Crossing the color line in Little Rock: The Eisenhower administration and the dilemma of race for U.S. Foreign policy

Diplomatic History

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 233-264

  Fraser, Cary ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039850914     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0145-2096.00211     Document Type: Article

References (133)

1. The crisis originated in the decision of the governor of Arkansas, Orval Faubus, to prevent the desegregation of the high school in Little Rock in defiance of the orders of federal courts and through the use of the National Guard. For accounts of the crisis see Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South during the 1950s (Baton Rouge, 1969); Herbert Brownell, with John P. Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell (Lawrence, KS, 1993); Robert Frederick Burk, The Eisenbower Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville, 1984); Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation (Westport, CT, 1984); Roy Reed, The Life and Times of an American Prodigal (Fayetteville, 1997); and Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York, 1973). For a recent effort to explore the way in which the crisis reflected the interrelationship of American race relations and foreign policy see Mary L. Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image of American Democracy," Southern California Law Review 70, no. 6 (1997): 1641-1716.
2. The crisis originated in the decision of the governor of Arkansas, Orval Faubus, to prevent the desegregation of the high school in Little Rock in defiance of the orders of federal courts and through the use of the National Guard. For accounts of the crisis see Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South during the 1950s (Baton Rouge, 1969); Herbert Brownell, with John P. Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell (Lawrence, KS, 1993); Robert Frederick Burk, The Eisenbower Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville, 1984); Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation (Westport, CT, 1984); Roy Reed, The Life and Times of an American Prodigal (Fayetteville, 1997); and Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York, 1973). For a recent effort to explore the way in which the crisis reflected the interrelationship of American race relations and foreign policy see Mary L. Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image of American Democracy," Southern California Law Review 70, no. 6 (1997): 1641-1716.
3. The crisis originated in the decision of the governor of Arkansas, Orval Faubus, to prevent the desegregation of the high school in Little Rock in defiance of the orders of federal courts and through the use of the National Guard. For accounts of the crisis see Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South during the 1950s (Baton Rouge, 1969); Herbert Brownell, with John P. Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell (Lawrence, KS, 1993); Robert Frederick Burk, The Eisenbower Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville, 1984); Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation (Westport, CT, 1984); Roy Reed, The Life and Times of an American Prodigal (Fayetteville, 1997); and Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York, 1973). For a recent effort to explore the way in which the crisis reflected the interrelationship of American race relations and foreign policy see Mary L. Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image of American Democracy," Southern California Law Review 70, no. 6 (1997): 1641-1716.
4. The crisis originated in the decision of the governor of Arkansas, Orval Faubus, to prevent the desegregation of the high school in Little Rock in defiance of the orders of federal courts and through the use of the National Guard. For accounts of the crisis see Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South during the 1950s (Baton Rouge, 1969); Herbert Brownell, with John P. Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell (Lawrence, KS, 1993); Robert Frederick Burk, The Eisenbower Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville, 1984); Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation (Westport, CT, 1984); Roy Reed, The Life and Times of an American Prodigal (Fayetteville, 1997); and Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York, 1973). For a recent effort to explore the way in which the crisis reflected the interrelationship of American race relations and foreign policy see Mary L. Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image of American Democracy," Southern California Law Review 70, no. 6 (1997): 1641-1716.
5. The crisis originated in the decision of the governor of Arkansas, Orval Faubus, to prevent the desegregation of the high school in Little Rock in defiance of the orders of federal courts and through the use of the National Guard. For accounts of the crisis see Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South during the 1950s (Baton Rouge, 1969); Herbert Brownell, with John P. Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell (Lawrence, KS, 1993); Robert Frederick Burk, The Eisenbower Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville, 1984); Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation (Westport, CT, 1984); Roy Reed, The Life and Times of an American Prodigal (Fayetteville, 1997); and Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York, 1973). For a recent effort to explore the way in which the crisis reflected the interrelationship of American race relations and foreign policy see Mary L. Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image of American Democracy," Southern California Law Review 70, no. 6 (1997): 1641-1716.
6. The crisis originated in the decision of the governor of Arkansas, Orval Faubus, to prevent the desegregation of the high school in Little Rock in defiance of the orders of federal courts and through the use of the National Guard. For accounts of the crisis see Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South during the 1950s (Baton Rouge, 1969); Herbert Brownell, with John P. Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell (Lawrence, KS, 1993); Robert Frederick Burk, The Eisenbower Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville, 1984); Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation (Westport, CT, 1984); Roy Reed, The Life and Times of an American Prodigal (Fayetteville, 1997); and Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York, 1973). For a recent effort to explore the way in which the crisis reflected the interrelationship of American race relations and foreign policy see Mary L. Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image of American Democracy," Southern California Law Review 70, no. 6 (1997): 1641-1716.
7. The crisis originated in the decision of the governor of Arkansas, Orval Faubus, to prevent the desegregation of the high school in Little Rock in defiance of the orders of federal courts and through the use of the National Guard. For accounts of the crisis see Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South during the 1950s (Baton Rouge, 1969); Herbert Brownell, with John P. Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell (Lawrence, KS, 1993); Robert Frederick Burk, The Eisenbower Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville, 1984); Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation (Westport, CT, 1984); Roy Reed, The Life and Times of an American Prodigal (Fayetteville, 1997); and Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York, 1973). For a recent effort to explore the way in which the crisis reflected the interrelationship of American race relations and foreign policy see Mary L. Dudziak, "The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image of American Democracy," Southern California Law Review 70, no. 6 (1997): 1641-1716.
8. In a letter to Swede Hazlett, his boyhood friend, Eisenhower confided that "no other single event has so disturbed the domestic scene in many years as did the Supreme Court's decision of 1954 in the school segregation case. That decision and similar ones earlier and later in point of time have interpreted the Constitution in such fashion as to put heavier responsibilities than before on the Federal government in the matter of assuring to each citizen his guaranteed Constitutional rights." For the full text of the letter see Robert Griffith, Ike's Letters to a Friend (Lawrence, KS, 1984), 183-89.
9. In his memoirs, Eisenhower indicated that since boyhood "I had accepted without qualification the right to equality before the law of all citizens of this country, whatever their race or color or creed." See Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (New York, 1965), 148; but at a more visceral level, Eisenhower's views revealed the fear of racial mixing that has informed the American weltanschauung. He confided to Earl Warren that he sympathized with Southerners whose concern "is to see that their sweet little girls are not required to sit in school alongside some big overgrown Negroes." Quoted in Stanley I. Kutler, "Eisenhower, the Judiciary, and Desegregation: Some Reflections," in Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment, ed. Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose (Baton Rouge, 1995), 89.
10. In his memoirs, Eisenhower indicated that since boyhood "I had accepted without qualification the right to equality before the law of all citizens of this country, whatever their race or color or creed." See Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (New York, 1965), 148; but at a more visceral level, Eisenhower's views revealed the fear of racial mixing that has informed the American weltanschauung. He confided to Earl Warren that he sympathized with Southerners whose concern "is to see that their sweet little girls are not required to sit in school alongside some big overgrown Negroes." Quoted in Stanley I. Kutler, "Eisenhower, the Judiciary, and Desegregation: Some Reflections," in Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment, ed. Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose (Baton Rouge, 1995), 89.
11. For earlier efforts to explore the linkages that race created between non-European nationalists and African Americans see Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson, "The American Dilemma in a Changing World: The Rise of Africa and the Negro American," in The Negro American, ed. Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark (Boston,1966), 626-55; and Mark Solomon, "Black Critics of Colonialism and the Cold War," Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Chicago, 1971), 205-38. For an interesting overview of race as a factor in the international relations of the twentieth century see in its entirety Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination (Boulder, 1988).
12. For earlier efforts to explore the linkages that race created between non-European nationalists and African Americans see Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson, "The American Dilemma in a Changing World: The Rise of Africa and the Negro American," in The Negro American, ed. Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark (Boston,1966), 626-55; and Mark Solomon, "Black Critics of Colonialism and the Cold War," Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Chicago, 1971), 205-38. For an interesting overview of race as a factor in the international relations of the twentieth century see in its entirety Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination (Boulder, 1988).
13. For earlier efforts to explore the linkages that race created between non-European nationalists and African Americans see Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson, "The American Dilemma in a Changing World: The Rise of Africa and the Negro American," in The Negro American, ed. Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark (Boston,1966), 626-55; and Mark Solomon, "Black Critics of Colonialism and the Cold War," Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Chicago, 1971), 205-38. For an interesting overview of race as a factor in the international relations of the twentieth century see in its entirety Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination (Boulder, 1988).
14. W. E. B. Du Bois, "The Souls of Black Folk," in 3 Negro Classics, intro. by John Hope Franklin (New York, 1965), 221.
15. The intersection of domestic and foreign policy on issues of race has been a consistent theme in the political activism of African Americans. For accounts of the consistency of this theme in African-American history see Gerald Home, Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War (Albany, 1986); Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill, 1996); William R. Scott, The Sons of Sheba's Race: African Americans and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-41 (Bloomington, 1993); Elliot P. Skinner, African Americans and U.S. Policy toward Africa, 1850-1024: In Defense of Black Nationality (Washington, 1992); and Penny M. Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca, 1997).
16. The intersection of domestic and foreign policy on issues of race has been a consistent theme in the political activism of African Americans. For accounts of the consistency of this theme in African-American history see Gerald Home, Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War (Albany, 1986); Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill, 1996); William R. Scott, The Sons of Sheba's Race: African Americans and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-41 (Bloomington, 1993); Elliot P. Skinner, African Americans and U.S. Policy toward Africa, 1850-1024: In Defense of Black Nationality (Washington, 1992); and Penny M. Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca, 1997).
17. The intersection of domestic and foreign policy on issues of race has been a consistent theme in the political activism of African Americans. For accounts of the consistency of this theme in African-American history see Gerald Home, Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War (Albany, 1986); Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill, 1996); William R. Scott, The Sons of Sheba's Race: African Americans and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-41 (Bloomington, 1993); Elliot P. Skinner, African Americans and U.S. Policy toward Africa, 1850-1024: In Defense of Black Nationality (Washington, 1992); and Penny M. Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca, 1997).
18. The intersection of domestic and foreign policy on issues of race has been a consistent theme in the political activism of African Americans. For accounts of the consistency of this theme in African-American history see Gerald Home, Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War (Albany, 1986); Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill, 1996); William R. Scott, The Sons of Sheba's Race: African Americans and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-41 (Bloomington, 1993); Elliot P. Skinner, African Americans and U.S. Policy toward Africa, 1850-1024: In Defense of Black Nationality (Washington, 1992); and Penny M. Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca, 1997).
19. The intersection of domestic and foreign policy on issues of race has been a consistent theme in the political activism of African Americans. For accounts of the consistency of this theme in African-American history see Gerald Home, Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War (Albany, 1986); Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill, 1996); William R. Scott, The Sons of Sheba's Race: African Americans and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-41 (Bloomington, 1993); Elliot P. Skinner, African Americans and U.S. Policy toward Africa, 1850-1024: In Defense of Black Nationality (Washington, 1992); and Penny M. Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca, 1997).
20. Several recent studies have pointed to the salience of race for American foreign policy in the non-European world since the Second World War. See Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (New York, 1993); Cary Fraser, Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940-64 (Westport, CT, 1994); Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York, 1983); and, Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968 (Columbia, MO, 1985). For a discussion of the influence of foreign policy concerns upon domestic politics and desegregation see Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," Stanford Law Review 41 (1988): 61-120; and the "Symposium: African Americans and U.S. Foreign Relations," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 531-650.
21. Several recent studies have pointed to the salience of race for American foreign policy in the non-European world since the Second World War. See Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (New York, 1993); Cary Fraser, Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940-64 (Westport, CT, 1994); Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York, 1983); and, Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968 (Columbia, MO, 1985). For a discussion of the influence of foreign policy concerns upon domestic politics and desegregation see Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," Stanford Law Review 41 (1988): 61-120; and the "Symposium: African Americans and U.S. Foreign Relations," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 531-650.
22. Several recent studies have pointed to the salience of race for American foreign policy in the non-European world since the Second World War. See Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (New York, 1993); Cary Fraser, Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940-64 (Westport, CT, 1994); Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York, 1983); and, Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968 (Columbia, MO, 1985). For a discussion of the influence of foreign policy concerns upon domestic politics and desegregation see Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," Stanford Law Review 41 (1988): 61-120; and the "Symposium: African Americans and U.S. Foreign Relations," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 531-650.
23. Several recent studies have pointed to the salience of race for American foreign policy in the non-European world since the Second World War. See Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (New York, 1993); Cary Fraser, Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940-64 (Westport, CT, 1994); Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York, 1983); and, Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968 (Columbia, MO, 1985). For a discussion of the influence of foreign policy concerns upon domestic politics and desegregation see Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," Stanford Law Review 41 (1988): 61-120; and the "Symposium: African Americans and U.S. Foreign Relations," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 531-650.
24. Several recent studies have pointed to the salience of race for American foreign policy in the non-European world since the Second World War. See Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (New York, 1993); Cary Fraser, Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940-64 (Westport, CT, 1994); Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York, 1983); and, Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968 (Columbia, MO, 1985). For a discussion of the influence of foreign policy concerns upon domestic politics and desegregation see Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," Stanford Law Review 41 (1988): 61-120; and the "Symposium: African Americans and U.S. Foreign Relations," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 531-650.
25. Several recent studies have pointed to the salience of race for American foreign policy in the non-European world since the Second World War. See Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (New York, 1993); Cary Fraser, Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940-64 (Westport, CT, 1994); Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York, 1983); and, Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968 (Columbia, MO, 1985). For a discussion of the influence of foreign policy concerns upon domestic politics and desegregation see Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," Stanford Law Review 41 (1988): 61-120; and the "Symposium: African Americans and U.S. Foreign Relations," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 531-650.
26. Thomas F. Power, Jr., memorandum to Samuel Palma, 20 June 1947, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, United States Mission to the United Nations, 1945-49, box 78, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
27. For a discussion of the increasing scale of the problem in Washington after the accession to independence by an increasing number of non-European states see Timothy P. Maga, "Battling the 'Ugly American' at Home: The Special Protocol Service and the New Frontier, 1961-63," Diplomacy and Statecraft 3, no. 1 (1992): 126-42.
28. McBride, despatch to the Department of State, 5 October 1955, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, 811.411/10-555, National Archives II.
29. Freimarck despatch to the Department of State, 30 September 1955, RG 59, 811. 411/9-3055.
30. Allen despatch to the Department of State, 9 February 1956, RG 59, 811. 411/2-956.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid. He closed his dispatch with the comment that "so long as Southern defiance of the Supreme Court's decision continues and incidents take place, the Danes can be expected to continue their avid interest and frequently to misread or exaggerate various incidents to the detriment of U.S. prestige and reputation."
33. Dulles tel. to American Embassy, Copenhagen, 8 February 1956, RG 59, 811. 411/2-856.
34. Eisenhower himself seemed to display very little concern about the actions of state and university authorities in Alabama. In a response to letters from citizens writing Eisenhower about the incident, Maxwell Rabb, the administration's troubleshooter on issues of race, advised that the president had expressed his regret about the incident and his hope that "the State and the University would be able to find a solution." Since 1956 was a presidential election year, it is not impossible that Eisenhower sought to avoid any action that would antagonize Southern white voters and states rights' advocates on the matter of segregation. In the same letter, Rabb expressed the view that "the problem at the University of Alabama is not within the jurisdiction of the federal government and it is indicated that federal intervention in what is essentially a matter of State concern would undoubtedly be interpreted as a violation of the constitutional rights of the individual States." Maxwell M. Rabb to James A. Haljun, 18 February 1956, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Alphabetical File, box 1894, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
35. Turner despatch to the Department of State, 27 February 1956, RG 59, 811. 411/2-2756.
36. Van Hollen depatch to the Department of State, 13 March 1956, RG 59, 811. 411/3-1356. The editorial concluded that the "inhumanity of racial arrogance seems to have become the privilege of certain people with blonde skins. The odd thing is that it finds apologists among U.S. leaders who want to convert pigmented Asians to the American cult of democracy."
37. K. Balaraman, "'Satyagraha' in Alabama Negro Boycott of Buses Walk-to-Work Campaign," in The Hindu, 27 February 1956. A typed copy of this article is attached to Fleck despatch to the Department of State, 28 February 1956, RG 59, 811.411/2-2856.
38. Sweeney despatch to the Department of State, 7 March 1956, RG 59, 811. 411/3-756.
39. Ibid. According to the embassy, "All of the major Stockholm papers with New York correspondents have published feature articles on the negro problem in the United States in which criticism tends to outweigh the unspectacular record of accomplishment." It was perhaps not surprising that Swedish newspapers should devote considerable coverage to American race relations given the prominent role of Gunnar Myrdal in shaping the American agenda for racial reform after 1945.
40. The representative at the Trusteeship Council (Sears) memorandum to the secretary of state, 15 February 1956, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957 (Washington, 1989), 18:30.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid, (emphasis added).
43. Editorial note, FRUS, 1955-1957 18:39. This is a quote from a document cited in the editorial note but the entire document is not provided.
44. Memorandum of conversation between Mr. Mason Sears (U.S. representative and president of the United Nations Trusteeship Council), Donald Dumont (officer in charge, Southern Africa Affairs), and J. J. Durnan, A. J. Davit, W. R. Duggan, and W. M. Johnson (desk officers, Southern Africa Affairs), 7 June 1956, RG 59, 811.411/6-756.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Memorandum of conversation between Sears and Dumont, 8 June 1956, RG 59, 811. 424/6-856. Sears conceded that his previous proposal would be detrimental to American national interests.
49. Acting director of the Office of Southern Africa Affairs (Hadsel) to the ambassador in Egypt (Byroade), 3 August 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957 18:786-89.
50. Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 25 October 1955, ibid., 775-79.
51. "U.S. Policy toward South Africa," enclosure in Hadsel to Byroade, 3 August 1956, ibid., 786-89.
52. Hadsel to Byroade, 3 August 1956, ibid., 786-89. The reasons for the identification of American interests with that of the apartheid regime were clearly articulated to the ambassador-designate. "From a practical point of view, our relations with South Africa are very friendly and harmonious. South Africa is strongly anti-Communist and pro-West. It looks increasingly to the United States, instead of Britain as formerly, as its model, its leader, and its source of assistance and capital. There is more American capital invested in South Africa today than in any other African territory - over $300,000,000. 116 American companies are represented there, and there are several thousand Americans resident throughout the Union. South Africans of all races are so friendly and hospitable by nature that Americans find life in the Union usually congenial." This harmony was further buttressed by an American assistance program for the extraction of uranium and its reliance upon South Africa for such other strategic minerals as manganese and chrome. In addition, the two countries were working upon a Nuclear Reactor Treaty and improvement of the South African early-warning radar system with help from the U.S. Air Force.
53. A section of Lodge's letter is reprinted as a footnote to Sears's memorandum. 15 February 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957 18:30.
54. Lodge, from his position at the United Nations, continued to serve as an adviser to Eisenhower on domestic politics, and this may help to explain in part the administration's increasing sensitivity to the issue of race on both American domestic politics and foreign policy. For a description of Lodge's role see Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (Baltimore, 1994), 60. For an account of the debates within the administration about the strategies needed to win black votes in 1956 see Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, 151-73.
55. Lodge, from his position at the United Nations, continued to serve as an adviser to Eisenhower on domestic politics, and this may help to explain in part the administration's increasing sensitivity to the issue of race on both American domestic politics and foreign policy. For a description of Lodge's role see Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (Baltimore, 1994), 60. For an account of the debates within the administration about the strategies needed to win black votes in 1956 see Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, 151-73.
56. C. L. Sulzberger, "In Search of a Bipartisan Asian Policy," The New York Times, 12 February 1955. Bowles later served as the undersecretary in the Department of State in the Kennedy administration.
57. Letter to the editor, The New York Times, 24 February 1955.
58. Ibid. According to Katzen, "It is these memories of past grievances and wounded pride, because of the color line, which are mainly responsible for the aloofness of the peoples of Asia and Africa to the Western democracies."
59. Ibid.
60. The American response to the Bandung Conference has been explored in Cary Fraser, "Grappling with the Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Bandung Conference" (Paper presented at the 1997 Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations held at Georgetown University, 19-22 June 1997). Dulles was particularly forthright about his opposition to the implications of the Bandung Conference in a meeting at the Department of State in January 1955: "The Secretary said that, if the nations invited to Bandung, acquired the habit of meeting from time to time without Western participation, India and China because of their vast populations will certainly dominate the scene and one by-product will be a very solid block of anti-Western votes in the United Nations." Memorandum of conversation, Subject: Afro-Asian Conference, Secretary's Office, 7 January 1955, 14 January 1955, RG 59, 670.901/1-1455.
61. For accounts of Powell's trip see Charles V. Hamilton, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.: The Political Biography of an American Dilemma (New York, 1991), 237-48; Wil Haygood, King of the Cats: The Life and Times of Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (New York, 1993), 199-204; Plummer, Rising Wind, 250-53; and Adam Clayton Powell Jr., Adam by Adam: The Autobiograply of Adam Claytom Powell, Jr. (New York, 1971), 102-20. In his autobiography, Powell remembered his trip to Bandung as a transformative experience that led him to become more militant in his espousal of the civil rights agenda within the United States. At the time, he was castigated by many in the black community while endearing himself to influential whites and the Eisenhower administration.
62. For accounts of Powell's trip see Charles V. Hamilton, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.: The Political Biography of an American Dilemma (New York, 1991), 237-48; Wil Haygood, King of the Cats: The Life and Times of Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (New York, 1993), 199-204; Plummer, Rising Wind, 250-53; and Adam Clayton Powell Jr., Adam by Adam: The Autobiograply of Adam Claytom Powell, Jr. (New York, 1971), 102-20. In his autobiography, Powell remembered his trip to Bandung as a transformative experience that led him to become more militant in his espousal of the civil rights agenda within the United States. At the time, he was castigated by many in the black community while endearing himself to influential whites and the Eisenhower administration.
63. For accounts of Powell's trip see Charles V. Hamilton, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.: The Political Biography of an American Dilemma (New York, 1991), 237-48; Wil Haygood, King of the Cats: The Life and Times of Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (New York, 1993), 199-204; Plummer, Rising Wind, 250-53; and Adam Clayton Powell Jr., Adam by Adam: The Autobiograply of Adam Claytom Powell, Jr. (New York, 1971), 102-20. In his autobiography, Powell remembered his trip to Bandung as a transformative experience that led him to become more militant in his espousal of the civil rights agenda within the United States. At the time, he was castigated by many in the black community while endearing himself to influential whites and the Eisenhower administration.
64. For accounts of Powell's trip see Charles V. Hamilton, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.: The Political Biography of an American Dilemma (New York, 1991), 237-48; Wil Haygood, King of the Cats: The Life and Times of Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (New York, 1993), 199-204; Plummer, Rising Wind, 250-53; and Adam Clayton Powell Jr., Adam by Adam: The Autobiograply of Adam Claytom Powell, Jr. (New York, 1971), 102-20. In his autobiography, Powell remembered his trip to Bandung as a transformative experience that led him to become more militant in his espousal of the civil rights agenda within the United States. At the time, he was castigated by many in the black community while endearing himself to influential whites and the Eisenhower administration.
65. Radio address by the Honorable John Foster Dulles, secretary of state, on his recent trip to the Near East and South Asia, 1 June 1953, KO 371/103515, Public Record Office, Kew, United Kingdom. In his address, Dulles commented on the tact that "most of the peoples of the Near East and South Asia are deeply concerned about political independence for themselves and others. They are suspicious of the colonial powers. The United States too is suspect because, it is reasoned, our NATO alliance with France and Britain requires us to try to preserve or restore the old colonial interests of our allies."
66. Richard Nixon, "The Emergence of Africa: Report to President Eisenhower by Vice-President Nixon," Department of State Bulletin 36 (22 April 1957): 635-40 (emphasis added).
67. Assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs (Alien) memorandum to the secretary of state, 12 August 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957 18:20.
68. For accounts of African-American efforts to influence American policy toward Africa see Plummer, Rising Wind; and Von Eschen, Race against Colonialism.
69. For accounts of African-American efforts to influence American policy toward Africa see Plummer, Rising Wind; and Von Eschen, Race against Colonialism.
70. This sense of the increasing importance of Africa to American politics and foreign policy was evidenced in a State Department memorandum in December 1955. Arguing the case for the extension of American technical assistance to European colonies in Africa and the Caribbean, the memorandum suggested that "If we do not gradually ease into the picture there, a rising nationalistic sentiment among the peoples south of the Sahara will look elsewhere for help and sympathy. It is a most fertile field for future (and not so distant future) Soviet activity. Moreover, American Negroes are beginning to look on Africa south of the Sahara with somewhat the same kind of sympathy and interest as American Zionists look on Israel. We should capitalize on this sentiment, utilizing it to work towards evolution rather than revolution in Africa. American Negroes, who are our best hope of keeping Africa oriented towards the United States, are anxious for the Department to help in the improvement of economic conditions in Africa and would be very much upset by a decision against any technical assistance programs there." See assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs (Allen) memorandum to the secretary of state, 28 December 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957 18:23.
71. Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, 173.
72. One of the interesting aspects of the workings of the Eisenhower White House was the care lavished upon ensuring that the administration did not appear to be solicitous of African-American concerns. One perspective was provided by E. Frederic Morrow, the first black presidential assistant. As the racial tensions in the country mounted and the Little Rock crisis unfolded, Morrow lamented, "I have been powerless to do anything. The President's advisers have not asked me my thinking on these matters, and I am too well-schooled in protocol to advance any uninvited ideas." E. Frederic Morrow, Black Man in the White House (New York, 1963), 122-24. Robert Burk was of the view that the White House was more interested in having black government employees "as symbols of national racial democracy rather than in their usefulness as policy makers." As a consequence, the resident troubleshooter on racial matters was Maxwell Rabb, a former volunteer assistant to Henry Cabot Lodge who was Jewish and "liberal." See Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, 70.
73. One of the interesting aspects of the workings of the Eisenhower White House was the care lavished upon ensuring that the administration did not appear to be solicitous of African-American concerns. One perspective was provided by E. Frederic Morrow, the first black presidential assistant. As the racial tensions in the country mounted and the Little Rock crisis unfolded, Morrow lamented, "I have been powerless to do anything. The President's advisers have not asked me my thinking on these matters, and I am too well-schooled in protocol to advance any uninvited ideas." E. Frederic Morrow, Black Man in the White House (New York, 1963), 122-24. Robert Burk was of the view that the White House was more interested in having black government employees "as symbols of national racial democracy rather than in their usefulness as policy makers." As a consequence, the resident troubleshooter on racial matters was Maxwell Rabb, a former volunteer assistant to Henry Cabot Lodge who was Jewish and "liberal." See Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, 70.
74. Department of State Press Release, no. 507, 10 September 1957, John Foster Dulles Papers, box 119, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
75. Memorandum of a telephone conversation between the secretary of state and the attorney general (Brownell), Washington, 24 September 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957 (Washington, 1987), 9:612-13. In an earlier conversation on the same day with Senator William Knowland, the influential Republican from California, Dulles indicated that the situation made "him sick at heart" after Knowland had expressed the view that "if we can't counteract the Little Rock thing we will undo all the good will we have build [sic\ up in the world." Memorandum of telephone conversation, 24 September 1957, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone Calls Series, box 7, Eisenhower Library.
76. Memorandum of a telephone conversation between the secretary of state and the attorney general (Brownell), Washington, 24 September 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957 9:612-13.
77. Radio and television address to the American people on the situation in Little Rock, 24 September 1957, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957 (Washington,1958), 689-94. In a letter to Senator Francis Case of South Dakota, Eisenhower thanked him for his approval of Eisenhower's address and continued "unfortunately, a handful of irresponsible citizens have managed to defame the image of America before all the world." Eisenhower to Francis Case, 30 September 1957, Eisenhower Papers, Central Files, OF 142-A-5, box 732.
78. The USIA reported from Bonn that while the Little Rock crisis had received extensive press coverage in Germany, there had been considerable restraint in commentary on the issue. The lack of criticism was attributed to "German awareness [of their] own vulnerability on [the] question [of] persecution racial minority." Bruce tel. to USIA, 5 October 1957, RG 59, 811.411/10-557.
79. Alger despatch to the Department of State, 20 March 1956, RG 59, 811. 411/3-2056.
80. McBride despatch to the Department of State, 5 October 1955, RG 59, 811.411/10-555.
81. Fraleigh despatch to the Department of State, 13 March 1956, RG 59, 811.411/3-1356.
82. The editorial continued: "In our universities no anti-racial measures have ever been considered. On the contrary, the colored man is treated with special affection. The negro among us enjoys popularity, as witness that of certain soccer players. Likewise in Brazil, where despite the large percentage of colored citizens, racial prejudice is nonexistent. On the contrary, the Brazilian is fully aware of the importance of the negro contribution to his civilization - the docility, simplicity and resigned courage in the face of the worse hardships, the obstinate sensuality - as pointed out by a favorite poet." Reed despatch to the Department of State, 14 March 1956, RG 59, 811.411/3-1456.
83. Vance despatch to the Department of State, 8 October 1957, RG 59, 811. 411/10-857.
84. Taylor despatch to the Department of State, 12 September 1957, RG 59, 811. 411/9-1257.
85. Christensen despatch to the Department of State, 30 September 1957, RG 59, 811. 411/9-3057.
86. Chalker despatch to the Department of State, 16 September 1957, RG 59, 811. 411/9-1657.
87. Vance despatch to the Department of State, 8 October 1957, RG 59, 811. 411/10-857.
88. Young tel. to the Secretary of State, 26 September 1957, RG 59, 811. 411/9-2657.
89. Christensen despatch to the Department of State, 30 September 1957, RG 59, 811.411/9-3057.
90. Hunt despatch to the Department of State, 14 October 1957, RG 59, 811. 411/10-1457.
91. Mallory-Browne despatch to the Department of State, 30 October 1957, RG 59, 811. 411/10-3057.
92. Ibid. The consul general went on to report that the Little Rock crisis had been widely discussed and had become known to villages deep in the interior. He reported the view of a leading Senegalese politician that the president's action in dispatching troops to Little Rock had had an enormous impact upon Africans: "M. Doudou Gueye said that at Bamako, where several thousand Africans were gathered from all parts of the area, Little Rock was a topic of intense discussion, and the consensus had been that the President would not dare use federal troops to enforce de-segregation. When he did so, Africans were deeply impressed."
93. Beach despatch to the Department of State, 5 December 1957, RG 59, 811. 411/12-557.
94. Simpson despatch to the Department of State, 30 September 59, RG 59, 811. 411/9-3057.
95. Bell despatch to the Department of State, 7 October 1957, RG 59, 811. 411/10-757.
96. Lodge to the president, 25 September 1957, Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman File, Administration, Folder - H. C. Lodge, 1957-58.
97. Lodge to the president, 16 October 1957, Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman File, Administration, Folder - H. C. Lodge, 1957-58.
98. Berding memorandum to Rubottom, 1 October 1957, RG 59, 811. 411/10-159.
99. Herter, Department of State instruction to Missions in Sub-Saharan Africa, 10 October 1957, RG 59, 811.411/10-1057.
100. Berding memorandum to Rubottom, 1 October 1957, RG 59, 811.411/10-159. This was not the only initiative by the Eisenhower administration to provide its perspective on the situation of black Americans in the contemporary United States. In November 1957, Secretary of Labor James Mitchell sent Dulles a copy of his article "The Negro Moves Up," which was due for publication in the December issue of the Reader's Digest. Mitchell to Dulles, 13 November 1957, Dulles Papers, box 119, Mudd Library. Dulles responded that "This comprehensive report with its impressive background of statistical facts should clear up a lot of misunderstanding overseas." Dulles to Mitchell, 20 November 1957, Dulles Papers, box 119, Mudd Library.
101. Lodge to the president, 15 October 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957 (Washington, 1988), 11:247-46. In September, Eisenhower had written to Lodge indicating, "I realize, with you, the harm that our prestige has suffered, and if you have any ideas as to how we might try to repair the damage, after the situation calms down, I would be most interested." Eisenhower to Lodge, 27 September 1957, Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, box 24.
102. Lodge to the president, 17 October 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957 11:247-46. The reference to the Soviet satellites was the successful launching of Sputnik, which would provoke serious questions in the United States about its technological lead over the Soviet Union. For a discussion of the impact of the Sputnik upon American politics see Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenbower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York, 1993).
103. Lodge to the president, 17 October 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957 11:247-46. The reference to the Soviet satellites was the successful launching of Sputnik, which would provoke serious questions in the United States about its technological lead over the Soviet Union. For a discussion of the impact of the Sputnik upon American politics see Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenbower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York, 1993).
104. Department of State tel. to the embassy in Ghana, 9 October 1957; and embassy in Ghana tel. to the Department of State, 10 October 1977, FRUS, 1955-1957 18:378-80.
105. There is extensive documentation on the U.S. effort to disrupt Soviet and Chinese efforts to establish relations with Ghana and Liberia in FRUS, 1955-1957 18:361-414.
106. According to Morrow, who attended the meeting, "Randall came back to this country with a shocked reaction to the treatment of Africans receive from the various nations still holding spheres of influence on that continent." Morrow, Black Man in the White House, 153. The similarities between conditions in parts of the United States for African Americans and conditions under European colonial rule for Africans apparently did not emerge in the discussion, according to the official record of the meeting. See memorandum of discussion at the 365th meeting of the National Security Council, 8 May 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960 (Washington, 1992), 14:13-16. For a remarkably graphic autobiographical account of growing up black in the American South see Richard Wright, "The Ethics of Living Jim Crow," in Justice Denied: The Black Man in White America, ed. William M. Chace and Peter Collier (New York, 1970), 270-81.
107. According to Morrow, who attended the meeting, "Randall came back to this country with a shocked reaction to the treatment of Africans receive from the various nations still holding spheres of influence on that continent." Morrow, Black Man in the White House, 153. The similarities between conditions in parts of the United States for African Americans and conditions under European colonial rule for Africans apparently did not emerge in the discussion, according to the official record of the meeting. See memorandum of discussion at the 365th meeting of the National Security Council, 8 May 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960 (Washington, 1992), 14:13-16. For a remarkably graphic autobiographical account of growing up black in the American South see Richard Wright, "The Ethics of Living Jim Crow," in Justice Denied: The Black Man in White America, ed. William M. Chace and Peter Collier (New York, 1970), 270-81.
108. According to Morrow, who attended the meeting, "Randall came back to this country with a shocked reaction to the treatment of Africans receive from the various nations still holding spheres of influence on that continent." Morrow, Black Man in the White House, 153. The similarities between conditions in parts of the United States for African Americans and conditions under European colonial rule for Africans apparently did not emerge in the discussion, according to the official record of the meeting. See memorandum of discussion at the 365th meeting of the National Security Council, 8 May 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960 (Washington, 1992), 14:13-16. For a remarkably graphic autobiographical account of growing up black in the American South see Richard Wright, "The Ethics of Living Jim Crow," in Justice Denied: The Black Man in White America, ed. William M. Chace and Peter Collier (New York, 1970), 270-81.
109. Memorandum of discussion at the 365th meeting of the National Security Council, 8 May 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960 14:13-16. According to Randall, "The metropoles do not want the United States to provide any assistance to their African colonies. On the other hand, the newly independent states insist on knowing where the United States stands on the problem of colonialism. So we are caught on the horns of the dilemma of NATO on the one hand and of a free, non-Communist Africa on the other. Mr. Randall felt the time was approaching when we would have to take a firm stand against colonialism."
110. Ibid. With further prompting from General Cutler, Randall revealed that the issue of discrimination in Liberia also encompassed relations among the descendants ot the former American slaves who had settled in that country and who discriminated against the indigenous groups there.
111. Morrow, Black Man in the White House, 154.
112. John A. Calhoun (Civil Rights Commission) memorandum to Gerald D. Morgan (White House), 31 December 1958, RG 59, 811.411/12-458.
113. Strong despatch to the Department of State, 3 October 1958, RG 59, 811.411/10-358.
114. Dulles tel. to Folsom, 4 September 1958, RG 59, 811.411/9-458.
115. Folsom tel. to Dulles, 5 September 1958, RG 59, 811.411/9-558.
116. Folsom tel. to Dulles, 29 September 1958, RG 59, 811.411/9-2958. Folsom also sent a cable to the British Labour party's secretary general, Morgan Phillips, informing him that the death sentence for Wilson had been commuted. The cable was announced to the Labour party's national conference, where the decision to commute the death sentence was cheered but the decision to impose a life sentence on Wilson was jeered. "Folsom Move Cheered," New York Times, 1 October 1958.
117. Embassy in South Africa tel. to the Department of State, 7 November 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960 14:730-32. The ambassador went on to explain that: "For one thing it could hardly be denied that our problems at home had made more people aware of and think about racial problems than in years of the recent past. Also if we felt compelled to uphold a vital principle considered West in East-West struggle for men's minds in our own country to extent of much regretted necessity use troops to enforce courts' decision and integration, we would perhaps be less likely avoid taking a position against segregation and discrimination abroad." The curious phrasing of the ambassador's explanation of the shift in the Eisenhower administration's stance on desegregation is very suggestive of the intellectual dissonance that accompanied the waning of "white supremacy" as the official orthodoxy in American life.
118. Deputy assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs (Henderson) to the undersecretary of state (Herter), 16 January 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960 (Washington, 1990), 2:94-96.
119. Editorial note, ibid. 14:741-42. The editorial note contains only excerpts of memoranda dealing with the issue.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid. (emphasis added).
123. Embassy in South Africa tel. to the Department of State, 25 March 1960, ibid., 743-44. In June 1960, however, the United States decided to admit Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress, an act considered "unfriendly" by the South African government. See Embassy in South Africa tel. to the Department of State, 30 June 1960, ibid., 752-53.
124. Memorandum of conversation, 28 March 1960, ibid., 745-47. The president "said that he would agree with such a procedure. He had strong feelings that one could not sit in judgment on a difficult social and political problem six thousand miles away. He had to say that our own problem was in his mind in this connection, and that he had some sympathy even with his friends in Atlanta on some of their difficulties. He suggested that a UN resolution could perhaps just express regret about the disturbances in South Africa and hope that measures would be taken to prevent their recurrence."
125. Even though Eisenhower's reactions betrayed his personal predilection for siding with the white-minority government in South Africa, it had become evident since Little Rock that the United States would publicly continue to dissociate itself in the United Nations from the apartheid policies in South Africa. The South African foreign minister was informed at a meeting in the Department of State with Secretary Herter, in response to the foreign minister's reiteration of his government's unhappiness with the statement on the Sharpeville incident and U.S. votes in the United Nations against South Africa's racial policy, that the United States hoped "real progress can be made in ameliorating racial conditions in the Union. While we have always fully appreciated the difficulties of the problem, we cannot support South Africa's official racial policy." Memorandum of conversation, 25 October 1960, ibid., 757-60.
126. Editorial note, ibid. 2:457-58.
127. Mission at the United Nations tel. to the Department of State, 14 December 1960, ibid., 459. The final vote was 89 to 0, with the United States joining Australia, Belgium, Britain, the Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, and South Africa in abstaining. Only the Dominican Republic was not a colonial power and it was the only Latin American state that did not support the resolution.
128. Ibid. Wadsworth emphasized that: "It is also particularly unfortunate this last minute reversal was made after Department informed Tokyo and Manila we would support this resolution; it seems inescapable that word will spread that our vote on this issue, of critical importance to Asians and Africans, was determined by wishes of colonial powers which even we recognize as such."
129. The New York Times, 15 December 1960. The newspaper reported that "Mrs. George's action reminded delegates of a similar move made two years ago by Marian Anderson, another noted Negro, while serving with the United States delegation. After voting against a motion to call a special session of the Assembly to study the Cameroons, Miss Anderson made it clear that she was "a member of an instructed delegation, and we are here to carry out what is wanted."
130. The irony of Eisenhower's instruction for the United States to abstain on the vote was that it followed upon an apology issued by Eisenhower himself to Michel Gallin-Douathe, the Central African Republic representative to the UN, for an incident in Baltimore where he was refused service in a restaurant. Gallin-Douathe had gone to Washington to present his credentials to Eisenhower and was on his way back to New York when the incident occurred. The United States Mission to the United Nations recommended that there should be an apology from the president. It reported that the story was circulating among the representatives of the African countries, and that the Guineans and Ghanaians were "making [a] special point in conversations with African colleagues of citing this case as proof [that] America is a nation of racists." The mission saw the presidential apology as a way of defusing the potential problems for American relations with the African states raised by the incident. Eisenhower sent an apology deploring the incident and assuring Gallin-Douathe that the United States would continue its efforts to eliminate the causes of such incidents. The letter concluded: "The United States attaches great importance to the friendship of the African people. I hope you will judge this regrettable incident, which reflects the attitude of only a minority of the citizens of this country, in its proper perspective." Editorial note, which contains excerpts of the documents pertaining to the issue, FRUS, 1958-1960 2:438-39.
131. Michael Krenn has shown the ways in which even the administration's propaganda efforts fell victim to that state of flux. See Michael L. Krenn, "Segregation and the 1958 World's Fair," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 591-612.
132. A vivid example of this tendency was exemplified by Eisenhower's resistance to appeals to intervene, even if symbolically, in the situation in New Orleans in November 1960 where white protesters had mounted a vigorous campaign against the desegregation of the schools. Ward Melville, who had served as a trustee of Columbia University when Eisenhower was president of that institution, sent a note to the president in November 1960 suggesting that Eisenhower should speak out on "this New Orleans integration matter." He attached a letter to the editor of the New York Times that argued "how fitting it would be for the President, by deed or word, to pay tribute to these Negro kids, their parents, friends and counterparts who unquestionably represent the highest expression of the spirit, the courage, the moral dedication that have taken America so far. As a lame-duck President there are no votes to win or lose; there is no one to impugn his motive. All that is necessary is the belief and the desire." Ward Melville to Eisenhower, 19 November 1960, Eisenhower Papers, Central Files, OF 142-A-5-A, box 733. Eisenhower sent a non-committal response that "any statement or action respecting this delicate situation must be very carefully weighed both as to content and timing. I appreciate your feeling and, of course, will stay in continuous close touch with the developing situation." Eisenhower to Melville, 30 November 1960, Eisenhower Papers, Central Files, OF 142-A-5-A, box 733. A similar appeal from Senator Jacob Javits of New York received an equally non-committal response. Eisenhower Papers, Central Files, OF 142-A-5-A, box 733.
133. As Robert MacMahon has argued, it is not possible to provide a thorough evaluation of Eisenhower as a president without assessing his policy toward the rise of non-European nationalism. I would only add that non-European nationalism and civil rights are two sides of the same coin when such an assessment is contemplated. See Robert J. MacMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 3 (1986): 453-73.