Corporate takeovers in the laboratory when shareholders own more than one share

Journal of Business

Volumn 71, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 537-572

  Cadsby, C Bram ^a   Maynes, Elizabeth ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH   (Canada)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039491124     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/209756     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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3. Benoit, J., and Krishna, V. 1985. Finitely repeated games. Econometrica 53 (July): 905-22.
4. Cadsby, C. B., and Maynes, E. 1998, in press. Voluntary provision of threshold public goods: New experimental evidence. Journal of Public Economics.
5. Fudenberg, D., and Tirole, J. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
6. Grossman, S., and Hart, O. 1980. Takeover bids, the free rider problem, and the theory of corporation. Bell Journal of Economics 11 (Spring): 42-64.
7. Harsanyi, J. 1973. Oddnessof the number of equilibrium points: A new proof. International Journal of Game Theory 2:235-50.
8. Holmstrom, B., and Nalebuff, B. 1992. To the raider goes the surplus? A Reexamination of the free-rider problem. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 1 (Spring): 37-62.
9. Kale, J., and Noe, T. 1997. Unconditional and conditional takeover offers: Theory and experimental evidence. Review of Financial Studies 10 (Fall): 735-66.
10. Sunder, S. 1995. Experimental asset markets: A survey. In J. Kagel and A. Roth (eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.