The bitter end and the lost chance in Vietnam: Congress, the Ford administration, and the battle over Vietnam, 1975-76

Diplomatic History

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 265-293

  Jespersen, T Christopher ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0039850908     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0145-2096.00212     Document Type: Article

References (115)

1. Handwritten notes of 6 December 1975 meeting in Paris, Paul N. McCloskey Papers, box H-237, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California.
2. Handwritten notes of 6 December 1975 meeting in Paris, Paul N. McCloskey Papers, box H-237. There is no indication in the notes which congressional representative uttered the quote at the beginning of the paragraph, perhaps suggesting McCloskey, but it remains unclear.
3. For a scholarly account that attempts to revise the American involvement in Vietnam see Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York, 1978). For more on the cultural aspects of the post-Vietnam circumstances in the United States see Susan Jeffords, The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War (Bloomington, 1989).
4. For a scholarly account that attempts to revise the American involvement in Vietnam see Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York, 1978). For more on the cultural aspects of the post-Vietnam circumstances in the United States see Susan Jeffords, The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War (Bloomington, 1989).
5. See Ralph B. Levering, "Is Domestic Politics Being Slighted as an Interpretative Framework," The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter (March 1994): 17-35. For a more comprehensive discussion of the issue see Melvin Small, Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994 (Baltimore, 1996).
6. See Ralph B. Levering, "Is Domestic Politics Being Slighted as an Interpretative Framework," The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter (March 1994): 17-35. For a more comprehensive discussion of the issue see Melvin Small, Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994 (Baltimore, 1996).
7. To date, most historical investigations into the nature of U.S.-Vietnamese relations stop with 1975, if not 1973. A few others provide a brief overview of the postwar period, but there has been little analysis concerning the nature of U.S.-Vietnamese relations at the end of the war and why the normalization of relations did not come about in 1975-76. The standard works on the American side of the war are George C. Herring, America's Longest War. The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 3d ed. (New York, 1996), esp. 315-16; and Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York, 1991). See also Robert Schulzinger, A Time for War (New York, 1997), which covers the 1973-197 period in greater detail but does not address the diplomatic negotiations after the war. The best account of the relations between the United States and Vietnam in the aftermath of the war remains Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War (New York, 1986). Chanda's work, however, does not cover the diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Vietnam for the years 1971-76 to any considerable degree, though a very brief overview is provided on pp. 142-45. Chanda picks up the story with the Carter administration. For more on the Carter administration and Vietnam see also Steven Hurst, The Carter Administration and Vietnam (New York, 1996).
8. To date, most historical investigations into the nature of U.S.-Vietnamese relations stop with 1975, if not 1973. A few others provide a brief overview of the postwar period, but there has been little analysis concerning the nature of U.S.-Vietnamese relations at the end of the war and why the normalization of relations did not come about in 1975-76. The standard works on the American side of the war are George C. Herring, America's Longest War. The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 3d ed. (New York, 1996), esp. 315-16; and Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York, 1991). See also Robert Schulzinger, A Time for War (New York, 1997), which covers the 1973-197 period in greater detail but does not address the diplomatic negotiations after the war. The best account of the relations between the United States and Vietnam in the aftermath of the war remains Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War (New York, 1986). Chanda's work, however, does not cover the diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Vietnam for the years 1971-76 to any considerable degree, though a very brief overview is provided on pp. 142-45. Chanda picks up the story with the Carter administration. For more on the Carter administration and Vietnam see also Steven Hurst, The Carter Administration and Vietnam (New York, 1996).
9. To date, most historical investigations into the nature of U.S.-Vietnamese relations stop with 1975, if not 1973. A few others provide a brief overview of the postwar period, but there has been little analysis concerning the nature of U.S.-Vietnamese relations at the end of the war and why the normalization of relations did not come about in 1975-76. The standard works on the American side of the war are George C. Herring, America's Longest War. The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 3d ed. (New York, 1996), esp. 315-16; and Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York, 1991). See also Robert Schulzinger, A Time for War (New York, 1997), which covers the 1973-197 period in greater detail but does not address the diplomatic negotiations after the war. The best account of the relations between the United States and Vietnam in the aftermath of the war remains Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War (New York, 1986). Chanda's work, however, does not cover the diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Vietnam for the years 1971-76 to any considerable degree, though a very brief overview is provided on pp. 142-45. Chanda picks up the story with the Carter administration. For more on the Carter administration and Vietnam see also Steven Hurst, The Carter Administration and Vietnam (New York, 1996).
10. To date, most historical investigations into the nature of U.S.-Vietnamese relations stop with 1975, if not 1973. A few others provide a brief overview of the postwar period, but there has been little analysis concerning the nature of U.S.-Vietnamese relations at the end of the war and why the normalization of relations did not come about in 1975-76. The standard works on the American side of the war are George C. Herring, America's Longest War. The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 3d ed. (New York, 1996), esp. 315-16; and Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York, 1991). See also Robert Schulzinger, A Time for War (New York, 1997), which covers the 1973-197 period in greater detail but does not address the diplomatic negotiations after the war. The best account of the relations between the United States and Vietnam in the aftermath of the war remains Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War (New York, 1986). Chanda's work, however, does not cover the diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Vietnam for the years 1971-76 to any considerable degree, though a very brief overview is provided on pp. 142-45. Chanda picks up the story with the Carter administration. For more on the Carter administration and Vietnam see also Steven Hurst, The Carter Administration and Vietnam (New York, 1996).
11. To date, most historical investigations into the nature of U.S.-Vietnamese relations stop with 1975, if not 1973. A few others provide a brief overview of the postwar period, but there has been little analysis concerning the nature of U.S.-Vietnamese relations at the end of the war and why the normalization of relations did not come about in 1975-76. The standard works on the American side of the war are George C. Herring, America's Longest War. The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 3d ed. (New York, 1996), esp. 315-16; and Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York, 1991). See also Robert Schulzinger, A Time for War (New York, 1997), which covers the 1973-197 period in greater detail but does not address the diplomatic negotiations after the war. The best account of the relations between the United States and Vietnam in the aftermath of the war remains Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War (New York, 1986). Chanda's work, however, does not cover the diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Vietnam for the years 1971-76 to any considerable degree, though a very brief overview is provided on pp. 142-45. Chanda picks up the story with the Carter administration. For more on the Carter administration and Vietnam see also Steven Hurst, The Carter Administration and Vietnam (New York, 1996).
12. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald R. Ford, 1974 (Washington, 1975), 25. Comments were made by Ford on 19 August 1974 in announcing his plan for amnesty.
13. For a brief summary of the League's origins see the statement by E. C. "Bus" Mills, Hearings before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, 23 and 30 September and 9 and 23 October 1975, 94th. Cong., 1st. sess., pt. 1:64-71. For more on the "go public" campaign see also, H. Bruce Franklin, M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America (Brooklyn, 1992), 49-54, and House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, Americans Missing in Southeast Asia, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 13 December 1976, H.R. No.94-1764, pp. 106-8, 135-38.
14. For a brief summary of the League's origins see the statement by E. C. "Bus" Mills, Hearings before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, 23 and 30 September and 9 and 23 October 1975, 94th. Cong., 1st. sess., pt. 1:64-71. For more on the "go public" campaign see also, H. Bruce Franklin, M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America (Brooklyn, 1992), 49-54, and House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, Americans Missing in Southeast Asia, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 13 December 1976, H.R. No.94-1764, pp. 106-8, 135-38.
15. For a brief summary of the League's origins see the statement by E. C. "Bus" Mills, Hearings before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, 23 and 30 September and 9 and 23 October 1975, 94th. Cong., 1st. sess., pt. 1:64-71. For more on the "go public" campaign see also, H. Bruce Franklin, M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America (Brooklyn, 1992), 49-54, and House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, Americans Missing in Southeast Asia, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 13 December 1976, H.R. No.94-1764, pp. 106-8, 135-38.
16. Franklin, M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America, 50-53.
17. Kissinger began serving as national security adviser in 1969 and retained that position upon being named secretary of state in August 1973. In October 1975, President Ford relieved Kissinger of his position as national security adviser but kept him as secretary of state.
18. NSC memo, William L. Stearman and Sven Kraemer to General Scowcrort, 9 January 1975, Brent Scowcroft Papers, box 3, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
19. Memo, General Lawson to the president, 20 January 1975, Scowcroft Papers, box 3.
20. Lawson, however, did meet with the League to explain the president's policies. Of particular interest is that Lawson was originally scheduled to meet with the League leadership only but agreed to talk to the entire group when asked because of what he termed its "emotional state." Memo, Lawson to the president, 1 February 1975, John O. Marsh Papers, box 21, Ford Library.
21. Memo, Lawson to the president, 11 March 1975, Scowcroft Papers, box 1.
22. Memo, William L. Stearman to Russell A. Rourke, 17 March 1975, Marsh Papers, box 21.
23. Draft of a memo, coming out of the Defense Department's General Counsel's Office, Marty Hoffman to Theodore Marrs, 9 July 1975, Scowcroft Papers, box 3.
24. Memo, Brent Scowcroft to Philip Buchen, 18 July 1975, Scowcroft Papers, box 3.
25. Memo, Henry Kissinger to the president, n.d., Scowcroft Papers, box 3.
26. The other nine members included Henry B. Gonzalez (D-TX), Patricia Schroeder (D-CO), Tom Harkin (D-IA), Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), Tennyson Guyer (R-OH), Jim Lloyd (D-CA), Joe Moakley (D-MA), Richard Ottinger (D-NY), and Paul "Pete" McCloskey, Jr. (R-CA).
27. Hearings before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, 94th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 1, p. 9.
28. Paul N. McCloskey to Henry A. Kissinger, 3 November 1975, McCloskey Papers, box H-296.
29. Paul N. McCloskey to Henry A. Kissinger, 3 November 1975, McCloskey Papers, box H-296.
30. Memo, John J. Taylor to General Scowcroft with attachment, 31 October 1975, Scowcroft Papers, box 5.
31. Memo of conversation, 14 November 1975, Scowcroft Papers, box 1.
32. Washington Post, 24 November 1975.
33. Richard L. Ottinger to the Washington Post, 1 December 1975.
34. Memo of conversation, 14 November 1975, Scowcroft Papers, box 1.
35. Memo, Gareth Porter to Representatives Ottinger, Schroeder, and Harkin, 18 October 1975, McCloskey Papers, box H-296.
36. Memo, Gareth Porter to Representatives Ottinger, Schroeder, and Harkin, 18 October 1975, McCloskey Papers, box H-296.
37. Prime Minister Pham Van Dong to Richard Ottinger, 25 November 1975, McCloskey Papers, box H-296.
38. Memo, Gareth Porter to Chairman Montgomery, n.d., McCloskey Papers, box H-237.
39. Public Papers of the President, 1975, 1950-55, quotes are from 1954.
40. National Security memo, Brent Scowcroft, Scowcroft Papers, box 1.
41. Fortney (Pete) H. Stark Jr. et al. to President Gerald R. Ford, 17 December 1975, Milton E. Mitler Papers, box 1, Ford Library.
42. Fortney (Pete) H. Stark Jr. et al. to President Gerald R. Ford, 17 December 1975, Mitler Papers, box 1. Ford's response was apparently a draft. A shorter version of the president's letter, but one that makes the same basic points, was written on 19 February 1976, CO 165-1 Vietnam (North), White House Central Files (WHCF), Subject File, CO 165-CO 169, box 59, Ford Library.
43. Hearings before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, 94th Cong., 1st. sess., pt. 1:12.
44. Hearings before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, 94th Cong., 1st. sess., pt. 1:92.
45. Hearings before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, 94th Cong., 1st. sess., pt. 1:94.
46. Memorandum for the Record: December 21, 1975, Hanoi, Vietnam (Afternoon Meeting) House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, McCloskey Papers, box H-237.
47. Memorandum tor the Record: December 21, 1975, Hanoi, Vietnam (Afternoon Meeting) House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, McCloskey Papers, box H-237.
48. Memorandum for the Record: December 21, 1975, Hanoi, Vietnam (Afternoon Meeting) House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, McCloskey Papers, box H-237.
49. Memorandum for the Record: December 21, 1975, Hanoi, Vietnam (Afternoon Meeting) House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, McCloskey Papers, box H-237.
50. Memorandum for the Record: December 21, 1975, Hanoi, Vietnam (Dinner Meeting) House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, McCloskey Papers, box H-237.
51. Memorandum for the Record: December 21, 1975, Hanoi, Vietnam (Dinner Meeting) House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, McCloskey Papers, box H-237.
52. Memorandum for the Record: December 22, 1975, Hanoi, Vietnam House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, McCloskey Papers, box H-237.
53. The first quote is in a letter from W. Hobart Robinson to Congressman Pete McCloskey, 15 January 1976, the second is in a letter from Terrance Gilroy, 16 January 1976, the third is from Guy Wright's column, "Hanoi's peddlers of corpses," San Francisco Examiner, 8 January 1976, all in McCloskey Papers, box H-232.
54. Statement to the News Media, 7 December 1975, by Col. (Ret.) Earl P. Hopper, executive director, National League of Families, McCloskey Papers, box H-237.
55. McCloskey to Hopper, 9 December 1975, McCloskey Papers, box H-232.
56. Transcript of Congressman McCloskey's Visit with Ohio Families, 13 January 1976, McCloskey Papers, box H-232.
57. Transcript of Congressman McCloskey's Visit with Ohio Families, 13 January 1976, McCloskey Papers, box H-232.
58. Transcript of Congressman McCloskey's Visit with Ohio Families, 13 January 1976, McCloskey Papers, box H-232.
59. Transcript of Congressman McCloskey's Visit with Ohio Families, 13 January 1976, McCloskey Papers, box H-232.
60. Transcript of Congressman McCloskey's Visit with Ohio Families, 13 January 1976, McCloskey Papers, box H-232. The transcript has orangutan misspelled urangatang. I have changed it for clarity and added punctuation.
61. Phone message from Angus MacDonald upon which McCloskey wrote his comments, 28 January 1976, McCloskey Papers, box H-232.
62. E. C. "Bus" Mills to G. V. Sonny Montgomery, 26 January 1976, Marsh Papers, box 21.
63. E. C. "Bus" Mills to G. V. Sonny Montgomery, 26 January 1976, Marsh Papers, box 21.
64. "Your Meeting with Members of the House Select Committee on MIA's," 26 January 1976, Max Friedersdorf Papers, box 6, Ford Library.
65. "Your Meeting with Members of the House Select Committee on MIA's," 26 January 1976, Max Friedersdorf Papers, box 6.
66. Background for meeting with Congressman Montgomery, attachment to 24 January 1976 memo, Brent Scowcroft to Max Friedersdorf, Scowcroft Papers, box 3.
67. McCloskey to Habib, 9 March 1976, McCloskey Papers, box H-237.
68. McCloskey to Habib, 9 March 1976, McCloskey Papers, box H-237.
69. Memo of conversation, 12 March 1976, Scowcroft Papers, box 1.
70. Memo of conversation, 12 March 1976, Scowcroft Papers, box 1.
71. Memo of conversation, 12 March 1976, Scowcroft Papers, box 1.
72. Memo of conversation, 12 March 1976, Scowcroft Papers, box 1.
73. Memo of conversation, 12 March 1976, Scowcroft Papers, box 1.
74. Memo of conversation, 12 March 1976, Scowcroft Papers, box 1.
75. Memo of conversation, 12 March 1976, Scowcroft Papers, box 1.
76. 20 March 1976, Presidential Documents: Gerald R. Ford, 1976, vol. 12, no. 13: 469.
77. "U.S. Invites Talks With Hanoi, Says It Hopes for Normal Ties," New York Times, 27 March 1976.
78. "Kissinger, in Rebutting Reagan, Calls Charges 'False Inventions,'" ibid., 2 April 1976.
79. For more on Kissinger's precarious position during the 1976 election see Walter Isaacson, Kissinger (New York, 1992), 695-99.
80. Presidential Documents: Gerald R. Ford, 1976, vol.12, no.18: 680.
81. Robin F. Gatwood to President Ford, 2 April 1976, Mitler Papers, box 1.
82. "2 key Panels in Congress Back Revised Aid Bill," New York Times, 12 May 1976.
83. Memo for the record, 12 May 1976, Scowcrott Papers, box 1.
84. Telegram, Ronald Reagan to the League, 24 July 1976, attached to a memo, Jack Marsh to Dick Cheney and Brent Scowcroft, 28 July 1976, Richard B. Cheney Papers, box 17, Ford Library. In his memo, Marsh indicated his surprise "at the stridency of both [telegrams] insofar as directing attacks on the President on this subject."
85. Telegram, Jimmy Carter to the League, 24 July 1976 Cheney Papers, box 17.
86. Presidential Documents: Gerald R. Ford, 1976, vol. 12, no. 31: 1207-8. What is far more interesting than the president's actual remarks is a draft put together earlier in the month. In it the president was scheduled to state that most of the missing Americans had "undoubtedly made the ultimate sacrifice," a clear indication of the administration's conclusions about the fate of the missing soldiers. But that was crossed out and not included in the final set of remarks. See Schedule Proposal for the President from Milton Mitler, 14 July 1976, and attachment, Mitler Papers, box 21.
87. Presidential Documents: Gerald R. Ford, 1976, vol. 12, no. 31: 1207-8. What is far more interesting than the president's actual remarks is a draft put together earlier in the month. In it the president was scheduled to state that most of the missing Americans had "undoubtedly made the ultimate sacrifice," a clear indication of the administration's conclusions about the fate of the missing soldiers. But that was crossed out and not included in the final set of remarks. See Schedule Proposal for the President from Milton Mitler, 14 July 1976, and attachment, Mitler Papers, box 21.
88. Text of a telegram from the American embassy in Paris to the secretary of state, 6 September 1976, Ron Nessen Papers, box 13, Ford Library.
89. Remarks on Administration Efforts to Account for Americans Missing in Action, 7 September 1976, Public Papers of the President: Gerald R. Ford, 1976-77 (Washington, 1979), 2210-11. See also James M. Naughton, "U.S. Decides to Veto Vietnam's Request for U.N. Membership," New York Times, 14 September 1975, for the bit about Ford's personal statement. With its official unification on 2 July 1976, Vietnam's application for admission to the United Nations was no longer analogous to the Korean situation. South Korea, moreover, had decided against pressing for admission again, at least for the time being. The justification for denying Vietnam entry, then, had to undergo a rethinking, though the outcome remained the same.
90. Remarks on Administration Efforts to Account for Americans Missing in Action, 7 September 1976, Public Papers of the President: Gerald R. Ford, 1976-77 (Washington, 1979), 2210-11. See also James M. Naughton, "U.S. Decides to Veto Vietnam's Request for U.N. Membership," New York Times, 14 September 1975, for the bit about Ford's personal statement. With its official unification on 2 July 1976, Vietnam's application for admission to the United Nations was no longer analogous to the Korean situation. South Korea, moreover, had decided against pressing for admission again, at least for the time being. The justification for denying Vietnam entry, then, had to undergo a rethinking, though the outcome remained the same.
91. McCloskey to Ford, 9 September 1976, WHCF, Subject File, CO 160-CO 165, box 58.
92. McCloskey to Ford, 9 September 1976, WHCF, Subject File, CO 160-CO 165, box 58.
93. Naughton, "U.S. Decides to Veto Vietnam's Request for U.N. Membership."
94. The League coordinator for Colorado and Wyoming thanked the president, calling his decision "a tribute to the 1300 missing Americans in Southeast Asia!" Elzene E. Gourley to Gerald Ford, n.d., Mitler Papers, box 2.
95. Memo, Velma to Milt Mitler, 16 September 1976, Mitler Papers, box 2.
96. Memo, Dick Cheney to Jack Marsh, 13 September 1976, with attachment, Marsh Papers, box 21. In addition to the question about a task force, Dole asked when the president planned to issue an executive order on status changes.
97. Memo, Russ Rourke to Jack Marsh, 4 October 1976, Marsh Papers, box 21.
98. 6 October 1976, Presidential Documents: Gerald R. Ford, 1976, vol. 12, no. 41: 1457-58.
99. Memo, Milt Mitler to Jack Marsh, 8 October 1976, Mitler Papers, box 2.
100. New York Times, 16 October 1976.
101. Memo, Milt Mitler to Jack Marsh with attachment, 18 October 1976, Marsh Papers, box 21. In its final report, the House Select Committee listed 33 possible POWs and 728 servicemen as missing but concluded that none was still living in Southeast Asia. In recent pronouncements, Ford was talking about roughly 800 Americans as missing, while the League claimed the number was in the area of 2,500. According to figures compiled by both the State and Defense Departments, the total number of American servicemen listed as missing came to 2,506. Of those, however, 1,113 were categorized as KIA-BNR, and an additional 594 were classified under the heading PFOD (presumed finding of death). That left 765 listed as missing and only 34 for the POW column, making a combined total of 799 servicemen plus an additional 26 civilians. The 825 for both military personnel and civilians, then, was in the range mentioned by Ford - short of the number pushed by the League but well above the number of remotely possible cases listed by the House Select Committee.
102. NSC memo, William Gleysteen to Brent Scowcroft with attachments, 29 October 1976, Scowcroft Papers, box 1. Everything appeared in place to make the announcement, but Bud MacFarlane wrote to Bill Gleysteen that it had been put aside for some unclarified reason. Memo, MacFarlane to Gleysteen, 1 November 1976, WHCF Subject File, box 10.
103. Seymour Maxwell Finger, "The Ford Administration and the United Nations," in Gerald R. Ford and the Politics of Post-Watergate, ed. Bernard J. Firestone and Alexej Ugrinsky (Westport, CT, 1993), 444.
104. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York, 1983); and William Shawcross, Sideshow Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York, 1987). Also very good in this regard is H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York, 1994).
105. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York, 1983); and William Shawcross, Sideshow Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York, 1987). Also very good in this regard is H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York, 1994).
106. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York, 1983); and William Shawcross, Sideshow Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York, 1987). Also very good in this regard is H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York, 1994).
107. Hersh, Price of Power, 82; Shawcross, Sideshow, 109, has Kissinger calling Vietnam a "third-rate" power.
108. House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, Americans Missing in Southeast Asia, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 13 December 1976, 94-1764, p. 238.
109. House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, Americans Missing in Southeast Asia, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 13 December 1976, 94-1764, p. 243.
110. Memo from Mitler to Marsh, 21 December 1976, Marsh Papers, box 21.
111. See "Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in China," Diplomatic History 21 (Winter 1997): 71-115. Although the contributors to the symposium - Chen Jian, John Garver, Michael Sheng, and Odd Arne Westad - individually conclude that no chance was lost, Warren Cohen, in his introduction, remains a bit skeptical, asserting, "there was room for a modest level of diplomatic and economic contact" (p. 75). Similarly, Michael H. Hunt, in his The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York, 1996), 174, argues that "Mao's general framework left ample room for diplomatic relations with a United States that would treat China as an equal and respect Chinese sovereignty."
112. See "Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in China," Diplomatic History 21 (Winter 1997): 71-115. Although the contributors to the symposium - Chen Jian, John Garver, Michael Sheng, and Odd Arne Westad - individually conclude that no chance was lost, Warren Cohen, in his introduction, remains a bit skeptical, asserting, "there was room for a modest level of diplomatic and economic contact" (p. 75). Similarly, Michael H. Hunt, in his The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York, 1996), 174, argues that "Mao's general framework left ample room for diplomatic relations with a United States that would treat China as an equal and respect Chinese sovereignty."
113. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 319.
114. Chanda, Brother Enemy, 149.
115. Ibid., 157. Chanda is referring to the Carter administration, but the same holds true for the Ford administration.