John Stuart Mill's civic liberalism

History of Political Thought

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 87-113

  Miller, Dale E ^a  

^a OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039594385     PISSN: 0143781X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (171)

1. Citations to Mill's works include an abbreviated title (when citing apiece of Mill's correspondence I will give the recipient's name) and volume and page numbers from the Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto, 1963-91). The following abbreviations are employed: A - Autobiography; AB - Speech on 'The Army Bill' ; ACP - Auguste Comte's Philosophy; B - 'Bentham'; C - 'Coleridge'; Civ. - 'Civilization'; CRG -Considerations on Representative Government; CS - Chapters on Socialism; GHGii -'Grote's History of Greece (ii)'; N - 'Nature'; NPE - 'Newman's Political Economy'; OL - On Liberty; PP - Speech on 'Political Progress'; PPE - Principles of Political Economy; RBP - 'Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy'; RR - 'Rationale of Representation'; RWR - 'Recent Writers on Reform'; SA - 'Spirit of the Age'; SL - A System of Logic; SW - The Subjection of Women; TDAi - 'Tocqueville's Democracy in America (i)'; TDAii - 'Tocqueville's Democracy in America (ii)'; TPR - 'Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform'; TS - 'Taylor's Statesman'; U - Utilitarianism; UR - 'Utility of Religion'. am chiefly interested here in Mill's later views, those he held roughly from the 1850s, although many elements of the position I ascribe to him were in place much earlier. Those interested in how his theory of democracy changed over time may especially wish to consult J.H. Burns, 'J.S. Mill and Democracy, 1829-61', in Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. J.B. Schneewind (Notre Dame, 1969), pp. 280-328; and Richard Krouse 'Two Concepts of Democratic Representation: James and John Stuart Mill' Journal of Politics, 44 (May 1982), pp. 509-37, pp. 520-37.
2. Citations to Mill's works include an abbreviated title (when citing apiece of Mill's correspondence I will give the recipient's name) and volume and page numbers from the Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto, 1963-91). The following abbreviations are employed: A - Autobiography; AB - Speech on 'The Army Bill' ; ACP - Auguste Comte's Philosophy; B - 'Bentham'; C - 'Coleridge'; Civ. - 'Civilization'; CRG - Considerations on Representative Government; CS - Chapters on Socialism; GHGii - 'Grote's History of Greece (ii)'; N - 'Nature'; NPE - 'Newman's Political Economy'; OL - On Liberty; PP - Speech on 'Political Progress'; PPE - Principles of Political Economy; RBP - 'Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy'; RR - 'Rationale of Representation'; RWR - 'Recent Writers on Reform'; SA - 'Spirit of the Age'; SL - A System of Logic; SW - The Subjection of Women; TDAi - 'Tocqueville's Democracy in America (i)'; TDAii - 'Tocqueville's Democracy in America (ii)'; TPR - 'Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform'; TS - 'Taylor's Statesman'; U - Utilitarianism; UR - 'Utility of Religion'. am chiefly interested here in Mill's later views, those he held roughly from the 1850s, although many elements of the position I ascribe to him were in place much earlier. Those interested in how his theory of democracy changed over time may especially wish to consult J.H. Burns, 'J.S. Mill and Democracy, 1829-61', in Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. J.B. Schneewind (Notre Dame, 1969), pp. 280-328; and Richard Krouse 'Two Concepts of Democratic Representation: James and John Stuart Mill' Journal of Politics, 44 (May 1982), pp. 509-37, pp. 520-37.
3. Citations to Mill's works include an abbreviated title (when citing apiece of Mill's correspondence I will give the recipient's name) and volume and page numbers from the Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto, 1963-91). The following abbreviations are employed: A - Autobiography; AB - Speech on 'The Army Bill' ; ACP - Auguste Comte's Philosophy; B - 'Bentham'; C - 'Coleridge'; Civ. - 'Civilization'; CRG - Considerations on Representative Government; CS - Chapters on Socialism; GHGii - 'Grote's History of Greece (ii)'; N - 'Nature'; NPE - 'Newman's Political Economy'; OL - On Liberty; PP - Speech on 'Political Progress'; PPE - Principles of Political Economy; RBP - 'Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy'; RR - 'Rationale of Representation'; RWR - 'Recent Writers on Reform'; SA - 'Spirit of the Age'; SL - A System of Logic; SW - The Subjection of Women; TDAi - 'Tocqueville's Democracy in America (i)'; TDAii - 'Tocqueville's Democracy in America (ii)'; TPR - 'Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform'; TS - 'Taylor's Statesman'; U - Utilitarianism; UR - 'Utility of Religion'. am chiefly interested here in Mill's later views, those he held roughly from the 1850s, although many elements of the position I ascribe to him were in place much earlier. Those interested in how his theory of democracy changed over time may especially wish to consult J.H. Burns, 'J.S. Mill and Democracy, 1829-61', in Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. J.B. Schneewind (Notre Dame, 1969), pp. 280-328; and Richard Krouse 'Two Concepts of Democratic Representation: James and John Stuart Mill' Journal of Politics, 44 (May 1982), pp. 509-37, pp. 520-37.
4. Ronald Beiner, 'Comment on Lawrence B. Solum's "Virtues and Voices"', Chicago-Kent Law Review, 66 ( 1990), pp. 141-3, p. 142.
5. GHGii, XI, pp. 315-16.
6. Trans. George Grote, quoted by Mill at GHGii, p. 318.
7. Ibid.
8. CRG, XIX, p. 489.
9. Letter to George Cornwall Lewis, XV, p. 608. Grote's revisionary history of Greece was the main influence on Mill's view of Athenian political life; see T.H. Irwin, 'Mill and the Classical World', Cambridge Companion to Mill, ed. John Skorupski (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 423-63, pp. 423-39.
10. Letter to George Cornwall Lewis, XV, p. 608. Grote's revisionary history of Greece was the main influence on Mill's view of Athenian political life; see T.H. Irwin, 'Mill and the Classical World', Cambridge Companion to Mill, ed. John Skorupski (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 423-63, pp. 423-39.
11. I will not claim that Mill himself should be considered a civic republican, nor will I attempt to formulate the criteria he or any other political theorist would have to satisfy in order for that label to be appropriate. J.G.A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republic Tradition (Princeton, 1975) is the most comprehensive treatment of the republican tradition.
12. Stewart Justman, The Hidden Text of Mill's 'Liberty' (Savage, MA, 1991).
13. I do not mean to suggest that Mill is the only important historical thinker to have embraced both the liberal and civic ideals; one might take Tocqueville, Constant and/or Dewey to have done so as well. More recently, Richard Dagger has done so in his book Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (Oxford, 1997). But Mill's case is an especially interesting one due to the familiarity of his liberalism, its central and influential position within the liberal tradition, and the fact that the freedoms for which he contends go beyond those necessary for democracy (such as the freedoms of speech and of the press). While I lack the space to explore this matter, Tocqueville's influence on both the civic and liberal elements of Mill's thought is considerable (but cf Joseph Hamburger, 'Mill and Tocqueville on Liberty', James and John Stuart Mill: Papers of the Centenary Conference, ed. John Robson and Michael Laine (Toronto, 1976), pp. 111-25).
14. I do not mean to suggest that Mill is the only important historical thinker to have embraced both the liberal and civic ideals; one might take Tocqueville, Constant and/or Dewey to have done so as well. More recently, Richard Dagger has done so in his book Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (Oxford, 1997). But Mill's case is an especially interesting one due to the familiarity of his liberalism, its central and influential position within the liberal tradition, and the fact that the freedoms for which he contends go beyond those necessary for democracy (such as the freedoms of speech and of the press). While I lack the space to explore this matter, Tocqueville's influence on both the civic and liberal elements of Mill's thought is considerable (but cf Joseph Hamburger, 'Mill and Tocqueville on Liberty', James and John Stuart Mill: Papers of the Centenary Conference, ed. John Robson and Michael Laine (Toronto, 1976), pp. 111-25).
15. The similarities between Mill's views and Constant's are striking, but Mill gives no indication that Constant was an important influence on his thought-John Lachs argues that he must have been one nonetheless in his 'Mill and Constant' A Neglected Connection in the History of the Idea of Liberty', History of Philosophy Quarterly, 9 (January 1992), pp. 87-96.
16. CRG, XIX, pp. 390-1.
17. Dennis Thompson, John Stuart Mill and Representative Government (Princeton, 1976), p. 9.
18. CRG, XIX, p. 404.
19. 'It is an inherent condition of human affairs, that no intention, however sincere, of protecting the interests of others, can make it safe or salutary to tie up their own hands.' (Ibid., p. 405.)
20. AB, XXIX, pp. 413-14; PP, XXVIII, p. 129; Letters to Edwin Chadwick and T.E. Cliffe Leslie, XVII, pp. 1792, 1805-6.
21. AB, XXIX, pp. 413-14; PP, XXVIII, p. 129; Letters to Edwin Chadwick and T.E. Cliffe Leslie, XVII, pp. 1792, 1805-6.
22. AB, XXIX, pp. 413-14; PP, XXVIII, p. 129; Letters to Edwin Chadwick and T.E. Cliffe Leslie, XVII, pp. 1792, 1805-6.
23. PPE, III, pp. 970-1.
24. While the state should provide a minimal level of aid to all of the indigent, for example, only private charities can 'discriminate between the deserving and the undeserving' and portion out support accordingly (ibid., p. 962).
25. CRG, XIX, pp. 390, 407.
26. TDAii, XVIII, p. 169.
27. CRG, XIX, pp. 410-12, 469.
28. Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (Yale, 1989), pp. 124-5.
29. Richard Arneson, 'Democracy and Liberty in Mill's Theory of Government', Journal of the History of Philosophy, XX (January 1982), pp. 43-64, p. 53.
30. Cf. Thompson, John Stuart Mill, p. 5.
31. TDAi, XVIII, pp. 73-4; CRG, XIX, pp. 501-12.
32. TDAi, XVIII, pp. 73-4; CRG, XIX, pp. 501-12.
33. CRG, XIX, pp. 470-2. See also TPR, XIX, pp. 326-7; RR, XVIII, p. 31.
34. CRG, XIX, pp. 470-2. See also TPR, XIX, pp. 326-7; RR, XVIII, p. 31.
35. CRG, XIX, pp. 470-2. See also TPR, XIX, pp. 326-7; RR, XVIII, p. 31.
36. John Robson, The Improvement of Mankind (Toronto, 1968), p. 224.
37. CRG, XIX, p. 412.
38. Letter to Mary Carpenter, XVI, p. 1340. See also Letter to Thomas Hare, XV, p. 697.
39. Letter to Mary Carpenter, XVI, p. 1340. See also Letter to Thomas Hare, XV, p. 697.
40. Arneson, 'Democracy and Liberty', p. 52.
41. SW, XXI, p. 295.
42. Arneson, 'Democracy and Liberty', p. 46.
43. Graeme Duncan, Marx and Mill: Two Views of Social Conflict and Social Harmony (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 263-4.
44. CRG, XIX, pp. 442-7. This may seem to suggest that in place of cultivating genuine disinterest it should be sufficient to render citizens better able to perceive their own interests, or those of their class. But Mill holds that we are unable to accomplish the latter except by accomplishing the former; only those who have a general concern for others are likely to perceive accurately what is in their own long-term best interests (ibid., p. 445).
45. CRG, XIX, pp. 442-7. This may seem to suggest that in place of cultivating genuine disinterest it should be sufficient to render citizens better able to perceive their own interests, or those of their class. But Mill holds that we are unable to accomplish the latter except by accomplishing the former; only those who have a general concern for others are likely to perceive accurately what is in their own long-term best interests (ibid., p. 445).
46. On some of the influences which help to explain this faith see F.W. Garforth, Educative Democracy: John Stuart Mill on Education in Society (Oxford 1980), p. 65.
47. OL, XVIII, p. 269.
48. CRG, XIX, p. 405. See also CS, V, pp. 739-40. Even Mill's most dedicated defenders must concede that there are very serious problems here. Even if we allow that society contains an intellectual élite and a moral élite it is not at all clear why Mill feels entitled to assume that these will be more or less coextensive, that there are not 'two Fews but just one' (Willmoore Kendall and George Carey, 'The "Roster Device": J.S. Mill and Contemporary Elitism', Western Political Quarterly, XXI (March 1968), pp 20-39, p. 34). Although Mill sometimes writes as if the only prerequisite for élite status is sufficient formal education, he is cognizant that mere classroom instruction will not inoculate a person against selfishness (TDAi, XVIII, p. 63; PPE, III, p. 943).
49. CRG, XIX, p. 405. See also CS, V, pp. 739-40. Even Mill's most dedicated defenders must concede that there are very serious problems here. Even if we allow that society contains an intellectual élite and a moral élite it is not at all clear why Mill feels entitled to assume that these will be more or less coextensive, that there are not 'two Fews but just one' (Willmoore Kendall and George Carey, 'The "Roster Device": J.S. Mill and Contemporary Elitism', Western Political Quarterly, XXI (March 1968), pp 20-39, p. 34). Although Mill sometimes writes as if the only prerequisite for élite status is sufficient formal education, he is cognizant that mere classroom instruction will not inoculate a person against selfishness (TDAi, XVIII, p. 63; PPE, III, p. 943).
50. CRG, XIX, p. 405. See also CS, V, pp. 739-40. Even Mill's most dedicated defenders must concede that there are very serious problems here. Even if we allow that society contains an intellectual élite and a moral élite it is not at all clear why Mill feels entitled to assume that these will be more or less coextensive, that there are not 'two Fews but just one' (Willmoore Kendall and George Carey, 'The "Roster Device": J.S. Mill and Contemporary Elitism', Western Political Quarterly, XXI (March 1968), pp 20-39, p. 34). Although Mill sometimes writes as if the only prerequisite for élite status is sufficient formal education, he is cognizant that mere classroom instruction will not inoculate a person against selfishness (TDAi, XVIII, p. 63; PPE, III, p. 943).
51. CRG, XIX, p. 405. See also CS, V, pp. 739-40. Even Mill's most dedicated defenders must concede that there are very serious problems here. Even if we allow that society contains an intellectual élite and a moral élite it is not at all clear why Mill feels entitled to assume that these will be more or less coextensive, that there are not 'two Fews but just one' (Willmoore Kendall and George Carey, 'The "Roster Device": J.S. Mill and Contemporary Elitism', Western Political Quarterly, XXI (March 1968), pp 20-39, p. 34). Although Mill sometimes writes as if the only prerequisite for élite status is sufficient formal education, he is cognizant that mere classroom instruction will not inoculate a person against selfishness (TDAi, XVIII, p. 63; PPE, III, p. 943).
52. CRG, XIX, p. 405. See also CS, V, pp. 739-40. Even Mill's most dedicated defenders must concede that there are very serious problems here. Even if we allow that society contains an intellectual élite and a moral élite it is not at all clear why Mill feels entitled to assume that these will be more or less coextensive, that there are not 'two Fews but just one' (Willmoore Kendall and George Carey, 'The "Roster Device": J.S. Mill and Contemporary Elitism', Western Political Quarterly, XXI (March 1968), pp 20-39, p. 34). Although Mill sometimes writes as if the only prerequisite for élite status is sufficient formal education, he is cognizant that mere classroom instruction will not inoculate a person against selfishness (TDAi, XVIII, p. 63; PPE, III, p. 943).
53. '. . . and then there is no power on earth or in hell itself, capable of withstanding them' (SA, XXII, p. 245); see also Civ., XVIII, pp. 137-8; ACP, X, pp. 325-6.
54. '. . . and then there is no power on earth or in hell itself, capable of withstanding them' (SA, XXII, p. 245); see also Civ., XVIII, pp. 137-8; ACP, X, pp. 325-6.
55. '. . . and then there is no power on earth or in hell itself, capable of withstanding them' (SA, XXII, p. 245); see also Civ., XVIII, pp. 137-8; ACP, X, pp. 325-6.
56. I take this tripartite analysis of political competence from Robert Dahl, but it fits Mill's thinking exactly and in fact was very likely inspired by Mill. (Dahl, Democracy, p. 58.)
57. Thompson, John Stuart Mill, pp. 3-11. See also Robson, The Improvement of Mankind, pp. 238-9.
58. Thompson, John Stuart Mill, pp. 3-11. See also Robson, The Improvement of Mankind, pp. 238-9.
59. CRG, XIX, p. 447.
60. '. . . if the most numerous class, which . . . is lowest in the educational scale, refuses to recognize a right in the better educated, in virtue of their superior qualifications, to such plurality of votes as may prevent them from being always and hopelessly outvoted by the comparatively incapable, the numerical majority must submit to have the suffrage limited to such portion of their numbers, or to have such a distribution made of the constituencies, as may effect the necessary balance between numbers and education in another manner' (TPR, XIX, p. 325).
61. CRG, XIX, p. 456; RWR, XIX, p. 362.
62. CRG, XIX, p. 456; RWR, XIX, p. 362.
63. CRG, XIX, pp. 459-60. Because Mill believes drafting legislation is a demanding technical skill he supports the idea of delegating this work to an unelected Legislative Commission, with the representative legislature essentially being limited to approving or rejecting the measures the Commission generates (CRG, XIX, pp. 430-2). Some commentators see this as another, and especially worrisome, device for ensuring the influence of the élite, but I take Mill's aim to be that of crafting legislation so that the law is free of the sorts of obscurities and paradoxes which Bentham so effectively criticized; this is consistent with its giving effect to the popular will, for '[t]he Commission, of course, would have no power of refusing instrumentality to any legislation which the country desired'. While he obviously intends the Commission to be composed of specialists, persons with a particular technical skill, he does not seem to assume it would be an instrument of the élite.
64. CRG, XIX, pp. 459-60. Because Mill believes drafting legislation is a demanding technical skill he supports the idea of delegating this work to an unelected Legislative Commission, with the representative legislature essentially being limited to approving or rejecting the measures the Commission generates (CRG, XIX, pp. 430-2). Some commentators see this as another, and especially worrisome, device for ensuring the influence of the élite, but I take Mill's aim to be that of crafting legislation so that the law is free of the sorts of obscurities and paradoxes which Bentham so effectively criticized; this is consistent with its giving effect to the popular will, for '[t]he Commission, of course, would have no power of refusing instrumentality to any legislation which the country desired'. While he obviously intends the Commission to be composed of specialists, persons with a particular technical skill, he does not seem to assume it would be an instrument of the élite.
65. CRG, XIX, p. 476. See also Alan S. Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism (New York 1992), p. 71; C.L. Ten, 'Democracy, Socialism, and the Working Classes', Cambridge Companion to Mill, ed. John Skorupski (Cambridge, 1997), pp 372-95, p. 382
66. CRG, XIX, p. 476. See also Alan S. Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism (New York 1992), p. 71; C.L. Ten, 'Democracy, Socialism, and the Working Classes', Cambridge Companion to Mill, ed. John Skorupski (Cambridge, 1997), pp 372-95, p. 382
67. CRG, XIX, p. 476. See also Alan S. Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism (New York 1992), p. 71; C.L. Ten, 'Democracy, Socialism, and the Working Classes', Cambridge Companion to Mill, ed. John Skorupski (Cambridge, 1997), pp 372-95, p. 382
68. ACP, X, p. 314. See also Thompson, John Stuart Mill, p. 85; Krouse, 'Two Concepts of Democratic Representation', p. 534.
69. ACP, X, p. 314. See also Thompson, John Stuart Mill, p. 85; Krouse, 'Two Concepts of Democratic Representation', p. 534.
70. ACP, X, p. 314. See also Thompson, John Stuart Mill, p. 85; Krouse, 'Two Concepts of Democratic Representation', p. 534.
71. See Thompson, John Stuart Mill, p. 134.
72. RBP, X, p. 15; CRG, XIX, pp. 390, 444-5.
73. RBP, X, p. 15; CRG, XIX, pp. 390, 444-5.
74. RR, XVIII, p. 24;
75. TDAi, XVIII, pp. 72-4;
76. CRG, XIX, pp. 504-12.
77. Brian Barry presents a similar conception of the public good in Political Argument (Berkeley, 1965), pp. 190-202.
78. CRG, XIX, pp. 508-9.
79. Bernard Semmel, John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue (New Haven, 1984), p. 101.
80. CRG, XIX, p. 490.
81. He continues with this reductio of the claim that the franchise is a right: 'Those who say that the suffrage is not a trust but a right will scarcely accept the conclusions to which their doctrine leads. If it is a right, if it belongs to the voter for his own sake, on what ground can we blame him for selling it, or using it to recommend himself to any one whom it is his interest to please?' (Ibid., p. 508.) This is not really satisfactory. The claim that a given individual has a right to the suffrage is not inconsistent with the claim that he is obligated to exercise that right so as to promote the public good. We might say that what a citizen has a right to is the opportunity to render his judgment about what outcome is best from the standpoint of the public good. In fact Mill does not really want to deny that a citizen of a democratic state who satisfies the requirements for voting discussed above has a right to the franchise, in the sense of having 'a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it' (U, X, p. 250);
82. He continues with this reductio of the claim that the franchise is a right: 'Those who say that the suffrage is not a trust but a right will scarcely accept the conclusions to which their doctrine leads. If it is a right, if it belongs to the voter for his own sake, on what ground can we blame him for selling it, or using it to recommend himself to any one whom it is his interest to please?' (Ibid., p. 508.) This is not really satisfactory. The claim that a given individual has a right to the suffrage is not inconsistent with the claim that he is obligated to exercise that right so as to promote the public good. We might say that what a citizen has a right to is the opportunity to render his judgment about what outcome is best from the standpoint of the public good. In fact Mill does not really want to deny that a citizen of a democratic state who satisfies the requirements for voting discussed above has a right to the franchise, in the sense of having 'a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it' (U, X, p. 250);
83. he says that 'it is a personal injustice to withhold from any one, unless for the prevention of greater evils, the ordinary privilege of having his voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in which he has the same interest as other people' (CRG, XIX, p. 469). His real worry seems to be that to refer to the right to vote is to invite others to infer, wrongly, that one may vote as one pleases.
84. U, X, p. 255.
85. For a similar account of the nature of authority see Michael Walzer, 'Town Meetings and Workers' Control: A Story for Socialists', Radical Principles (New York, 1980), pp. 273-90.
86. I use the term 'multi-level utilitarianism' to refer to both rule-utilitarianism and sophisticated versions of act-utilitarianism in which agents follow some decision procedure other than attempting to directly apply the act-utilitarian moral standard. A variety of multi-level interpretations of Mill's utilitarianism have been advanced. See for example J.O. Urmson, The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill', Philosophical Quarterly, 3 (1953), pp. 33-9; David Lyons, 'Mill's Theory of Morality', Noûs, 10 (1976), pp. 101-20; Roger Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism (London 1997),' pp. 105-12.
87. I use the term 'multi-level utilitarianism' to refer to both rule-utilitarianism and sophisticated versions of act-utilitarianism in which agents follow some decision procedure other than attempting to directly apply the act-utilitarian moral standard. A variety of multi-level interpretations of Mill's utilitarianism have been advanced. See for example J.O. Urmson, The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill', Philosophical Quarterly, 3 (1953), pp. 33-9; David Lyons, 'Mill's Theory of Morality', Noûs, 10 (1976), pp. 101-20; Roger Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism (London 1997),' pp. 105-12.
88. I use the term 'multi-level utilitarianism' to refer to both rule-utilitarianism and sophisticated versions of act-utilitarianism in which agents follow some decision procedure other than attempting to directly apply the act-utilitarian moral standard. A variety of multi-level interpretations of Mill's utilitarianism have been advanced. See for example J.O. Urmson, The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill', Philosophical Quarterly, 3 (1953), pp. 33-9; David Lyons, 'Mill's Theory of Morality', Noûs, 10 (1976), pp. 101-20; Roger Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism (London 1997),' pp. 105-12.
89. SW, XXI, p. 294. I am indebted to Maria Morales for bringing this passage to my attention.
90. According to Quentin Skinner a number of republicans, including Machiavelli, valued collective self-rule at least in part because it makes it possible for citizens to preserve their individual liberty; thus they 'not only connect social freedom with self-government, but also link the idea of personal liberty with that of virtuous public service' (Q. Skinner, 'The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty', Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed. Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 293-309, p. 306). Philip Petit's Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997) is a recent defence of republican political theory which focuses on the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination.
91. According to Quentin Skinner a number of republicans, including Machiavelli, valued collective self-rule at least in part because it makes it possible for citizens to preserve their individual liberty; thus they 'not only connect social freedom with self-government, but also link the idea of personal liberty with that of virtuous public service' (Q. Skinner, 'The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty', Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed. Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 293-309, p. 306). Philip Petit's Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997) is a recent defence of republican political theory which focuses on the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination.
92. GHGii, XI, p. 312; RG, XIX, p. 401. In this passage Mill is actually describing the likely eventual end of despotic rule, but his point is that free states are better able to resist invasion because they tend to cultivate public spirit.
93. GHGii, XI, p. 312; RG, XIX, p. 401. In this passage Mill is actually describing the likely eventual end of despotic rule, but his point is that free states are better able to resist invasion because they tend to cultivate public spirit.
94. CRG, XIX, p. 410.
95. PPE, III, pp. 943-4.
96. On the stifling tendencies of the bureaucracy see, e.g., CRG, XIX, pp. 308, 439.
97. OL, XVIII, p. 306.
98. Ibid., pp. 409-10.
99. U, X, p. 255.
100. For a discussion of his account of the feeling of duty and conscience see Dale E. Miller, 'Internal Sanctions in Mill's Moral Psychology', Utilitas, 10 (March 1998) pp. 67-81, pp. 68-76.
101. CRG, XIX, p. 445; A, I, p. 241; OL, XVIII, p. 305.
102. CRG, XIX, p. 445; A, I, p. 241; OL, XVIII, p. 305.
103. CRG, XIX, p. 445; A, I, p. 241; OL, XVIII, p. 305.
104. ACP, X, p. 339; TS, XIX, p. 625.
105. ACP, X, p. 339; TS, XIX, p. 625.
106. OL, XVIII, p. 305.
107. CRG, XIX, p. 412.
108. CRG, XIX, pp. 411-12; OL, XVIII, pp. 305-6; TDAii, XVIII, p. 169; ACP, X, p. 341; AB, XXIX, p. 413. Mill never specifically refers to women being conscripted, although he does say 'I wish the mass of soldiers to be identical with the mass of citizens' (Letter to Patrick Hennessey, XVII, p. 1760), and he implies the privilege of enlisting voluntarily should not be restricted exclusively to men (Letter to John Nichol, XVII, p. 1790).
109. CRG, XIX, pp. 411-12; OL, XVIII, pp. 305-6; TDAii, XVIII, p. 169; ACP, X, p. 341; AB, XXIX, p. 413. Mill never specifically refers to women being conscripted, although he does say 'I wish the mass of soldiers to be identical with the mass of citizens' (Letter to Patrick Hennessey, XVII, p. 1760), and he implies the privilege of enlisting voluntarily should not be restricted exclusively to men (Letter to John Nichol, XVII, p. 1790).
110. CRG, XIX, pp. 411-12; OL, XVIII, pp. 305-6; TDAii, XVIII, p. 169; ACP, X, p. 341; AB, XXIX, p. 413. Mill never specifically refers to women being conscripted, although he does say 'I wish the mass of soldiers to be identical with the mass of citizens' (Letter to Patrick Hennessey, XVII, p. 1760), and he implies the privilege of enlisting voluntarily should not be restricted exclusively to men (Letter to John Nichol, XVII, p. 1790).
111. CRG, XIX, pp. 411-12; OL, XVIII, pp. 305-6; TDAii, XVIII, p. 169; ACP, X, p. 341; AB, XXIX, p. 413. Mill never specifically refers to women being conscripted, although he does say 'I wish the mass of soldiers to be identical with the mass of citizens' (Letter to Patrick Hennessey, XVII, p. 1760), and he implies the privilege of enlisting voluntarily should not be restricted exclusively to men (Letter to John Nichol, XVII, p. 1790).
112. CRG, XIX, pp. 411-12; OL, XVIII, pp. 305-6; TDAii, XVIII, p. 169; ACP, X, p. 341; AB, XXIX, p. 413. Mill never specifically refers to women being conscripted, although he does say 'I wish the mass of soldiers to be identical with the mass of citizens' (Letter to Patrick Hennessey, XVII, p. 1760), and he implies the privilege of enlisting voluntarily should not be restricted exclusively to men (Letter to John Nichol, XVII, p. 1790).
113. CRG, XIX, pp. 411-12; OL, XVIII, pp. 305-6; TDAii, XVIII, p. 169; ACP, X, p. 341; AB, XXIX, p. 413. Mill never specifically refers to women being conscripted, although he does say 'I wish the mass of soldiers to be identical with the mass of citizens' (Letter to Patrick Hennessey, XVII, p. 1760), and he implies the privilege of enlisting voluntarily should not be restricted exclusively to men (Letter to John Nichol, XVII, p. 1790).
114. CRG, XIX, pp. 411-12; OL, XVIII, pp. 305-6; TDAii, XVIII, p. 169; ACP, X, p. 341; AB, XXIX, p. 413. Mill never specifically refers to women being conscripted, although he does say 'I wish the mass of soldiers to be identical with the mass of citizens' (Letter to Patrick Hennessey, XVII, p. 1760), and he implies the privilege of enlisting voluntarily should not be restricted exclusively to men (Letter to John Nichol, XVII, p. 1790).
115. TPR, XIX, p. 338; CRG, XIX, p. 495.
116. TPR, XIX, p. 338; CRG, XIX, p. 495.
117. CRG, XV, pp. 535-6; TDAi, XVIII, p. 60; NPE, V, p. 457.
118. CRG, XV, pp. 535-6; TDAi, XVIII, p. 60; NPE, V, p. 457.
119. CRG, XV, pp. 535-6; TDAi, XVIII, p. 60; NPE, V, p. 457.
120. PPE, III, pp. 768, 793.
121. PPE, III, p. 769; II, p. 208; CS, V, p. 746. discuss Mill's views on worker control of firms, socialism and communism in an unpublished master's thesis, A Philosophical Economist: John Stuart Mill's Normative Political Economy, University of Pittsburgh Department of Economics, 1993.
122. PPE, III, p. 769; II, p. 208; CS, V, p. 746. discuss Mill's views on worker control of firms, socialism and communism in an unpublished master's thesis, A Philosophical Economist: John Stuart Mill's Normative Political Economy, University of Pittsburgh Department of Economics, 1993.
123. PPE, III, p. 769; II, p. 208; CS, V, p. 746. discuss Mill's views on worker control of firms, socialism and communism in an unpublished master's thesis, A Philosophical Economist: John Stuart Mill's Normative Political Economy, University of Pittsburgh Department of Economics, 1993.
124. PPE, III, p. 769; II, p. 208; CS, V, p. 746. discuss Mill's views on worker control of firms, socialism and communism in an unpublished master's thesis, A Philosophical Economist: John Stuart Mill's Normative Political Economy, University of Pittsburgh Department of Economics, 1993.
125. C, X, pp. 134-6; CRG, XIX, pp. 546-7.
126. C, X, pp. 134-6; CRG, XIX, pp. 546-7.
127. SW, XXI, pp. 329-33.
128. Ibid., p. 321.
129. PPE, III, p. 955.
130. See, e.g., ibid., pp. 763-5.
131. Ibid., pp. 791-2.
132. 'If it be said that so broadly marked a distinction between what is due to a fellow-countryman and what is due merely to a human creature is more worthy of savages than of civilised beings, and ought, with the utmost energy, to be contended against, no one holds that opinion more strongly than myself (CRG, XIX, p. 548). See also UR, X, pp. 420-8.
133. 'If it be said that so broadly marked a distinction between what is due to a fellow-countryman and what is due merely to a human creature is more worthy of savages than of civilised beings, and ought, with the utmost energy, to be contended against, no one holds that opinion more strongly than myself (CRG, XIX, p. 548). See also UR, X, pp. 420-8.
134. See Martha Nussbaum, 'Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism', For Love of Country, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston, 1996), pp. 3-17.
135. CS, V, p. 740.
136. Gertrude Himmelfarb, On Liberty and Liberalism: The Case of John Stuart Mill (San Francisco, 1990), p. 269. Originally published 1974.
137. OL, XVIII, p. 305.
138. For more comprehensive criticisms of the 'two Mills' thesis see C.L. Ten, Mill on Liberty (Oxford, 1980), pp. 151-66; John C. Rees, John Stuart Mill's 'On Liberty' (Oxford, 1985), pp. 109-15.
139. For more comprehensive criticisms of the 'two Mills' thesis see C.L. Ten, Mill on Liberty (Oxford, 1980), pp. 151-66; John C. Rees, John Stuart Mill's 'On Liberty' (Oxford, 1985), pp. 109-15.
140. Justman, Hidden Text, p. 149. I am very critical of Justman here, but I have learned a great deal from his book. He really has two goals: to show that On Liberty fails rhetorically, because of the way its republican content is lost in the dominant liberal message, and to show that it fails philosophically - along with Mill's political theory as a whole - because Mill ultimately fails to reconcile the liberal and civic ideals. I deny that Justman succeeds at the second task, but this does not mean he fails at the first.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid., p. 20.
143. Ibid., p. 24.
144. ibid., p. 42.
145. OL, XVIII, p. 223.
146. Ibid., p. 292.
147. Ibid.
148. OL, XVIII, p. 282.
149. Justman, Hidden Text, p. 1.
150. Ibid., p. 10.
151. Justman, 'The Abstract Citizen', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 19 (1993), pp. 317-32, p. 324.
152. OL, XVIII, p. 276.
153. U, X, pp. 215-16.
154. Ibid., p. 232.
155. OL, XVIII, pp. 224-5.
156. Ibid., p. 276.
157. D.G. Brown, 'Mill on Liberty and Morality', Philosophical Review, 81 (April 1972), pp. 133-58, p. 135.
158. Ibid., pp. 142-6, 158.
159. David Lyons, 'Liberty and Harm to Others', New Essays on John Stuart Mill and Utilitarianism, ed. W.E. Cooper, K. Nielsen and S.C. Patten, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplemental Volume, 5 (1979), pp. 1-19.
160. 'Though society is not founded on a contract . . . everyone who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit.' (OL, XVIII, p. 276.) 'The important rank, among human evils and wrongs, of the disappointment of expectation, is shown in the fact it constitutes the principal criminality of two such highly immoral acts as a breach of friendship and a breach of promise.' (U, X, p. 256.)
161. 'Though society is not founded on a contract . . . everyone who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit.' (OL, XVIII, p. 276.) 'The important rank, among human evils and wrongs, of the disappointment of expectation, is shown in the fact it constitutes the principal criminality of two such highly immoral acts as a breach of friendship and a breach of promise.' (U, X, p. 256.)
162. OL, XVIII, p. 282.
163. ACP, X, p. 337.
164. Stephen Holmes, Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern Liberalism (New Haven, 1984), p. 161.
165. Arneson, 'Democracy and Liberty', passim.
166. PPE, II, p. xix.
167. OL, XVIII, p. 279. Admittedly, he probably only has in mind compulsion exercised by individuals as opposed to the state.
168. W. Sullivan, Reconstructing Public Philosophy (Berkeley, 1986).
169. See, e.g., C. Taylor, 'Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate', Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 181-203.
170. M. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent (Cambridge, 1996).
171. This paper is drawn from portions of my PhD dissertation, and my first words of thanks go to the members of my committee: Kurt Baier, David Gauthier, Fred Whelan, Nicholas Rescher and Tamara Horowitz. I would also like to acknowledge the valuable comments and suggestions I have received from Roger Crisp, Richard Dagger, Alfonso Damico, Ben Eggleston, Jerry Gaus, Jonathan Mandle, Maria H. Morales, John Skorupski, and the anonymous referees of this journal, as well as from audiences and commentators at the University of Manchester Graduate Conference on Political Thought (Brave New World 2), the Minnesota Philosophical Society meeting, and the Universities of Reading, Pittsburgh and Minnesota Duluth.