Fixed content of political obligations

Political Studies

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 53-67

  Klosko, George ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039494608     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00129     Document Type: Article

References (85)

1. Scholars who question the traditional arguments in defence of political obligation include A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979); L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988); J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1979), ch. 12: C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (New York, University of California Press, 1979).
2. Scholars who question the traditional arguments in defence of political obligation include A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979); L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988); J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1979), ch. 12: C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (New York, University of California Press, 1979).
3. Scholars who question the traditional arguments in defence of political obligation include A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979); L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988); J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1979), ch. 12: C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (New York, University of California Press, 1979).
4. Scholars who question the traditional arguments in defence of political obligation include A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979); L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988); J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1979), ch. 12: C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (New York, University of California Press, 1979).
5. For the broader sense of obligation, see Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 2;
6. and G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation (Savage MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 1992), ch. 1.
7. For the concept of obligation see R. B. Brandt, 'The concepts of obligation and duty', Mind 73 (1964), 374-93; H. L. A. Hart, 'Legal and Moral Obligation,' in A. I. Melden, ed., Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1958); Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 1; J. Mish'Alanai, ' "Duty," "Obligation" and "Ought" ', Analysis, 30 (1969), 33-41.
8. For the concept of obligation see R. B. Brandt, 'The concepts of obligation and duty', Mind 73 (1964), 374-93; H. L. A. Hart, 'Legal and Moral Obligation,' in A. I. Melden, ed., Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1958); Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 1; J. Mish'Alanai, ' "Duty," "Obligation" and "Ought" ', Analysis, 30 (1969), 33-41.
9. For the concept of obligation see R. B. Brandt, 'The concepts of obligation and duty', Mind 73 (1964), 374-93; H. L. A. Hart, 'Legal and Moral Obligation,' in A. I. Melden, ed., Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1958); Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 1; J. Mish'Alanai, ' "Duty," "Obligation" and "Ought" ', Analysis, 30 (1969), 33-41.
10. For the concept of obligation see R. B. Brandt, 'The concepts of obligation and duty', Mind 73 (1964), 374-93; H. L. A. Hart, 'Legal and Moral Obligation,' in A. I. Melden, ed., Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1958); Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 1; J. Mish'Alanai, ' "Duty," "Obligation" and "Ought" ', Analysis, 30 (1969), 33-41.
11. Raz, 'Authority and justification,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 3-29, p. 13; italics removed.
12. Raz, 'Authority and Justification,' pp. 18-9. In order to be as clear as possible here, I should note that political authority does not require the subject's actual surrender of judgment. For instance, Jones does not have to change her previous belief and accept the view that driving on the right is preferable; she must only act on the state's opinion, more or less regardless of her own beliefs.
13. Hart, 'Legal and Moral Obligation,' pp. 100-1.
14. J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, Sec. 97, in P. Lassett, ed., Two Treatises of Government, Student edition (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988).
15. J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, Sec. 97, in P. Lassett, ed., Two Treatises of Government, Student edition (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988).
16. T. Hobles, R. Tuck, ed. Leviathan (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), chs 16-19, 26.
17. D. Hume, 'Of the Original Contract', in E. Miller, ed., Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, rev. ed. (Indianapolis, Liberty, 1985). For the best recent discussion, see Simmons, Moral Principles, chs 3-4, Who demolishes the contention that adequate numbers of people have consented tacitly.
18. D. Hume, 'Of the Original Contract', in E. Miller, ed., Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, rev. ed. (Indianapolis, Liberty, 1985). For the best recent discussion, see Simmons, Moral Principles, chs 3-4, Who demolishes the contention that adequate numbers of people have consented tacitly.
19. The main discussions are A. D. M. Walker, 'Political obligation and argument from gratitude,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17 (1988), 191-211; and Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 7. See also Kloslco 'Political obligation and gratitude', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989), 352-8; Walker, Obligation of gratitude and political obligation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989) 359-64 and Klosko, 'Four arguments against political obligation from gratitude', ; Public Affairs Quarterly, 5 (1991), 33-48. On the concept of gratitude, see Walker, 'Gratefulness and gratitude' Proceedings of the Aristotelan Society, 81 (1980-81), 39-55; F. R. Berger, 'Gratitude', Ethics, 85 (1975), 298-309; C. Card, 'Gratitude and obligation', American Philosophycal Quarterly, 25 (1988), 115-27; P. Camenisch, 'Gift and gratitude in ethics', Journal of Religious Ethics, 9 (1981), 1-34.
20. The main discussions are A. D. M. Walker, 'Political obligation and argument from gratitude,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17 (1988), 191-211; and Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 7. See also Kloslco 'Political obligation and gratitude', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989), 352-8; Walker, Obligation of gratitude and political obligation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989) 359-64 and Klosko, 'Four arguments against political obligation from gratitude', ; Public Affairs Quarterly, 5 (1991), 33-48. On the concept of gratitude, see Walker, 'Gratefulness and gratitude' Proceedings of the Aristotelan Society, 81 (1980-81), 39-55; F. R. Berger, 'Gratitude', Ethics, 85 (1975), 298-309; C. Card, 'Gratitude and obligation', American Philosophycal Quarterly, 25 (1988), 115-27; P. Camenisch, 'Gift and gratitude in ethics', Journal of Religious Ethics, 9 (1981), 1-34.
21. The main discussions are A. D. M. Walker, 'Political obligation and argument from gratitude,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17 (1988), 191-211; and Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 7. See also Kloslco 'Political obligation and gratitude', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989), 352-8; Walker, Obligation of gratitude and political obligation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989) 359-64 and Klosko, 'Four arguments against political obligation from gratitude', ; Public Affairs Quarterly, 5 (1991), 33-48. On the concept of gratitude, see Walker, 'Gratefulness and gratitude' Proceedings of the Aristotelan Society, 81 (1980-81), 39-55; F. R. Berger, 'Gratitude', Ethics, 85 (1975), 298-309; C. Card, 'Gratitude and obligation', American Philosophycal Quarterly, 25 (1988), 115-27; P. Camenisch, 'Gift and gratitude in ethics', Journal of Religious Ethics, 9 (1981), 1-34.
22. The main discussions are A. D. M. Walker, 'Political obligation and argument from gratitude,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17 (1988), 191-211; and Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 7. See also Kloslco 'Political obligation and gratitude', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989), 352-8; Walker, Obligation of gratitude and political obligation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989) 359-64 and Klosko, 'Four arguments against political obligation from gratitude', ; Public Affairs Quarterly, 5 (1991), 33-48. On the concept of gratitude, see Walker, 'Gratefulness and gratitude' Proceedings of the Aristotelan Society, 81 (1980-81), 39-55; F. R. Berger, 'Gratitude', Ethics, 85 (1975), 298-309; C. Card, 'Gratitude and obligation', American Philosophycal Quarterly, 25 (1988), 115-27; P. Camenisch, 'Gift and gratitude in ethics', Journal of Religious Ethics, 9 (1981), 1-34.
23. The main discussions are A. D. M. Walker, 'Political obligation and argument from gratitude,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17 (1988), 191-211; and Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 7. See also Kloslco 'Political obligation and gratitude', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989), 352-8; Walker, Obligation of gratitude and political obligation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989) 359-64 and Klosko, 'Four arguments against political obligation from gratitude', ; Public Affairs Quarterly, 5 (1991), 33-48. On the concept of gratitude, see Walker, 'Gratefulness and gratitude' Proceedings of the Aristotelan Society, 81 (1980-81), 39-55; F. R. Berger, 'Gratitude', Ethics, 85 (1975), 298-309; C. Card, 'Gratitude and obligation', American Philosophycal Quarterly, 25 (1988), 115-27; P. Camenisch, 'Gift and gratitude in ethics', Journal of Religious Ethics, 9 (1981), 1-34.
24. The main discussions are A. D. M. Walker, 'Political obligation and argument from gratitude,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17 (1988), 191-211; and Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 7. See also Kloslco 'Political obligation and gratitude', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989), 352-8; Walker, Obligation of gratitude and political obligation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989) 359-64 and Klosko, 'Four arguments against political obligation from gratitude', ; Public Affairs Quarterly, 5 (1991), 33-48. On the concept of gratitude, see Walker, 'Gratefulness and gratitude' Proceedings of the Aristotelan Society, 81 (1980-81), 39-55; F. R. Berger, 'Gratitude', Ethics, 85 (1975), 298-309; C. Card, 'Gratitude and obligation', American Philosophycal Quarterly, 25 (1988), 115-27; P. Camenisch, 'Gift and gratitude in ethics', Journal of Religious Ethics, 9 (1981), 1-34.
25. The main discussions are A. D. M. Walker, 'Political obligation and argument from gratitude,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17 (1988), 191-211; and Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 7. See also Kloslco 'Political obligation and gratitude', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989), 352-8; Walker, Obligation of gratitude and political obligation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989) 359-64 and Klosko, 'Four arguments against political obligation from gratitude', ; Public Affairs Quarterly, 5 (1991), 33-48. On the concept of gratitude, see Walker, 'Gratefulness and gratitude' Proceedings of the Aristotelan Society, 81 (1980-81), 39-55; F. R. Berger, 'Gratitude', Ethics, 85 (1975), 298-309; C. Card, 'Gratitude and obligation', American Philosophycal Quarterly, 25 (1988), 115-27; P. Camenisch, 'Gift and gratitude in ethics', Journal of Religious Ethics, 9 (1981), 1-34.
26. The main discussions are A. D. M. Walker, 'Political obligation and argument from gratitude,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17 (1988), 191-211; and Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 7. See also Kloslco 'Political obligation and gratitude', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989), 352-8; Walker, Obligation of gratitude and political obligation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989) 359-64 and Klosko, 'Four arguments against political obligation from gratitude', ; Public Affairs Quarterly, 5 (1991), 33-48. On the concept of gratitude, see Walker, 'Gratefulness and gratitude' Proceedings of the Aristotelan Society, 81 (1980-81), 39-55; F. R. Berger, 'Gratitude', Ethics, 85 (1975), 298-309; C. Card, 'Gratitude and obligation', American Philosophycal Quarterly, 25 (1988), 115-27; P. Camenisch, 'Gift and gratitude in ethics', Journal of Religious Ethics, 9 (1981), 1-34.
27. The main discussions are A. D. M. Walker, 'Political obligation and argument from gratitude,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17 (1988), 191-211; and Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 7. See also Kloslco 'Political obligation and gratitude', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989), 352-8; Walker, Obligation of gratitude and political obligation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989) 359-64 and Klosko, 'Four arguments against political obligation from gratitude', ; Public Affairs Quarterly, 5 (1991), 33-48. On the concept of gratitude, see Walker, 'Gratefulness and gratitude' Proceedings of the Aristotelan Society, 81 (1980-81), 39-55; F. R. Berger, 'Gratitude', Ethics, 85 (1975), 298-309; C. Card, 'Gratitude and obligation', American Philosophycal Quarterly, 25 (1988), 115-27; P. Camenisch, 'Gift and gratitude in ethics', Journal of Religious Ethics, 9 (1981), 1-34.
28. Discussion in the following three paragraphs draws on Klosko, 'Four arguments.'
29. For different circumstances in which gratitude obligation arise, see D. A. J. Richards, A Theory of Reason for Actions (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 173-5 189-90, 209-11.
30. Walker, 'Gratefulness,' pp. 50-3; the quotation is from p. 50. For the most important attempt to deal with vagueness problems, see Walker. 'Political obligation'; for discussion, see Klosko, 'Four arguments'.
31. Walker, 'Gratefulness,' pp. 50-3; the quotation is from p. 50. For the most important attempt to deal with vagueness problems, see Walker. 'Political obligation'; for discussion, see Klosko, 'Four arguments'.
32. Walker, 'Gratefulness,' pp. 50-3; the quotation is from p. 50. For the most important attempt to deal with vagueness problems, see Walker. 'Political obligation'; for discussion, see Klosko, 'Four arguments'.
33. Card, 'Gratitude and obligation'.
34. Camenisch, 'Gift and gratitude', p. 4.
35. Walker, 'Gratefulness', p. 49; on the relationship between gratitude and gratefulness, see Walker, pp. 45-7.
36. Walker, 'Gratefulness', p. 49; on the relationship between gratitude and gratefulness, see Walker, pp. 45-7.
37. Berger, 'Gratitude'.
38. See Camenisch, 'Gift and gratitude'.
39. On how institutions can have motives necessary for the generation of political obligations, see Walker, 'Political obligation', pp. 196-9.
40. Locke, Second Treatise, Sec. 119.
41. For criticism of this claim, see Simmons, Moral Principles, ch.4
42. Simmons, Moral Principles, pp. 79-83; Simmons discusses other necessary conditions, which it not necessary to examine here.
43. Simmons, Moral Principles, pp. 79-80
44. J. Plamentaz, Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 170; his emphasis.
45. taula hōmologēto hēmin te kai soi ē emmenein tais dikais hais an hē polis dikazē, Crito 50c4-6; J. Burnet, ed. Platonis Opera, 5 vols (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1900-1907);
46. taula hōmologēto hēmin te kai soi ē emmenein tais dikais hais an hē polis dikazē, Crito 50c4-6; J. Burnet, ed. Platonis Opera, 5 vols (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1900-1907);
47. translation by G. M. A. Grube, in Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates (Indianapolis, Hackett, 1975).
48. Crito, 51d.
49. Crito, 51e.
50. For interesting discussion, see R. Kraut, Socrates and the State (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984).
51. Hart was anticipated by C .D. Broad, 'On the function of false hypotheses in ethics', International Journal of Ethics, 26 (1915-16), 377-97; and A. C. Ewing, 'What would happen if everyone acted like me?' Philosophy, 28 (1953), 16-29.
52. Hart was anticipated by C .D. Broad, 'On the function of false hypotheses in ethics', International Journal of Ethics, 26 (1915-16), 377-97; and A. C. Ewing, 'What would happen if everyone acted like me?' Philosophy, 28 (1953), 16-29.
53. H. L. A. Hart, 'Are there any natural rigths?' Philosophical Review, 64 (1955), 175-91, p. 185.
54. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 164; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA, Harvard Unversity Press, 1971), p. 112. The underlying moral principle is analyzed by R. Arneson, 'The principle of fairness and free-rider problem', Ethics, 92 (1982), 616-33; see also C. Strang, 'What if everyone did that?', Durham University Journal, 53 (1960), 5-10.
55. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 164; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA, Harvard Unversity Press, 1971), p. 112. The underlying moral principle is analyzed by R. Arneson, 'The principle of fairness and free-rider problem', Ethics, 92 (1982), 616-33; see also C. Strang, 'What if everyone did that?', Durham University Journal, 53 (1960), 5-10.
56. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 164; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA, Harvard Unversity Press, 1971), p. 112. The underlying moral principle is analyzed by R. Arneson, 'The principle of fairness and free-rider problem', Ethics, 92 (1982), 616-33; see also C. Strang, 'What if everyone did that?', Durham University Journal, 53 (1960), 5-10.
57. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 164; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA, Harvard Unversity Press, 1971), p. 112. The underlying moral principle is analyzed by R. Arneson, 'The principle of fairness and free-rider problem', Ethics, 92 (1982), 616-33; see also C. Strang, 'What if everyone did that?', Durham University Journal, 53 (1960), 5-10.
58. For full discussion, see Klosko, Principle of Fairness, Ch.2.
59. The need to accept benifits is noted by Rawls, Theory of Justice, pp. 113-6; similarly R. Nozick, Anarchy, state, and Utopia (New York, Basic, 1974), p.95; R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 192-3; R. Sartorius, 'Political authority and political obligation', Virginia Law Review, 67 (1981), 3-17, pp. 14 ff.
60. The need to accept benifits is noted by Rawls, Theory of Justice, pp. 113-6; similarly R. Nozick, Anarchy, state, and Utopia (New York, Basic, 1974), p.95; R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 192-3; R. Sartorius, 'Political authority and political obligation', Virginia Law Review, 67 (1981), 3-17, pp. 14 ff.
61. The need to accept benifits is noted by Rawls, Theory of Justice, pp. 113-6; similarly R. Nozick, Anarchy, state, and Utopia (New York, Basic, 1974), p.95; R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 192-3; R. Sartorius, 'Political authority and political obligation', Virginia Law Review, 67 (1981), 3-17, pp. 14 ff.
62. The need to accept benifits is noted by Rawls, Theory of Justice, pp. 113-6; similarly R. Nozick, Anarchy, state, and Utopia (New York, Basic, 1974), p.95; R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 192-3; R. Sartorius, 'Political authority and political obligation', Virginia Law Review, 67 (1981), 3-17, pp. 14 ff.
63. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 93-4.
64. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 94.
65. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 95.
66. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 95; his emphasis.
67. For reasons of space, I will discuss only (ii) in this paper. In the following discussion, I assume that (ii) and (iii) are met. For discussion of these and other important aspects of the principle, see Klosko, Principle of Fairness.
68. Though I will not discuss other possible members of this class, I do not rule them out.
69. Discussion here draws on Klosko, Principle of Fairness, ch. 2, where I also consider and counter other possible arguments against obligations in these cases.
70. J. Wolff, 'Political obligation, fairness, and independence'., Ratio, 8 (1995), 87-99, 93 ff.
71. Wolff, 'Political obligation,' p. 96.
72. For discussion, including assessing costs and how packages of benefits are constituted, see Klosko, Principle of Fairness, ch. 4.
73. In Britain, contributoins are set by the goverment, but broadcasts are one component of the package of benefits supplied by government, as opposed to the product of an independent agency that furnishes only them. For the importance of this distinction, see Klosko, Principle of Faieness, ch. 4.
74. For this formulation of the principle, see Rawls, 'Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play', in S. Hook, ed., Law and Philosophy (New York, New York University Press, 1964), p. 17.
75. M. Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, ed. and trans., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 78.
76. See esp. Locke, Second Treatise, Sec. 127.
77. See above, n. 45.
78. Though this question cannot be pursued in detail here, I should clarify the claim that the form in which a given presumptive good is provided is necesarry, and so justly comprises the content of a given political obligation. For instance, if country X's national defence needs could be met with a volunteer army instead of a draft, is Brown still required to submit to the draft? Briefly, we should distinguish two levels of analysis here. According to the empirical assumption mentioned on p. 65, a presumptive good such as national defence must be supplied through a pattern of regulated cooperation. Before it is decided how defence will be supplied, citezens can propose alternative means, none of which is necessary. But because some coordinated activity is necesarry, once a particular package of measures had been selected, these are necessary, and Brown must comply with them. at this point, the only alternative to large-scale cooperation is non-supply. If we assume that decesions concerning the provision of presumptive goods are made by democratic procedures, then Brown would retain to work towards changing the form in which a given good is provided, though while still being reqiured to cooperative with the measures currently prescribed.
79. For discussion, see Klosko, Principle of Fairness, ch. 3.
80. The idea of prima facie obligations (or duties) was first presented by W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 18-20. Though Ross's main point still holds, errors in this formulation of the concept are widely noted; see, e.g., J. Searle, 'Prima Facie Obligation', in Raz, ed., Practical Reasoning (Oxford, 1978).
81. The idea of prima facie obligations (or duties) was first presented by W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 18-20. Though Ross's main point still holds, errors in this formulation of the concept are widely noted; see, e.g., J. Searle, 'Prima Facie Obligation', in Raz, ed., Practical Reasoning (Oxford, 1978).
82. For additional limits concerning services that can be required and so gaps in the ability of the principle of fairness to ground obligations to the state, see Klosko, Principle of Fairness, pp. 91, 98-9;
83. for problems concerning individuals for whom political obligations cannot be established, see Klosko, Principle of Fairness, pp. 48-9;
84. Wolff, 'Political obligation'.
85. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1995 meeting of the American Political Science Association, in Chicago, Illinois. I am grateful to Ernie Alleva, Richard Dagger Joshua Dienstag, Alan Dugger. Debra Morris, John Simmons, Mark Tunick, Jonathan Wolff, and anonymous readers for this journal for valuable comments on previous versions. Financial support was provided by a University of Virginia Summer Grant.