Organizational and safety factors in automated oil and gas pipeline systems

Automation and Human Performance: Theory and Applications

Volumn , Issue , 2018, Pages 427-446

  Meshkati, Najmedin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AIRCRAFT; CHEMICAL INDUSTRY; COCKPITS (AIRCRAFT); DISASTERS; ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT; GAS PIPELINES; HEALTH RISKS; NUCLEAR FUELS; NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENTS; SAFETY FACTOR;

CENTRALIZED CONTROL; CHEMICAL PROCESSING PLANTS; COMPLEX TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS; ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES; ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE; OIL-AND-GAS PIPELINES; POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS; TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEM;

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS;

EID: 0039773023     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1201/9781315137957     Document Type: Chapter

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