Economic crisis and the demise of the legal left in Peru

Comparative Politics

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 69-92

  Roberts, Kenneth M ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039612319     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/422183     Document Type: Review

References (60)

1. Adam Przeworski, "The Neoliberal Fallacy," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy Revisited (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
2. See, for example, Jorge Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993); Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, José María Maravall, and Adam Przeworski, Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social-Democratic Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
3. See, for example, Jorge Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993); Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, José María Maravall, and Adam Przeworski, Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social-Democratic Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
4. Arturo Escobar and Sonia E. Alvarez, eds., The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
5. See Debate, 10 (March-April 1988), 10.
6. A centerpiece of Fujimori's campaign was opposition to the economic shock program promised by conservative rival Mario Vargas Llosa. After taking office, Fujimori imposed a shock program of his own, with sharp price increases, cuts in government subsidies, tariffs, and real wages, and privatizations. See Efraín Gonzales de Olarte, "Peru's Economiic Program under Fujimori," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 35 (Summer 1993), 51-80.
7. Orlando Fais Borda, "Social Movements and Political Power in Latin America," in Escobar and Alvarez, eds.
8. See Denis Sulmont, El Movimiento Obrero Peruano (1890-1980) (Lima: Tarea, 1980).
9. See Evelyne Huber Stephens, "The Peruvian Military Government, Labor Mobilization, and the Political Strength of the Left," Latin American Research Review, 28 (1983), 57-93; Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
10. See Evelyne Huber Stephens, "The Peruvian Military Government, Labor Mobilization, and the Political Strength of the Left," Latin American Research Review, 28 (1983), 57-93; Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
11. Henry A. Dietz, Poverty and Problem-Solving under Military Rule: The Urban Poor in Lima, Peru (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), esp. ch. 8.
12. Carmen Rosa Balbi, Identidad Clasista en el Sindicalismo: Su Impacto en las Fábricas (Lima: DESCO, 1989).
13. Maxwell A. Cameron, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru: Political Coalitions and Social Change (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), ch. 2.
14. See Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, Pobreza Urbana y Cambios Electorales en Lima (Lima: DESCO, 1989).
15. The Belaunde administration was badly shaken by the regional debt crisis, which caused a 12 percent decline in the Peruvian economy in 1983. Belaunde also responded passively to Sendero Luminoso's insurgency in the southern highlands from 1980 to 1982, then put the region under a state of emergency, ceded political authority to military officials, and tolerated human rights violations. See Americas Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority: Human Rights in Peru (New York: 1984).
16. Some individual leftists, such as Cuzco mayor Daniel Estrada, ran successfully as independents. All the traditional parties did poorly in these elections; Fujimori encouraged the proliferation of independent candidates by relaxing requirements.
17. Julio Cotler, Descomposición Política y Autoritarismo en el Peru (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1993).
18. E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Pantheon, 1964), p. 9.
19. These variables, initially identified by Marx and Engels in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, have been stressed by more contemporary scholars as well; see for example, Charles Bergquist, Labor in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), ch. 1.
20. Susan C. Stokes, for example, has found that exposure to labor unions is a powerful indicator of radicalism in Lima's shantytowns. Susan C. Stokes, Cultures in Conflict: Social Movements and the State in Peru (Berkeley: University of California Press), ch. 5.
21. Robert Dix, "Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America," Comparative Politics, 22 (October 1989), 25-37.
22. Balbi, p. 44.
23. Jeffrey Paige, Agrarian Revolution (New York: Free Press, 1975), ch. 3.
24. These conditions helped Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho. Cynthia McClintock, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso Rebellion: Origins and Trajectories," in Susan Eckstein, ed., Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
25. See Stokes, ch. 5; and Teresa Tovar Samanez, Movimiento Popular y Paros Nacionales (Lima: DESCO, 1982), p. 33.
26. Carlos Ivan Desregori, "El Aprendiz de Brujo y el Curandero Chino: Etnicidad, Modernidad, y Ciudadanía," in Carlos Ivan Degregori and Romeo Grompone, Elecciones 1990: Demonios y Redentores en el Nuevo Peru (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1991), p. 87.
27. Peru: Compendio Estádistico 1991-92, vol. 1 (Lima: Dirección Técnica de Indicadores Económicos, 1992), p. 584.
28. Peru: Compendia Estadístico 1993-1994, vol. 1 (Lima: Dirección Técnica de Indicadores Económicos, 1994), p. 430.
29. Eliana Chávez O'Brien, "El Mercado de Trabajo y las Nuevas Tendencias en la Estructura del Empleo en el Perú," Socialismo y Participación, 60 (December 1992), 20.
30. James W. Wilkie and Carlos Alberto Contreras, eds., Statistical Abstract of Latin America, vol. 29 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin America Center, 1992), p. 373.
31. See Chávez O'Brien, pp. 15-20.
32. See Henry Dietz, "Electoral Politics in Peru, 1978-1986," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 28 (Winter 1986-1987), 139-163; Cameron, ch. 2.
33. See Cameron, ch. 2, 3; Carlos Franco, Imagenes de la Sociedad Peruana: La Otra Modernidad (Lima: Centra de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participación, 1991).
34. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 495.
35. See Jorge Parodi, Ser Obrero Es Algo Relativo: Obreros, Clasismo, y Política (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1986).
36. Balbi, Identidad Clasista en el Sindicalismo, pp. 111-122.
37. Exceptions include the southern department of Puno, where peasant federations clashed with cooperatives over land rights in the 1980s. José Luis Rénique, "La Batalla por Puno: Violencia Política en la Sierra del Peru," Columbia/NYU Consortium Conference Paper No. 36, 1990.
38. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985).
39. The rondas began as community-based peasant patrols to guard against cattle rustling but "evolved into an entire alternative justice system with open community assemblies" to resolve diverse problems. Orin Starn, "'I Dreamed of Foxes and Hawks': Reflections on Peasant Protest, New Social Movements, and the Rondas Campesinas of Northern Peru," in Escobar and Alvarez, eds., p. 90. The original rondas were highly autonomous; more recently, the term has also been applied to patrols organized by the army as part of the counterinsurgency campaign against Sendero Luminoso.
40. See Stokes, Cultures in Conflict.
41. See the spatial model of political identities in Cameron, ch. 6.
42. See Luis Pásara, Nena Delpino, Rocío Valdeavellano, and Alonso Zarzar, La Otra Cara de la Luna: Nuevos Actores Sociales en el Peru (Buenos Aires: Manantial, 1991), p. 198.
43. In 1992 Sendero assassinated community leader María Elena Moyano in Villa El Salvador. It also infiltrated and captured the small business federation, the women's federation, and the main neighborhood association. See Jo-Marie Burt, "Poverty, Violence and Grassroots Organizing in Peru," in Carlos Vilas, Katherine Roberts-Hite, and Monique Segarra, Rethinking Participation in Latin America (forthcoming); Tom Marks, "Making Revolution with Shining Path," in David Scott Palmer, ed. Shining Path of Peru (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
44. In 1992 Sendero assassinated community leader María Elena Moyano in Villa El Salvador. It also infiltrated and captured the small business federation, the women's federation, and the main neighborhood association. See Jo-Marie Burt, "Poverty, Violence and Grassroots Organizing in Peru," in Carlos Vilas, Katherine Roberts-Hite, and Monique Segarra, Rethinking Participation in Latin America (forthcoming); Tom Marks, "Making Revolution with Shining Path," in David Scott Palmer, ed. Shining Path of Peru (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
45. Henry Pease García, Democracia Local: Reflexiones y Experiencias (Lima: DESCO, 1989).
46. See Julio Calderón and Rocío Valdeavellano, Izquierda y Democracia: Entre la Utopía y la Realidad (Lima: Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano, 1991), ch. 2.
47. Cited in Resúmen Semanal, Mar. 2-8, 1990, p. 4.
48. Interview with Alfonso Barrantes," NACLA Report on the Americas, 20 (September-December 1986), 60.
49. See Raul A. Wiener, (El Antizorro): El Debate Sobre el "Acuerdo Nacional" (Lima: Ediciones Debate Mariateguista, 1987), chs. 4, 5.
50. "Interview with Alfonso Barrantes," p. 59.
51. The PUM and UNIR dominated the IU's congressional delegation and together with the PCP led Peru's major labor, peasant, and shantytown organizations. The two small IU parties which strongly backed Barrantes, the PSR and the PCR, were weakly represented in social organizations..
52. The Peru Report, 3 (May 1989), B3-4.
53. Partido Unificado Mariateguista, Perú 1989; Crísis y Salida Política (Lima: 1989).
54. In an interview with the author in Lima on September 19, 1990, former senator Rolando Ames, a leader of the Christian Left, admitted that the PUM represented a "different political project" but thought it was important not to break with it because of the organizational weakness of the moderate Left in civil society and the PUM's greater strength as a bulwark against Sendero Luminoso in popular movements.
55. In an interview with the author in Lima on September 12, 1990, PUM secretary general Eduardo Cáceres expressed concern about the grass-roots competition of Sendero. "At the base level, especially in the countryside in regions like Puno, our only real competitor is Sendero. The other groups often don't exist. It is just the PUM against Sendero."
56. In a 1991 poll only 13 percent of youth between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four sympathized with political parties, whereas 25 percent justified participation in armed groups. Luis Fernán Cisneros C., "Entre la Ira y la Paz," Debate, 15 (September-October 1992), 36.
57. See Sidney Tarrow, Power and Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
58. See Philip Oxhorn, "Where Did All the Protesters Go? Popular Mobilization and the Transition to Democracy in Chile," Latin American Perspectives, 21 (Summer 1994), 49-68.
59. Castañeda, p. 172.
60. Kenneth M. Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case," World Politics, 48 (October 1995), 82-116.