On the formation of political coalitions

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 153, Issue 2, 1997, Pages

  Kirchsteiger, Georg ^a   Puppe, Clemens ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039471915     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. AXELROD, R. [1970], Conflict of Interest, Markham: Chicago.
2. BROWNE, E. and M. FRANKLIN [1973], "Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies," American Political Science Review, 67, 453-467.
3. DE SWAAN, A. [1973], Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation, Elsevier: Amsterdam.
4. GAMSON, W. [1961], "A Theory of Coalition Formation," American Sociological Review, 26, 373-382.
5. LAVER, M. and N. SCHOFIELD [1990], Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe, Oxford University Press: Oxford.
6. PELEG, B. [1980], "A Theory of Coalition Formation in Committees," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, 115-134.
7. _ [1981], "Coalition Formation in Simple Games With Dominant Players," International Journal of Game Theory, 10, 11-33.
8. PLOTT, C. [1967], "A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule," American Economic Review, 57, 787-806.
9. RIKER, W. [1962], The Theory of Political Coalitions, Yale University Press: New Haven, CT.
10. SCHOFIELD, N. [1983], "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," Review of Economic Studies, 50, 696-705.
11. TAYLOR, M. [1972], "On the Theory of Government Coalition Formation," British Journal of Political Science, 2, 1-73.
12. VON NEUMANN, J. and O. MORGENSTERN [1953], Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.