?'. But in the end most found it to be deceptively uninteresting, perhaps even meaningless: proffering moral reasons for being moral would be circular; and wholly self-interested reasons for being moral would be inappropriate, since the question 'Why be moral?' is only germane in cases when being moral is not to one's advantage. See, e.g., K. Nielsen, 'Is "why should I be moral?" an absurdity?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 36 (1958). Of course, such analytic arguments are wholly irrelevant to the much more complex project of trying to provide an evolutionary or game-theoretic explanation for the emergence of moral norms among rational agents - see D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986); T. Scanlon, 'Moral theory: understanding and disagreement', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55 (1995), 346f; and K. Nielsen, 'Justice as a kind of impartiality', Laval théologique et philosophique, 50 (1994), p. 527. Methodological Rawlsians do not, for the most part, engage in this project (cp. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 503); but they need not deny its importance to various meta-ethical issues.
76. This last assumption is so widely shared amongst methodological Rawlsians that I doubt many have even questioned it. In the heyday of linguistic analysis and meta-ethics, during the 1950s, philosophers did discuss the question 'Why be moral?'. But in the end most found it to be deceptively uninteresting, perhaps even meaningless: proffering moral reasons for being moral would be circular; and wholly self-interested reasons for being moral would be inappropriate, since the question 'Why be moral?' is only germane in cases when being moral is not to one's advantage. See, e.g., K. Nielsen, 'Is "why should I be moral?" an absurdity?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 36 (1958). Of course, such analytic arguments are wholly irrelevant to the much more complex project of trying to provide an evolutionary or game-theoretic explanation for the emergence of moral norms among rational agents - see D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986); T. Scanlon, 'Moral theory: understanding and disagreement', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55 (1995), 346f; and K. Nielsen, 'Justice as a kind of impartiality', Laval théologique et philosophique, 50 (1994), p. 527. Methodological Rawlsians do not, for the most part, engage in this project (cp. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 503); but they need not deny its importance to various meta-ethical issues.
77. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 18.
78. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, he makes this claim about the contractual representation of 'weak premises' in the original position.
79. See, e.g., R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford, Clarendon, 1963), and J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, (Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1990), trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Christian Lenhardt.
80. See, e.g., R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford, Clarendon, 1963), and J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, (Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1990), trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Christian Lenhardt.
81. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 46.
82. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 18.
83. By 'speculative' the methodological Rawlsian has in mind theories that are unfalsifiable, practically impossible to test, or which are opposed by many leading experts in the relevant fields. I should think that much of the social, psychoanalytic and linguistic theory cited by Habermas falls into this category. So might the social-psychological theories of Kohlberg used by both Habermas and the earlier Rawls. More recently Rawls has been willing to exclude appeal even to 'elaborate economic theories of general equilibrium' (Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 225). Note that this maxim can be embraced by philosophers who hold strong views on these controversial subjects. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt's arguments for why his fellow believers should nevertheless avoid appealing to religious premises in most public debates, in K. Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988).
84. By 'speculative' the methodological Rawlsian has in mind theories that are unfalsifiable, practically impossible to test, or which are opposed by many leading experts in the relevant fields. I should think that much of the social, psychoanalytic and linguistic theory cited by Habermas falls into this category. So might the social-psychological theories of Kohlberg used by both Habermas and the earlier Rawls. More recently Rawls has been willing to exclude appeal even to 'elaborate economic theories of general equilibrium' (Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 225). Note that this maxim can be embraced by philosophers who hold strong views on these controversial subjects. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt's arguments for why his fellow believers should nevertheless avoid appealing to religious premises in most public debates, in K. Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988).
85. Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 90. A sceptical colleague, Hilliard Aronovitch, asks whether they travel light in order to make a quick getaway.
86. See, e.g., Raz, Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence'; J. Hampton, 'Should political philosophy be done without metaphysics?', Ethics, 99/4 (1989), and 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism'; S. Scheffler, 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and polities', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (1992), p. 318. Rawls denies these charges (Political Liberalism, pp. 10, 95) and Kai Nielsen has made something of a crusade on Rawls's behalf. See, e.g., Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', pp. 101-7, where he replies directly to Hampton's critique. See also Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', p. 29; and Rorty, 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291.
87. See, e.g., Raz, Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence'; J. Hampton, 'Should political philosophy be done without metaphysics?', Ethics, 99/4 (1989), and 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism'; S. Scheffler, 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and polities', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (1992), p. 318. Rawls denies these charges (Political Liberalism, pp. 10, 95) and Kai Nielsen has made something of a crusade on Rawls's behalf. See, e.g., Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', pp. 101-7, where he replies directly to Hampton's critique. See also Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', p. 29; and Rorty, 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291.
88. See, e.g., Raz, Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence'; J. Hampton, 'Should political philosophy be done without metaphysics?', Ethics, 99/4 (1989), and 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism'; S. Scheffler, 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and polities', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (1992), p. 318. Rawls denies these charges (Political Liberalism, pp. 10, 95) and Kai Nielsen has made something of a crusade on Rawls's behalf. See, e.g., Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', pp. 101-7, where he replies directly to Hampton's critique. See also Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', p. 29; and Rorty, 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291.
89. See, e.g., Raz, Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence'; J. Hampton, 'Should political philosophy be done without metaphysics?', Ethics, 99/4 (1989), and 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism'; S. Scheffler, 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and polities', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (1992), p. 318. Rawls denies these charges (Political Liberalism, pp. 10, 95) and Kai Nielsen has made something of a crusade on Rawls's behalf. See, e.g., Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', pp. 101-7, where he replies directly to Hampton's critique. See also Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', p. 29; and Rorty, 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291.
90. See, e.g., Raz, Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence'; J. Hampton, 'Should political philosophy be done without metaphysics?', Ethics, 99/4 (1989), and 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism'; S. Scheffler, 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and polities', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (1992), p. 318. Rawls denies these charges (Political Liberalism, pp. 10, 95) and Kai Nielsen has made something of a crusade on Rawls's behalf. See, e.g., Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', pp. 101-7, where he replies directly to Hampton's critique. See also Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', p. 29; and Rorty, 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291.
91. See, e.g., Raz, Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence'; J. Hampton, 'Should political philosophy be done without metaphysics?', Ethics, 99/4 (1989), and 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism'; S. Scheffler, 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and polities', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (1992), p. 318. Rawls denies these charges (Political Liberalism, pp. 10, 95) and Kai Nielsen has made something of a crusade on Rawls's behalf. See, e.g., Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', pp. 101-7, where he replies directly to Hampton's critique. See also Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', p. 29; and Rorty, 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291.
92. See, e.g., Raz, Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence'; J. Hampton, 'Should political philosophy be done without metaphysics?', Ethics, 99/4 (1989), and 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism'; S. Scheffler, 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and polities', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (1992), p. 318. Rawls denies these charges (Political Liberalism, pp. 10, 95) and Kai Nielsen has made something of a crusade on Rawls's behalf. See, e.g., Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', pp. 101-7, where he replies directly to Hampton's critique. See also Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', p. 29; and Rorty, 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291.
93. See, e.g., Raz, Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence'; J. Hampton, 'Should political philosophy be done without metaphysics?', Ethics, 99/4 (1989), and 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism'; S. Scheffler, 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and polities', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (1992), p. 318. Rawls denies these charges (Political Liberalism, pp. 10, 95) and Kai Nielsen has made something of a crusade on Rawls's behalf. See, e.g., Nielsen, 'How to proceed in social philosophy', pp. 101-7, where he replies directly to Hampton's critique. See also Cladis, 'Wittgenstein, Rawls and conservatism', p. 29; and Rorty, 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 291.
94. As will become clear in my discussion of 'reflective equilibrium', below, the reasoning within the process of reflective equilibrium cannot possibly be construed as deductive. This should provide methodological Rawlsians with leeway in dealing with controversial premises. For a sustained defence of a non-deductive model of moral reasoning see Wellman, Challenge and Response.
95. Barry, Theories of Justice, p. 263.
96. C. Larmore, Modernité et Morale, (Paris, Presses Universitaires de la France, 1993), p. 15. For a summary in English, see D. Weinstock, 'Review of C. Larmore, Modernité et morale', Journal of Philosophy, 93, 1 (1996), 41-8. Larmore lists among philosophers who violate this ethics of thought 'Heidegger, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School (before Habermas), and the neo-Nietzschean thought of Foucault and Derrida'. Gadamer, Ricoeur, Habermas and Bergson are among the continental philosophers who respect it (pp. 15f). Note that general principles involving vague references to freedom, equality and welfare would also violate this maxim (see Norman, Taking Freedom Too Seriously?, pp. 153-62). See Folke Tersman's argument (pp. 404f) for why reflective equilibrium would have to reject utilitarianism on these grounds, in F. Tersman, 'Utilitarianism and the idea of reflective equilibrium', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29 (1991), 395-406.
97. C. Larmore, Modernité et Morale, (Paris, Presses Universitaires de la France, 1993), p. 15. For a summary in English, see D. Weinstock, 'Review of C. Larmore, Modernité et morale', Journal of Philosophy, 93, 1 (1996), 41-8. Larmore lists among philosophers who violate this ethics of thought 'Heidegger, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School (before Habermas), and the neo-Nietzschean thought of Foucault and Derrida'. Gadamer, Ricoeur, Habermas and Bergson are among the continental philosophers who respect it (pp. 15f). Note that general principles involving vague references to freedom, equality and welfare would also violate this maxim (see Norman, Taking Freedom Too Seriously?, pp. 153-62). See Folke Tersman's argument (pp. 404f) for why reflective equilibrium would have to reject utilitarianism on these grounds, in F. Tersman, 'Utilitarianism and the idea of reflective equilibrium', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29 (1991), 395-406.
98. C. Larmore, Modernité et Morale, (Paris, Presses Universitaires de la France, 1993), p. 15. For a summary in English, see D. Weinstock, 'Review of C. Larmore, Modernité et morale', Journal of Philosophy, 93, 1 (1996), 41-8. Larmore lists among philosophers who violate this ethics of thought 'Heidegger, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School (before Habermas), and the neo-Nietzschean thought of Foucault and Derrida'. Gadamer, Ricoeur, Habermas and Bergson are among the continental philosophers who respect it (pp. 15f). Note that general principles involving vague references to freedom, equality and welfare would also violate this maxim (see Norman, Taking Freedom Too Seriously?, pp. 153-62). See Folke Tersman's argument (pp. 404f) for why reflective equilibrium would have to reject utilitarianism on these grounds, in F. Tersman, 'Utilitarianism and the idea of reflective equilibrium', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29 (1991), 395-406.
99. C. Larmore, Modernité et Morale, (Paris, Presses Universitaires de la France, 1993), p. 15. For a summary in English, see D. Weinstock, 'Review of C. Larmore, Modernité et morale', Journal of Philosophy, 93, 1 (1996), 41-8. Larmore lists among philosophers who violate this ethics of thought 'Heidegger, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School (before Habermas), and the neo-Nietzschean thought of Foucault and Derrida'. Gadamer, Ricoeur, Habermas and Bergson are among the continental philosophers who respect it (pp. 15f). Note that general principles involving vague references to freedom, equality and welfare would also violate this maxim (see Norman, Taking Freedom Too Seriously?, pp. 153-62). See Folke Tersman's argument (pp. 404f) for why reflective equilibrium would have to reject utilitarianism on these grounds, in F. Tersman, 'Utilitarianism and the idea of reflective equilibrium', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29 (1991), 395-406.
100. There has been a great deal written about intuitions and considered judgments in Rawls's method. For the most widely cited descriptions of these ideas, see. e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 18-21; J. Rawls, 'The independence of moral theory', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 48 (1974), 5-22; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 45; Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', and 'Reflective equilibrium and Archimedean points'.
101. There has been a great deal written about intuitions and considered judgments in Rawls's method. For the most widely cited descriptions of these ideas, see. e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 18-21; J. Rawls, 'The independence of moral theory', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 48 (1974), 5-22; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 45; Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', and 'Reflective equilibrium and Archimedean points'.
102. There has been a great deal written about intuitions and considered judgments in Rawls's method. For the most widely cited descriptions of these ideas, see. e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 18-21; J. Rawls, 'The independence of moral theory', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 48 (1974), 5-22; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 45; Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', and 'Reflective equilibrium and Archimedean points'.
103. There has been a great deal written about intuitions and considered judgments in Rawls's method. For the most widely cited descriptions of these ideas, see. e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 18-21; J. Rawls, 'The independence of moral theory', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 48 (1974), 5-22; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 45; Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', and 'Reflective equilibrium and Archimedean points'.
104. There has been a great deal written about intuitions and considered judgments in Rawls's method. For the most widely cited descriptions of these ideas, see. e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 18-21; J. Rawls, 'The independence of moral theory', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 48 (1974), 5-22; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 45; Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', and 'Reflective equilibrium and Archimedean points'.
105. Will Kymlicka emphasizes that principles must not only cohere with, but also illuminate, our considered convictions, Contemporary Political Philosophy, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 7.
106. Rawls himself introduced the distinction between wide and narrow reflective equilibrium, implicitly in A Theory of Justice, pp. 49f, and explicitly in his 'The Independence of Moral Theory'. DePaul proposes a distinction between conservative and radical conceptions of reflective equilibrium which cuts across that between wide and narrow, in 'Two Conceptions of Coherence Methods in Ethics', Mind, 96 (1987), 463-81.
107. Rawls himself introduced the distinction between wide and narrow reflective equilibrium, implicitly in A Theory of Justice, pp. 49f, and explicitly in his 'The Independence of Moral Theory'. DePaul proposes a distinction between conservative and radical conceptions of reflective equilibrium which cuts across that between wide and narrow, in 'Two Conceptions of Coherence Methods in Ethics', Mind, 96 (1987), 463-81.
108. R. M. Hare, 'The Argument from Received Opinion', in R. M. Hare, Essays on Philosophical Method (London, Macmillan, 1971), p. 122; criticized in Grice, 'Moral theories and received opinion'. See also S. Sencerz, 'Moral intuitions and justification in ethics', Philosophical Studies, 50 (1986), p. 78.
109. R. M. Hare, 'The Argument from Received Opinion', in R. M. Hare, Essays on Philosophical Method (London, Macmillan, 1971), p. 122; criticized in Grice, 'Moral theories and received opinion'. See also S. Sencerz, 'Moral intuitions and justification in ethics', Philosophical Studies, 50 (1986), p. 78.
110. R. M. Hare, 'The Argument from Received Opinion', in R. M. Hare, Essays on Philosophical Method (London, Macmillan, 1971), p. 122; criticized in Grice, 'Moral theories and received opinion'. See also S. Sencerz, 'Moral intuitions and justification in ethics', Philosophical Studies, 50 (1986), p. 78.
111. R. M. Hare, 'The Argument from Received Opinion', in R. M. Hare, Essays on Philosophical Method (London, Macmillan, 1971), p. 122; criticized in Grice, 'Moral theories and received opinion'. See also S. Sencerz, 'Moral intuitions and justification in ethics', Philosophical Studies, 50 (1986), p. 78.
112. See S. Lukes, Essays in Social Theory (London, Macmillan, 1977), pp. 154-74, 177-80; S. Blackburn, 'Can Philosophy Exist?', in J. Couture and K. Nielsen (eds), Méta-philosophie: Reconstructing Philosophy? New Essays on Metaphilosophy (Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 1993), p. 91, n20; Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', pp. 516f. The passages from Singer and Blackburn are among the most colourful in this otherwise bone-dry literature on moral methodology. Others who are less scathing in their judgments on intuitive starting points, but troubled by reliance on them nonetheless, include Lyons, 'Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments', p. 146; D. Little, 'Reflective equilibrium and justification', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1984), 373-87; and Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium'.
113. See S. Lukes, Essays in Social Theory (London, Macmillan, 1977), pp. 154-74, 177-80; S. Blackburn, 'Can Philosophy Exist?', in J. Couture and K. Nielsen (eds), Méta-philosophie: Reconstructing Philosophy? New Essays on Metaphilosophy (Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 1993), p. 91, n20; Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', pp. 516f. The passages from Singer and Blackburn are among the most colourful in this otherwise bone-dry literature on moral methodology. Others who are less scathing in their judgments on intuitive starting points, but troubled by reliance on them nonetheless, include Lyons, 'Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments', p. 146; D. Little, 'Reflective equilibrium and justification', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1984), 373-87; and Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium'.
114. See S. Lukes, Essays in Social Theory (London, Macmillan, 1977), pp. 154-74, 177-80; S. Blackburn, 'Can Philosophy Exist?', in J. Couture and K. Nielsen (eds), Méta-philosophie: Reconstructing Philosophy? New Essays on Metaphilosophy (Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 1993), p. 91, n20; Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', pp. 516f. The passages from Singer and Blackburn are among the most colourful in this otherwise bone-dry literature on moral methodology. Others who are less scathing in their judgments on intuitive starting points, but troubled by reliance on them nonetheless, include Lyons, 'Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments', p. 146; D. Little, 'Reflective equilibrium and justification', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1984), 373-87; and Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium'.
115. See S. Lukes, Essays in Social Theory (London, Macmillan, 1977), pp. 154-74, 177-80; S. Blackburn, 'Can Philosophy Exist?', in J. Couture and K. Nielsen (eds), Méta-philosophie: Reconstructing Philosophy? New Essays on Metaphilosophy (Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 1993), p. 91, n20; Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', pp. 516f. The passages from Singer and Blackburn are among the most colourful in this otherwise bone-dry literature on moral methodology. Others who are less scathing in their judgments on intuitive starting points, but troubled by reliance on them nonetheless, include Lyons, 'Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments', p. 146; D. Little, 'Reflective equilibrium and justification', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1984), 373-87; and Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium'.
116. See S. Lukes, Essays in Social Theory (London, Macmillan, 1977), pp. 154-74, 177-80; S. Blackburn, 'Can Philosophy Exist?', in J. Couture and K. Nielsen (eds), Méta-philosophie: Reconstructing Philosophy? New Essays on Metaphilosophy (Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 1993), p. 91, n20; Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', pp. 516f. The passages from Singer and Blackburn are among the most colourful in this otherwise bone-dry literature on moral methodology. Others who are less scathing in their judgments on intuitive starting points, but troubled by reliance on them nonetheless, include Lyons, 'Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments', p. 146; D. Little, 'Reflective equilibrium and justification', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1984), 373-87; and Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium'.
117. See S. Lukes, Essays in Social Theory (London, Macmillan, 1977), pp. 154-74, 177-80; S. Blackburn, 'Can Philosophy Exist?', in J. Couture and K. Nielsen (eds), Méta-philosophie: Reconstructing Philosophy? New Essays on Metaphilosophy (Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 1993), p. 91, n20; Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', pp. 516f. The passages from Singer and Blackburn are among the most colourful in this otherwise bone-dry literature on moral methodology. Others who are less scathing in their judgments on intuitive starting points, but troubled by reliance on them nonetheless, include Lyons, 'Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments', p. 146; D. Little, 'Reflective equilibrium and justification', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1984), 373-87; and Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium'.
118. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, pp. 373f. See also Sidgwick, 'The establishment of ethical first principles', p. 109. Like Sidgwick in his day, Audi notes that this kind of 'appeal to intuitions is a pervasive strategy in contemporary philosophical discourse ... Ethical theory is no exception.' (Audi, 'Ethical reflectionism', p. 295).
119. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, pp. 373f. See also Sidgwick, 'The establishment of ethical first principles', p. 109. Like Sidgwick in his day, Audi notes that this kind of 'appeal to intuitions is a pervasive strategy in contemporary philosophical discourse ... Ethical theory is no exception.' (Audi, 'Ethical reflectionism', p. 295).
120. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, pp. 373f. See also Sidgwick, 'The establishment of ethical first principles', p. 109. Like Sidgwick in his day, Audi notes that this kind of 'appeal to intuitions is a pervasive strategy in contemporary philosophical discourse ... Ethical theory is no exception.' (Audi, 'Ethical reflectionism', p. 295).
121. Barry, Theories of Justice, p. 258. See H. Aronovitch, 'A defence of analogical argument', Political Studies, 45, 1 (1997), 78-92.
122. Barry, Theories of Justice, p. 258. See H. Aronovitch, 'A defence of analogical argument', Political Studies, 45, 1 (1997), 78-92.
123. Singer, 'Sidgwick and reflective equilibrium', p. 516.
124. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', p. 317. Sencerz ('Moral Intuitions and Justification in Ethics', pp. 80f) makes a brief and surely disingenuous case for not winnowing out judgments made in the heat of passion. Raz ('The claims of reflective equilibrium', p. 318) questions why one would have to jettison 'unconsidered' judgments at the start if reflective equilibrium will get rid of them later anyway.
125. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', p. 317. Sencerz ('Moral Intuitions and Justification in Ethics', pp. 80f) makes a brief and surely disingenuous case for not winnowing out judgments made in the heat of passion. Raz ('The claims of reflective equilibrium', p. 318) questions why one would have to jettison 'unconsidered' judgments at the start if reflective equilibrium will get rid of them later anyway.
126. Nielsen, 'Relativism and wide reflective equilibrium', p. 317. Sencerz ('Moral Intuitions and Justification in Ethics', pp. 80f) makes a brief and surely disingenuous case for not winnowing out judgments made in the heat of passion. Raz ('The claims of reflective equilibrium', p. 318) questions why one would have to jettison 'unconsidered' judgments at the start if reflective equilibrium will get rid of them later anyway.
127. Rawls, 'Outline of a decision procedure for ethics', section 2.
128. See also Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 46-8.
129. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', p. 267.
130. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 20, where he cites N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-8. Daniels makes a convincing case that Rawls's suggestion about an analogy between the methods of ethics and linguistics is unhelpful; see N. Daniels, 'On some methods of ethics and linguistics', Philosophical Studies, 37 (1980), 21-36; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 47f; C. Kukathas, and P. Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Standford CA, Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 7. Several authors have discussed the alleged parallel between reflective equilibrium and scientific method. Those receptive to the parallel include Nielsen (K. Nielsen, 'Considered judgements again', Human Studies, 5 (1982), p. 117; 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 120), Audi ('Ethical reflectionism', p. 307), and J. English, 'Ethics and science', Proceedings of the XVI International Congress of Philosophy, 1980; those noting significant differences between the methods include Little ('Reflective Equilibrium and Justification', p. 384), and Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 263f), among many others, including Wellman (Challenge and Response, pp. 36-44), who does not discuss reflective equilibrium explicitly.
131. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 20, where he cites N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-8. Daniels makes a convincing case that Rawls's suggestion about an analogy between the methods of ethics and linguistics is unhelpful; see N. Daniels, 'On some methods of ethics and linguistics', Philosophical Studies, 37 (1980), 21-36; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 47f; C. Kukathas, and P. Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Standford CA, Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 7. Several authors have discussed the alleged parallel between reflective equilibrium and scientific method. Those receptive to the parallel include Nielsen (K. Nielsen, 'Considered judgements again', Human Studies, 5 (1982), p. 117; 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 120), Audi ('Ethical reflectionism', p. 307), and J. English, 'Ethics and science', Proceedings of the XVI International Congress of Philosophy, 1980; those noting significant differences between the methods include Little ('Reflective Equilibrium and Justification', p. 384), and Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 263f), among many others, including Wellman (Challenge and Response, pp. 36-44), who does not discuss reflective equilibrium explicitly.
132. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 20, where he cites N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-8. Daniels makes a convincing case that Rawls's suggestion about an analogy between the methods of ethics and linguistics is unhelpful; see N. Daniels, 'On some methods of ethics and linguistics', Philosophical Studies, 37 (1980), 21-36; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 47f; C. Kukathas, and P. Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Standford CA, Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 7. Several authors have discussed the alleged parallel between reflective equilibrium and scientific method. Those receptive to the parallel include Nielsen (K. Nielsen, 'Considered judgements again', Human Studies, 5 (1982), p. 117; 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 120), Audi ('Ethical reflectionism', p. 307), and J. English, 'Ethics and science', Proceedings of the XVI International Congress of Philosophy, 1980; those noting significant differences between the methods include Little ('Reflective Equilibrium and Justification', p. 384), and Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 263f), among many others, including Wellman (Challenge and Response, pp. 36-44), who does not discuss reflective equilibrium explicitly.
133. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 20, where he cites N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-8. Daniels makes a convincing case that Rawls's suggestion about an analogy between the methods of ethics and linguistics is unhelpful; see N. Daniels, 'On some methods of ethics and linguistics', Philosophical Studies, 37 (1980), 21-36; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 47f; C. Kukathas, and P. Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Standford CA, Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 7. Several authors have discussed the alleged parallel between reflective equilibrium and scientific method. Those receptive to the parallel include Nielsen (K. Nielsen, 'Considered judgements again', Human Studies, 5 (1982), p. 117; 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 120), Audi ('Ethical reflectionism', p. 307), and J. English, 'Ethics and science', Proceedings of the XVI International Congress of Philosophy, 1980; those noting significant differences between the methods include Little ('Reflective Equilibrium and Justification', p. 384), and Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 263f), among many others, including Wellman (Challenge and Response, pp. 36-44), who does not discuss reflective equilibrium explicitly.
134. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 20, where he cites N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-8. Daniels makes a convincing case that Rawls's suggestion about an analogy between the methods of ethics and linguistics is unhelpful; see N. Daniels, 'On some methods of ethics and linguistics', Philosophical Studies, 37 (1980), 21-36; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 47f; C. Kukathas, and P. Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Standford CA, Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 7. Several authors have discussed the alleged parallel between reflective equilibrium and scientific method. Those receptive to the parallel include Nielsen (K. Nielsen, 'Considered judgements again', Human Studies, 5 (1982), p. 117; 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 120), Audi ('Ethical reflectionism', p. 307), and J. English, 'Ethics and science', Proceedings of the XVI International Congress of Philosophy, 1980; those noting significant differences between the methods include Little ('Reflective Equilibrium and Justification', p. 384), and Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 263f), among many others, including Wellman (Challenge and Response, pp. 36-44), who does not discuss reflective equilibrium explicitly.
135. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 20, where he cites N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-8. Daniels makes a convincing case that Rawls's suggestion about an analogy between the methods of ethics and linguistics is unhelpful; see N. Daniels, 'On some methods of ethics and linguistics', Philosophical Studies, 37 (1980), 21-36; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 47f; C. Kukathas, and P. Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Standford CA, Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 7. Several authors have discussed the alleged parallel between reflective equilibrium and scientific method. Those receptive to the parallel include Nielsen (K. Nielsen, 'Considered judgements again', Human Studies, 5 (1982), p. 117; 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 120), Audi ('Ethical reflectionism', p. 307), and J. English, 'Ethics and science', Proceedings of the XVI International Congress of Philosophy, 1980; those noting significant differences between the methods include Little ('Reflective Equilibrium and Justification', p. 384), and Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 263f), among many others, including Wellman (Challenge and Response, pp. 36-44), who does not discuss reflective equilibrium explicitly.
136. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 20, where he cites N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-8. Daniels makes a convincing case that Rawls's suggestion about an analogy between the methods of ethics and linguistics is unhelpful; see N. Daniels, 'On some methods of ethics and linguistics', Philosophical Studies, 37 (1980), 21-36; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 47f; C. Kukathas, and P. Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Standford CA, Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 7. Several authors have discussed the alleged parallel between reflective equilibrium and scientific method. Those receptive to the parallel include Nielsen (K. Nielsen, 'Considered judgements again', Human Studies, 5 (1982), p. 117; 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 120), Audi ('Ethical reflectionism', p. 307), and J. English, 'Ethics and science', Proceedings of the XVI International Congress of Philosophy, 1980; those noting significant differences between the methods include Little ('Reflective Equilibrium and Justification', p. 384), and Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 263f), among many others, including Wellman (Challenge and Response, pp. 36-44), who does not discuss reflective equilibrium explicitly.
137. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 20, where he cites N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-8. Daniels makes a convincing case that Rawls's suggestion about an analogy between the methods of ethics and linguistics is unhelpful; see N. Daniels, 'On some methods of ethics and linguistics', Philosophical Studies, 37 (1980), 21-36; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 47f; C. Kukathas, and P. Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Standford CA, Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 7. Several authors have discussed the alleged parallel between reflective equilibrium and scientific method. Those receptive to the parallel include Nielsen (K. Nielsen, 'Considered judgements again', Human Studies, 5 (1982), p. 117; 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 120), Audi ('Ethical reflectionism', p. 307), and J. English, 'Ethics and science', Proceedings of the XVI International Congress of Philosophy, 1980; those noting significant differences between the methods include Little ('Reflective Equilibrium and Justification', p. 384), and Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 263f), among many others, including Wellman (Challenge and Response, pp. 36-44), who does not discuss reflective equilibrium explicitly.
138. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 20, where he cites N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-8. Daniels makes a convincing case that Rawls's suggestion about an analogy between the methods of ethics and linguistics is unhelpful; see N. Daniels, 'On some methods of ethics and linguistics', Philosophical Studies, 37 (1980), 21-36; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 47f; C. Kukathas, and P. Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Standford CA, Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 7. Several authors have discussed the alleged parallel between reflective equilibrium and scientific method. Those receptive to the parallel include Nielsen (K. Nielsen, 'Considered judgements again', Human Studies, 5 (1982), p. 117; 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 120), Audi ('Ethical reflectionism', p. 307), and J. English, 'Ethics and science', Proceedings of the XVI International Congress of Philosophy, 1980; those noting significant differences between the methods include Little ('Reflective Equilibrium and Justification', p. 384), and Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 263f), among many others, including Wellman (Challenge and Response, pp. 36-44), who does not discuss reflective equilibrium explicitly.
139. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 20, where he cites N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-8. Daniels makes a convincing case that Rawls's suggestion about an analogy between the methods of ethics and linguistics is unhelpful; see N. Daniels, 'On some methods of ethics and linguistics', Philosophical Studies, 37 (1980), 21-36; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 47f; C. Kukathas, and P. Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Standford CA, Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 7. Several authors have discussed the alleged parallel between reflective equilibrium and scientific method. Those receptive to the parallel include Nielsen (K. Nielsen, 'Considered judgements again', Human Studies, 5 (1982), p. 117; 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 120), Audi ('Ethical reflectionism', p. 307), and J. English, 'Ethics and science', Proceedings of the XVI International Congress of Philosophy, 1980; those noting significant differences between the methods include Little ('Reflective Equilibrium and Justification', p. 384), and Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 263f), among many others, including Wellman (Challenge and Response, pp. 36-44), who does not discuss reflective equilibrium explicitly.
140. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 20, where he cites N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-8. Daniels makes a convincing case that Rawls's suggestion about an analogy between the methods of ethics and linguistics is unhelpful; see N. Daniels, 'On some methods of ethics and linguistics', Philosophical Studies, 37 (1980), 21-36; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 47f; C. Kukathas, and P. Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Standford CA, Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 7. Several authors have discussed the alleged parallel between reflective equilibrium and scientific method. Those receptive to the parallel include Nielsen (K. Nielsen, 'Considered judgements again', Human Studies, 5 (1982), p. 117; 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 120), Audi ('Ethical reflectionism', p. 307), and J. English, 'Ethics and science', Proceedings of the XVI International Congress of Philosophy, 1980; those noting significant differences between the methods include Little ('Reflective Equilibrium and Justification', p. 384), and Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 263f), among many others, including Wellman (Challenge and Response, pp. 36-44), who does not discuss reflective equilibrium explicitly.
141. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 20, where he cites N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-8. Daniels makes a convincing case that Rawls's suggestion about an analogy between the methods of ethics and linguistics is unhelpful; see N. Daniels, 'On some methods of ethics and linguistics', Philosophical Studies, 37 (1980), 21-36; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 47f; C. Kukathas, and P. Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Standford CA, Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 7. Several authors have discussed the alleged parallel between reflective equilibrium and scientific method. Those receptive to the parallel include Nielsen (K. Nielsen, 'Considered judgements again', Human Studies, 5 (1982), p. 117; 'How to proceed in social philosophy', p. 120), Audi ('Ethical reflectionism', p. 307), and J. English, 'Ethics and science', Proceedings of the XVI International Congress of Philosophy, 1980; those noting significant differences between the methods include Little ('Reflective Equilibrium and Justification', p. 384), and Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 263f), among many others, including Wellman (Challenge and Response, pp. 36-44), who does not discuss reflective equilibrium explicitly.
142. Daniels, 'Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics', p. 259. This paper is generally regarded as the canonical description and defence of the method.
143. Grice, 'Moral theories and received opinion', p. 11.
144. After discussing the highly theorized motivations of the parties in the original position in Rawls's Dewey Lectures, Barry remarks: 'It seems clear that Rawls has hit upon a method whereby you can get anything out of the theory at the end by simply putting it in at the beginning'. (Barry, Theories of Justice, p. 337.) See also P. Ricoeur, 'Le cercle de la démonstration', in C. Audard (ed.), Individu et justice sociale autour de John Rawls (Paris, Seuil, 1988), pp. 129-41.
145. After discussing the highly theorized motivations of the parties in the original position in Rawls's Dewey Lectures, Barry remarks: 'It seems clear that Rawls has hit upon a method whereby you can get anything out of the theory at the end by simply putting it in at the beginning'. (Barry, Theories of Justice, p. 337.) See also P. Ricoeur, 'Le cercle de la démonstration', in C. Audard (ed.), Individu et justice sociale autour de John Rawls (Paris, Seuil, 1988), pp. 129-41.
146. Rawls, Theories of Justice, p. 48. Note, Rawls couches this remark in a misleading descriptive mode.
147. D. Weinstock, 'The justification of political liberalism', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75 (1994), p. 166.
148. 'It is mere Kantian dogma that behind every moral intuition lies a universal rule, behind every set of rules a single stateable principle or system of principles.' (A. Baier, Postures of the Mind (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 208). See also Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', p. 329; and A. Gibbard, 'Why theorize how to live with each other?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55 (1995), 323-28.
149. 'It is mere Kantian dogma that behind every moral intuition lies a universal rule, behind every set of rules a single stateable principle or system of principles.' (A. Baier, Postures of the Mind (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 208). See also Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', p. 329; and A. Gibbard, 'Why theorize how to live with each other?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55 (1995), 323-28.
150. 'It is mere Kantian dogma that behind every moral intuition lies a universal rule, behind every set of rules a single stateable principle or system of principles.' (A. Baier, Postures of the Mind (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 208). See also Raz, 'The claims of reflective equilibrium', p. 329; and A. Gibbard, 'Why theorize how to live with each other?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55 (1995), 323-28.
151. Larmore (Modernité et Morale, p. 17) says the same about the defining characteristic of the Anglo-American philosophical tradition.
152. I am not concerned here with whether it is a theory with an analogous content (e.g., confirmation procedure) to methodologies of science; but rather whether it is a theory of the same kind.
153. See Barry, Theories of Justice, p. 263 for a similar observation. Of all the explanations of reflective equilibrium I have read, there is only one extended hypothetical description of a typical process of arriving at an equilibrium, and it is scarcely a page long - De Paul's 'Two Conceptions of Coherence Methods in Ethics', pp. 468f.
154. See Barry, Theories of Justice, p. 263 for a similar observation. Of all the explanations of reflective equilibrium I have read, there is only one extended hypothetical description of a typical process of arriving at an equilibrium, and it is scarcely a page long - De Paul's 'Two Conceptions of Coherence Methods in Ethics', pp. 468f.
155. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21, my italics. Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 281) and Snare ('John Rawls and the methods of ethics', pp. 109f) cite this fact as evidence that Rawls might not actually be using the method.
156. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21, my italics. Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 281) and Snare ('John Rawls and the methods of ethics', pp. 109f) cite this fact as evidence that Rawls might not actually be using the method.
157. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 21, my italics. Barry (Theories of Justice, p. 281) and Snare ('John Rawls and the methods of ethics', pp. 109f) cite this fact as evidence that Rawls might not actually be using the method.
158. Hence, if there is an analogy with science here, then reflective equilibrium may tell us more about the so-called logic of discovery - how thoughtful philosophers come up with principles -than about the logic of justification, which was the object of scientific methodology.
159. Rawls, Theories of Justice, p. 49; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal' and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'; Kukathas and Pettit, Rawls, p. 69.
160. Rawls, Theories of Justice, p. 49; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal' and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'; Kukathas and Pettit, Rawls, p. 69.
161. Rawls, Theories of Justice, p. 49; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal' and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'; Kukathas and Pettit, Rawls, p. 69.
162. Rawls, Theories of Justice, p. 49; Nielsen, 'Rawls and the Socratic ideal' and 'How to proceed in social philosophy'; Kukathas and Pettit, Rawls, p. 69.
163. Wellman, Challenge and Response, p. 31.
164. For a similar vision of political philosophizing, see Perelman, Justice, 58f. When Snare ('John Rawls and the methods of ethics', p. 110) and Raz ('The claims of reflective equilibrium', p. 329) consider reflective equilibrium interpreted this way they think of it as a 'weasel concept' (Snare's term) that places 'few actual restraints' on investigation. For Raz, its appealing features are 'shared by many other conceptions of morality and of moral progress.'
165. For a similar vision of political philosophizing, see Perelman, Justice, 58f. When Snare ('John Rawls and the methods of ethics', p. 110) and Raz ('The claims of reflective equilibrium', p. 329) consider reflective equilibrium interpreted this way they think of it as a 'weasel concept' (Snare's term) that places 'few actual restraints' on investigation. For Raz, its appealing features are 'shared by many other conceptions of morality and of moral progress.'
166. For a similar vision of political philosophizing, see Perelman, Justice, 58f. When Snare ('John Rawls and the methods of ethics', p. 110) and Raz ('The claims of reflective equilibrium', p. 329) consider reflective equilibrium interpreted this way they think of it as a 'weasel concept' (Snare's term) that places 'few actual restraints' on investigation. For Raz, its appealing features are 'shared by many other conceptions of morality and of moral progress.'
167. In theory, methadone is supposed to stop the addict's craving for heroin without getting her high. Nielsen seems to think of the therapeutic effects of reflective equilibrium in this way. Veterans of methadone treatment, however, often speak favourably of the high they get from the drug. Norman Daniels is one of the few methodological Rawlsians who seems to have enjoyed an epistemological high with reflective equilibrium. See, e.g., his full-page, graphic illustration of it in Daniels, 'Reflective equilibrium and Archimedean points', p. 88.
168. See the quote from Barry at the outset and T. Wolfe, Painted Word (New York NY, Farrar, 1975).
169. 'Writing in ethics which accepts without thought too much that is the traditional or current outlook and discourse of the staff of policy-making institutions and of other professions is, however, in danger of providing no more than a limited critique of institutional and social arrangements. The worldly success of problem-centred writing in ethics ... is in part achieved by willingness to accept established and establishment views of what moral problems there are.' (O'Neill, 'The Power of Example', pp. 21f.)
170. Little, 'Reflective Equilibrium and Justification, p. 385.
171. This is a central idea in Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical' and 'The Idea of Overlapping Consensus'. The moralization of the philosopher's task is criticized in Raz, 'Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence', Hampton 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism', p. 293 and J. Hampton, 'The common faith of liberalism', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75 (1994), 186-216. Weinstock ('Justification of Political Liberalism', pp. 175f) presents a powerful argument for the incoherence of reflective equilibrium once Rawls substitutes 'shared notions implicit in the political culture' for his early notion of considered judgments. But I have not seen an analysis of Rawls that explains how political liberalism seems to grow out of his earlier methodological ideas. See P. Forster, 'A critique of Rorty's pragmatic defence of liberalism', (unpublished, Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa) for a meticulous critique of the move from pragmatism to liberalism in Rorty.
172. This is a central idea in Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical' and 'The Idea of Overlapping Consensus'. The moralization of the philosopher's task is criticized in Raz, 'Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence', Hampton 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism', p. 293 and J. Hampton, 'The common faith of liberalism', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75 (1994), 186-216. Weinstock ('Justification of Political Liberalism', pp. 175f) presents a powerful argument for the incoherence of reflective equilibrium once Rawls substitutes 'shared notions implicit in the political culture' for his early notion of considered judgments. But I have not seen an analysis of Rawls that explains how political liberalism seems to grow out of his earlier methodological ideas. See P. Forster, 'A critique of Rorty's pragmatic defence of liberalism', (unpublished, Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa) for a meticulous critique of the move from pragmatism to liberalism in Rorty.
173. This is a central idea in Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical' and 'The Idea of Overlapping Consensus'. The moralization of the philosopher's task is criticized in Raz, 'Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence', Hampton 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism', p. 293 and J. Hampton, 'The common faith of liberalism', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75 (1994), 186-216. Weinstock ('Justification of Political Liberalism', pp. 175f) presents a powerful argument for the incoherence of reflective equilibrium once Rawls substitutes 'shared notions implicit in the political culture' for his early notion of considered judgments. But I have not seen an analysis of Rawls that explains how political liberalism seems to grow out of his earlier methodological ideas. See P. Forster, 'A critique of Rorty's pragmatic defence of liberalism', (unpublished, Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa) for a meticulous critique of the move from pragmatism to liberalism in Rorty.
174. This is a central idea in Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical' and 'The Idea of Overlapping Consensus'. The moralization of the philosopher's task is criticized in Raz, 'Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence', Hampton 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism', p. 293 and J. Hampton, 'The common faith of liberalism', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75 (1994), 186-216. Weinstock ('Justification of Political Liberalism', pp. 175f) presents a powerful argument for the incoherence of reflective equilibrium once Rawls substitutes 'shared notions implicit in the political culture' for his early notion of considered judgments. But I have not seen an analysis of Rawls that explains how political liberalism seems to grow out of his earlier methodological ideas. See P. Forster, 'A critique of Rorty's pragmatic defence of liberalism', (unpublished, Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa) for a meticulous critique of the move from pragmatism to liberalism in Rorty.
175. This is a central idea in Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical' and 'The Idea of Overlapping Consensus'. The moralization of the philosopher's task is criticized in Raz, 'Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence', Hampton 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism', p. 293 and J. Hampton, 'The common faith of liberalism', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75 (1994), 186-216. Weinstock ('Justification of Political Liberalism', pp. 175f) presents a powerful argument for the incoherence of reflective equilibrium once Rawls substitutes 'shared notions implicit in the political culture' for his early notion of considered judgments. But I have not seen an analysis of Rawls that explains how political liberalism seems to grow out of his earlier methodological ideas. See P. Forster, 'A critique of Rorty's pragmatic defence of liberalism', (unpublished, Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa) for a meticulous critique of the move from pragmatism to liberalism in Rorty.
176. This is a central idea in Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical' and 'The Idea of Overlapping Consensus'. The moralization of the philosopher's task is criticized in Raz, 'Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence', Hampton 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism', p. 293 and J. Hampton, 'The common faith of liberalism', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75 (1994), 186-216. Weinstock ('Justification of Political Liberalism', pp. 175f) presents a powerful argument for the incoherence of reflective equilibrium once Rawls substitutes 'shared notions implicit in the political culture' for his early notion of considered judgments. But I have not seen an analysis of Rawls that explains how political liberalism seems to grow out of his earlier methodological ideas. See P. Forster, 'A critique of Rorty's pragmatic defence of liberalism', (unpublished, Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa) for a meticulous critique of the move from pragmatism to liberalism in Rorty.
177. This is a central idea in Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical' and 'The Idea of Overlapping Consensus'. The moralization of the philosopher's task is criticized in Raz, 'Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence', Hampton 'The Moral Commitments of Liberalism', p. 293 and J. Hampton, 'The common faith of liberalism', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75 (1994), 186-216. Weinstock ('Justification of Political Liberalism', pp. 175f) presents a powerful argument for the incoherence of reflective equilibrium once Rawls substitutes 'shared notions implicit in the political culture' for his early notion of considered judgments. But I have not seen an analysis of Rawls that explains how political liberalism seems to grow out of his earlier methodological ideas. See P. Forster, 'A critique of Rorty's pragmatic defence of liberalism', (unpublished, Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa) for a meticulous critique of the move from pragmatism to liberalism in Rorty.
178. Sayre-McCord, 'Coherence and models for moral theorizing, pp. 185-7. He argues against adopting coherence models on these (and other) grounds.
179. For exemplary practice of methodological Rawlsianism on these three subjects see, respectively, D. Réaume, 'The Group Right to Linguistic Security; Whose Right, What Duties?', in J. Baker (ed.), Group Rights, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 118-41; J. Carens, 'Aliens and Citizens: the Case for Open Borders', in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 331-49; and W. Kymlicka, 'Moral philosophy and public policy: the case of NRTs', Bioethics, 7 (1993), 1-26.
180. For exemplary practice of methodological Rawlsianism on these three subjects see, respectively, D. Réaume, 'The Group Right to Linguistic Security; Whose Right, What Duties?', in J. Baker (ed.), Group Rights, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 118-41; J. Carens, 'Aliens and Citizens: the Case for Open Borders', in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 331-49; and W. Kymlicka, 'Moral philosophy and public policy: the case of NRTs', Bioethics, 7 (1993), 1-26.
181. For exemplary practice of methodological Rawlsianism on these three subjects see, respectively, D. Réaume, 'The Group Right to Linguistic Security; Whose Right, What Duties?', in J. Baker (ed.), Group Rights, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 118-41; J. Carens, 'Aliens and Citizens: the Case for Open Borders', in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 331-49; and W. Kymlicka, 'Moral philosophy and public policy: the case of NRTs', Bioethics, 7 (1993), 1-26.
182. J. Fishkin, A Dialogue of Justice: Toward a Self-Reflective Society (New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 1993), p. 5. See also S. Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1989), p. 72.
183. J. Fishkin, A Dialogue of Justice: Toward a Self-Reflective Society (New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 1993), p. 5. See also S. Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1989), p. 72.