Politics, power, and decision making in the Serb Republic

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 56-64

  Kesić, Obrad ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039610265     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.1996.11655670     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Serbia, along with Montenegro, prefers to be collectively known as "Yugoslavia."
2. NIN [Belgrade] (February 10, 1995): 7.
3. In June 1994, Karadžić and other senior SDS officials stressed that they felt extremely confident that they would be the overwhelming victors in any election, but they were convinced that any election held in the RS would be manipulated by Milošević and his SPS. This seems to be supported by the information leaked from the Dayton peace talks that Milošević had been pushing hard for early elections in the new Bosnian federation.
4. In discussions and interviews with soldiers and officers of the RSA in June and October 1994, the belief that the government was incompetent in prosecuting the war was frequently mentioned. Most soldiers interviewed indicated that morale was suffering and casualties were mounting as a result of orders to withdraw from hard-fought battle gains.
5. Gordana Lazarević, "Deveta Ofanziva," Interviu [Belgrade] (May 5, 1995): 11-12.
6. Ibid.
7. Interview with Bosnian Serb leaders by author, Pale, June 12, 1994.
8. Milan Nikolić, "Kapitulacija Pred Amerikom Nije Nacionalna Sramota," Telegraf[Belgrade] (September 6, 1995): 6.
9. Ljiljana Smajlović, "From the Heart of the Heart of the Former Yugoslavia," Wilson Quarterly (Summer 1995): 100-113.
10. Radovan Karadžić, interview with the author and Western journalists, Pale, June 12, 1994.
11. Karadžić, interview with the author, Pale, October 27, 1994.
12. Drazena Peranić, "Zelje Obicnih Ljudi," NIN [Belgrade] (June 9, 1995): 18-19.
13. Philip Schwarm, "Heavy Fall-out," War Report [London] (November-December 1995): 21-22.
14. Peranić, "Zelje Obicnih Ljudi," 19.
15. In response to the massacre of thirty-seven civilians in Sarajevo on August 28, 1995, NATO air strikes began on August 30. On that day, Richard Holbrooke and his delegation of American negotiators arrived in Belgrade and announced the agreement between Milošević and the Bosnian Serbs, indirectly linking the agreement to the air strikes. The American media also linked the two, indicating that the Bosnian Serbs had been forced into the agreement by the air strikes. In reality the agreement, although it was signed on August 29, was actually concluded on August 27, one full day before the Sarajevo massacre and well before the threat of N ATO air strikes. See Milan Milošević, Ivan Radovanović, and Ljiljana Smajlović, "Savez Jednog," Vreme [Belgrade] (September 4, 1995): 8-10.
16. Most Bosnian Serbs admit that their armed forces have committed atrocities, but they contest the extent of the atrocities that were committed and especially take issue with what they perceive to be the one-sided focus on atrocities in the international media, which concentrates on Muslim victims and Serbian villains. Many Bosnian Serbs also suspect that some of the atrocities, such as the brutal expulsion of Muslim civilians from the town of Janja in the fall of 1994, were orchestrated from Belgrade in order to discredit the Bosnian Serb leadership and reinforce their isolation.
17. Elaine Sciolino, Roger Cohen, and Stephen Engelberg, "In U.S. Eyes, 'Good' Muslims and 'Bad' Serbs Did a Switch," New York Times, (November 23, 1995): 1 .
18. This resentment is evident in slogans painted on the walls in Grbavića, which read "Palejans go back to your village," or "It's easy to defend Sarajevo from Pale."