From villains to victims: Fraternization and the feminization of Germany, 1945-1947

Diplomatic History

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-20

  Goedde, Petra ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039602963     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0145-2096.00149     Document Type: Article

References (98)

1. Beginning in the summer of 1944, army commanders distributed among soldiers the Pocket Guide to Germany (Washington, 1944). Newsweek, 4 February 1946.
2. Beginning in the summer of 1944, army commanders distributed among soldiers the Pocket Guide to Germany (Washington, 1944). Newsweek, 4 February 1946.
3. Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946 (Frankfurt, Germany, 1947), 25.
4. Joan W. Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," American Historical Review 91 (December 1986): 1053-75. This article has been very helpful in clarifying the use of gender analysis for foreign relations studies. See also Emily Rosenberg, "Gender," Journal of American History 77 (June 1990): 116-24.
5. Joan W. Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," American Historical Review 91 (December 1986): 1053-75. This article has been very helpful in clarifying the use of gender analysis for foreign relations studies. See also Emily Rosenberg, "Gender," Journal of American History 77 (June 1990): 116-24.
6. Even though there is no documentation of homosexual relationships between Americans and Germans, they must have occurred. For more information see Allan Bérubé, Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World War II (New York, 1990).
7. Percy Knauth, "Fraternization: The Word Takes on a Brand-New Meaning in Germany," Life, 2 July 1945, 26; "Appendix 'A' to letter from Eisenhower to Commanding Generals, 'Policy on Relationships Between Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany,' " 12 September 1944, Record Group 331, Adjutant General's Records 1944, file 91-4 (Germany), SHAEF, National Archives, Washington, DC.
8. JCS 1067 constituted the basis tor this policy. The directive established controls on the German economy and outlined among others a policy for denazification and demilitarization. For a text of the directive see "Directive to the Commander in Chief of the United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany, May 10, 1945," U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (Washington, 1985), 15-32.
9. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany Is Our Problem (New York, 1945), 105. Morgenthau's plan gained prominence at the Quebec Conference between President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in September 1944. FDR's position on Germany softened shortly after his return from Quebec, in part because his secretaries of war and state, Henry L. Stimson and Cordell Hull, objected to the plan. Neither of them had accompanied him to Quebec. For more detail on the debate about the Morgenthau plan within the Roosevelt administration see Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull (New York, 1964), 756-61. History of Military Government, Württemberg-Baden, to June 1946, Records of United States Occupation Headquarters, World War II (OMGUS), Record Group 260, file 4, box 46, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland.
10. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany Is Our Problem (New York, 1945), 105. Morgenthau's plan gained prominence at the Quebec Conference between President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in September 1944. FDR's position on Germany softened shortly after his return from Quebec, in part because his secretaries of war and state, Henry L. Stimson and Cordell Hull, objected to the plan. Neither of them had accompanied him to Quebec. For more detail on the debate about the Morgenthau plan within the Roosevelt administration see Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull (New York, 1964), 756-61. History of Military Government, Württemberg-Baden, to June 1946, Records of United States Occupation Headquarters, World War II (OMGUS), Record Group 260, file 4, box 46, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland.
11. The issue of Germany's collective guilt was hotly debated at the end of the war and has since been at the center of many controversies among politicians and historians. Most recently, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen revived the idea of Germany's collective guilt for the Nazi crimes in his best-selling, yet controversial book, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York, 1996).
12. His study rejects most recent scholarship in this field, particularly Christopher R. Browning's highly acclaimed study of Reserve Police Battalion 101, one of the battalions responsible for mass killings of Jew's in the Polish countryside in 1942-43. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York, 1992), esp. 159-89.
13. For a summary of the recent debate over the Goldhagen controversy in Germany and the United States see Julius H. Schoeps, ed., Ein Volk von Mördern? Die Dokumentation zur Goldhagen-Kontroverse um die Rolle der Deutschen im Holocaust [A people of murderers? Documentation of the Goldhagen controversy about the Germans' role in the Holocaust] (Hamburg, 1996).
14. For a detailed discussion of the reasons for the nonfraternization policy see Fraternization with the Germans, 10-13.
15. For more detail on the breakdown of the nonfraternization rule and friendly relations between Americans and Germans after World War I see Keith L. Nelson, Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923 (Berkeley, 1975), esp. 33-37, 49-51; Alfred E. Cornebise, The Amaroc News: The Daily Newspaper of the American Forces in Germany, 1919-1923 (Carbondale, IL, 1981), esp. 184-86, 215-16; and Henry T. Allen, The Rhineland Occupation (Indianapolis, 1927), esp. 69-74. Fraternization with the Germans, 2-4. Besides distributing the Pocket Guide to Germany, the military government aired short messages on popular radio shows of the American Forces Network in the American occupation zone and showed educational films about Germany's historical record of aggression.
16. For more detail on the breakdown of the nonfraternization rule and friendly relations between Americans and Germans after World War I see Keith L. Nelson, Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923 (Berkeley, 1975), esp. 33-37, 49-51; Alfred E. Cornebise, The Amaroc News: The Daily Newspaper of the American Forces in Germany, 1919-1923 (Carbondale, IL, 1981), esp. 184-86, 215-16; and Henry T. Allen, The Rhineland Occupation (Indianapolis, 1927), esp. 69-74. Fraternization with the Germans, 2-4. Besides distributing the Pocket Guide to Germany, the military government aired short messages on popular radio shows of the American Forces Network in the American occupation zone and showed educational films about Germany's historical record of aggression.
17. For more detail on the breakdown of the nonfraternization rule and friendly relations between Americans and Germans after World War I see Keith L. Nelson, Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923 (Berkeley, 1975), esp. 33-37, 49-51; Alfred E. Cornebise, The Amaroc News: The Daily Newspaper of the American Forces in Germany, 1919-1923 (Carbondale, IL, 1981), esp. 184-86, 215-16; and Henry T. Allen, The Rhineland Occupation (Indianapolis, 1927), esp. 69-74. Fraternization with the Germans, 2-4. Besides distributing the Pocket Guide to Germany, the military government aired short messages on popular radio shows of the American Forces Network in the American occupation zone and showed educational films about Germany's historical record of aggression.
18. For more detail on the breakdown of the nonfraternization rule and friendly relations between Americans and Germans after World War I see Keith L. Nelson, Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923 (Berkeley, 1975), esp. 33-37, 49-51; Alfred E. Cornebise, The Amaroc News: The Daily Newspaper of the American Forces in Germany, 1919-1923 (Carbondale, IL, 1981), esp. 184-86, 215-16; and Henry T. Allen, The Rhineland Occupation (Indianapolis, 1927), esp. 69-74. Fraternization with the Germans, 2-4. Besides distributing the Pocket Guide to Germany, the military government aired short messages on popular radio shows of the American Forces Network in the American occupation zone and showed educational films about Germany's historical record of aggression.
19. For more detail on the breakdown of the nonfraternization rule and friendly relations between Americans and Germans after World War I see Keith L. Nelson, Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923 (Berkeley, 1975), esp. 33-37, 49-51; Alfred E. Cornebise, The Amaroc News: The Daily Newspaper of the American Forces in Germany, 1919-1923 (Carbondale, IL, 1981), esp. 184-86, 215-16; and Henry T. Allen, The Rhineland Occupation (Indianapolis, 1927), esp. 69-74. Fraternization with the Germans, 2-4. Besides distributing the Pocket Guide to Germany, the military government aired short messages on popular radio shows of the American Forces Network in the American occupation zone and showed educational films about Germany's historical record of aggression.
20. Pocket Guide to Germany, 5-6.
21. A correspondent for Time magazine who accompanied the troops into Germany described a typical invasion into a small German town. According to his account, "fear gave way to sullenness, and sullenness to little offers of assistance." "Germany: Heavings," Time, 25 September 1944.
22. The Pocket Guide did not mention the concentration camps, even though military and political administrators had known of their existence for some time. Soldiers' attitudes shifted with the fading memory of the conditions in the camps upon their liberation. For a detailed discussion of these changes as well as the complex web of relations among occupation troops, former concentration camp inmates, and the German population see Robert H. Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heart (New York, 1985), esp. 144, 154. See also Frank Stern, The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge: Antisemitism and Philosemitism in Postwar Germany (Oxford, 1992), 53-157.
23. The Pocket Guide did not mention the concentration camps, even though military and political administrators had known of their existence for some time. Soldiers' attitudes shifted with the fading memory of the conditions in the camps upon their liberation. For a detailed discussion of these changes as well as the complex web of relations among occupation troops, former concentration camp inmates, and the German population see Robert H. Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heart (New York, 1985), esp. 144, 154. See also Frank Stern, The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge: Antisemitism and Philosemitism in Postwar Germany (Oxford, 1992), 53-157.
24. A barrage of articles on fraternization between 1944 and 1946 in major American newspapers and magazines as well as frequent complaints in official military correspondence about the lack of discipline among soldiers give an indication of the high rate of those contacts. See also Fraternization with the Germans, 45-47. "Occupation: Unofficial Mercy," Time, 20 October 1944.
25. A barrage of articles on fraternization between 1944 and 1946 in major American newspapers and magazines as well as frequent complaints in official military correspondence about the lack of discipline among soldiers give an indication of the high rate of those contacts. See also Fraternization with the Germans, 45-47. "Occupation: Unofficial Mercy," Time, 20 October 1944.
26. "Letter from Germany," 'American Mercury, August 1945,157; Knauth, "Fraternization," 26.
27. "Letter from Germany," 'American Mercury, August 1945,157; Knauth, "Fraternization," 26.
28. Pocket Guide to Germany, 8. See also Emil Ludwig's article on the German national character: "As a soldier the German for 2,000 years has found satisfaction in seeing the fear he evokes in other countries." Ludwig's "How to Treat Defeated Germany," Collier's, 2 October 1945. Fraternization with the Germans, 47.
29. Pocket Guide to Germany, 8. See also Emil Ludwig's article on the German national character: "As a soldier the German for 2,000 years has found satisfaction in seeing the fear he evokes in other countries." Ludwig's "How to Treat Defeated Germany," Collier's, 2 October 1945. Fraternization with the Germans, 47.
30. Pocket Guide to Germany, 8. See also Emil Ludwig's article on the German national character: "As a soldier the German for 2,000 years has found satisfaction in seeing the fear he evokes in other countries." Ludwig's "How to Treat Defeated Germany," Collier's, 2 October 1945. Fraternization with the Germans, 47.
31. Pocket Guide to Germany, 8. See also Emil Ludwig's article on the German national character: "As a soldier the German for 2,000 years has found satisfaction in seeing the fear he evokes in other countries." Ludwig's "How to Treat Defeated Germany," Collier's, 2 October 1945. Fraternization with the Germans, 47.
32. The case of three American soldiers stationed in Okinawa who raped a twelve-year-old girl near their base in the fall of 1995 provides one of the more extreme examples of sexual assaults committed by soldiers stationed on military bases away from their home communities. The writer and philosopher J. Glenn Gray devoted a whole chapter in his book The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (New York, 1959, 1967) to the issue of love and sexual desires in wartime. He noted that "anyone entering military service can only be astonished by the soldiers' concentration upon the subject of women and, more especially, upon the sexual act" (p. 61). In his observations he drew on his experience as a U.S. Army intelligence officer during World War II in Italy, France, and Germany.
33. Artists commissioned by the Nazi regime often produced pictures and sculptures of muscular men and fragile women holding small children. See Hans-Dieter Schärer, Das gespaltene Bewußtsein: Deutsche Kultur und Lebenswirklichkeit 1933-1945 [Split consciousness: German culture and the reality of life, 1933-1945] (Frankfurt, 1981), 140-41. On the centrality of female reproduction in Nazi ideology see Ute Frevert, Women in German History: From Bourgeois Emancipation to Sexual Liberation (New York, 1989), 230-34; see also Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics (London, 1987), 177.
34. Artists commissioned by the Nazi regime often produced pictures and sculptures of muscular men and fragile women holding small children. See Hans-Dieter Schärer, Das gespaltene Bewußtsein: Deutsche Kultur und Lebenswirklichkeit 1933-1945 [Split consciousness: German culture and the reality of life, 1933-1945] (Frankfurt, 1981), 140-41. On the centrality of female reproduction in Nazi ideology see Ute Frevert, Women in German History: From Bourgeois Emancipation to Sexual Liberation (New York, 1989), 230-34; see also Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics (London, 1987), 177.
35. Artists commissioned by the Nazi regime often produced pictures and sculptures of muscular men and fragile women holding small children. See Hans-Dieter Schärer, Das gespaltene Bewußtsein: Deutsche Kultur und Lebenswirklichkeit 1933-1945 [Split consciousness: German culture and the reality of life, 1933-1945] (Frankfurt, 1981), 140-41. On the centrality of female reproduction in Nazi ideology see Ute Frevert, Women in German History: From Bourgeois Emancipation to Sexual Liberation (New York, 1989), 230-34; see also Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics (London, 1987), 177.
36. See Hilde Thurnwald, Gegenwartsprobleme Berliner Familien: Eine Soziologische Untersuchung an 498 Familien [Current problems of Berlin families: A sociological investigation of 498 families] (Berlin 1948) 10; also Robert G. Moeller, Protecting Motherhood: Women and the family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany (Berkeley, 1995), 12. "Zunahme der weiblichen Bevölkerung; Stand: 29.10.1948," Länderrat des amerikanischen Besatzungsgebietes: Memorandum über die soziale Lage in der US-Zone, Handakten Preller, 21, 965, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Ann Sloan to author, 17 July 1992.
37. See Hilde Thurnwald, Gegenwartsprobleme Berliner Familien: Eine Soziologische Untersuchung an 498 Familien [Current problems of Berlin families: A sociological investigation of 498 families] (Berlin 1948) 10; also Robert G. Moeller, Protecting Motherhood: Women and the family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany (Berkeley, 1995), 12. "Zunahme der weiblichen Bevölkerung; Stand: 29.10.1948," Länderrat des amerikanischen Besatzungsgebietes: Memorandum über die soziale Lage in der US-Zone, Handakten Preller, 21, 965, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Ann Sloan to author, 17 July 1992.
38. Food rations in the American zone fluctuated constantly and varied by region. For more detail see Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton, 1957), 295-500; and Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, NY, 1950), 263-70. "The Occupation Viewed One Year After," Weekly Intelligence Summary, Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS), No. 52, 27 July 1946, ICD, RG 260, file 4, box 154; Weekly Opinion Summary, ICD Opinion Surveys Unit, Marburg Area, 19 November 1946, ICD, RG 260, file 4, box 146.
39. Food rations in the American zone fluctuated constantly and varied by region. For more detail see Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton, 1957), 295-500; and Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, NY, 1950), 263-70. "The Occupation Viewed One Year After," Weekly Intelligence Summary, Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS), No. 52, 27 July 1946, ICD, RG 260, file 4, box 154; Weekly Opinion Summary, ICD Opinion Surveys Unit, Marburg Area, 19 November 1946, ICD, RG 260, file 4, box 146.
40. Food rations in the American zone fluctuated constantly and varied by region. For more detail see Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton, 1957), 295-500; and Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, NY, 1950), 263-70. "The Occupation Viewed One Year After," Weekly Intelligence Summary, Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS), No. 52, 27 July 1946, ICD, RG 260, file 4, box 154; Weekly Opinion Summary, ICD Opinion Surveys Unit, Marburg Area, 19 November 1946, ICD, RG 260, file 4, box 146.
41. The 1948 Hollywood film A Foreign Affair explores the connections between GIs' fraternization with German women and their duties as providers at home. For an interpretation of the film see Emily Rosenberg, "'Foreign Affairs' after World War II: Connecting Sexual and International Politics," Diplomatic History 18 (Winter 1994): 59-70. See also Georg Schmundt-Thomas, "Hollywood's Romance of Foreign Policy: American GIs and the Conquest of the German Fräulein," Journal of Popular Film & Television 19 (Winter 1992): 187-97. Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York, 1988), 76.
42. The 1948 Hollywood film A Foreign Affair explores the connections between GIs' fraternization with German women and their duties as providers at home. For an interpretation of the film see Emily Rosenberg, "'Foreign Affairs' after World War II: Connecting Sexual and International Politics," Diplomatic History 18 (Winter 1994): 59-70. See also Georg Schmundt-Thomas, "Hollywood's Romance of Foreign Policy: American GIs and the Conquest of the German Fräulein," Journal of Popular Film & Television 19 (Winter 1992): 187-97. Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York, 1988), 76.
43. The 1948 Hollywood film A Foreign Affair explores the connections between GIs' fraternization with German women and their duties as providers at home. For an interpretation of the film see Emily Rosenberg, "'Foreign Affairs' after World War II: Connecting Sexual and International Politics," Diplomatic History 18 (Winter 1994): 59-70. See also Georg Schmundt-Thomas, "Hollywood's Romance of Foreign Policy: American GIs and the Conquest of the German Fräulein," Journal of Popular Film & Television 19 (Winter 1992): 187-97. Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York, 1988), 76.
44. Leila Rupp argued that during the war women in Germany did not encounter the same pressures to seek employment as their American counterparts did. Especially middle- and upper-class women were reluctant to work outside the home. This trend continued after the war. For more detail see Leila Rupp, Mobilizing Women for War German and American Propaganda, 1939-1945 (Princeton, 1978), 86, 172.
45. "Berichte der Familienfürsorgerin verschiedener nordrhein-westfalischer Städte über die Wohnverhältnisse, Ernährungsverhältnisse, Bekleidung und allgemeine Notlage der Bevölkerung," July 1947, cited in Annette Kuhn, Frauen in der Deutschen Nachkriegszeit, vol. I [Women in postwar Germany] (Düsseldorf, 1986), 44.
46. Elfrieda Berthiaume Shukert and Barbara Smith Scibetta, War Brides of World War II (New York, 1988), 129, 130; see also Ann Sloan to the author, 17 July 1992.
47. The Marshall Plan allocated economic aid to Western European countries, including the western zones of Germany. See Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 40, 129. See also Charles Maier, ed., The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program (New York, 1991). The Berlin airlift supplied food, fuel, and other vital materials to the western sectors of Berlin by air when the Soviets blocked the Western Allies' access to the city. The American-British airlift lasted almost a year, from 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949. With the airlift Americans literally assumed the role of provider for the citizens of West Berlin. For more information see Uwe Prell and Lothar Wilker, eds., Berlin Blockade und Luftbrücke 1948/49: Analyse und Dokumentation [Berlin blockade and airlift 1948/49: Analysis and documentation] (Berlin, 1987); Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-49: A Study in Decision-Making (Berkeley, 1983); Daniel F. Harrington, "The Berlin Blockade Revisited," International History Review 6 (February 1984): 88-112; and Hans Herzfeld, Berlin in der Weltpolitik, 1945-1970 [Berlin in world politics, 1945-1970] (Berlin, 1973), 230-71.
48. The Marshall Plan allocated economic aid to Western European countries, including the western zones of Germany. See Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 40, 129. See also Charles Maier, ed., The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program (New York, 1991). The Berlin airlift supplied food, fuel, and other vital materials to the western sectors of Berlin by air when the Soviets blocked the Western Allies' access to the city. The American-British airlift lasted almost a year, from 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949. With the airlift Americans literally assumed the role of provider for the citizens of West Berlin. For more information see Uwe Prell and Lothar Wilker, eds., Berlin Blockade und Luftbrücke 1948/49: Analyse und Dokumentation [Berlin blockade and airlift 1948/49: Analysis and documentation] (Berlin, 1987); Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-49: A Study in Decision-Making (Berkeley, 1983); Daniel F. Harrington, "The Berlin Blockade Revisited," International History Review 6 (February 1984): 88-112; and Hans Herzfeld, Berlin in der Weltpolitik, 1945-1970 [Berlin in world politics, 1945-1970] (Berlin, 1973), 230-71.
49. The Marshall Plan allocated economic aid to Western European countries, including the western zones of Germany. See Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 40, 129. See also Charles Maier, ed., The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program (New York, 1991). The Berlin airlift supplied food, fuel, and other vital materials to the western sectors of Berlin by air when the Soviets blocked the Western Allies' access to the city. The American-British airlift lasted almost a year, from 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949. With the airlift Americans literally assumed the role of provider for the citizens of West Berlin. For more information see Uwe Prell and Lothar Wilker, eds., Berlin Blockade und Luftbrücke 1948/49: Analyse und Dokumentation [Berlin blockade and airlift 1948/49: Analysis and documentation] (Berlin, 1987); Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-49: A Study in Decision-Making (Berkeley, 1983); Daniel F. Harrington, "The Berlin Blockade Revisited," International History Review 6 (February 1984): 88-112; and Hans Herzfeld, Berlin in der Weltpolitik, 1945-1970 [Berlin in world politics, 1945-1970] (Berlin, 1973), 230-71.
50. The Marshall Plan allocated economic aid to Western European countries, including the western zones of Germany. See Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 40, 129. See also Charles Maier, ed., The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program (New York, 1991). The Berlin airlift supplied food, fuel, and other vital materials to the western sectors of Berlin by air when the Soviets blocked the Western Allies' access to the city. The American-British airlift lasted almost a year, from 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949. With the airlift Americans literally assumed the role of provider for the citizens of West Berlin. For more information see Uwe Prell and Lothar Wilker, eds., Berlin Blockade und Luftbrücke 1948/49: Analyse und Dokumentation [Berlin blockade and airlift 1948/49: Analysis and documentation] (Berlin, 1987); Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-49: A Study in Decision-Making (Berkeley, 1983); Daniel F. Harrington, "The Berlin Blockade Revisited," International History Review 6 (February 1984): 88-112; and Hans Herzfeld, Berlin in der Weltpolitik, 1945-1970 [Berlin in world politics, 1945-1970] (Berlin, 1973), 230-71.
51. The Marshall Plan allocated economic aid to Western European countries, including the western zones of Germany. See Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 40, 129. See also Charles Maier, ed., The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program (New York, 1991). The Berlin airlift supplied food, fuel, and other vital materials to the western sectors of Berlin by air when the Soviets blocked the Western Allies' access to the city. The American-British airlift lasted almost a year, from 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949. With the airlift Americans literally assumed the role of provider for the citizens of West Berlin. For more information see Uwe Prell and Lothar Wilker, eds., Berlin Blockade und Luftbrücke 1948/49: Analyse und Dokumentation [Berlin blockade and airlift 1948/49: Analysis and documentation] (Berlin, 1987); Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-49: A Study in Decision-Making (Berkeley, 1983); Daniel F. Harrington, "The Berlin Blockade Revisited," International History Review 6 (February 1984): 88-112; and Hans Herzfeld, Berlin in der Weltpolitik, 1945-1970 [Berlin in world politics, 1945-1970] (Berlin, 1973), 230-71.
52. The Marshall Plan allocated economic aid to Western European countries, including the western zones of Germany. See Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 40, 129. See also Charles Maier, ed., The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program (New York, 1991). The Berlin airlift supplied food, fuel, and other vital materials to the western sectors of Berlin by air when the Soviets blocked the Western Allies' access to the city. The American-British airlift lasted almost a year, from 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949. With the airlift Americans literally assumed the role of provider for the citizens of West Berlin. For more information see Uwe Prell and Lothar Wilker, eds., Berlin Blockade und Luftbrücke 1948/49: Analyse und Dokumentation [Berlin blockade and airlift 1948/49: Analysis and documentation] (Berlin, 1987); Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-49: A Study in Decision-Making (Berkeley, 1983); Daniel F. Harrington, "The Berlin Blockade Revisited," International History Review 6 (February 1984): 88-112; and Hans Herzfeld, Berlin in der Weltpolitik, 1945-1970 [Berlin in world politics, 1945-1970] (Berlin, 1973), 230-71.
53. Fraternization with the Germans, 46, 76, 8o. The drastic variations among the divisions could be explained in part by their role during the war. While the 4th Armored Division was engaged in active combat, the quartermaster corps stayed behind the lines to provide primarily food and clothing for the troops. The latter's distance from the fighting might have produced less hatred toward German civilians. The document attributed the 89 percent figure to African American troops. There is reason to doubt the accuracy of this information because racism pervaded the reports on army discipline in the American zone. News articles gave still different figures. Newsweek claimed in the summer of 1946 that 26 percent of the troops were infected, a four-fold increase since the end of the war. See "Services: Disabilities and VD," Newsweek, 22 July 1946. German newspapers also reported on the problem of VD among Germans. See "Berlins Krankheitskurve seit 1941" [Berlin's disease graph since 1945], Der Tagesspiegel, 23 January 1948; and "TBC und Geschlechtskrankheiten" [Tuberculosis and Venereal Disease], Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 November 1948. "Medicine: The GI and VD," Newsweek, 2 September 1946; Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1950. Until 1947 more women than men were infected with VD, indicating a higher degree of sexual promiscuity. For more information on the introduction of penicillin and its effect on the spread of venereal disease see Allan Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880 (New York, 1987), 161-82.
54. Fraternization with the Germans, 46, 76, 8o. The drastic variations among the divisions could be explained in part by their role during the war. While the 4th Armored Division was engaged in active combat, the quartermaster corps stayed behind the lines to provide primarily food and clothing for the troops. The latter's distance from the fighting might have produced less hatred toward German civilians. The document attributed the 89 percent figure to African American troops. There is reason to doubt the accuracy of this information because racism pervaded the reports on army discipline in the American zone. News articles gave still different figures. Newsweek claimed in the summer of 1946 that 26 percent of the troops were infected, a four-fold increase since the end of the war. See "Services: Disabilities and VD," Newsweek, 22 July 1946. German newspapers also reported on the problem of VD among Germans. See "Berlins Krankheitskurve seit 1941" [Berlin's disease graph since 1945], Der Tagesspiegel, 23 January 1948; and "TBC und Geschlechtskrankheiten" [Tuberculosis and Venereal Disease], Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 November 1948. "Medicine: The GI and VD," Newsweek, 2 September 1946; Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1950. Until 1947 more women than men were infected with VD, indicating a higher degree of sexual promiscuity. For more information on the introduction of penicillin and its effect on the spread of venereal disease see Allan Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880 (New York, 1987), 161-82.
55. Fraternization with the Germans, 46, 76, 8o. The drastic variations among the divisions could be explained in part by their role during the war. While the 4th Armored Division was engaged in active combat, the quartermaster corps stayed behind the lines to provide primarily food and clothing for the troops. The latter's distance from the fighting might have produced less hatred toward German civilians. The document attributed the 89 percent figure to African American troops. There is reason to doubt the accuracy of this information because racism pervaded the reports on army discipline in the American zone. News articles gave still different figures. Newsweek claimed in the summer of 1946 that 26 percent of the troops were infected, a four-fold increase since the end of the war. See "Services: Disabilities and VD," Newsweek, 22 July 1946. German newspapers also reported on the problem of VD among Germans. See "Berlins Krankheitskurve seit 1941" [Berlin's disease graph since 1945], Der Tagesspiegel, 23 January 1948; and "TBC und Geschlechtskrankheiten" [Tuberculosis and Venereal Disease], Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 November 1948. "Medicine: The GI and VD," Newsweek, 2 September 1946; Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1950. Until 1947 more women than men were infected with VD, indicating a higher degree of sexual promiscuity. For more information on the introduction of penicillin and its effect on the spread of venereal disease see Allan Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880 (New York, 1987), 161-82.
56. Fraternization with the Germans, 46, 76, 8o. The drastic variations among the divisions could be explained in part by their role during the war. While the 4th Armored Division was engaged in active combat, the quartermaster corps stayed behind the lines to provide primarily food and clothing for the troops. The latter's distance from the fighting might have produced less hatred toward German civilians. The document attributed the 89 percent figure to African American troops. There is reason to doubt the accuracy of this information because racism pervaded the reports on army discipline in the American zone. News articles gave still different figures. Newsweek claimed in the summer of 1946 that 26 percent of the troops were infected, a four-fold increase since the end of the war. See "Services: Disabilities and VD," Newsweek, 22 July 1946. German newspapers also reported on the problem of VD among Germans. See "Berlins Krankheitskurve seit 1941" [Berlin's disease graph since 1945], Der Tagesspiegel, 23 January 1948; and "TBC und Geschlechtskrankheiten" [Tuberculosis and Venereal Disease], Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 November 1948. "Medicine: The GI and VD," Newsweek, 2 September 1946; Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1950. Until 1947 more women than men were infected with VD, indicating a higher degree of sexual promiscuity. For more information on the introduction of penicillin and its effect on the spread of venereal disease see Allan Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880 (New York, 1987), 161-82.
57. Fraternization with the Germans, 46, 76, 8o. The drastic variations among the divisions could be explained in part by their role during the war. While the 4th Armored Division was engaged in active combat, the quartermaster corps stayed behind the lines to provide primarily food and clothing for the troops. The latter's distance from the fighting might have produced less hatred toward German civilians. The document attributed the 89 percent figure to African American troops. There is reason to doubt the accuracy of this information because racism pervaded the reports on army discipline in the American zone. News articles gave still different figures. Newsweek claimed in the summer of 1946 that 26 percent of the troops were infected, a four-fold increase since the end of the war. See "Services: Disabilities and VD," Newsweek, 22 July 1946. German newspapers also reported on the problem of VD among Germans. See "Berlins Krankheitskurve seit 1941" [Berlin's disease graph since 1945], Der Tagesspiegel, 23 January 1948; and "TBC und Geschlechtskrankheiten" [Tuberculosis and Venereal Disease], Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 November 1948. "Medicine: The GI and VD," Newsweek, 2 September 1946; Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1950. Until 1947 more women than men were infected with VD, indicating a higher degree of sexual promiscuity. For more information on the introduction of penicillin and its effect on the spread of venereal disease see Allan Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880 (New York, 1987), 161-82.
58. Fraternization with the Germans, 46, 76, 8o. The drastic variations among the divisions could be explained in part by their role during the war. While the 4th Armored Division was engaged in active combat, the quartermaster corps stayed behind the lines to provide primarily food and clothing for the troops. The latter's distance from the fighting might have produced less hatred toward German civilians. The document attributed the 89 percent figure to African American troops. There is reason to doubt the accuracy of this information because racism pervaded the reports on army discipline in the American zone. News articles gave still different figures. Newsweek claimed in the summer of 1946 that 26 percent of the troops were infected, a four-fold increase since the end of the war. See "Services: Disabilities and VD," Newsweek, 22 July 1946. German newspapers also reported on the problem of VD among Germans. See "Berlins Krankheitskurve seit 1941" [Berlin's disease graph since 1945], Der Tagesspiegel, 23 January 1948; and "TBC und Geschlechtskrankheiten" [Tuberculosis and Venereal Disease], Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 November 1948. "Medicine: The GI and VD," Newsweek, 2 September 1946; Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1950. Until 1947 more women than men were infected with VD, indicating a higher degree of sexual promiscuity. For more information on the introduction of penicillin and its effect on the spread of venereal disease see Allan Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880 (New York, 1987), 161-82.
59. Fraternization with the Germans, 46, 76, 8o. The drastic variations among the divisions could be explained in part by their role during the war. While the 4th Armored Division was engaged in active combat, the quartermaster corps stayed behind the lines to provide primarily food and clothing for the troops. The latter's distance from the fighting might have produced less hatred toward German civilians. The document attributed the 89 percent figure to African American troops. There is reason to doubt the accuracy of this information because racism pervaded the reports on army discipline in the American zone. News articles gave still different figures. Newsweek claimed in the summer of 1946 that 26 percent of the troops were infected, a four-fold increase since the end of the war. See "Services: Disabilities and VD," Newsweek, 22 July 1946. German newspapers also reported on the problem of VD among Germans. See "Berlins Krankheitskurve seit 1941" [Berlin's disease graph since 1945], Der Tagesspiegel, 23 January 1948; and "TBC und Geschlechtskrankheiten" [Tuberculosis and Venereal Disease], Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 November 1948. "Medicine: The GI and VD," Newsweek, 2 September 1946; Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1950. Until 1947 more women than men were infected with VD, indicating a higher degree of sexual promiscuity. For more information on the introduction of penicillin and its effect on the spread of venereal disease see Allan Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880 (New York, 1987), 161-82.
60. Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1967, 391. See also Barbara Willenbacher, "Zerrüttung und Bewährung der Nachkriegs-Familie" [Breakdown and endurance of the postwar family] in Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland [From Stalingrad to currency reform: About the social history of change in Germany], ed. Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, and Hans Woller (München, 1988), 600-601; Hans Habe, Our Love Affair with Germany (New York, 1953), 10; Willenbacher, "Zerrüttung und Bewährung der Nachkriegs-Familie," 601; and "Occupation: GI Legacy in Germany," Newsweek, 16 June 1947.
61. Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1967, 391. See also Barbara Willenbacher, "Zerrüttung und Bewährung der Nachkriegs-Familie" [Breakdown and endurance of the postwar family] in Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland [From Stalingrad to currency reform: About the social history of change in Germany], ed. Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, and Hans Woller (München, 1988), 600-601; Hans Habe, Our Love Affair with Germany (New York, 1953), 10; Willenbacher, "Zerrüttung und Bewährung der Nachkriegs-Familie," 601; and "Occupation: GI Legacy in Germany," Newsweek, 16 June 1947.
62. Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1967, 391. See also Barbara Willenbacher, "Zerrüttung und Bewährung der Nachkriegs-Familie" [Breakdown and endurance of the postwar family] in Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland [From Stalingrad to currency reform: About the social history of change in Germany], ed. Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, and Hans Woller (München, 1988), 600-601; Hans Habe, Our Love Affair with Germany (New York, 1953), 10; Willenbacher, "Zerrüttung und Bewährung der Nachkriegs-Familie," 601; and "Occupation: GI Legacy in Germany," Newsweek, 16 June 1947.
63. Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1967, 391. See also Barbara Willenbacher, "Zerrüttung und Bewährung der Nachkriegs-Familie" [Breakdown and endurance of the postwar family] in Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland [From Stalingrad to currency reform: About the social history of change in Germany], ed. Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, and Hans Woller (München, 1988), 600-601; Hans Habe, Our Love Affair with Germany (New York, 1953), 10; Willenbacher, "Zerrüttung und Bewährung der Nachkriegs-Familie," 601; and "Occupation: GI Legacy in Germany," Newsweek, 16 June 1947.
64. Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1967, 391. See also Barbara Willenbacher, "Zerrüttung und Bewährung der Nachkriegs-Familie" [Breakdown and endurance of the postwar family] in Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland [From Stalingrad to currency reform: About the social history of change in Germany], ed. Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, and Hans Woller (München, 1988), 600-601; Hans Habe, Our Love Affair with Germany (New York, 1953), 10; Willenbacher, "Zerrüttung und Bewährung der Nachkriegs-Familie," 601; and "Occupation: GI Legacy in Germany," Newsweek, 16 June 1947.
65. "Report by Ninth Army Courier Leiser," 14 March 1945, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II (SHAEF), Record Group 331, file 250.1-1, G-1 Division (Personnel), National Archives. Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 70-137, esp. 115; also Atina Grossmann, "A Question of Silence: The Rape of German Women by Occupation Soldiers," October 72 (Spring 1995): 43-63.
66. "Report by Ninth Army Courier Leiser," 14 March 1945, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II (SHAEF), Record Group 331, file 250.1-1, G-1 Division (Personnel), National Archives. Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 70-137, esp. 115; also Atina Grossmann, "A Question of Silence: The Rape of German Women by Occupation Soldiers," October 72 (Spring 1995): 43-63.
67. Message from USFET Main, signed Eisenhower, to Commanding Posts, 29 September 1945, RG 260, file 261.01, box 87; see also Headquarters USFET, Circular 181, Subject: Marriages, 19 December 1946, Records of United States Theaters of War, World War II, Record Group 332, file 291.1, box 310, ETO/USFET, Washington National Records Center. Soldiers could apply for permission to marry only between six and three months prior to their scheduled departure from Germany. In this period, the German fiancée or fiancé had to apply for a military exit permit at the nearest military government office. Only with a valid exit permit would the commanding officer of the American soldier approve the marriage. Another hurdle to overcome was the investigation of the moral character of the German fiancée. "Commanding officers," the circular stated, "will make such local inquiry or investigation into the character and moral background of the German fiancée or fiancé as they deem advisable. This inquiry will include an interview by a chaplain with the applicant and with the fiancée or fiancé."
68. Public Law No. 271 went into effect on 28 December 1945. It was designed to speed up the process of immigration for spouses and children of citizen members of the armed forces. At this time most applications came from English-speaking countries such as Great Britain and Australia. For debate of the bill see Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 10-12 December 1945, vol. 91, pt.9:11738, 12342, 12547. "Bill to Facilitate the Admission into the United States of the Alien Fiancées or Fiancés of Members of the Armed Forces of the United States," Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 10-29 June 1946, vol. 92, pt. 6:6919, 7317-18, 7601-2, 8016.
69. Public Law No. 271 went into effect on 28 December 1945. It was designed to speed up the process of immigration for spouses and children of citizen members of the armed forces. At this time most applications came from English-speaking countries such as Great Britain and Australia. For debate of the bill see Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 10-12 December 1945, vol. 91, pt.9:11738, 12342, 12547. "Bill to Facilitate the Admission into the United States of the Alien Fiancées or Fiancés of Members of the Armed Forces of the United States," Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 10-29 June 1946, vol. 92, pt. 6:6919, 7317-18, 7601-2, 8016.
70. Immigration and Naturalization Service: Annual Report, 1950, Table 9A; Annual Report, 1949, Table 9A.
71. Immigration and Naturalization Service: Annual Report, 1950, Table 9A; Annual Report, 1949, Table 9A.
72. Information Control Division (ICD) Survey in the U.S. Zone, cited in "U.S. Survey Discloses Returning German Soldiers' Views," New York Times, 23 August 1945.
73. Quote in "SS Remnants Warn German Women."
74. Outgoing message from General Eisenhower to 12th Army Group (Personal for Bradley), 17 September 1944, RG 331, file 91-4 (Germany), Adjutant General's Records, 1944, SHAEF.
75. Incoming message from General Marshall to General Eisenhower, 21 September 1944, and outgoing message from Eisenhower to Commanding Generals, 26 September 1944, RG 331, file 91-4 (Germany), Adjutant General's Records, 1944, SHAEF.
76. Arthur Goodfriend, "Fraternization between Germans and American Officers and Men," Report to Chief, Special and Information Services, 7 October 1944, RG 331, file 250.1-11, G-1 (Personnel), SHAEF.
77. Memorandum from Schneider to McClure, 30 May 1945, RG 331, file 250.1-11, G-1 Division (Personnel), SHAEF.
78. See Eisenhower to Marshall, "Eyes Only," 2 June 1945, and ETOUSA (signed Eisenhower) to Commanding Generals, Subject: Non-Fraternization Order, 8 June 1945, RG 331, file 250.1-6, G-1 Division (Personnel), SHAEF.
79. Press Statement Release from Eisenhower, 14 July 1945, and memorandum from William S. Paley, Colonel, Psychological Warfare Division, to Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Subject: Non-Fraternization Policy, 30 May 1945, RG 331, file 250.1-11, G-1 Division (Personnel), SHAEF.
80. Press Statement Release from Eisenhower, 14 July 1945, RG 331, file 250.1-11, G-1 Division (Personnel), SHAEF. For more information on denazification see Lutz Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikanischer Besatzung [Denazification in Bavaria: Cleansing and rehabilitation under the American Occupation] (Frankfurt, 1972); Tom Bower, The Pledge Betrayed: America and Britain and the Denazification in Postwar Germany (Garden City, NY, 1982); and James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany (Chicago, 1982).
81. Press Statement Release from Eisenhower, 14 July 1945, RG 331, file 250.1-11, G-1 Division (Personnel), SHAEF. For more information on denazification see Lutz Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikanischer Besatzung [Denazification in Bavaria: Cleansing and rehabilitation under the American Occupation] (Frankfurt, 1972); Tom Bower, The Pledge Betrayed: America and Britain and the Denazification in Postwar Germany (Garden City, NY, 1982); and James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany (Chicago, 1982).
82. Press Statement Release from Eisenhower, 14 July 1945, RG 331, file 250.1-11, G-1 Division (Personnel), SHAEF. For more information on denazification see Lutz Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikanischer Besatzung [Denazification in Bavaria: Cleansing and rehabilitation under the American Occupation] (Frankfurt, 1972); Tom Bower, The Pledge Betrayed: America and Britain and the Denazification in Postwar Germany (Garden City, NY, 1982); and James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany (Chicago, 1982).
83. On the cancellation of nonfraternization see message from U.S. Group Control Council to Headquarters USFET for Action, Subject: Non-Fraternization, 28 September 1945, and message from USFET, Main, signed Eisenhower, to Commanding posts, 29 September 1945, RG 260, file 261.01, box 87.
84. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1, Year of Decision (Garden City, NY, 1955), 341.
85. Byron Price, "Relations between the Armed Forces and the German People," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 15 December 1945, 885.
86. A 1945 Gallup poll revealed that young women were the harshest opponents of the relaxation of the fraternization ban. The survey asked: "Do you think American soldiers in Germany should be allowed to have dates with German girls?" Among women under thirty, 22 percent answered yes, 70 percent no, and 8 percent were undecided. Among men under thirty, 45 percent answered yes, 40 percent no, and 15 percent were undecided. The age group of 30-49 differed only slightly: 25 percent of the women approved, 66 percent disapproved, and 9 percent were undecided. Among men 43 percent approved, 45 percent disapproved, and 12 percent were undecided. For the complete survey see "The Quarter's Poll," Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (Fall 1945): 385.
87. "Hilfsaktion Amerikas für Deutschland" [American relief for Germany], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22 February 1946; see also "Amerikanische Hilfspakete für die amerikanische Zone" [American relief packages for the American zone], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 June 1946.
88. "Hilfsaktion Amerikas für Deutschland" [American relief for Germany], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22 February 1946; see also "Amerikanische Hilfspakete für die amerikanische Zone" [American relief packages for the American zone], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 June 1946. A 1946 German magazine article explained in great detail the journey of CRALOG and CARE packages from American to German households. See "Pakete von Drüben" [Packages from over there], Heute, 15 August 1946; and "Offen gesagt" [Openly said], ibid., 1 September 1947.
89. "Hilfsaktion Amerikas für Deutschland" [American relief for Germany], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22 February 1946; see also "Amerikanische Hilfspakete für die amerikanische Zone" [American relief packages for the American zone], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 June 1946. A 1946 German magazine article explained in great detail the journey of CRALOG and CARE packages from American to German households. See "Pakete von Drüben" [Packages from over there], Heute, 15 August 1946; and "Offen gesagt" [Openly said], ibid., 1 September 1947.
90. "Hilfsaktion Amerikas für Deutschland" [American relief for Germany], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22 February 1946; see also "Amerikanische Hilfspakete für die amerikanische Zone" [American relief packages for the American zone], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 June 1946. A 1946 German magazine article explained in great detail the journey of CRALOG and CARE packages from American to German households. See "Pakete von Drüben" [Packages from over there], Heute, 15 August 1946; and "Offen gesagt" [Openly said], ibid., 1 September 1947.
91. As mentioned earlier in this study, the food rations declined to as low as one thousand calories per day in the winter of 1946-47, causing widespread malnutrition and even starvation among Germans. See Clay, Decision in Germany, 265, 267-68.
92. Ibid., 270.
93. Germans themselves began to appropriate the fate of German women after the war as the archetypal German experience. For more detail see Elizabeth Heineman, "The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany's 'Crisis Years' and West German National Identity," American Historical Review 101 (April 1996): 354-95. See also Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 11-14; and Grossman, "A Question of Silence," 49.
94. Germans themselves began to appropriate the fate of German women after the war as the archetypal German experience. For more detail see Elizabeth Heineman, "The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany's 'Crisis Years' and West German National Identity," American Historical Review 101 (April 1996): 354-95. See also Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 11-14; and Grossman, "A Question of Silence," 49.
95. Germans themselves began to appropriate the fate of German women after the war as the archetypal German experience. For more detail see Elizabeth Heineman, "The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany's 'Crisis Years' and West German National Identity," American Historical Review 101 (April 1996): 354-95. See also Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 11-14; and Grossman, "A Question of Silence," 49.
96. The United States allocated approximately $12 billion in aid between 1948 and 1951. For more detail on the distribution of Marshall Plan funds see Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 161-64, 414-15. "Directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Forces of Occupation, July 11, 1947," Documents on Germany, 124-35.
97. The United States allocated approximately $12 billion in aid between 1948 and 1951. For more detail on the distribution of Marshall Plan funds see Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 161-64, 414-15. "Directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Forces of Occupation, July 11, 1947," Documents on Germany, 124-35.
98. Heineman, "The Hour of the Woman," 355.