Constraints on Tung Chee-hwa's Power and His Governance of Hong Kong

Issues and Studies

Volumn 33, Issue 8, 1997, Pages 26-48

  Wong, Timothy Ka Ying ^a  

^a CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Chief Executive; Power constraints; The Basic Law; The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; Way of governance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039748559     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (55)

1. Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), 68.
2. Ibid., 69.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 69-71; Peter Harris, Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucracy and Politics (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1988), 87.
5. Ibid., 69-71; Peter Harris, Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucracy and Politics (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1988), 87.
6. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong: One Country Two Systems Economic Research Center, 1992), 8.
7. Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, 68.
8. Ibid., 48.
9. Hsin-chi Kuan, Hong Kong After the Basic Law (Nova Scotia: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1991), 11.
10. The Basic Law, 42.
11. Ibid., 14.
12. Ibid., 50.
13. PRC President Jiang Zemin expressed this prerequisite. See Ming Pao (Hong Kong), July 8, 1996, A9.
14. For instance, from a series of telephone polls the author conducted at the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, it was found that the amount of support for either Lo or Li remained lower than 5 percent throughout, with Lo's support mostly remaining between 1 and 2 percent.
15. Telephone polls conducted by the author at the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies reveal that at the end of June in 1996, Tung still boasted only about 10 percent support in the polls. However, on December 10, a day before the election, the figure had jumped to 45.3 percent. For the impact of public opinion on the election of the Chief Executive, see Timothy Kaying Wong, "Election of the Chief Executive of the HKSAR and Public Opinion," Ming Pao Monthly (Chinese, Hong Kong) 31, no. 12 (December 1996): 22-25.
16. See Sai-wing Leung, "The China Factor in the 1991 Legislative Council Election: The June 4th Incident and Anti-Communist China Syndrome," in Hong Kong Tried Democracy, ed. Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1993), 187-236. Aside from this, a telephone opinion poll conducted at the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies from November 11 to 12, 1996 reveals that less than 15 percent (14.9 percent to be exact) of Hong Kong citizens trusted the Chinese government.
17. Siu-kai Lau, Hong Kong's Politics during the Period of Transition (Hong Kong: Wide Angle Publishing Co., 1993), 120.
18. Ibid., 122.
19. See Siu-kai Lau, "Can the Chief Executive Form His 'Governing Coalition'?" Ming Pao, January 7, 1997, C12; and "Who Will Escort the HKSAR Government?" ibid., January 9, 1997, C12.
20. See Siu-kai Lau, "Can the Chief Executive Form His 'Governing Coalition'?" Ming Pao, January 7, 1997, C12; and "Who Will Escort the HKSAR Government?" ibid., January 9, 1997, C12.
21. The Basic Law, 47.
22. Mark Roberti, The Fall of Hong Kong (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), 304.
23. The amended versions of the Societies and Public Order ordinances were adopted separately in 1992 and 1995. These amendments mainly eased controls on demonstrations and assembly in line with the Hong Kong Bill of Rights adopted in 1990.
24. According to a telephone poll conducted by the author at the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies on January 28, 1997, the citizens gave Tung a score of 60.5 out of a possible 100, down more than 10 percentage points from the 71.3 at the time of his election.
25. Of the sixty members of the Provisional Legislative Council, fifty-one are concurrently members of the Selection Committee.
26. According to the Basic Law, the first Legco is composed of sixty members, of which twenty are returned by geographic constituencies through direct elections, ten are returned by the Election Committee, and thirty are returned by functional constituencies. See The Basic Law, 48.
27. Leung, "The China Factor," 121.
28. Ambrose King calls this phenomenon of Hong Kong's political stability resulting from bureaucratic structure a case of "administrative absorption of politics." See Ambrose King, "The Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong," Asian Survey 15, no. 5 (May 1975): 422-39.
29. Max Weber's so-called bureaucratic rationality refers in the main to this operational logic of modern administrative systems, which is relatively independent of individual rule.
30. For Anson Chan's speech, see Hong Kong Economic Times, December 13, 1996, A2; and Ming Pao, December 13, 1996, A2.
31. For Anson Chan's speech, see Hong Kong Economic Times, December 13, 1996, A2; and Ming Pao, December 13, 1996, A2.
32. For instance, the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) has been quite helpless in the face of corruption cases straddling Hong Kong and mainland China.
33. For example, the American scholar James O'Connor points out that fiscal policy is in fact the most important means for modern governments to stabilize political power. See James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).
34. Aside from the seven constraints originating from the HKSAR's political system, Tung is also faced with other extra-system constraints, such as the concern of international and local media for Hong Kong's future political development, the sensitivity of multinational capital regarding Hong Kong's political and economic environment, and the attention paid to Hong Kong's political and economic interests by world capitalist powers, including Britain, the United States, and Japan. Since these constraints do not originate from the special arrangement of the HKSAR's political system, and since they have been discussed by other scholars elsewhere, they will not be discussed here. For more, see Michael Yahuda, Hong Kong: China's Challenge (London: Routledge, 1996), 131-34.
35. This may be seen in many points in Tung's election platform and the many political speeches he made after his election. See dispatches on his speeches, Ming Pao, December 12 and 13, 1996 and January 24, 1997.
36. See Hong Kong Standard, December 18, 1996, 11; ibid., January 23, 1997, 3; and Ming Pao, January 4, 1997, A2.
37. See Hong Kong Standard, December 18, 1996, 11; ibid., January 23, 1997, 3; and Ming Pao, January 4, 1997, A2.
38. See Hong Kong Standard, December 18, 1996, 11; ibid., January 23, 1997, 3; and Ming Pao, January 4, 1997, A2.
39. See dispatch on his questions-and-answers session at the Selection Committee, Ming Pao, November 28, 1996, A15.
40. See dispatch on his press interview, Ming Pao, December 13, 1996, B16.
41. See dispatch on Chan's not running for the office, Ming Pao, October 27, 1996, A2.
42. There are eleven nonofficial members in the Exco of the HKSAR, of whom Yiu-chung Tam is both a leader of the "pro-China" camp and a labor leader; Henry Ying-yen Tang is president of the Industrialists Association and represents industrial circles; Rosanna Yick-ming Wong and Raymond Kuo-fung Chien are present members of the Exco, and Sze-yuen Chung was the former senior member of the Exco, hence the appointment of the three represents the continuity of the Exco; Chun-ying Leung is a professional and an influential leader of the "pro-China" camp; Kut-man Fong Wong is favored by the Chinese side and is an accountant; Yeh-kwong Lee was previously the president of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and belongs to financial circles; Yang Ti-hang was formerly the chief justice, and represents the judiciary; Anthony Kam-chung Leung belongs to banking circles and is chairman of the Universities Grant Committee, and Shui-ming Chung is the president of the HKSAR Government Land Fund, and a financial leader. Tung also named Kwok-wah Yip his special advisor on the same day of the proclamation of his Exco. Yip is a successful businessman and is well known for having a special ability 10 bridge Hong Kong's ideological divides. See Asiaweek, February 21, 1997, 28.
43. See Ming Pao, Oriental Daily, South China Morning Post, Hong Kong Economic Journal, Sing Tao Daily, and Economic Daily of January 25, 1997.
44. For positive reactions from local society, see the editorials of Hong Kong's major newspapers on February 21, 1997. Even the Democratic Party welcomed Tung's proclamation, saying that it was a stabilizing move.
45. See Robert Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).
46. See Chris Patten's 1996 Policy Address, Hong Kong: Transition (Hong Kong: Government Information Services, October 2, 1996), 14.
47. See editorials of the Hong Kong Economic Journal, Ming Pao, and Oriental Daily, January 25, 1997.
48. See note 18 above.
49. For details of the plans, see The Consultation Paper on Amendments to the Public Order and Societies Ordinances published by the HKSAR Office on April 9, 1997.
50. Timothy Ka-ying Wong, "Hong Kong-Taiwan Relations," in The Other Hong Kong Report 1996, ed. Mee-kau Nyaw and Si-ming Li (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996), 142.
51. For details of the statement, see South China Morning Post, June 23, 1995, 1.
52. These commentaries point out that as Tung, as well as his family, has deep-rooted ties with the authorities in Taipei, and also that he understands Taiwan well, he should be able to take Taiwan's position and needs into consideration when dealing with Hong Kong's relations with Taiwan.
53. As Beijing insists that Taiwan is part of China, such a ban may not be totally consistent with its "one China" policy. Yet since the ban attempts to actively restrict Taiwan's political involvement in Hong Kong, it reflects Tung's conservative stand in dealing with Taiwan-related matters.
54. See Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, March 1997.
55. The Hong Kong people seem to have clearly understood the difficulty Tung has faced in balancing the contradictory demands between the Chinese government and Hong Kong society. According to the findings of the several polls done by the author at the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies between December 1996 and March 1997, while the majority of the Hong Kong people consider Tung to be conservative on Hong Kong's democratic development, they also rated Tune's "ability to balance the interests of China and Hong Kong" the highest among ten indicators of Tung's ruling ability.