Turning left or class realignment? Analysis of the changing relationship between class and party in the Czech Republic, 1992-96

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 501-536

  Matějů, Petr ^a   Řeháková, Blanka ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039560101     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0888325497011003004     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. The parties defines as "left-wing" for this purpose were the Czech Social Democracy, the Communist party of Bohemia and Moravia, the Left Block, and the Party of the Democratic Left in the Czech Republic; the Hungarian Socialist party in Hungary; and the Union of Democratic Left, the Polish Peasant party, and the Labor's Union in Poland.
2. Using the self-placement of the left-right political spectrum, Czechs are more right-wing-oriented than Hungarians and Poles. It is also interesting to note that unlike the Czech population, both the Hungarian and the Polish populations shifted slightly to the left between 1991 and 1995. See J. Večerník, Markets and People: The Czech Reform Experience in a Comparative Perspective (Avebury: Aldershot, 1997).
3. P. Matějů et al., "Sociální třídy, postoje k nerovnostem a politické orientace" (Manuscript, 1995).
4. The index of "egalitarian inclinations" was based on the factor analysis of six items. Two items - "The fairest way of distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone equal shares," and "The most important thing is that people get what they need, even if this means allocating money from those who earned more than they need" - were selected to compute the index ranging from 2 (most antiegalitarian) to 10 (most egalitarian).
5. Večerník, Markets and People. As evidence of this, the Social Justice surveys carried out in 1991 and 1995 showed, for example, that the proportion of individuals who strongly endorsed market mechanisms as a driving force of the economy dropped from 60 to 34 percent during these four years.
6. For example, the Financial Times - reporting on the Hungarian election on May 9, 1994 - expressed the view that Hungarian voters were punishing the previous government for the 20 percent fall in industrial output during the previous four years. This corresponds with a general view that the recent election successes of the left political parties in Poland, Hungary, and some other formerly communist countries are political consequences of the failure of economic reforms in these countries.
7. See E. Wnuk-Lipinksi, "Left Turn in Poland: A Sociological and Political Analysis" (Warsaw: Instititue of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993). He argues that positive and negative macroeconomic trends do not affect voting behavior until they are transformed into changes in the microeconomic conditions in which households operate. It also seems to be true that there is a greater lag in the effect of positive macroeconomic trends than is the case with negative macroeconomic trends.
8. Wnuk-Lipinski, "Left Turn in Poland." J. Kis, "Liberalism, Democracy, and Hungarian Politics," interview for the Bulletin of the East and Central Europe Program of the New School for Social Research, December 1994. See also P. Matějů, "Subjective Mobility and Perception of Life-Chances in Eastern Europe" (Prague: Institute of Sociology, Working Papers, no. 5, 1996); and P. Matějů, "In Search of an Explanation for Recent Left-Turns in Post-Communist Countries," International Review of Comparative Public Policy 7 (May 1996): 43-82.
9. Wnuk-Lipinski, "Left Turn in Poland." J. Kis, "Liberalism, Democracy, and Hungarian Politics," interview for the Bulletin of the East and Central Europe Program of the New School for Social Research, December 1994. See also P. Matějů, "Subjective Mobility and Perception of Life-Chances in Eastern Europe" (Prague: Institute of Sociology, Working Papers, no. 5, 1996); and P. Matějů, "In Search of an Explanation for Recent Left-Turns in Post-Communist Countries," International Review of Comparative Public Policy 7 (May 1996): 43-82.
10. Wnuk-Lipinski, "Left Turn in Poland." J. Kis, "Liberalism, Democracy, and Hungarian Politics," interview for the Bulletin of the East and Central Europe Program of the New School for Social Research, December 1994. See also P. Matějů, "Subjective Mobility and Perception of Life-Chances in Eastern Europe" (Prague: Institute of Sociology, Working Papers, no. 5, 1996); and P. Matějů, "In Search of an Explanation for Recent Left-Turns in Post-Communist Countries," International Review of Comparative Public Policy 7 (May 1996): 43-82.
11. There were, of course, winners of socialism who have succeeded in maintaining their advantages throughout the transformation period as well as those who have been trapped in disadvantageous positions both before and since the collapse of the communist regime. We have dealt with these two special groups elsewhere. See P. Matějů and B. Řeháková, "Revolution for Whom? Analysis of Selected Patterns of Intergenerational Mobility 1989-1992," Czech Sociological Review 1:1 (1993): 73-90; and P. Matějů and N. Lim, "Who Has Gotten Ahead After the Fall of Communism? The case of the Czech Republic," Czech Sociological Review 3 (1995): 117-136. Here we emphasize only the major division line between "winners" and "losers."
12. There were, of course, winners of socialism who have succeeded in maintaining their advantages throughout the transformation period as well as those who have been trapped in disadvantageous positions both before and since the collapse of the communist regime. We have dealt with these two special groups elsewhere. See P. Matějů and B. Řeháková, "Revolution for Whom? Analysis of Selected Patterns of Intergenerational Mobility 1989-1992," Czech Sociological Review 1:1 (1993): 73-90; and P. Matějů and N. Lim, "Who Has Gotten Ahead After the Fall of Communism? The case of the Czech Republic," Czech Sociological Review 3 (1995): 117-136. Here we emphasize only the major division line between "winners" and "losers."
13. B. Řeháková and K. Vlachová, "Subjective Mobility After 1989: Do People Feel a Social and Economic Improvement or Relative Deprivation?" Czech Sociological Review 3:2 (1995): 137-156. See also Matějů, "Subjective Mobility."
14. B. Řeháková and K. Vlachová, "Subjective Mobility After 1989: Do People Feel a Social and Economic Improvement or Relative Deprivation?" Czech Sociological Review 3:2 (1995): 137-156. See also Matějů, "Subjective Mobility."
15. Matějů, "Left-Turns."
16. The effect of "subjective mobility" on left voting turned out to be particularly strong in the Czech Republic. In other countries this effect was less pronounced but still stronger than the effect of objective class and mobility.
17. S. M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and J. H. Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
18. S. M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and J. H. Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
19. Anthony Heath, "Class and Political Partisanship," in J. Clark, C. Modgil, and S. Modgil, eds., John H. Goldthorpe: Consensus and Controversy (London: Falmer Press, 1990); N. D. De Graaf, P. Nieuwberta, and A. Heath, "Class Mobility and Political Preferences; Individual and Contextual Effects," American Journal of Sociology 100 (1995): 997-1027; P. Nieuwberta, The Democratic Class Struggle in Twenty Countries 1945-90 (Amsterdam: Theses Publisher, 1995); M. Hout, C. Brooks, and J. Manza, "The Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Societies)" International Sociology 8:3 (1993): 259-77; M. Hour, C. Brooks, and J. Manza, "The Democratic Class Struggle in the United States," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 805-28; and J. Manza, M. Hout, and C. Brooks, "Class Voting in Capitalist Democracies Since World War II: Dealignment, Realignment, or Trendless Fluctuation?" Annual Review of Sociology 21 (1995): 137-62.
20. Anthony Heath, "Class and Political Partisanship," in J. Clark, C. Modgil, and S. Modgil, eds., John H. Goldthorpe: Consensus and Controversy (London: Falmer Press, 1990); N. D. De Graaf, P. Nieuwberta, and A. Heath, "Class Mobility and Political Preferences; Individual and Contextual Effects," American Journal of Sociology 100 (1995): 997-1027; P. Nieuwberta, The Democratic Class Struggle in Twenty Countries 1945-90 (Amsterdam: Theses Publisher, 1995); M. Hout, C. Brooks, and J. Manza, "The Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Societies)" International Sociology 8:3 (1993): 259-77; M. Hour, C. Brooks, and J. Manza, "The Democratic Class Struggle in the United States," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 805-28; and J. Manza, M. Hout, and C. Brooks, "Class Voting in Capitalist Democracies Since World War II: Dealignment, Realignment, or Trendless Fluctuation?" Annual Review of Sociology 21 (1995): 137-62.
21. Anthony Heath, "Class and Political Partisanship," in J. Clark, C. Modgil, and S. Modgil, eds., John H. Goldthorpe: Consensus and Controversy (London: Falmer Press, 1990); N. D. De Graaf, P. Nieuwberta, and A. Heath, "Class Mobility and Political Preferences; Individual and Contextual Effects," American Journal of Sociology 100 (1995): 997-1027; P. Nieuwberta, The Democratic Class Struggle in Twenty Countries 1945-90 (Amsterdam: Theses Publisher, 1995); M. Hout, C. Brooks, and J. Manza, "The Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Societies)" International Sociology 8:3 (1993): 259-77; M. Hour, C. Brooks, and J. Manza, "The Democratic Class Struggle in the United States," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 805-28; and J. Manza, M. Hout, and C. Brooks, "Class Voting in Capitalist Democracies Since World War II: Dealignment, Realignment, or Trendless Fluctuation?" Annual Review of Sociology 21 (1995): 137-62.
22. Anthony Heath, "Class and Political Partisanship," in J. Clark, C. Modgil, and S. Modgil, eds., John H. Goldthorpe: Consensus and Controversy (London: Falmer Press, 1990); N. D. De Graaf, P. Nieuwberta, and A. Heath, "Class Mobility and Political Preferences; Individual and Contextual Effects," American Journal of Sociology 100 (1995): 997-1027; P. Nieuwberta, The Democratic Class Struggle in Twenty Countries 1945-90 (Amsterdam: Theses Publisher, 1995); M. Hout, C. Brooks, and J. Manza, "The Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Societies)" International Sociology 8:3 (1993): 259-77; M. Hour, C. Brooks, and J. Manza, "The Democratic Class Struggle in the United States," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 805-28; and J. Manza, M. Hout, and C. Brooks, "Class Voting in Capitalist Democracies Since World War II: Dealignment, Realignment, or Trendless Fluctuation?" Annual Review of Sociology 21 (1995): 137-62.
23. Anthony Heath, "Class and Political Partisanship," in J. Clark, C. Modgil, and S. Modgil, eds., John H. Goldthorpe: Consensus and Controversy (London: Falmer Press, 1990); N. D. De Graaf, P. Nieuwberta, and A. Heath, "Class Mobility and Political Preferences; Individual and Contextual Effects," American Journal of Sociology 100 (1995): 997-1027; P. Nieuwberta, The Democratic Class Struggle in Twenty Countries 1945-90 (Amsterdam: Theses Publisher, 1995); M. Hout, C. Brooks, and J. Manza, "The Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Societies)" International Sociology 8:3 (1993): 259-77; M. Hour, C. Brooks, and J. Manza, "The Democratic Class Struggle in the United States," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 805-28; and J. Manza, M. Hout, and C. Brooks, "Class Voting in Capitalist Democracies Since World War II: Dealignment, Realignment, or Trendless Fluctuation?" Annual Review of Sociology 21 (1995): 137-62.
24. Anthony Heath, "Class and Political Partisanship," in J. Clark, C. Modgil, and S. Modgil, eds., John H. Goldthorpe: Consensus and Controversy (London: Falmer Press, 1990); N. D. De Graaf, P. Nieuwberta, and A. Heath, "Class Mobility and Political Preferences; Individual and Contextual Effects," American Journal of Sociology 100 (1995): 997-1027; P. Nieuwberta, The Democratic Class Struggle in Twenty Countries 1945-90 (Amsterdam: Theses Publisher, 1995); M. Hout, C. Brooks, and J. Manza, "The Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Societies)" International Sociology 8:3 (1993): 259-77; M. Hour, C. Brooks, and J. Manza, "The Democratic Class Struggle in the United States," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 805-28; and J. Manza, M. Hout, and C. Brooks, "Class Voting in Capitalist Democracies Since World War II: Dealignment, Realignment, or Trendless Fluctuation?" Annual Review of Sociology 21 (1995): 137-62.
25. R. A. Nisbet, "The Decline and Fall of Social Class," Pacific Sociological Review (1959): 11-17; Lipset, Political Man; N. T. Clark and S. M. Lipset, "Are Social Classes Dying?" International Sociology 6 (1991): 397-410 and; N. T. Clark, S. M. Lipset, and M. Rempel, "The Declining Political Significance of Social Class," International Sociology 8 (1993): 293-316.
26. R. A. Nisbet, "The Decline and Fall of Social Class," Pacific Sociological Review (1959): 11-17; Lipset, Political Man; N. T. Clark and S. M. Lipset, "Are Social Classes Dying?" International Sociology 6 (1991): 397-410 and; N. T. Clark, S. M. Lipset, and M. Rempel, "The Declining Political Significance of Social Class," International Sociology 8 (1993): 293-316.
27. R. A. Nisbet, "The Decline and Fall of Social Class," Pacific Sociological Review (1959): 11-17; Lipset, Political Man; N. T. Clark and S. M. Lipset, "Are Social Classes Dying?" International Sociology 6 (1991): 397-410 and; N. T. Clark, S. M. Lipset, and M. Rempel, "The Declining Political Significance of Social Class," International Sociology 8 (1993): 293-316.
28. R. A. Nisbet, "The Decline and Fall of Social Class," Pacific Sociological Review (1959): 11-17; Lipset, Political Man; N. T. Clark and S. M. Lipset, "Are Social Classes Dying?" International Sociology 6 (1991): 397-410 and; N. T. Clark, S. M. Lipset, and M. Rempel, "The Declining Political Significance of Social Class," International Sociology 8 (1993): 293-316.
29. Manza, Hout, Brooks, "Class Voting."
30. I. Szelényi, E. Fodor, and E. Hanley, "Left Turn in Post-Communist Politics? Hungarian and Polish Elections, 1991-1994" (UCLA: Department of Sociology, manuscript).
31. Ibid. Jadwiga Staniszkis advanced similar arguments in 1991, when she spoke about the process of tightening the links between the political scene and the economic rhythm of society, and anticipated the growth of the role of economic interests in political behavior. (J. Staniszkis, The Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience [Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991], 91-95.)
32. See Večerník, Markets and People, for a comparison of different indicators of poverty among post-communist countries.
33. According to the Institute for comparative economic studies in Vienna (WIIW), the Czech Republic faces an inflation rate of about 8.5 percent (which is the lowest rate after Slovakia, for which 7 percent was predicted for 1996), with far the lowest unemployment rate (3 percent compared with 11 percent in Hungary, 13 percent in Slovakia, 14 percent in Poland and Slovenia, etc.).
34. See B. Řeháková, "Příjmy a spravedlnost: Tolerance české veřejnosti k příjmovým nerovnostem v roce 1992 a 1995," Sociologický časopis 33:1 (1997): 69-86.
35. See the debate between Matéjů, Vlachová, and Havelka about a plausible explanation of the historical roots of Czech egalitarianism. While Matějů and Vlachová (P. Matějů, "From Equality to Equity? The Czech Republic Between Two Ideologies of Distributive Justice," Czech Sociological Review 1:2 [1993]: 251-76; P. Matějů and K. Valchová, "Od rovnostářství k zásluhovosti. Česká republika mezi dvěma ideologiemi distributivní spravedlnosti," Sociologický časopis 31:2 [1995]: 215-39 and; M. Havelka, "Recenzentovy pochybnosti o jedné tezi výše uvedeného článku, "Sociologický časopis 31:2 [1995]: 240-42) emphasize "ideological" roots (the effect of a rather egalitarian interpretation of reform and the Protestant movement in Bohemia), Havelka finds a more plausible explanation in the "social incompleteness" of the Czech social structure due to the loss of its national gentry in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, when the Habsburgs won the battle for the Czech crown.
36. See the debate between Matéjů, Vlachová, and Havelka about a plausible explanation of the historical roots of Czech egalitarianism. While Matějů and Vlachová (P. Matějů, "From Equality to Equity? The Czech Republic Between Two Ideologies of Distributive Justice," Czech Sociological Review 1:2 [1993]: 251-76; P. Matějů and K. Valchová, "Od rovnostářství k zásluhovosti. Česká republika mezi dvěma ideologiemi distributivní spravedlnosti," Sociologický časopis 31:2 [1995]: 215-39 and; M. Havelka, "Recenzentovy pochybnosti o jedné tezi výše uvedeného článku, "Sociologický časopis 31:2 [1995]: 240-42) emphasize "ideological" roots (the effect of a rather egalitarian interpretation of reform and the Protestant movement in Bohemia), Havelka finds a more plausible explanation in the "social incompleteness" of the Czech social structure due to the loss of its national gentry in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, when the Habsburgs won the battle for the Czech crown.
37. See the debate between Matéjů, Vlachová, and Havelka about a plausible explanation of the historical roots of Czech egalitarianism. While Matějů and Vlachová (P. Matějů, "From Equality to Equity? The Czech Republic Between Two Ideologies of Distributive Justice," Czech Sociological Review 1:2 [1993]: 251-76; P. Matějů and K. Valchová, "Od rovnostářství k zásluhovosti. Česká republika mezi dvěma ideologiemi distributivní spravedlnosti," Sociologický časopis 31:2 [1995]: 215-39 and; M. Havelka, "Recenzentovy pochybnosti o jedné tezi výše uvedeného článku, "Sociologický časopis 31:2 [1995]: 240-42) emphasize "ideological" roots (the effect of a rather egalitarian interpretation of reform and the Protestant movement in Bohemia), Havelka finds a more plausible explanation in the "social incompleteness" of the Czech social structure due to the loss of its national gentry in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, when the Habsburgs won the battle for the Czech crown.
38. The 1992 exit poll was carried out by INFAS, IVVM, and Factum for the Czechoslovak television. The 1996 exit poll was conducted by IFES and SC&C for the Czech television. The authors would like to express their gratitude to Czech Television, the legal owner of the data files, for permission to use the data for this analysis. We would also like to thank SC&C (Statistical Consulting and Computing) for its assistance in the preparation of the data sets for analysis.
39. Since the question on respondents' education was asked only in the 1996 exit poll, we could not use education as a variable in the comparative analysis.
40. In 1992, three ballots were used in each part of the former Czechoslovakia: two ballots to the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly and one ballot to the Czech National Council (in the Czech Republic) or to the Slovak National Council (in Slovakia).
41. See Appendix 1 for an explanation of the acronyms for names of political parties.
42. Two more parties reached the threshold in 1992 than in 1996: a Moravian nationalist party (HSD-SMS, with 5.8 percent of the votes in 1992), and the Liberal and Social Union (LSU, with 6.5 percent), a party without a clear political program and with a socially rather unspecific electorate. HSD-SMS split after the 1992 elections, and its successors (MNS-HSS and MSMS-MNS) together received less than 1 percent of the votes in 1996. The LSU was transformed into the LSNS (Liberal Social and National party) and integrated with the Free Democrats (SD) before elections took place in 1996. The new party (LSNS-SD) received only 2 percent of the votes.
43. See Appendix 2 for univariate distributions of individual dependent variables.
44. The distributions of both dependent and independent variables are displayed in Appendix 2.
45. This variable was created from the item "social class" in the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to answer the question on which class they belonged to by choosing one of the categories described in the list of classes. This method of asking the question (typical in exit polls) and the fact that in 1992 there was no question on respondents' education, prevented any closer approximation of EGP class schema, which would certainly be the preferable class variable for the analysis.
46. Only two age cohorts were defined in order to reduce the number of cells in the multiway arrays analyzed by logit models. Such a reduction was necessary in order to solve the problem of critically low frequencies.
47. Because of the increasing number of cells with a critically low number of cases, a more detailed classification was not possible.
48. 2-df/N] × K + df, where N is the size of the original sample and K is the sample size that is to be taken as the standard for comparisons. Fot details see R. Erikson and J. H. Goldthorpe, The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Post-Industrial Countries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 88.
49. Since adjusted standardized residuals are normally distributed, a residual larger than 1.96 indicates a statistically significant deviation of the corresponding cell frequency from the situation of independence.
50. R. Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1963).
51. See Manza, Hout, and Brooks, "Class Voting."
52. The Alford index is a simple difference between the percentage of manual workers who voted for left-wing political parties on the one hand and the percentage of non-manual workers who voted for these parties on the other. For example, if 60 percent of manual workers vote for left-wing political parties compared with only 20 percent of the non-manual class casting their vote for the left, the Alford index takes the value 60 - 20 = 40.
53. Hout, Brooks, and Manza, "The Democratic Class Struggle."
54. The frequency of a particular vote for a group defined by the contrast was calculated as a geometric mean from the frequencies in each class.
55. The numbers in parentheses are odds for left versus non-left voting for individual classes without controlling for sex, age, and region. Thus, for example, the value 0.5 means that the members of a particular class are 0.5 less likely to vote for the left than for the non-left political party.
56. The figure displays the ratios of left versus non-left odds between pairs of classes (or their groups). If for a particular year there was no difference between the compared classes, the displayed value is 1. If the propensity to vote for a left-wing party was higher for one class than for the other one in comparison, then the displayed value is higher than 1 and vise versa.
57. This is just a different expression for the finding that the odds of voting for one of the left-wing political parties rather than for any other party had increased in all classes.
58. In order to behave in accordance with the realignment hypothesis, the self-employed should have moved toward left parties to a lesser degree than other classes, though the opposite was true.
59. The ratio of the respective odds between men and women - 1.17 - is statistically significant.
60. In accordance with the definition of the dependent variable in Model 2, by the change in affinity toward the ČSSD we mean the change in the odds of voting for the Social Democrats rather than for the ODS.
61. The most frequently discussed factors of the electoral success of the Social Democratic party in the 1996 elections were the successful formation of a non-communist left, the way political parties on the right side of the political spectrum addressed the issues that apparently played a key role in voters' choices, the image of political leaders, and similar factors.