The international politics of national missile defence: A response to the critics

International Journal

Volumn 55, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 545-564

  Harvey, Frank P ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039619865     PISSN: 00207020     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/40203500     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Although both signatories of the ABM treaty have now acknowledged the threat from 'states of concern,' many critics continue to argue that the 'rogue-state' threat is exaggerated. Some suggest it continues to be fabricated by the United States government and its military industrial complex to justify massive defence expenditures. This issue is partly addressed in notes 14 and 16, but a more detailed evaluation of the logical and factual errors with this particular set of criticisms can be found in Frank Harvey, 'Proliferation, rogue-states and national missile defence: assessing European concerns and interests,' Canadian Military Journal (forthcoming).
2. Space constraints preclude using direct quotes from critics, but the arguments described in this article are well known and are consistent with the views expressed in every critical media report on NMD published over the last two years. For some examples (and quotes) I recommend the Project Ploughshares web site: http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/ABOLISH%20NUCS/BMDandCanada.htm. As one of the most highly respected disarmament organizations in North America, Project Ploughshares is a useful resource for information on (and criticisms of) the NMD programme.
3. Relevant charts can be obtained from the Natural Resources Defense Council web page: http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp.
4. Note 16 lists resources that highlight the threats tied to ballistic missile proliferation and fissile material theft.
5. The analogy is less than ideal, of course, because the NYPD has the capacity and authority to arrest criminals - police can credibly threaten a myriad of punishments to prevent criminal activity. There are no parallel international institutions that can effectively monitor, prevent, or reverse proliferation by states that decide to acquire the technology or successfully sanction leaders who break laws or other treaty obligations.
6. This logic is used today by American nuclear strategists to justify increasing the number of targets from 2,500 (in 1995) to 3,000 today, mostly to address threats from China, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. See Hugo Young, 'Secrets of Washington's nuclear madness revealed,' Guardian Weekly, 22 June 2000.
7. For an excellent collection of articles summarizing these patterns, see Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds, The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results (London: Frank Cass 1993). See also William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds, The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network (Boulder CO and London: Westview 1994).
8. For an excellent collection of articles summarizing these patterns, see Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds, The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results (London: Frank Cass 1993). See also William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds, The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network (Boulder CO and London: Westview 1994).
9. For a detailed analysis of China's evolving nuclear policy see Brad Roberts, Robert A. Manning, and Ronald N. Montaperto, 'China: the forgotten nuclear power,' Foreign Affairs 79(July/August 2000). For an interesting discussion of China's position on bombing or invading Taiwan see http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7467-2000Jul8.html.
10. For additional details about Russia's SS-X-27 missile programme, see http://www.softwar.net/ss27.html, which claims that: 'The first deployment was reported to be in a SS-19 silo complex located at Tatishchevo in January of 1998... The mobile Russian SS-27 also raises serious proliferation questions since the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology is providing the SS-27 design to China. China intends to produce the TOPOL-M missile under the designation "Dong Feng" (East Wind) DF-41. The DF-41 is expected to be deployed with Chinese manufactured nuclear warheads also designed with the aid of U.S. super computers.'
11. The overview is from William Broad, 'A missile defense with limits: the ABC'S of the Clinton plan,' http://www10.nytimes.com/library/world/americas/063000missile-plan.html (30 June 2000). Additional details of NMD architecture can be found at: http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html.
12. Burton Richter, 'It doesn't take rocket science,' Washington Post, 23 July 2000, B02. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25940-2000Jul22.html.
13. Ibid.
14. Why would any leader be foolish enough to launch an attack on the United States in the first place, critics will ask. But that popular question overlooks the other objective of NMD: to prevent opponents from believing that they can deter the United States (or NATO) from launching a conventional attack. Protecting United States (and Canadian/European) bargaining leverage in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Taiwan, and North Korea is as relevant to NMD as protecting North America from a missile attack. Critics may be right in claiming that North Korean leaders are not likely to launch an attack (or even issue a nuclear threat) unless some crisis (for example, one that involves the United States over South Korea) escalates out of control. But the key question for United States policy-makers is whether, in the midst of this hypothetical conventional war, the probability of confronting an explicit nuclear threat from North Korea increases or decreases with/without NMD. In earlier stages of this crisis, does the probability of confronting a conventional war initiated by North Korea increase or decrease with/without NMD? And, to step even further back, does the probability of confronting crisis escalation by North Korea increase or decrease with/without NMD? And in terms of the initial stage of the crisis, are the incentives for crisis management and resolution higher or lower for the North Korean leadership with/without NMD? At each stage of the crisis United States NMD is likely to be more stabilizing, unless North Korean leaders are irrational. The critics respond that that is precisely the problem - North Korean leaders may be irrational and completely upset the logic associated with the simplistic, 'rational choice' interpretation of the scenario offered by proponents of NMD. Fair enough, but in addition to defending the culturally insensitive assertion that North Korean leaders are less rational than Western leaders, critics are now faced with having to explain why North Korea would contemplate launching a ballistic missile, an action they previously concluded was highly unlikely and a fabrication of the military industrial complex.' See Harvey, 'Proliferation, rogue-states and national missile defence' (Canadian Military Journal, forthcoming, 2000).
15. William Broad, 'A missile defense with limits.'
16. A simple web search for keywords 'nuclear proliferation' or 'ballistic missile proliferation' should provide the optimists with sufficient information to reconsider their position. Here is a small sample: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm; http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/; http://www.stimson.org/policy/nucleardangers.htm; http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html; http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/akbk.html; http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-051es.html; http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/bmtestimony.htm; http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1999/to1201999_to120md.html; http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/moltz97s.htm (Center for NonProliferation Studies); http://www.nuclearfiles.org/prolif/; http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cibo1.htm;
17. A simple web search for keywords 'nuclear proliferation' or 'ballistic missile proliferation' should provide the optimists with sufficient information to reconsider their position. Here is a small sample: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm; http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/; http://www.stimson.org/policy/nucleardangers.htm; http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html; http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/akbk.html; http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-051es.html; http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/bmtestimony.htm; http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1999/to1201999_to120md.html; http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/moltz97s.htm (Center for NonProliferation Studies); http://www.nuclearfiles.org/prolif/; http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cibo1.htm;
18. A simple web search for keywords 'nuclear proliferation' or 'ballistic missile proliferation' should provide the optimists with sufficient information to reconsider their position. Here is a small sample: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm; http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/; http://www.stimson.org/policy/nucleardangers.htm; http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html; http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/akbk.html; http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-051es.html; http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/bmtestimony.htm; http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1999/to1201999_to120md.html; http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/moltz97s.htm (Center for NonProliferation Studies); http://www.nuclearfiles.org/prolif/; http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cibo1.htm;
19. A simple web search for keywords 'nuclear proliferation' or 'ballistic missile proliferation' should provide the optimists with sufficient information to reconsider their position. Here is a small sample: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm; http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/; http://www.stimson.org/policy/nucleardangers.htm; http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html; http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/akbk.html; http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-051es.html; http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/bmtestimony.htm; http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1999/to1201999_to120md.html; http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/moltz97s.htm (Center for NonProliferation Studies); http://www.nuclearfiles.org/prolif/; http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cibo1.htm;
20. A simple web search for keywords 'nuclear proliferation' or 'ballistic missile proliferation' should provide the optimists with sufficient information to reconsider their position. Here is a small sample: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm; http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/; http://www.stimson.org/policy/nucleardangers.htm; http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html; http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/akbk.html; http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-051es.html; http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/bmtestimony.htm; http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1999/to1201999_to120md.html; http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/moltz97s.htm (Center for NonProliferation Studies); http://www.nuclearfiles.org/prolif/; http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cibo1.htm;
21. A simple web search for keywords 'nuclear proliferation' or 'ballistic missile proliferation' should provide the optimists with sufficient information to reconsider their position. Here is a small sample: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm; http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/; http://www.stimson.org/policy/nucleardangers.htm; http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html; http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/akbk.html; http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-051es.html; http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/bmtestimony.htm; http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1999/to1201999_to120md.html; http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/moltz97s.htm (Center for NonProliferation Studies); http://www.nuclearfiles.org/prolif/; http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cibo1.htm;
22. A simple web search for keywords 'nuclear proliferation' or 'ballistic missile proliferation' should provide the optimists with sufficient information to reconsider their position. Here is a small sample: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm; http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/; http://www.stimson.org/policy/nucleardangers.htm; http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html; http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/akbk.html; http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-051es.html; http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/bmtestimony.htm; http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1999/to1201999_to120md.html; http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/moltz97s.htm (Center for NonProliferation Studies); http://www.nuclearfiles.org/prolif/; http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cibo1.htm;
23. A simple web search for keywords 'nuclear proliferation' or 'ballistic missile proliferation' should provide the optimists with sufficient information to reconsider their position. Here is a small sample: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm; http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/; http://www.stimson.org/policy/nucleardangers.htm; http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html; http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/akbk.html; http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-051es.html; http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/bmtestimony.htm; http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1999/to1201999_to120md.html; http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/moltz97s.htm (Center for NonProliferation Studies); http://www.nuclearfiles.org/prolif/; http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cibo1.htm;
24. A simple web search for keywords 'nuclear proliferation' or 'ballistic missile proliferation' should provide the optimists with sufficient information to reconsider their position. Here is a small sample: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm; http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/; http://www.stimson.org/policy/nucleardangers.htm; http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html; http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/akbk.html; http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-051es.html; http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/bmtestimony.htm; http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1999/to1201999_to120md.html; http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/moltz97s.htm (Center for NonProliferation Studies); http://www.nuclearfiles.org/prolif/; http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cibo1.htm;
25. A simple web search for keywords 'nuclear proliferation' or 'ballistic missile proliferation' should provide the optimists with sufficient information to reconsider their position. Here is a small sample: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm; http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/; http://www.stimson.org/policy/nucleardangers.htm; http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html; http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/akbk.html; http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-051es.html; http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/bmtestimony.htm; http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1999/to1201999_to120md.html; http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/moltz97s.htm (Center for NonProliferation Studies); http://www.nuclearfiles.org/prolif/; http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cibo1.htm;
26. A simple web search for keywords 'nuclear proliferation' or 'ballistic missile proliferation' should provide the optimists with sufficient information to reconsider their position. Here is a small sample: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm; http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/; http://www.stimson.org/policy/nucleardangers.htm; http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html; http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/akbk.html; http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-051es.html; http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/bmtestimony.htm; http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1999/to1201999_to120md.html; http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/moltz97s.htm (Center for NonProliferation Studies); http://www.nuclearfiles.org/prolif/; http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cibo1.htm;
27. One week after the second of three failed interceptor tests, the United States Senate approved a $1.9 billion expenditure for the next stage of the NMD programme. Audrey Hudson, 'Senate approves $1.9 billion for missile defense,' Washington Times, 14 July 2000.
28. A failure with booster separation was not even considered among the thousands of potential problems, for obvious reasons. For commentary by Kadish immediately following the failed test, see http:// www.cnn.com/2000/US/07/08/missile.defense.04/index.html.