Too clever by half: The problem with novelty in constitutional law

Northwestern University Law Review

Volumn 95, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 921-930

  Sherry, Suzanna ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039568854     PISSN: 00293571     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (76)

1. See Robert W. Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense of Difficulty, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 845 (2001); see also Editor's Note, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 843 (2001) (providing a brief introduction to the Northwestern University Law Review Spring 2001 Symposium exploring the counter-majoritarian difficulty).
2. See Robert W. Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense of Difficulty, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 845 (2001); see also Editor's Note, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 843 (2001) (providing a brief introduction to the Northwestern University Law Review Spring 2001 Symposium exploring the counter-majoritarian difficulty).
3. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (forthcoming 2002).
4. Barry Friedman, An Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three (forthcoming article, on file with author); Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 953 (2001).
5. Barry Friedman, An Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three (forthcoming article, on file with author); Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 953 (2001).
6. In addition to the sources cited in note 2, see also, for example, ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law 62 U. CHI L. REV. 689 (1995); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993) [hereinafter Friedman, Dialogue]; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991).
7. In addition to the sources cited in note 2, see also, for example, ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law 62 U. CHI L. REV. 689 (1995); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993) [hereinafter Friedman, Dialogue]; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991).
8. In addition to the sources cited in note 2, see also, for example, ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law 62 U. CHI L. REV. 689 (1995); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993) [hereinafter Friedman, Dialogue]; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991).
9. In addition to the sources cited in note 2, see also, for example, ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law 62 U. CHI L. REV. 689 (1995); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993) [hereinafter Friedman, Dialogue]; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991).
10. In addition to the sources cited in note 2, see also, for example, ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law 62 U. CHI L. REV. 689 (1995); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993) [hereinafter Friedman, Dialogue]; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991).
11. In addition to the sources cited in note 2, see also, for example, ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law 62 U. CHI L. REV. 689 (1995); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993) [hereinafter Friedman, Dialogue]; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991).
12. In addition to the sources cited in note 2, see also, for example, ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law 62 U. CHI L. REV. 689 (1995); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993) [hereinafter Friedman, Dialogue]; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991).
13. In addition to the sources cited in note 2, see also, for example, ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law 62 U. CHI L. REV. 689 (1995); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993) [hereinafter Friedman, Dialogue]; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991).
14. In addition to the sources cited in note 2, see also, for example, ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law 62 U. CHI L. REV. 689 (1995); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993) [hereinafter Friedman, Dialogue]; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991).
15. In addition to the sources cited in note 2, see also, for example, ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law 62 U. CHI L. REV. 689 (1995); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993) [hereinafter Friedman, Dialogue]; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991).
16. For an elaboration and critique of the theories of each of these six scholars and of foundationahsm in general, see FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2.
17. In addition to viewing the courts in isolation, those who focus on the counter-majoritarian difficulty overlook the many ways in which the courts are themselves linked to, and limited by, majoritarian politics. See generally Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 4 (arguing for an understanding of the role of courts that emphasizes the interplay of all three branches of government in constitutional interpretation). For a fuller critique of the focus on counter-majoritarianism, see FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2.
18. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 152 (1991).
19. Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992) (child abuse); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 789-92 (1999) [hereinafter Amar, Intratextualism] (right to vote on juries).
20. Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992) (child abuse); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 789-92 (1999) [hereinafter Amar, Intratextualism] (right to vote on juries).
21. Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992) (child abuse); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 789-92 (1999) [hereinafter Amar, Intratextualism] (right to vote on juries).
22. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
23. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 214 HARV. L. REV. 26, 129-33 (2000). Amar appears to believe that this is especially true where the father and son bear the same name, and the younger is known by his middle initial. See id. at 132.
24. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 129-33 (2000). Amar appears to believe that this is especially true where the father and son bear the same name, and the younger is known by his middle initial. See id. at 132.
25. Richard Epstein, Life Boats, Desert Islands, and the Poverty of Modern Jurisprudence, 68 MISS. L.J. 861, 887 (1999). It is ironic that this quotation comes from Epstein, one of the cleverest of the foundationalist scholars. What explains the divergence between his advice and his own theories is a part of the first sentence that I left out of the quotation: "[I]n most moral or legal disputes the right answer will be simple and straightforward." In fact, as I note in the text, constitutional answers are not likely to be simple or straightforward, and a search for a single foundation that makes them so is doomed to fail.
26. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 8, at 816-17.
27. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 281.
28. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 268-361 (1998).
29. Bennett, supra note 1, at 883-88.
30. On prudence, see Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985). On pragmatism, see, for example, PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
31. On prudence, see Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985). On pragmatism, see, for example, PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
32. On prudence, see Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985). On pragmatism, see, for example, PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
33. Kronman, supra note 16, at 1569 (citation omitted).
34. Bennett, supra note 1, at 845-52.
35. Ward Farnsworth, Talking Out of School: The Transmission of Intellectual Capital from the Legal Academy to Public Tribunals, 81 B.U. L. REV. 13 (2001).
36. For other critiques of this privileging of novelty, see Daniel A. Farber, Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1987); Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986); Daniel A. Farber, Gresham's Law of Legal Scholarship, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 307 (1986).
37. For other critiques of this privileging of novelty, see Daniel A. Farber, Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1987); Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986); Daniel A. Farber, Gresham's Law of Legal Scholarship, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 307 (1986).
38. For other critiques of this privileging of novelty, see Daniel A. Farber, Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1987); Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986); Daniel A. Farber, Gresham's Law of Legal Scholarship, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 307 (1986).
39. Kronman, supra note 16, at 1598.
40. John Henry Schlegel, An Endangered Species?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 18, 19 (1986). Schlegel believes that little has changed since then. See id. at 19-20. Kronman, supra note 16, at 1609-10. Kronman also suggests that it arises out of legal realism and its heirs. See id. at 1607.
41. John Henry Schlegel, An Endangered Species?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 18, 19 (1986). Schlegel believes that little has changed since then. See id. at 19-20. Kronman, supra note 16, at 1609-10. Kronman also suggests that it arises out of legal realism and its heirs. See id. at 1607.
42. John Henry Schlegel, An Endangered Species?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 18, 19 (1986). Schlegel believes that little has changed since then. See id. at 19-20. Kronman, supra note 16, at 1609-10. Kronman also suggests that it arises out of legal realism and its heirs. See id. at 1607.
43. John Henry Schlegel, An Endangered Species?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 18, 19 (1986). Schlegel believes that little has changed since then. See id. at 19-20. Kronman, supra note 16, at 1609-10. Kronman also suggests that it arises out of legal realism and its heirs. See id. at 1607.
44. Morris B. Hoffman, Populist Pabulum, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 97, 98 (1998) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1998); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998)).
45. Morris B. Hoffman, Populist Pabulum, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 97, 98 (1998) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1998); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998)).
46. Morris B. Hoffman, Populist Pabulum, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 97, 98 (1998) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1998); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998)).
47. For recent critiques of the pseudo-interdisciplinary legal scholarship, see, for example, Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Mark A. Graber, Law and Sports Officiating: A Misunderstood and Justly Neglected Relationship, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 293 (1999); Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253 (1996); Jack Rakove, Two Foxes in the Forest of History, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 191 (1999); Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises in Mathematics: A Case Study in Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51 (1996).
48. For recent critiques of the pseudo-interdisciplinary legal scholarship, see, for example, Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Mark A. Graber, Law and Sports Officiating: A Misunderstood and Justly Neglected Relationship, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 293 (1999); Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253 (1996); Jack Rakove, Two Foxes in the Forest of History, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 191 (1999); Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises in Mathematics: A Case Study in Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51 (1996).
49. For recent critiques of the pseudo-interdisciplinary legal scholarship, see, for example, Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Mark A. Graber, Law and Sports Officiating: A Misunderstood and Justly Neglected Relationship, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 293 (1999); Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253 (1996); Jack Rakove, Two Foxes in the Forest of History, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 191 (1999); Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises in Mathematics: A Case Study in Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51 (1996).
50. For recent critiques of the pseudo-interdisciplinary legal scholarship, see, for example, Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Mark A. Graber, Law and Sports Officiating: A Misunderstood and Justly Neglected Relationship, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 293 (1999); Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253 (1996); Jack Rakove, Two Foxes in the Forest of History, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 191 (1999); Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises in Mathematics: A Case Study in Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51 (1996).
51. For recent critiques of the pseudo-interdisciplinary legal scholarship, see, for example, Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Mark A. Graber, Law and Sports Officiating: A Misunderstood and Justly Neglected Relationship, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 293 (1999); Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253 (1996); Jack Rakove, Two Foxes in the Forest of History, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 191 (1999); Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises in Mathematics: A Case Study in Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51 (1996).
52. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1133-34 (1995) (suggesting that when students cannot evaluate articles, they rely on other indicia, including the reputation of the author, the article's political stance, the prestige of the author's school, and the length of the article, among other things).
53. For similar critiques of student-edited law reviews, see, for example, Arthur D. Austin, The "Custom of Vetting" as a Substitute for Peer Review, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Faculty-Edited Law Journals, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 88 (1994); John G. Kester, Faculty Participation in the Student-Edited Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14 (1986); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936).
54. For similar critiques of student-edited law reviews, see, for example, Arthur D. Austin, The "Custom of Vetting" as a Substitute for Peer Review, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Faculty-Edited Law Journals, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 88 (1994); John G. Kester, Faculty Participation in the Student-Edited Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14 (1986); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936).
55. For similar critiques of student-edited law reviews, see, for example, Arthur D. Austin, The "Custom of Vetting" as a Substitute for Peer Review, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Faculty-Edited Law Journals, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 88 (1994); John G. Kester, Faculty Participation in the Student-Edited Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14 (1986); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936).
56. For similar critiques of student-edited law reviews, see, for example, Arthur D. Austin, The "Custom of Vetting" as a Substitute for Peer Review, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Faculty-Edited Law Journals, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 88 (1994); John G. Kester, Faculty Participation in the Student-Edited Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14 (1986); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936).
57. For similar critiques of student-edited law reviews, see, for example, Arthur D. Austin, The "Custom of Vetting" as a Substitute for Peer Review, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Faculty-Edited Law Journals, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 88 (1994); John G. Kester, Faculty Participation in the Student-Edited Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14 (1986); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936).
58. The pejorative reference comes from Learned Hand, who resigned from the Harvard Law Review with the statement that he had not enrolled in law school "to edit or write parts of a magazine." GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 44-45 (1994). Felix Frankfurter voiced similar sentiments, but quickly changed his mind. See Thomas E. Baker, Tyrannous Lex, 82 IOWA L. REV. 689, 710 (1997).
59. The pejorative reference comes from Learned Hand, who resigned from the Harvard Law Review with the statement that he had not enrolled in law school "to edit or write parts of a magazine." GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 44-45 (1994). Felix Frankfurter voiced similar sentiments, but quickly changed his mind. See Thomas E. Baker, Tyrannous Lex, 82 IOWA L. REV. 689, 710 (1997).
60. Cf. Kester, supra note 27 (suggesting that faculties are so divided about the merits of various types of scholarship that they can offer no guidance); Elyce H. Zenoff, I Have Seen the Enemy and They Are Us, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 21, 22 (1986) (suggesting that law schools have "eliminated or reduced the role of faculty advisors and faculty-led law review seminars").
61. Cf. Kester, supra note 27 (suggesting that faculties are so divided about the merits of various types of scholarship that they can offer no guidance); Elyce H. Zenoff, I Have Seen the Enemy and They Are Us, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 21, 22 (1986) (suggesting that law schools have "eliminated or reduced the role of faculty advisors and faculty-led law review seminars").
62. Of course, peer-reviewed journals may be no better at sorting. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Dangers of the Graduate School Model, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1986); Schlegel, supra note 22.
63. Of course, peer-reviewed journals may be no better at sorting. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Dangers of the Graduate School Model, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1986); Schlegel, supra note 22.
64. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1966).
65. See Neal Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future of Academic Freedom, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 165 (1999) (describing and critiquing the circumstances of the letter). I must advise the reader that I signed that particular letter because I considered its topic within my area of expertise. I have written extensively on constitutional history, including co-authoring a casebook. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1990). Prior to the Clinton impeachment, I had written on judicial impeachment. See Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Independence: Playing Politics with the Constitution, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 795 (1998). An appropriate standard for judging expertise sufficient to justify signatures of this sort may be found in Farnsworth, supra note 19: legal academics "should use the same care and have the same expertise called for in their published professional work" and "should not sign documents unless they would be ready to defend them orally in the tribunals to which the documents are being presented."
66. See Neal Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future of Academic Freedom, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 165 (1999) (describing and critiquing the circumstances of the letter). I must advise the reader that I signed that particular letter because I considered its topic within my area of expertise. I have written extensively on constitutional history, including co-authoring a casebook. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1990). Prior to the Clinton impeachment, I had written on judicial impeachment. See Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Independence: Playing Politics with the Constitution, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 795 (1998). An appropriate standard for judging expertise sufficient to justify signatures of this sort may be found in Farnsworth, supra note 19: legal academics "should use the same care and have the same expertise called for in their published professional work" and "should not sign documents unless they would be ready to defend them orally in the tribunals to which the documents are being presented."
67. See Neal Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future of Academic Freedom, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 165 (1999) (describing and critiquing the circumstances of the letter). I must advise the reader that I signed that particular letter because I considered its topic within my area of expertise. I have written extensively on constitutional history, including co-authoring a casebook. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1990). Prior to the Clinton impeachment, I had written on judicial impeachment. See Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Independence: Playing Politics with the Constitution, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 795 (1998). An appropriate standard for judging expertise sufficient to justify signatures of this sort may be found in Farnsworth, supra note 19: legal academics "should use the same care and have the same expertise called for in their published professional work" and "should not sign documents unless they would be ready to defend them orally in the tribunals to which the documents are being presented."
68. I refer to The George Washington University Law School Professor Jonathan Turley. For Turley's media status, see Lars-Erik Nelson, Party's Over: Take the Hint, Kenneth Starr, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 14, 1999, at 2 (calling Turley an "ubiquitous impeachment expert"). Turley's biography in THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS (1999-2000) lists him as teaching Criminal Procedure, Environmental Criminal Law, Environmental Law, Legislation, Prisoner Project, Property, and Torts. A search of Westlaw ("AU: JONATHAN PRE/3 TURLEY") in early December 2000 revealed 10 law review articles prior to 1999. None were on impeachment. None were on core questions of constitutional law, interpretation, or history, although one discussed the idea of a Madisonian dualist constitution in the context of international law and several addressed constitutional criminal procedure issues. The remainder had nothing to do with the Constitution. Since 1999, however, Turley has published four essays on impeachment and three others with at least peripheral connections to constitutional law. On the dangers of such unknowledgeable pontificating, see Farnsworth, supra note 19.
69. I refer to The George Washington University Law School Professor Jonathan Turley. For Turley's media status, see Lars-Erik Nelson, Party's Over: Take the Hint, Kenneth Starr, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 14, 1999, at 2 (calling Turley an "ubiquitous impeachment expert"). Turley's biography in THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS (1999-2000) lists him as teaching Criminal Procedure, Environmental Criminal Law, Environmental Law, Legislation, Prisoner Project, Property, and Torts. A search of Westlaw ("AU: JONATHAN PRE/3 TURLEY") in early December 2000 revealed 10 law review articles prior to 1999. None were on impeachment. None were on core questions of constitutional law, interpretation, or history, although one discussed the idea of a Madisonian dualist constitution in the context of international law and several addressed constitutional criminal procedure issues. The remainder had nothing to do with the Constitution. Since 1999, however, Turley has published four essays on impeachment and three others with at least peripheral connections to constitutional law. On the dangers of such unknowledgeable pontificating, see Farnsworth, supra note 19.
70. Farnsworth, supra note 19.
71. Lest any reader infer that the counter-majoritarian difficulty only awaits its Arthur, let us remember that the story of King Arthur is largely mythical. One might say the same of the counter-majoritarian difficulty.
72. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997); MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS (4th ed. 1998); Paul H. Edelman & Suzanna Sherry, All or Nothing: Explaining the Size of Supreme Court Majorities, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1225 (2000); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119.
73. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997); MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS (4th ed. 1998); Paul H. Edelman & Suzanna Sherry, All or Nothing: Explaining the Size of Supreme Court Majorities, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1225 (2000); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119.
74. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997); MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS (4th ed. 1998); Paul H. Edelman & Suzanna Sherry, All or Nothing: Explaining the Size of Supreme Court Majorities, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1225 (2000); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119.
75. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997); MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS (4th ed. 1998); Paul H. Edelman & Suzanna Sherry, All or Nothing: Explaining the Size of Supreme Court Majorities, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1225 (2000); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119.
76. See Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 10, 2000, at 73, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/beyond/grad-rank/law/gdlawtl.htm (ranking Vanderbilt eighteenth).