Agency-theory and internal-labor-market explanations of bonus payments: Empirical evidence from Spanish firms

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 573-613

  Ortín Ángel, Pedro ^a   Salas Fumás, Vicente ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ZARAGOZA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039501945     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00573.x     Document Type: Article

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