Harming and allowing harm

Ethics

Volumn 110, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 749-779

  McCarthy, David ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039592583     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233372     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. See, e.g., Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
2. See, e.g., Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
3. See, e.g., Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
4. Terminology: I will regard a number of different sets of sentences or propositions about the permissibility of various actions as moralities as long as they have the right kind of subject matter (e.g., some sort of concern with some notion or other of harm and benefit), and I will often speak of features of this morality or that. A different use of terminology would refer to these only as candidate accounts for morality, the term 'morality' only referring to what, in my terminology, is the true or most defensible morality. This is only a word-saving device, and nothing significant hangs on it.
5. Compare Scanlon: "Rights . . . need to be justified somehow, and how other than by appeal to the human interests their recognition promotes and protects?" See T. M. Scanlon, "Rights, Goals, and Fairness," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 93-111, p. 93. This is a revised version of an article with the same title in Erkenntnis 11 (1977): 81-95.
6. Compare Scanlon: "Rights . . . need to be justified somehow, and how other than by appeal to the human interests their recognition promotes and protects?" See T. M. Scanlon, "Rights, Goals, and Fairness," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 93-111, p. 93. This is a revised version of an article with the same title in Erkenntnis 11 (1977): 81-95.
7. Kagan is an exception to this.
8. See Scheffler.
9. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Chapter 9 defends a structurally similar account of options, but it is complicated by the view that something like asymmetrical constraints can be defended by appeal to something like the principle of double effect. For criticism, see Bennett, chap. 11.
10. See Bennett, chap. 9. The critique of asymmetrical constraints takes up almost the whole book. Much of this critique is taken up w th the development of two analyses, in nonmoral terms, of the difference between making something happen and merely allowing it to happen. I feel that I ought to have something intelligent to say about how the present defense of asymmetrical constraints connects with these analyses, but I don't.
11. Note that this is not simply the claim that, in a natural extension of the terminology of Derek Parfit (Reasons and Persons [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984]), the first morality is collectively self-defeating. The second morality might be as well. It is at least arguable that the moralities defended by Bennett and Scheffler are collectively self-defeating in the most natural interpretation of that term given their approaches, so it is quite possible that this is simply a cost they are prepared to accept in exchange for a morality which has other virtues (liberating or not too demanding). I do not have the space to discuss this here. In this terminology, the point in the text is that if two moralities share those kinds of virtues, but the first is collectively self-defeating to a greater degree than the second, then that is surely a strong point against the first regardless of whether being collectively self-defeating is a decisive reason to reject a morality.
12. The 'priority view' is Parfit's term. See, e.g., Derek Parfit, "Equality and Priority," Ratio 10 (1997): 202-21.
13. See Judith Thomson, "Critical Study,' review of The Act Itself, Noûs 30 (1996): 545-57.
14. I try to defend this claim in a manuscript currently entitled "Options and Constraints."
15. But cf. the account of cooperative utilitarianism developed in Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Cooperation (Oxford: Clarendor Press, 1980).
16. A recent example of such a view is Liam Murphy, "The Demands of Beneficence," Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 (1993) : 267-92.
17. But again, cf. Regan.
18. For a discussion, see Brian Skyrms, The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).
19. A similar conjecture is expressed in, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 8-9, 244 ff.
20. See, e.g., Parfit, Reasons and Persons, chaps. 1 and 2.
21. See, e.g., John Rawls, "Social Unity and Primary Goods," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 159-85; and T. M. Scanlon, "Value, Desire and the Quality of Life," in The Quality of Life, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 185-200. Compare also the account of capability sets in Amartya Sen, "Well-Being, Agency, and Freedom," Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985) : 169-221.
22. See, e.g., John Rawls, "Social Unity and Primary Goods," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 159-85; and T. M. Scanlon, "Value, Desire and the Quality of Life," in The Quality of Life, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 185-200. Compare also the account of capability sets in Amartya Sen, "Well-Being, Agency, and Freedom," Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985) : 169-221.
23. See, e.g., John Rawls, "Social Unity and Primary Goods," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 159-85; and T. M. Scanlon, "Value, Desire and the Quality of Life," in The Quality of Life, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 185-200. Compare also the account of capability sets in Amartya Sen, "Well-Being, Agency, and Freedom," Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985) : 169-221.
24. Very roughly: if someone is acting from a morality with narrow options, there will be little she is able to do; hence, in terms of her choice interests, she will be badly off.
25. Compare the rich discussion of the Tradeoff Idea in Judith Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), chap. 6. I have benefited from the comments of an anonymous referee here. For simplicity, I ignore the possibility that "sufficiently outweighs" might be interpreted by some more complicated function of H and C.
26. The term 'externalize' and its cognates are from economics. Compare Schelling: " 'Externality' . . . refers to the effects of a firm's actions, or an agency's or a person's, that are beyond and outside - 'external to' - the firm's accounting or the agency's purview or the person's interests and concerns, but within the accounting, the purview, or the interest of somebody else" (Thomas Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior [New York: Norton, 1978], p. 213, n. 13). As I am using the term, it is slightly misleading to say that people are externalizing the costs of their projects, as the cost they are avoiding is a different and, in all the cases I will discuss, greater cost than the cost others bear by their avoiding it, but the advantages of the image seem to me to justify the slight inaccuracy. Similarly, if there is only one cost of an activity, a constraint on allowing harm may only result in some of that cost being externalized, and if there is more than one cost, one cost may be externalized while another is not. But to save words, whenever I say "externalize" these qualifications are implicit. I used to say that in the kinds of cases that follow, the person who externalizes a cost is free riding on someone else's resources, but this is seriously misleading: 'free riding' as used by almost everyone in the economics literature has a much narrower meaning, typically connected with problems of public goods. Some people regard all talk of externalization as confused; I will discuss this later.
27. I say "maximally strong" rather than "absolute" for reasons similar to the reasons Thomson gives for calling some claim rights "maximally stringent." See Thomson, The Realm of Rights, pp. 168-69, 197-200.
28. Quinn claims that it is incoherent for a morality to have a constraint on allowing harm that is stronger than a constraint on harming. To modify and extend Quinn's example, suppose I can save A by killing B. I remove the threat to A's life by initiating a threat of death to B as this morality may seem to require But if I can remove the threat to B's life by initiating a threat to A's life, then the morality may then seem to require me to do that, requiring me to oscillate faster and faster between saving A by threatening B and saving B by threatening A. There are ways out of this incoherence, but since no one believes in this kind of morality, I will avoid the trouble by stipulating that the constraint on harming is always at least as strong as the constraint on allowing harm. See Warren Quinn, "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing," Philosophical Review 98 (1989): 287-312.
29. Although I will not attempt it here, we will eventually have to ask what happens when we relax the common knowledge assumption. Toward that end, note that the existence of beneficiaries of either a nonmaximal constraint on harming or a constraint on allowing harm does not depend on the common knowledge assumption. Neither does the existence of exploiters depend on it in the harming case; the common knowledge assumption is only used in the allowing harm case, and it would have been possible to have gotten by with a less strong assumption.
30. Thanks to Smith and Kamm for urging the need to address this response.
31. I have not seen the phenomenon of cost externalization discussed anywhere in the literature on harming and allowing harm, except for some very brief suggestions in Thomson, "Critical Study." Thomson describes a case in which I can make an outcome come about either by making Smith suffer a harm or by making myself suffer the same harm. She claims that imposing the cost on Smith would be taking unfair advantage. But by contrast, she claims that if I have the choice of allowing Jones to suffer a harm or allowing myself to suffer the same harm, it would not be taking unfair advantage to allow Jones to suffer the harm. She cautiously suggests that this is the right kind of direction in which to defend the claim, in the terminology used here, that there is a difference between the constraints on harming and allowing harm, and there is a suggestion that unfair taking advantage of others is a kind of free riding which hypothetical contractors would avoid if they could. But she seems more inclined to regard an appeal to unfairness as the endpoint of explanation, and, as the text indicates, I disagree. Nor does she try to argue that my imposing a small cost on someone else in order to avoid myself bearing a large cost is unfair. Nevertheless, my overall argument strategy should still, I believe, be regarded as an attempt to develop Thomson's suggestions.
32. The classic expression of this claim is Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics I (1960) : 1-30.
33. For a recent expression of this claim, see Stephen Perry, "Libertarianism, Entitlement, and Responsibility," Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (1997) : 351-93.
34. I argue this in "Liability, Joint Contribution, and the Behavior of Victims," manuscript.
35. Sen has emphasized the moral significance of variations in efficiency of conversions of all-purpose goods into functionings (see, e.g., Sen).
36. At least in the context of iterated prisoner's dilemmas, it has been argued that, under a wide range of conditions, cooperation is rational. But it is very implausible that cooperation is rational in every prisoner's dilemma. That is all I need for the argument that follows, so I will not try to address the large technical literature on this topic.
37. Perhaps better: if "form an agreement" or some such was an available act, then we would not be facing a prsioner's dilemma to start with.
38. See, e.g., Rawls, "Social Unity and Primary Goods"; Scanlon, "Value, Desire and the Quality of Life."
39. See, e.g., Rawls, "Social Unity and Primary Goods"; Scanlon, "Value, Desire and the Quality of Life."
40. See Parfit, "Equality and Priority."
41. Recall that within the familiar rationales for using choice interests as the basis for interpersonal comparisons in the context of moral theory, having expensive tastes is not regarded as relevant to a morally basic measure of how well-off people are. See, e.g., Rawls, "Social Unity and Primary Goods."
42. For rich material on uncertainty, with further references, see Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 371-82.
43. This comes from Joel Feinberg, "Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life," Philosophy & Public Affairs 7 (1978): 93-123. It is discussed extensively by Thomson in a number of papers reprinted in her Rights, Restitution, and Risk (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). In particular, see "Self-Defense and Rights," "Some Ruminations on Rights," and "Rights and Compensation."
44. This comes from Joel Feinberg, "Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life," Philosophy & Public Affairs 7 (1978): 93-123. It is discussed extensively by Thomson in a number of papers reprinted in her Rights, Restitution, and Risk (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). In particular, see "Self-Defense and Rights," "Some Ruminations on Rights," and "Rights and Compensation."
45. This comes from Joel Feinberg, "Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life," Philosophy & Public Affairs 7 (1978): 93-123. It is discussed extensively by Thomson in a number of papers reprinted in her Rights, Restitution, and Risk (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). In particular, see "Self-Defense and Rights," "Some Ruminations on Rights," and "Rights and Compensation."
46. For a convincing argument that this is true even of stoics and Philippa Foot's "strong atheist," see Barbara Herman, "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons," in her The Practice of Moral Judgement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
47. For a convincing argument that this is true even of stoics and Philippa Foot's "strong atheist," see Barbara Herman, "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons," in her The Practice of Moral Judgement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
48. Many of the fine-tunings of this claim are fine-tunings of the liability rule or, more precisely, fine-tunings to the account of which of many liability rules applies in which of many different kinds of circumstances. See Thomson, "Remarks on Causation and Liability," Philosophy & Public Affairs 13 (1984): 101-33; reprinted in Rights, Restitution and Risk; and my "Liability and Risk," Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996): 238-63, for a discussion of a range of liability rules and their relative advantages. Note also that sometimes the problems associated with externalization will be minor relative to the transaction costs associated with a liability rule, so sometimes we may simply have to tolerate a small degree of externalization.
49. Many of the fine-tunings of this claim are fine-tunings of the liability rule or, more precisely, fine-tunings to the account of which of many liability rules applies in which of many different kinds of circumstances. See Thomson, "Remarks on Causation and Liability," Philosophy & Public Affairs 13 (1984): 101-33; reprinted in Rights, Restitution and Risk; and my "Liability and Risk," Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996): 238-63, for a discussion of a range of liability rules and their relative advantages. Note also that sometimes the problems associated with externalization will be minor relative to the transaction costs associated with a liability rule, so sometimes we may simply have to tolerate a small degree of externalization.
50. Many of the fine-tunings of this claim are fine-tunings of the liability rule or, more precisely, fine-tunings to the account of which of many liability rules applies in which of many different kinds of circumstances. See Thomson, "Remarks on Causation and Liability," Philosophy & Public Affairs 13 (1984): 101-33; reprinted in Rights, Restitution and Risk; and my "Liability and Risk," Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996): 238-63, for a discussion of a range of liability rules and their relative advantages. Note also that sometimes the problems associated with externalization will be minor relative to the transaction costs associated with a liability rule, so sometimes we may simply have to tolerate a small degree of externalization.
51. Its importance has, however, been emphasized by Thomson in a number of papers. See, e.g., Self-Defense and Rights," "Some Ruminations on Rights," and "Rights and Compensation." Mischief may have resulted from the fact that the debate about harming and allowing harm has often focused on killing and letting die. Since death is usually a noncompensable harm, this may obscure the importance of liability rules to commonsense morality, and that in turn may obscure the extent to which the structure of commonsense morality reflects a concern with cost internalization.
52. Its importance has, however, been emphasized by Thomson in a number of papers. See, e.g., Self-Defense and Rights," "Some Ruminations on Rights," and "Rights and Compensation." Mischief may have resulted from the fact that the debate about harming and allowing harm has often focused on killing and letting die. Since death is usually a noncompensable harm, this may obscure the importance of liability rules to commonsense morality, and that in turn may obscure the extent to which the structure of commonsense morality reflects a concern with cost internalization.
53. I have tried to outline some of the advantages of thinking about constraints in terms of the imposition of risks of harm rather than the causing of harm in my "Rights, Explanation, and Risks," Ethics 107 (1997): 205-25, "Liability and Risk," "Actions, Beliefs, and Consequences," Philosophical Studies 90 (1998) : 57-77, and "Liability, Joint Contribution, and the Behavior of Victims." For arguments against this approach, see Thomson, The Realm of Rights, chap. 9, esp. pp. 242-48, and "Imposing Risks," in Rights, Restitution, and Risk.
54. I have tried to outline some of the advantages of thinking about constraints in terms of the imposition of risks of harm rather than the causing of harm in my "Rights, Explanation, and Risks," Ethics 107 (1997): 205-25, "Liability and Risk," "Actions, Beliefs, and Consequences," Philosophical Studies 90 (1998) : 57-77, and "Liability, Joint Contribution, and the Behavior of Victims." For arguments against this approach, see Thomson, The Realm of Rights, chap. 9, esp. pp. 242-48, and "Imposing Risks," in Rights, Restitution, and Risk.
55. I have tried to outline some of the advantages of thinking about constraints in terms of the imposition of risks of harm rather than the causing of harm in my "Rights, Explanation, and Risks," Ethics 107 (1997): 205-25, "Liability and Risk," "Actions, Beliefs, and Consequences," Philosophical Studies 90 (1998) : 57-77, and "Liability, Joint Contribution, and the Behavior of Victims." For arguments against this approach, see Thomson, The Realm of Rights, chap. 9, esp. pp. 242-48, and "Imposing Risks," in Rights, Restitution, and Risk.
56. I have tried to outline some of the advantages of thinking about constraints in terms of the imposition of risks of harm rather than the causing of harm in my "Rights, Explanation, and Risks," Ethics 107 (1997): 205-25, "Liability and Risk," "Actions, Beliefs, and Consequences," Philosophical Studies 90 (1998) : 57-77, and "Liability, Joint Contribution, and the Behavior of Victims." For arguments against this approach, see Thomson, The Realm of Rights, chap. 9, esp. pp. 242-48, and "Imposing Risks," in Rights, Restitution, and Risk.
57. I have tried to outline some of the advantages of thinking about constraints in terms of the imposition of risks of harm rather than the causing of harm in my "Rights, Explanation, and Risks," Ethics 107 (1997): 205-25, "Liability and Risk," "Actions, Beliefs, and Consequences," Philosophical Studies 90 (1998) : 57-77, and "Liability, Joint Contribution, and the Behavior of Victims." For arguments against this approach, see Thomson, The Realm of Rights, chap. 9, esp. pp. 242-48, and "Imposing Risks," in Rights, Restitution, and Risk.
58. I have tried to outline some of the advantages of thinking about constraints in terms of the imposition of risks of harm rather than the causing of harm in my "Rights, Explanation, and Risks," Ethics 107 (1997): 205-25, "Liability and Risk," "Actions, Beliefs, and Consequences," Philosophical Studies 90 (1998) : 57-77, and "Liability, Joint Contribution, and the Behavior of Victims." For arguments against this approach, see Thomson, The Realm of Rights, chap. 9, esp. pp. 242-48, and "Imposing Risks," in Rights, Restitution, and Risk.
59. My sense is that there is more sympathy for the liability rule than the dual liability rule. I can see no principled reason for this, so the defense of the dual liability rule may be a minor challenge to commonsense morality.
60. The concerns of this and the next paragraph were raised by an anonymous reviewer.
61. See my "Liability and Risk" and "Rights, Explanation, and Risks."
62. It becomes more significant, I believe, in working out the two main issues raised in this section about consent and liability rules.
63. See Bennett, chap. 9.
64. Compare the account of the Trolley problem in Thomson, The Realm of Rights, chap. 7.
65. This objection to a related position was made in Kamm, "Non-consequentialism, the Person as End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status," Philosophy & Public Affairs 21 (1992): 354-89. I am grateful to Kamm for reminding me of the need to respond to this objection.
66. For an entry into some of the problems in working out how systems with breakdowns in common knowledge would behave, see Skyrms, chap. 6.