Revolutions and Attributions: Making Sense of Eisenhower Administration Policies in Bolivia and Guatemala

Diplomatic History

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 185-213

  Lehman, Kenneth ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039350696     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-7709.00063     Document Type: Article

References (169)

1. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer say the decision on Guatemala was made at an early August 1953 meeting of the 10/2 Committee, charged by the National Security Council with supervision of covert activities, but Richard Immerman is not certain that the decision can be pinpointed to that specific meeting. See Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (New York, 1982), 108; and Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982), 134. U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 29 (20 July 1953): 82, and (2 November 1953): 584. U.S. expenditure estimates come from James W. Wilkie, The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid since 1952 (Los Angeles, 1969), 48; and Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 111-12.
2. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer say the decision on Guatemala was made at an early August 1953 meeting of the 10/2 Committee, charged by the National Security Council with supervision of covert activities, but Richard Immerman is not certain that the decision can be pinpointed to that specific meeting. See Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (New York, 1982), 108; and Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982), 134. U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 29 (20 July 1953): 82, and (2 November 1953): 584. U.S. expenditure estimates come from James W. Wilkie, The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid since 1952 (Los Angeles, 1969), 48; and Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 111-12.
3. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer say the decision on Guatemala was made at an early August 1953 meeting of the 10/2 Committee, charged by the National Security Council with supervision of covert activities, but Richard Immerman is not certain that the decision can be pinpointed to that specific meeting. See Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (New York, 1982), 108; and Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982), 134. U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 29 (20 July 1953): 82, and (2 November 1953): 584. U.S. expenditure estimates come from James W. Wilkie, The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid since 1952 (Los Angeles, 1969), 48; and Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 111-12.
4. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer say the decision on Guatemala was made at an early August 1953 meeting of the 10/2 Committee, charged by the National Security Council with supervision of covert activities, but Richard Immerman is not certain that the decision can be pinpointed to that specific meeting. See Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (New York, 1982), 108; and Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982), 134. U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 29 (20 July 1953): 82, and (2 November 1953): 584. U.S. expenditure estimates come from James W. Wilkie, The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid since 1952 (Los Angeles, 1969), 48; and Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 111-12.
5. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer say the decision on Guatemala was made at an early August 1953 meeting of the 10/2 Committee, charged by the National Security Council with supervision of covert activities, but Richard Immerman is not certain that the decision can be pinpointed to that specific meeting. See Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (New York, 1982), 108; and Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982), 134. U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 29 (20 July 1953): 82, and (2 November 1953): 584. U.S. expenditure estimates come from James W. Wilkie, The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid since 1952 (Los Angeles, 1969), 48; and Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 111-12.
6. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer say the decision on Guatemala was made at an early August 1953 meeting of the 10/2 Committee, charged by the National Security Council with supervision of covert activities, but Richard Immerman is not certain that the decision can be pinpointed to that specific meeting. See Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (New York, 1982), 108; and Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982), 134. U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 29 (20 July 1953): 82, and (2 November 1953): 584. U.S. expenditure estimates come from James W. Wilkie, The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid since 1952 (Los Angeles, 1969), 48; and Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 111-12.
7. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer say the decision on Guatemala was made at an early August 1953 meeting of the 10/2 Committee, charged by the National Security Council with supervision of covert activities, but Richard Immerman is not certain that the decision can be pinpointed to that specific meeting. See Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (New York, 1982), 108; and Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982), 134. U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 29 (20 July 1953): 82, and (2 November 1953): 584. U.S. expenditure estimates come from James W. Wilkie, The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid since 1952 (Los Angeles, 1969), 48; and Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 111-12.
8. There are several excellent historical and analytical studies in English of Bolivia's 1952 revolution. They include James Malloy, Bolivia, the Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh, 1970); Christopher Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule (New York, 1977); James Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982 (London, 1984); Herbert S. Klein, Bolivia, the Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society, 2d ed. (New York, 1992); James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds., Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952 (Pittsburgh, 1971); and Laurence Whitehead, "The State and Sectional Interests in the Bolivian Case," European Journal of Political Research 3:2 (1975): 115-46. The best recent source on the nature and goals of postrevolutionary governments in Guatemala is Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, 1991).
9. There are several excellent historical and analytical studies in English of Bolivia's 1952 revolution. They include James Malloy, Bolivia, the Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh, 1970); Christopher Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule (New York, 1977); James Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982 (London, 1984); Herbert S. Klein, Bolivia, the Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society, 2d ed. (New York, 1992); James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds., Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952 (Pittsburgh, 1971); and Laurence Whitehead, "The State and Sectional Interests in the Bolivian Case," European Journal of Political Research 3:2 (1975): 115-46. The best recent source on the nature and goals of postrevolutionary governments in Guatemala is Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, 1991).
10. There are several excellent historical and analytical studies in English of Bolivia's 1952 revolution. They include James Malloy, Bolivia, the Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh, 1970); Christopher Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule (New York, 1977); James Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982 (London, 1984); Herbert S. Klein, Bolivia, the Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society, 2d ed. (New York, 1992); James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds., Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952 (Pittsburgh, 1971); and Laurence Whitehead, "The State and Sectional Interests in the Bolivian Case," European Journal of Political Research 3:2 (1975): 115-46. The best recent source on the nature and goals of postrevolutionary governments in Guatemala is Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, 1991).
11. There are several excellent historical and analytical studies in English of Bolivia's 1952 revolution. They include James Malloy, Bolivia, the Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh, 1970); Christopher Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule (New York, 1977); James Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982 (London, 1984); Herbert S. Klein, Bolivia, the Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society, 2d ed. (New York, 1992); James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds., Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952 (Pittsburgh, 1971); and Laurence Whitehead, "The State and Sectional Interests in the Bolivian Case," European Journal of Political Research 3:2 (1975): 115-46. The best recent source on the nature and goals of postrevolutionary governments in Guatemala is Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, 1991).
12. There are several excellent historical and analytical studies in English of Bolivia's 1952 revolution. They include James Malloy, Bolivia, the Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh, 1970); Christopher Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule (New York, 1977); James Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982 (London, 1984); Herbert S. Klein, Bolivia, the Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society, 2d ed. (New York, 1992); James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds., Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952 (Pittsburgh, 1971); and Laurence Whitehead, "The State and Sectional Interests in the Bolivian Case," European Journal of Political Research 3:2 (1975): 115-46. The best recent source on the nature and goals of postrevolutionary governments in Guatemala is Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, 1991).
13. There are several excellent historical and analytical studies in English of Bolivia's 1952 revolution. They include James Malloy, Bolivia, the Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh, 1970); Christopher Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule (New York, 1977); James Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982 (London, 1984); Herbert S. Klein, Bolivia, the Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society, 2d ed. (New York, 1992); James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds., Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952 (Pittsburgh, 1971); and Laurence Whitehead, "The State and Sectional Interests in the Bolivian Case," European Journal of Political Research 3:2 (1975): 115-46. The best recent source on the nature and goals of postrevolutionary governments in Guatemala is Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, 1991).
14. There are several excellent historical and analytical studies in English of Bolivia's 1952 revolution. They include James Malloy, Bolivia, the Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh, 1970); Christopher Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule (New York, 1977); James Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982 (London, 1984); Herbert S. Klein, Bolivia, the Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society, 2d ed. (New York, 1992); James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds., Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952 (Pittsburgh, 1971); and Laurence Whitehead, "The State and Sectional Interests in the Bolivian Case," European Journal of Political Research 3:2 (1975): 115-46. The best recent source on the nature and goals of postrevolutionary governments in Guatemala is Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, 1991).
15. John Moors Cabot, "The Political Basis for Continental Solidarity," Toward Our Common American Destiny (Medford, MA, n.d.), 86.
16. Ibid., 88.
17. Memorandum of a conversation with Miller, Thomas Mann, and Rollin Atwood sent from J. H. A. Watson to T. Garvey of the American Department of the British Foreign Office, 2 December 1952, cited in John Stephen Zunes, "Decisions on Intervention: United States Response to Third World Nationalist Governments, 1950-1957" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1990), 204. Miller did state that the process of Soviet penetration and exploitation had proceeded "furthest" in Guatemala but added that it "was also evident in certain other republics."
18. Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh, 1976), 128-50, 151-77, 202-10. See chap. 7 for his explanatory thesis.
19. Zunes, "Decisions on Intervention," 29-32. See also Zunes's chapter summations, chaps. 2 and 3. Zunes notes in his introduction that he does not directly address the decision-making process or "recent critiques involving cognitive psychology" (2-3). His purpose is to understand what decision makers perceived to be the key issues and not whether such perceptions were balanced and accurate, a matter that this essay addresses. Another dissertation out of Cornell is less interested in the differences between policies in Bolivia and in Guatemala than in the underlying similarities. See James Forshee Siekmeier, "Fighting Economic Nationalism: U.S. Aid and Development Policy toward Latin America, 1953-1961" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1993). This essay concurs with Siekmeier that there were similarities both in basic objectives and in long-term results, but is interested in why views of the two revolutionary movements were so different. Taking an approach closest to the one taken in this essay is Martha L. Cottam, Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh, 1994) . Cottam includes Guatemala and Bolivia in her examination of cognitive perceptions and their influence on U.S. policymakers. This essay compares and contrasts the two cases more directly and provides further evidence to support Cottam's thesis. See Cottam, chaps, 1 and 2.
20. Zunes, "Decisions on Intervention," 29-32. See also Zunes's chapter summations, chaps. 2 and 3. Zunes notes in his introduction that he does not directly address the decision-making process or "recent critiques involving cognitive psychology" (2-3). His purpose is to understand what decision makers perceived to be the key issues and not whether such perceptions were balanced and accurate, a matter that this essay addresses. Another dissertation out of Cornell is less interested in the differences between policies in Bolivia and in Guatemala than in the underlying similarities. See James Forshee Siekmeier, "Fighting Economic Nationalism: U.S. Aid and Development Policy toward Latin America, 1953-1961" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1993). This essay concurs with Siekmeier that there were similarities both in basic objectives and in long-term results, but is interested in why views of the two revolutionary movements were so different. Taking an approach closest to the one taken in this essay is Martha L. Cottam, Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh, 1994) . Cottam includes Guatemala and Bolivia in her examination of cognitive perceptions and their influence on U.S. policymakers. This essay compares and contrasts the two cases more directly and provides further evidence to support Cottam's thesis. See Cottam, chaps, 1 and 2.
21. Zunes, "Decisions on Intervention," 29-32. See also Zunes's chapter summations, chaps. 2 and 3. Zunes notes in his introduction that he does not directly address the decision-making process or "recent critiques involving cognitive psychology" (2-3). His purpose is to understand what decision makers perceived to be the key issues and not whether such perceptions were balanced and accurate, a matter that this essay addresses. Another dissertation out of Cornell is less interested in the differences between policies in Bolivia and in Guatemala than in the underlying similarities. See James Forshee Siekmeier, "Fighting Economic Nationalism: U.S. Aid and Development Policy toward Latin America, 1953-1961" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1993). This essay concurs with Siekmeier that there were similarities both in basic objectives and in long-term results, but is interested in why views of the two revolutionary movements were so different. Taking an approach closest to the one taken in this essay is Martha L. Cottam, Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh, 1994) . Cottam includes Guatemala and Bolivia in her examination of cognitive perceptions and their influence on U.S. policymakers. This essay compares and contrasts the two cases more directly and provides further evidence to support Cottam's thesis. See Cottam, chaps, 1 and 2.
22. Zunes, "Decisions on Intervention," 29-32. See also Zunes's chapter summations, chaps. 2 and 3. Zunes notes in his introduction that he does not directly address the decision-making process or "recent critiques involving cognitive psychology" (2-3). His purpose is to understand what decision makers perceived to be the key issues and not whether such perceptions were balanced and accurate, a matter that this essay addresses. Another dissertation out of Cornell is less interested in the differences between policies in Bolivia and in Guatemala than in the underlying similarities. See James Forshee Siekmeier, "Fighting Economic Nationalism: U.S. Aid and Development Policy toward Latin America, 1953-1961" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1993). This essay concurs with Siekmeier that there were similarities both in basic objectives and in long-term results, but is interested in why views of the two revolutionary movements were so different. Taking an approach closest to the one taken in this essay is Martha L. Cottam, Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh, 1994) . Cottam includes Guatemala and Bolivia in her examination of cognitive perceptions and their influence on U.S. policymakers. This essay compares and contrasts the two cases more directly and provides further evidence to support Cottam's thesis. See Cottam, chaps, 1 and 2.
23. Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton, 1987), 11, 25-26.
24. Ibid., 11. Schoultz carried out most of his interviews in the late 1970s and 1980s, but studies of Eisenhower policies toward Latin America clearly reveal that the schism he describes existed in the 1950s as well. See Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill, 1986), chap. 4, esp. 68; and Thomas Zoumaras, "The Path to Pan Americanism: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy toward Latin America" (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1987), esp. chap. 3. Jules Benjamin emphasizes the essential agreements on U.S. hegemony that run beneath the apparent schism. See Jules R. Benjamin, "The Framework of U.S. Relations with Latin America in the Twentieth Century: An Interpretive Essay," Diplomatic History 11 (Spring 1987): 106.
25. Ibid., 11. Schoultz carried out most of his interviews in the late 1970s and 1980s, but studies of Eisenhower policies toward Latin America clearly reveal that the schism he describes existed in the 1950s as well. See Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill, 1986), chap. 4, esp. 68; and Thomas Zoumaras, "The Path to Pan Americanism: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy toward Latin America" (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1987), esp. chap. 3. Jules Benjamin emphasizes the essential agreements on U.S. hegemony that run beneath the apparent schism. See Jules R. Benjamin, "The Framework of U.S. Relations with Latin America in the Twentieth Century: An Interpretive Essay," Diplomatic History 11 (Spring 1987): 106.
26. Ibid., 11. Schoultz carried out most of his interviews in the late 1970s and 1980s, but studies of Eisenhower policies toward Latin America clearly reveal that the schism he describes existed in the 1950s as well. See Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill, 1986), chap. 4, esp. 68; and Thomas Zoumaras, "The Path to Pan Americanism: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy toward Latin America" (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1987), esp. chap. 3. Jules Benjamin emphasizes the essential agreements on U.S. hegemony that run beneath the apparent schism. See Jules R. Benjamin, "The Framework of U.S. Relations with Latin America in the Twentieth Century: An Interpretive Essay," Diplomatic History 11 (Spring 1987): 106.
27. Ibid., 11. Schoultz carried out most of his interviews in the late 1970s and 1980s, but studies of Eisenhower policies toward Latin America clearly reveal that the schism he describes existed in the 1950s as well. See Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill, 1986), chap. 4, esp. 68; and Thomas Zoumaras, "The Path to Pan Americanism: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy toward Latin America" (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1987), esp. chap. 3. Jules Benjamin emphasizes the essential agreements on U.S. hegemony that run beneath the apparent schism. See Jules R. Benjamin, "The Framework of U.S. Relations with Latin America in the Twentieth Century: An Interpretive Essay," Diplomatic History 11 (Spring 1987): 106.
28. Cabot apparently was not privy to the initial decision; he commented in his memoirs that the undersecretary "nodded and smiled," giving him the impression that plans had already begun. Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 135.
29. Richard H. Immerman, "Psychology," Journal of American History 77 (June 1990): 178; idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 323; and Janice Gross Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat," Political Psychology 9 (1988): 247-48. Alexander L. George has suggested the methodology of "structured, focused, comparison" as a way to test theory. The approach here is closer to a "disciplined-configurative" comparison that examines similar cases by mobilizing existing theory. See Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused, Comparison," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York, 1979), 43-63; and Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, 1985), 59.
30. Richard H. Immerman, "Psychology," Journal of American History 77 (June 1990): 178; idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 323; and Janice Gross Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat," Political Psychology 9 (1988): 247-48. Alexander L. George has suggested the methodology of "structured, focused, comparison" as a way to test theory. The approach here is closer to a "disciplined-configurative" comparison that examines similar cases by mobilizing existing theory. See Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused, Comparison," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York, 1979), 43-63; and Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, 1985), 59.
31. Richard H. Immerman, "Psychology," Journal of American History 77 (June 1990): 178; idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 323; and Janice Gross Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat," Political Psychology 9 (1988): 247-48. Alexander L. George has suggested the methodology of "structured, focused, comparison" as a way to test theory. The approach here is closer to a "disciplined-configurative" comparison that examines similar cases by mobilizing existing theory. See Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused, Comparison," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York, 1979), 43-63; and Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, 1985), 59.
32. Richard H. Immerman, "Psychology," Journal of American History 77 (June 1990): 178; idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 323; and Janice Gross Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat," Political Psychology 9 (1988): 247-48. Alexander L. George has suggested the methodology of "structured, focused, comparison" as a way to test theory. The approach here is closer to a "disciplined-configurative" comparison that examines similar cases by mobilizing existing theory. See Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused, Comparison," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York, 1979), 43-63; and Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, 1985), 59.
33. Richard H. Immerman, "Psychology," Journal of American History 77 (June 1990): 178; idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 323; and Janice Gross Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat," Political Psychology 9 (1988): 247-48. Alexander L. George has suggested the methodology of "structured, focused, comparison" as a way to test theory. The approach here is closer to a "disciplined-configurative" comparison that examines similar cases by mobilizing existing theory. See Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused, Comparison," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York, 1979), 43-63; and Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, 1985), 59.
34. See Blasier, Hovering Giant, 154-58, 164-67; Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 82, 101-5, 197-98; and Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, chap. 3. Alex Hybel examines what he believes are the cognitive origins of the misperception. Alex Roberto Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford, 1990), chap. 4. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer develop an argument made by many Latin American analysts, that Communists never presented a viable threat to either the Arbenz government or U.S. security and that the real issue all along was Guatemala's economic nationalism and its challenge to North American business. Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 107, 108. Among the scholars who have argued that communism did, in fact, pose a genuine threat in Guatemala are Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1959 (New York, 1959), 186; and Frederick W. Marks III, "The CIA and Castillo Armas in Guatemala, 1954: New Clues to an Old Puzzle," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 67-86. Stephen Rabe provides an effective rebuttal to Marks in the same issue: "The Clues Didn't Check Out: Commentary on 'The CIA and Castillo Armas,'" 87-95.
35. See Blasier, Hovering Giant, 154-58, 164-67; Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 82, 101-5, 197-98; and Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, chap. 3. Alex Hybel examines what he believes are the cognitive origins of the misperception. Alex Roberto Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford, 1990), chap. 4. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer develop an argument made by many Latin American analysts, that Communists never presented a viable threat to either the Arbenz government or U.S. security and that the real issue all along was Guatemala's economic nationalism and its challenge to North American business. Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 107, 108. Among the scholars who have argued that communism did, in fact, pose a genuine threat in Guatemala are Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1959 (New York, 1959), 186; and Frederick W. Marks III, "The CIA and Castillo Armas in Guatemala, 1954: New Clues to an Old Puzzle," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 67-86. Stephen Rabe provides an effective rebuttal to Marks in the same issue: "The Clues Didn't Check Out: Commentary on 'The CIA and Castillo Armas,'" 87-95.
36. See Blasier, Hovering Giant, 154-58, 164-67; Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 82, 101-5, 197-98; and Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, chap. 3. Alex Hybel examines what he believes are the cognitive origins of the misperception. Alex Roberto Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford, 1990), chap. 4. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer develop an argument made by many Latin American analysts, that Communists never presented a viable threat to either the Arbenz government or U.S. security and that the real issue all along was Guatemala's economic nationalism and its challenge to North American business. Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 107, 108. Among the scholars who have argued that communism did, in fact, pose a genuine threat in Guatemala are Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1959 (New York, 1959), 186; and Frederick W. Marks III, "The CIA and Castillo Armas in Guatemala, 1954: New Clues to an Old Puzzle," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 67-86. Stephen Rabe provides an effective rebuttal to Marks in the same issue: "The Clues Didn't Check Out: Commentary on 'The CIA and Castillo Armas,'" 87-95.
37. See Blasier, Hovering Giant, 154-58, 164-67; Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 82, 101-5, 197-98; and Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, chap. 3. Alex Hybel examines what he believes are the cognitive origins of the misperception. Alex Roberto Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford, 1990), chap. 4. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer develop an argument made by many Latin American analysts, that Communists never presented a viable threat to either the Arbenz government or U.S. security and that the real issue all along was Guatemala's economic nationalism and its challenge to North American business. Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 107, 108. Among the scholars who have argued that communism did, in fact, pose a genuine threat in Guatemala are Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1959 (New York, 1959), 186; and Frederick W. Marks III, "The CIA and Castillo Armas in Guatemala, 1954: New Clues to an Old Puzzle," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 67-86. Stephen Rabe provides an effective rebuttal to Marks in the same issue: "The Clues Didn't Check Out: Commentary on 'The CIA and Castillo Armas,'" 87-95.
38. See Blasier, Hovering Giant, 154-58, 164-67; Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 82, 101-5, 197-98; and Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, chap. 3. Alex Hybel examines what he believes are the cognitive origins of the misperception. Alex Roberto Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford, 1990), chap. 4. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer develop an argument made by many Latin American analysts, that Communists never presented a viable threat to either the Arbenz government or U.S. security and that the real issue all along was Guatemala's economic nationalism and its challenge to North American business. Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 107, 108. Among the scholars who have argued that communism did, in fact, pose a genuine threat in Guatemala are Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1959 (New York, 1959), 186; and Frederick W. Marks III, "The CIA and Castillo Armas in Guatemala, 1954: New Clues to an Old Puzzle," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 67-86. Stephen Rabe provides an effective rebuttal to Marks in the same issue: "The Clues Didn't Check Out: Commentary on 'The CIA and Castillo Armas,'" 87-95.
39. See Blasier, Hovering Giant, 154-58, 164-67; Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 82, 101-5, 197-98; and Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, chap. 3. Alex Hybel examines what he believes are the cognitive origins of the misperception. Alex Roberto Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford, 1990), chap. 4. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer develop an argument made by many Latin American analysts, that Communists never presented a viable threat to either the Arbenz government or U.S. security and that the real issue all along was Guatemala's economic nationalism and its challenge to North American business. Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 107, 108. Among the scholars who have argued that communism did, in fact, pose a genuine threat in Guatemala are Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1959 (New York, 1959), 186; and Frederick W. Marks III, "The CIA and Castillo Armas in Guatemala, 1954: New Clues to an Old Puzzle," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 67-86. Stephen Rabe provides an effective rebuttal to Marks in the same issue: "The Clues Didn't Check Out: Commentary on 'The CIA and Castillo Armas,'" 87-95.
40. See Blasier, Hovering Giant, 154-58, 164-67; Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 82, 101-5, 197-98; and Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, chap. 3. Alex Hybel examines what he believes are the cognitive origins of the misperception. Alex Roberto Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford, 1990), chap. 4. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer develop an argument made by many Latin American analysts, that Communists never presented a viable threat to either the Arbenz government or U.S. security and that the real issue all along was Guatemala's economic nationalism and its challenge to North American business. Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 107, 108. Among the scholars who have argued that communism did, in fact, pose a genuine threat in Guatemala are Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1959 (New York, 1959), 186; and Frederick W. Marks III, "The CIA and Castillo Armas in Guatemala, 1954: New Clues to an Old Puzzle," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 67-86. Stephen Rabe provides an effective rebuttal to Marks in the same issue: "The Clues Didn't Check Out: Commentary on 'The CIA and Castillo Armas,'" 87-95.
41. See Blasier, Hovering Giant, 154-58, 164-67; Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 82, 101-5, 197-98; and Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, chap. 3. Alex Hybel examines what he believes are the cognitive origins of the misperception. Alex Roberto Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Oxford, 1990), chap. 4. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer develop an argument made by many Latin American analysts, that Communists never presented a viable threat to either the Arbenz government or U.S. security and that the real issue all along was Guatemala's economic nationalism and its challenge to North American business. Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 107, 108. Among the scholars who have argued that communism did, in fact, pose a genuine threat in Guatemala are Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1959 (New York, 1959), 186; and Frederick W. Marks III, "The CIA and Castillo Armas in Guatemala, 1954: New Clues to an Old Puzzle," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 67-86. Stephen Rabe provides an effective rebuttal to Marks in the same issue: "The Clues Didn't Check Out: Commentary on 'The CIA and Castillo Armas,'" 87-95.
42. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 4-7, 362. Gleijeses notes that while Arbenz did not join the PGT until 1957 and should not formally be called a Communist, the term "fellow-traveler fails to convey the intensity of his commitment" (147). It is perhaps important to note that Gleijeses's key sources, María de Arbenz (a committed Communist) and Manuel Fortuny (head of the PGT), might have cause to overstate Arbenz's identification with communism. Although U.S. intelligence agents poured over Guatemalan archival records after the coup, they could find "nothing conclusive" to tie the Arbenz regime to Communists or the Guatemalan Communists to Moscow. See Stephen G. Rabe, "Latin America and Anticommunism," in John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, ed. Richard H. Immerman (Princeton, 1990), 176-77.
43. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 4-7, 362. Gleijeses notes that while Arbenz did not join the PGT until 1957 and should not formally be called a Communist, the term "fellow-traveler fails to convey the intensity of his commitment" (147). It is perhaps important to note that Gleijeses's key sources, María de Arbenz (a committed Communist) and Manuel Fortuny (head of the PGT), might have cause to overstate Arbenz's identification with communism. Although U.S. intelligence agents poured over Guatemalan archival records after the coup, they could find "nothing conclusive" to tie the Arbenz regime to Communists or the Guatemalan Communists to Moscow. See Stephen G. Rabe, "Latin America and Anticommunism," in John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, ed. Richard H. Immerman (Princeton, 1990), 176-77.
44. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 147-48, 187, 200, 377-81.
45. Ambassador Patterson's full quote is found in Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 102. For discussions of the growing U.S. conviction that the Guatemalan government was Communist influenced see ibid., 82-109; Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York, 1984), 116-23; Blasier, Hovering Giant, 155-58; and Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, chaps. 6 and 11.
46. Ambassador Patterson's full quote is found in Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 102. For discussions of the growing U.S. conviction that the Guatemalan government was Communist influenced see ibid., 82-109; Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York, 1984), 116-23; Blasier, Hovering Giant, 155-58; and Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, chaps. 6 and 11.
47. Ambassador Patterson's full quote is found in Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 102. For discussions of the growing U.S. conviction that the Guatemalan government was Communist influenced see ibid., 82-109; Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York, 1984), 116-23; Blasier, Hovering Giant, 155-58; and Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, chaps. 6 and 11.
48. Ambassador Patterson's full quote is found in Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 102. For discussions of the growing U.S. conviction that the Guatemalan government was Communist influenced see ibid., 82-109; Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York, 1984), 116-23; Blasier, Hovering Giant, 155-58; and Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, chaps. 6 and 11.
49. Ambassador Patterson's full quote is found in Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 102. For discussions of the growing U.S. conviction that the Guatemalan government was Communist influenced see ibid., 82-109; Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York, 1984), 116-23; Blasier, Hovering Giant, 155-58; and Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, chaps. 6 and 11.
50. Air Attache's Report, dispatch 736 from La Paz, 17 April 1952, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, 724.00/4-1752, National Archives, Washington, DC. Accounts in English of the revolution include Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, 38-45; Malloy, Uncompleted Revolution, 156-64; and Mitchell, Legacy of Populism, 32-33.
51. Air Attache's Report, dispatch 736 from La Paz, 17 April 1952, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, 724.00/4-1752, National Archives, Washington, DC. Accounts in English of the revolution include Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, 38-45; Malloy, Uncompleted Revolution, 156-64; and Mitchell, Legacy of Populism, 32-33.
52. Air Attache's Report, dispatch 736 from La Paz, 17 April 1952, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, 724.00/4-1752, National Archives, Washington, DC. Accounts in English of the revolution include Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, 38-45; Malloy, Uncompleted Revolution, 156-64; and Mitchell, Legacy of Populism, 32-33.
53. Time, 21 April 1952, 38.
54. State Department records in the National Archives reveal the degree to which U.S. officials closely monitored Bolivia for signs of Communist infiltration. For information on the so-called Communist Pact and U.S. response see embassy in La Paz tel. 530 to Acheson and Acheson's response, tel. 311, 11 May 1951, RG 59, 724.00/5-1151. For the Guatemalan connection see embassy in Guatemala City dispatch 1028 to Department of State, 15 April 1953, RG 59, 724.02/4-1552.
55. Dispatch 470, "President Paz's Ideological Position," 12 January 1953, RG 59, 724.11/1-1253.
56. Dispatch 699 from La Paz, 30 April 1953, RG 59, 611.24/4-3053; Sparks tel. to State Department, 7 May 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954 (Washington, 1984), 4:527-28. Ultima Hora (La Paz), 2 May 1953, 4, gives the text of Paz's speech; and Hudson office memo to Cabot, Mann, and Atwood, 11 May 1953, RG 59, 611.24/5-453, reviews it for the State Department.
57. Dispatch 699 from La Paz, 30 April 1953, RG 59, 611.24/4-3053; Sparks tel. to State Department, 7 May 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954 (Washington, 1984), 4:527-28. Ultima Hora (La Paz), 2 May 1953, 4, gives the text of Paz's speech; and Hudson office memo to Cabot, Mann, and Atwood, 11 May 1953, RG 59, 611.24/5-453, reviews it for the State Department.
58. Dispatch 258 from La Paz, 23 October 1953, RG 59, 724.00/10-2353. Statement by Thruston Morton of the State Department to the United States Senate, U.S. Senate, Critical Materials, Sen. Doc. 83, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1956, 116.
59. See Cole Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," in Malloy and Thorn, eds., Beyond the Revolution, 58-61, 65-69. The significance of the earlier charges of fascism can perhaps be seen in 1950 embassy survey of the Communist threat in Bolivia, which stated that the MMR's strong nationalism and opposition to foreign political direction provide a potent defense against a Communist takeover. See "Survey of Communism in Bolivia," 29 March 1950, RG 59, 724.00/3- 3050. The MNR had in fact, defined itself against the more orthodox Marxist Left ever since both tendencies emerged in the 1930s. See Guillermo Lora, A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 1848-1971 (Cambridge, England, 1977), 163-66.
60. See Cole Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," in Malloy and Thorn, eds., Beyond the Revolution, 58-61, 65-69. The significance of the earlier charges of fascism can perhaps be seen in 1950 embassy survey of the Communist threat in Bolivia, which stated that the MMR's strong nationalism and opposition to foreign political direction provide a potent defense against a Communist takeover. See "Survey of Communism in Bolivia," 29 March 1950, RG 59, 724.00/3-3050. The MNR had in fact, defined itself against the more orthodox Marxist Left ever since both tendencies emerged in the 1930s. See Guillermo Lora, A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 1848-1971 (Cambridge, England, 1977), 163-66.
61. See Cole Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," in Malloy and Thorn, eds., Beyond the Revolution, 58-61, 65-69. The significance of the earlier charges of fascism can perhaps be seen in 1950 embassy survey of the Communist threat in Bolivia, which stated that the MMR's strong nationalism and opposition to foreign political direction provide a potent defense against a Communist takeover. See "Survey of Communism in Bolivia," 29 March 1950, RG 59, 724.00/3- 3050. The MNR had in fact, defined itself against the more orthodox Marxist Left ever since both tendencies emerged in the 1930s. See Guillermo Lora, A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 1848-1971 (Cambridge, England, 1977), 163-66.
62. Zunes, "Decisions on Intervention," 13. Immerman discusses the thesis of the book Yenan Way, written by one-time Latin American Communist Eudocio Racines. See Immerman, CIA in Guatemala 104-5. Hybel emphasizes the constructs of analogical thinking and, with Immerman, believes that the Yenan analogy was crucial to U.S. policymakers as they interpreted what was happening in Guatemala. Hybel, How Leaders Reason, 66-67. In Bolivia, for reasons developed in the text, the key analogy drawn by U.S. policymakers was not with China and Mao Zedong but with pre-Soviet Russia and Kerenski.
63. Zunes, "Decisions on Intervention," 13. Immerman discusses the thesis of the book Yenan Way, written by one-time Latin American Communist Eudocio Racines. See Immerman, CIA in Guatemala 104-5. Hybel emphasizes the constructs of analogical thinking and, with Immerman, believes that the Yenan analogy was crucial to U.S. policymakers as they interpreted what was happening in Guatemala. Hybel, How Leaders Reason, 66-67. In Bolivia, for reasons developed in the text, the key analogy drawn by U.S. policymakers was not with China and Mao Zedong but with pre-Soviet Russia and Kerenski.
64. Zunes, "Decisions on Intervention," 13. Immerman discusses the thesis of the book Yenan Way, written by one-time Latin American Communist Eudocio Racines. See Immerman, CIA in Guatemala 104-5. Hybel emphasizes the constructs of analogical thinking and, with Immerman, believes that the Yenan analogy was crucial to U.S. policymakers as they interpreted what was happening in Guatemala. Hybel, How Leaders Reason, 66-67. In Bolivia, for reasons developed in the text, the key analogy drawn by U.S. policymakers was not with China and Mao Zedong but with pre-Soviet Russia and Kerenski.
65. Zunes, "Decisions on Intervention," 13. Immerman discusses the thesis of the book Yenan Way, written by one-time Latin American Communist Eudocio Racines. See Immerman, CIA in Guatemala 104-5. Hybel emphasizes the constructs of analogical thinking and, with Immerman, believes that the Yenan analogy was crucial to U.S. policymakers as they interpreted what was happening in Guatemala. Hybel, How Leaders Reason, 66-67. In Bolivia, for reasons developed in the text, the key analogy drawn by U.S. policymakers was not with China and Mao Zedong but with pre-Soviet Russia and Kerenski.
66. Larson, Origins of Containment, 34-42; Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology, 255-56. For other discussions of the usefulness of cognitive theory and particularly of attribution theory to historians of international relations see Alexander L. George, "Cognitive Beliefs and Decision- Making Behavior" in Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Boulder, 1979), 98-99; Ole R. Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 13 (Winter 1989): 36-37; Immerman, "Psychology," 170-72; and William O. Walker III, "Decision-making Theory and Narcotic Foreign Policy: Implications for Historical Analysis," Diplomatic History 15 (Winter 1991):37-40. Hybel has reservations about the usefulness of attribution theory, which he defines more narrowly than does Larson or Stein. See his arguments in How Leaders Reason, chap. 10.
67. Larson, Origins of Containment, 34-42; Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology," 255-56. For other discussions of the usefulness of cognitive theory and particularly of attribution theory to historians of international relations see Alexander L. George, "Cognitive Beliefs and Decision- Making Behavior" in Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Boulder, 1979), 98-99; Ole R. Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 13 (Winter 1989): 36-37; Immerman, "Psychology," 170-72; and William O. Walker III, "Decision-making Theory and Narcotic Foreign Policy: Implications for Historical Analysis," Diplomatic History 15 (Winter 1991):37-40. Hybel has reservations about the usefulness of attribution theory, which he defines more narrowly than does Larson or Stein. See his arguments in How Leaders Reason, chap. 10.
68. Larson, Origins of Containment, 34-42; Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology," 255-56. For other discussions of the usefulness of cognitive theory and particularly of attribution theory to historians of international relations see Alexander L. George, "Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior" in Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Boulder, 1979), 98-99; Ole R. Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 13 (Winter 1989): 36-37; Immerman, "Psychology," 170-72; and William O. Walker III, "Decision-making Theory and Narcotic Foreign Policy: Implications for Historical Analysis," Diplomatic History 15 (Winter 1991):37-40. Hybel has reservations about the usefulness of attribution theory, which he defines more narrowly than does Larson or Stein. See his arguments in How Leaders Reason, chap. 10.
69. Larson, Origins of Containment, 34-42; Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology," 255-56. For other discussions of the usefulness of cognitive theory and particularly of attribution theory to historians of international relations see Alexander L. George, "Cognitive Beliefs and Decision- Making Behavior" in Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Boulder, 1979), 98-99; Ole R. Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 13 (Winter 1989): 36-37; Immerman, "Psychology," 170-72; and William O. Walker III, "Decision-making Theory and Narcotic Foreign Policy: Implications for Historical Analysis," Diplomatic History 15 (Winter 1991):37-40. Hybel has reservations about the usefulness of attribution theory, which he defines more narrowly than does Larson or Stein. See his arguments in How Leaders Reason, chap. 10.
70. Larson, Origins of Containment, 34-42; Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology," 255-56. For other discussions of the usefulness of cognitive theory and particularly of attribution theory to historians of international relations see Alexander L. George, "Cognitive Beliefs and Decision- Making Behavior" in Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Boulder, 1979), 98-99; Ole R. Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 13 (Winter 1989): 36-37; Immerman, "Psychology," 170-72; and William O. Walker III, "Decision-making Theory and Narcotic Foreign Policy: Implications for Historical Analysis," Diplomatic History 15 (Winter 1991):37-40. Hybel has reservations about the usefulness of attribution theory, which he defines more narrowly than does Larson or Stein. See his arguments in How Leaders Reason, chap. 10.
71. Larson, Origins of Containment, 34-42; Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology," 255-56. For other discussions of the usefulness of cognitive theory and particularly of attribution theory to historians of international relations see Alexander L. George, "Cognitive Beliefs and Decision- Making Behavior" in Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Boulder, 1979), 98-99; Ole R. Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 13 (Winter 1989): 36-37; Immerman, "Psychology," 170-72; and William O. Walker III, "Decision-making Theory and Narcotic Foreign Policy: Implications for Historical Analysis," Diplomatic History 15 (Winter 1991):37-40. Hybel has reservations about the usefulness of attribution theory, which he defines more narrowly than does Larson or Stein. See his arguments in How Leaders Reason, chap. 10.
72. Larson, Origins of Containment, 34-42; Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology," 255-56. For other discussions of the usefulness of cognitive theory and particularly of attribution theory to historians of international relations see Alexander L. George, "Cognitive Beliefs and Decision- Making Behavior" in Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Boulder, 1979), 98-99; Ole R. Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 13 (Winter 1989): 36-37; Immerman, "Psychology," 170-72; and William O. Walker III, "Decision-making Theory and Narcotic Foreign Policy: Implications for Historical Analysis," Diplomatic History 15 (Winter 1991):37-40. Hybel has reservations about the usefulness of attribution theory, which he defines more narrowly than does Larson or Stein. See his arguments in How Leaders Reason, chap. 10.
73. Cabot, "The Political Basis for Continental Solidarity," Toward Our Common Destiny, 86.
74. "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Central America and Panama Affairs (Clark)," 14 October 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954 4:1047.
75. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 134, 149-50, 378. Gleijeses notes that Communists shared honesty and dedication, "setting their world far apart from that of Guatemala's other political groups. This was to be a great asset to the party and one of the sources of the ever growing attraction it held for Jacobo Arbenz" (80). It is interesting that Ronald Schneider makes a similar point in a book that is much less sympathetic to the Arbenz regime.
76. See Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 51, 195-97.
77. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 86. See also Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 30, 31, 83; Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 50, 70; and LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 78.
78. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 86. See also Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 30, 31, 83; Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 50, 70; and LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 78.
79. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 86. See also Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 30, 31, 83; Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 50, 70; and LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 78.
80. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 86. See also Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 30, 31, 83; Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 50, 70; and LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 78.
81. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 99, 102, 132; Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 83-84. Sharon Meers maintains that it was the British, immediately after World War II (to protect interests in British Honduras), who first raised the specter of communism in Guatemala. Sharon I. Meers, "The British Connection: How the United States Covered Its Tracks in the 1954 Coup in Guatemala," Diplomatic History 16 (Summer 1992): 412. Quotes like the one in Time can be multiplied many times over. A quick review of articles in the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature under the index heading "Communism - Guatemala" reveals that over forty articles with titles clearly connoting a Communist threat appeared in popular periodicals between 1950 and the coup in June 1954. Schlesinger and Kinzer give the most complete account of UFCO's role in shaping U.S. press accounts. See Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, esp. chap. 6.
82. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 99, 102, 132; Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 83-84. Sharon Meers maintains that it was the British, immediately after World War II (to protect interests in British Honduras), who first raised the specter of communism in Guatemala. Sharon I. Meers, "The British Connection: How the United States Covered Its Tracks in the 1954 Coup in Guatemala," Diplomatic History 16 (Summer 1992): 412. Quotes like the one in Time can be multiplied many times over. A quick review of articles in the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature under the index heading "Communism - Guatemala" reveals that over forty articles with titles clearly connoting a Communist threat appeared in popular periodicals between 1950 and the coup in June 1954. Schlesinger and Kinzer give the most complete account of UFCO's role in shaping U.S. press accounts. See Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, esp. chap. 6.
83. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 99, 102, 132; Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 83-84. Sharon Meers maintains that it was the British, immediately after World War II (to protect interests in British Honduras), who first raised the specter of communism in Guatemala. Sharon I. Meers, "The British Connection: How the United States Covered Its Tracks in the 1954 Coup in Guatemala," Diplomatic History 16 (Summer 1992): 412. Quotes like the one in Time can be multiplied many times over. A quick review of articles in the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature under the index heading "Communism - Guatemala" reveals that over forty articles with titles clearly connoting a Communist threat appeared in popular periodicals between 1950 and the coup in June 1954. Schlesinger and Kinzer give the most complete account of UFCO's role in shaping U.S. press accounts. See Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, esp. chap. 6.
84. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 99, 102, 132; Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 83-84. Sharon Meers maintains that it was the British, immediately after World War II (to protect interests in British Honduras), who first raised the specter of communism in Guatemala. Sharon I. Meers, "The British Connection: How the United States Covered Its Tracks in the 1954 Coup in Guatemala," Diplomatic History 16 (Summer 1992): 412. Quotes like the one
85. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 131, 106-7.
86. Ibid., 177-78.
87. For differing accounts of U.S. relations with Bolivia after the revolution see Victor Andrade, My Missions for Revolutionary Bolivia, 1944-1962 (Pittsburgh, 1976); Blasier, "United States and the Revolution"; Naoki Kamimura, "The United States and the Bolivian Revolutionaries, 1943-1954" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1991); Kenneth Lehman "U.S Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia: The Pragmatics of a Patron-Client Relationship" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1992), esp. chap. 5; Carlos Navia Rivera, Los Estados Unidos y la revolución nacional: Entre el pragmatismo y el sometimiento (Cochabamba, Bolivia, 1984); G. Earl Sanders "The Quiet Experiment in American Diplomacy," The Americas 33 (July 1976): 25-49; and Laurence Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism (London, 1969).
88. For differing accounts of U.S. relations with Bolivia after the revolution see Victor Andrade, My Missions for Revolutionary Bolivia, 1944-1962 (Pittsburgh, 1976); Blasier, "United States and the Revolution"; Naoki Kamimura, "The United States and the Bolivian Revolutionaries, 1943-1954" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1991); Kenneth Lehman "U.S Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia: The Pragmatics of a Patron-Client Relationship" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1992), esp. chap. 5; Carlos Navia Rivera, Los Estados Unidos y la revolución nacional: Entre el pragmatismo y el sometimiento (Cochabamba, Bolivia, 1984); G. Earl Sanders "The Quiet Experiment in American Diplomacy," The Americas 33 (July 1976): 25-49; and Laurence Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism (London, 1969).
89. For differing accounts of U.S. relations with Bolivia after the revolution see Victor Andrade, My Missions for Revolutionary Bolivia, 1944-1962 (Pittsburgh, 1976); Blasier, "United States and the Revolution"; Naoki Kamimura, "The United States and the Bolivian Revolutionaries, 1943-1954" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1991); Kenneth Lehman "U.S Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia: The Pragmatics of a Patron-Client Relationship" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1992), esp. chap. 5; Carlos Navia Rivera, Los Estados Unidos y la revolución nacional: Entre el pragmatismo y el sometimiento (Cochabamba, Bolivia, 1984); G. Earl Sanders "The Quiet Experiment in American Diplomacy," The Americas 33 (July 1976): 25-49; and Laurence Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism (London, 1969).
90. For differing accounts of U.S. relations with Bolivia after the revolution see Victor Andrade, My Missions for Revolutionary Bolivia, 1944-1962 (Pittsburgh, 1976); Blasier, "United States and the Revolution"; Naoki Kamimura, "The United States and the Bolivian Revolutionaries, 1943-1954" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1991); Kenneth Lehman "U.S Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia: The Pragmatics of a Patron-Client Relationship" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1992), esp. chap. 5; Carlos Navia Rivera, Los Estados Unidos y la revolución nacional: Entre el pragmatismo y el sometimiento (Cochabamba, Bolivia, 1984); G. Earl Sanders "The Quiet Experiment in American Diplomacy," The Americas 33 (July 1976): 25-49; and Laurence Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism (London, 1969).
91. For differing accounts of U.S. relations with Bolivia after the revolution see Victor Andrade, My Missions for Revolutionary Bolivia, 1944-1962 (Pittsburgh, 1976); Blasier, "United States and the Revolution"; Naoki Kamimura, "The United States and the Bolivian Revolutionaries, 1943-1954" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1991); Kenneth Lehman "U.S Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia: The Pragmatics of a Patron-Client Relationship" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1992), esp. chap. 5; Carlos Navia Rivera, Los Estados Unidos y la revolución nacional: Entre el pragmatismo y el sometimiento (Cochabamba, Bolivia, 1984); G. Earl Sanders "The Quiet Experiment in American Diplomacy," The Americas 33 (July 1976): 25-49; and Laurence Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism (London, 1969).
92. For differing accounts of U.S. relations with Bolivia after the revolution see Victor Andrade, My Missions for Revolutionary Bolivia, 1944-1962 (Pittsburgh, 1976); Blasier, "United States and the Revolution"; Naoki Kamimura, "The United States and the Bolivian Revolutionaries, 1943-1954" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1991); Kenneth Lehman "U.S Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia: The Pragmatics of a Patron-Client Relationship" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1992), esp. chap. 5; Carlos Navia Rivera, Los Estados Unidos y la revolución nacional: Entre el pragmatismo y el sometimiento (Cochabamba, Bolivia, 1984); G. Earl Sanders "The Quiet Experiment in American Diplomacy," The Americas 33 (July 1976): 25-49; and Laurence Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism (London, 1969).
93. For differing accounts of U.S. relations with Bolivia after the revolution see Victor Andrade, My Missions for Revolutionary Bolivia, 1944-1962 (Pittsburgh, 1976); Blasier, "United States and the Revolution"; Naoki Kamimura, "The United States and the Bolivian Revolutionaries, 1943-1954" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1991); Kenneth Lehman "U.S Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia: The Pragmatics of a Patron-Client Relationship" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1992), esp. chap. 5; Carlos Navia Rivera, Los Estados Unidos y la revolución nacional: Entre el pragmatismo y el sometimiento (Cochabamba, Bolivia, 1984); G. Earl Sanders "The Quiet Experiment in American Diplomacy," The Americas 33 (July 1976): 25-49; and Laurence Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism (London, 1969).
94. Dispatch 725, "First Post-Revolutionary Impressions," 14 April 1952, RG 59, 724.00/4-452. For an early high-level expression of this position on Bolivia see Acheson tel. 312 to embassies in La Paz, Santiago, Lima, and Rio de Janeiro, 27 April 1952, RG 59, 724.00/4-2752. The assessment is repeated in Acheson's memorandum to President Truman on recognition of the MNR regime, 22 May 1952, Papers of the President, Official File, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
95. Andrade, My Missions, 197-98; U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Yearbook, 1951 (Washington, 1951), 1258, 1261; David J. Fox, Tin and the Bolivian Economy (London, 1970), 1, 4. I further examined the story of this conflict in "When Aid Becomes the Only Option: U.S. Tin Policies and Bolivian Dependency in the 1940s" (Paper presented at SHAFR's 19th Annual Meeting, 20 June 1995, Charlottesville, Virginia).
96. Andrade, My Missions, 197-98; U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Yearbook, 1951 (Washington, 1951), 1258, 1261; David J. Fox, Tin and the Bolivian Economy (London, 1970), 1, 4. I further examined the story of this conflict in "When Aid Becomes the Only Option: U.S. Tin Policies and Bolivian Dependency in the 1940s" (Paper presented at SHAFR's 19th Annual Meeting, 20 June 1995, Charlottesville, Virginia).
97. Andrade, My Missions, 197-98; U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Yearbook, 1951 (Washington, 1951), 1258, 1261; David J. Fox, Tin and the Bolivian Economy (London, 1970), 1, 4. I further examined the story of this conflict in "When Aid Becomes the Only Option: U.S. Tin Policies and Bolivian Dependency in the 1940s" (Paper presented at SHAFR's 19th Annual Meeting, 20 June 1995, Charlottesville, Virginia).
98. Andrade, My Missions, 197-98; U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Yearbook, 1951 (Washington, 1951), 1258, 1261; David J. Fox, Tin and the Bolivian Economy (London, 1970), 1, 4. I further examined the story of this conflict in "When Aid Becomes the Only Option: U.S. Tin Policies and Bolivian Dependency in the 1940s" (Paper presented at SHAFR's 19th Annual Meeting, 20 June 1995, Charlottesville, Virginia).
99. For the best record of this use of leverage and the favorable assessments of Paz and his cooperative attitudes see the series of letters from Ambassador Edward Sparks to Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Miller found in RG 59, Miller LOT, box 2, Bolivia folders.
100. Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 13.
101. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 6, 48-49.
102. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 155, 181-82, 231-32; Blasier, Hovering Giant, 89-90; Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 65-67, 80-81.
103. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 155, 181-82, 231-32; Blasier, Hovering Giant, 89-90; Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 65-67, 80-81.
104. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 155, 181-82, 231-32; Blasier, Hovering Giant, 89-90; Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 65-67, 80-81.
105. Secretary of State Dulles tel. 22 to embassy in La Paz, 12 March 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954 4:522-23. The ambassador's response came in a telegram, embassy in La Paz to secretary of state, 13 March 1953, ibid., 524-25.
106. Secretary of State Dulles tel. 22 to embassy in La Paz, 12 March 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954 4:522-23. The ambassador's response came in a telegram, embassy in La Paz to secretary of state, 13 March 1953, ibid., 524-25.
107. Blasier, Hovering Giant, 163, 224-26. Bryce Wood builds on this observation to make a case that the lower-level department officials who made Bolivian policies were still operating within the old paradigm of the Good Neighbor Policy, while the Dulles brothers unleashed a new phase of Cold War interventionism in Guatemala. Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy (Austin, 1985), 146-50, 198-209.
108. Blasier, Hovering Giant, 163, 224-26. Bryce Wood builds on this observation to make a case that the lower-level department officials who made Bolivian policies were still operating within the old paradigm of the Good Neighbor Policy, while the Dulles brothers unleashed a new phase of Cold War interventionism in Guatemala. Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy (Austin, 1985), 146-50, 198-209.
109. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 32. Both Rabe and Thomas Zoumaras see Bolivian policies as an exception resulting from crisis management rather than a well-thought-out alternative to administration policies in Guatemala. See ibid., 77-83; and Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," chap. 2.
110. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 32. Both Rabe and Thomas Zoumaras see Bolivian policies as an exception resulting from crisis management rather than a well-thought-out alternative to administration policies in Guatemala. See ibid., 77-83; and Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," chap. 2.
111. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 32. Both Rabe and Thomas Zoumaras see Bolivian policies as an exception resulting from crisis management rather than a well-thought-out alternative to administration policies in Guatemala. See ibid., 77-83; and Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," chap. 2.
112. Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 134.
113. Bureaucratic political analysis clearly elucidates aspects of the final policies chosen for Bolivia. For discussions see Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," 98-109; and Lehman "U.S. Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia," chap. 6. For the theoretical model of bureaucratic politics see Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 1971), 4-7; and J. Garry Clifford, "Bureaucratic Politics," Journal of American History 77 (June 1990): 161-68.
114. Bureaucratic political analysis clearly elucidates aspects of the final policies chosen for Bolivia. For discussions see Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," 98-109; and Lehman "U.S. Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia," chap. 6. For the theoretical model of bureaucratic politics see Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 1971), 4-7; and J. Garry Clifford, "Bureaucratic Politics," Journal of American History 77 (June 1990): 161-68.
115. Bureaucratic political analysis clearly elucidates aspects of the final policies chosen for Bolivia. For discussions see Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," 98-109; and Lehman "U.S. Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia," chap. 6. For the theoretical model of bureaucratic politics see Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 1971), 4-7; and J. Garry Clifford, "Bureaucratic Politics," Journal of American History 77 (June 1990): 161-68.
116. Bureaucratic political analysis clearly elucidates aspects of the final policies chosen for Bolivia. For discussions see Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," 98-109; and Lehman "U.S. Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia," chap. 6. For the theoretical model of bureaucratic politics see Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 1971), 4-7; and J. Garry Clifford, "Bureaucratic Politics," Journal of American History 77 (June 1990): 161-68.
117. For the initial State Department plan see Hudson office memorandum to Atwood, 30 April 1953, RG 59, 824.00/4-3053. The memoradum states that, by working with a revolutionary party that was "still somewhat plastic," the United States could demonstrate its willingness to cooperate with genuine popular reformers and show that "the Good Neighbor Policy is still a practical and important reality." Bryce Wood says that this is the last specific reference he found to the Good Neighbor Policy by State Department officials to "buttress an argument." Wood, Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy, 149n. Cabot's diaries reveal the degree to which he came to feel ownership of the Bolivia initiative and the frustrations he felt in dealing with his superiors on the matter. See entries for May and June 1953, John Moors Cabot Papers (microfilm), reel 19, part 4, Diaries, Continued, Diary no. 10, Jan-Dec. 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
118. For the initial State Department plan see Hudson office memorandum to Atwood, 30 April 1953, RG 59, 824.00/4-3053. The memoradum states that, by working with a revolutionary party that was "still somewhat plastic," the United States could demonstrate its willingness to cooperate with genuine popular reformers and show that "the Good Neighbor Policy is still a practical and important reality." Bryce Wood says that this is the last specific reference he found to the Good Neighbor Policy by State Department officials to "buttress an argument." Wood, Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy, 149n. Cabot's diaries reveal the degree to which he came to feel ownership of the Bolivia initiative and the frustrations he felt in dealing with his superiors on the matter. See entries for May and June 1953, John Moors Cabot Papers (microfilm), reel 19, part 4, Diaries, Continued, Diary no. 10, Jan-Dec. 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
119. Memorandum of conversation, Jackson, Galarza, and Hudson, 29 April 1953, RG 59, 724.00/4-2953; memorandum of conversation, Milton Eisenhower, Andrade, and Bennett, 17 June 1953, RG 59, 611.24/6-1753; Andrade, My Missions, 171-72. The role of labor leaders in influencing official views and attributions regarding MNR government is briefly covered in two dissertations. See Lehman, "U.S. Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia," 435-41; and Henry Weinberg Berger, "Union Diplomacy: American Labor's Foreign Policy in Latin America, 1933-1955" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1966), 321-26. For discussion of the Eisenhower administration's views of the role labor might play in the Cold War struggle see Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 34.
120. Memorandum of conversation, Jackson, Galarza, and Hudson, 29 April 1953, RG 59, 724.00/4-2953; memorandum of conversation, Milton Eisenhower, Andrade, and Bennett, 17 June 1953, RG 59, 611.24/6-1753; Andrade, My Missions, 171-72. The role of labor leaders in influencing official views and attributions regarding MNR government is briefly covered in two dissertations. See Lehman, "U.S. Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia," 435-41; and Henry Weinberg Berger, "Union Diplomacy: American Labor's Foreign Policy in Latin America, 1933-1955" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1966), 321-26. For discussion of the Eisenhower administration's views of the role labor might play in the Cold War struggle see Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 34.
121. Memorandum of conversation, Jackson, Galarza, and Hudson, 29 April 1953, RG 59, 724.00/4-2953; memorandum of conversation, Milton Eisenhower, Andrade, and Bennett, 17 June 1953, RG 59, 611.24/6-1753; Andrade, My Missions, 171-72. The role of labor leaders in influencing official views and attributions regarding MNR government is briefly covered in two dissertations. See Lehman, "U.S. Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia," 435-41; and Henry Weinberg Berger, "Union Diplomacy: American Labor's Foreign Policy in Latin America, 1933-1955" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1966), 321-26. For discussion of the Eisenhower administration's views of the role labor might play in the Cold War struggle see Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 34.
122. Memorandum of conversation, Jackson, Galarza, and Hudson, 29 April 1953, RG 59, 724.00/4-2953; memorandum of conversation, Milton Eisenhower, Andrade, and Bennett, 17 June 1953, RG 59, 611.24/6-1753; Andrade, My Missions, 171-72. The role of labor leaders in influencing official views and attributions regarding MNR government is briefly covered in two dissertations. See Lehman, "U.S. Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia," 435-41; and Henry Weinberg Berger, "Union Diplomacy: American Labor's Foreign Policy in Latin America, 1933-1955" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1966), 321-26. For discussion of the Eisenhower administration's views of the role labor might play in the Cold War struggle see Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 34.
123. Milton S. Eisenhower oral history, 21 June 1967, Eisenhower Library. Eisenhower later wished he had arrived at this understanding that social change must accompany economic development earlier and had pushed it more forcefully. See Milton S. Eisenhower, The Wine Is Bitter: The United States and Latin America (New York, 1963), 251-52.
124. Transcript of an interview with Milton S. Eisenhower by Robert Ivanov, 6 November 1975, Eisenhower Library; Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 65. These views are also apparent in Dr. Eisenhower's book on Latin America. See Eisenhower, The Wine Is Bitter. He entitles one chapter, "A man with a home, a full stomach, and children in school is a poor revolutionary."
125. Transcript of an interview with Milton S. Eisenhower by Robert Ivanov, 6 November 1975, Eisenhower Library; Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 65. These views are also apparent in Dr. Eisenhower's book on Latin America. See Eisenhower, The Wine Is Bitter. He entitles one chapter, "A man with a home, a full stomach, and children in school is a poor revolutionary."
126. Andrade, My Missions, 172.
127. Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 133; Eisenhower, The Wine Is Bitter, 48.
128. Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 133; Eisenhower, The Wine Is Bitter, 48.
129. The two brothers conversed often on policy issues, although Milton claims scrupulously to have avoided short-circuiting the president's normal advising channels. See Milton S. Eisenhower oral history, 11 June 1975, Eisenhower Library; Fred Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President," Political Science Quarterly 94 (Winter 1979-80): 578; Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Milton S. Eisenhower Educational Statesman (Baltimore, 1983), 146-60; and Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 28-29. For the president's view of his brother see diary entry, 14 May 1953, Ann Whitman Files, Diary Series, box 4, folder 2, Eisenhower Library.
130. The two brothers conversed often on policy issues, although Milton claims scrupulously to have avoided short-circuiting the president's normal advising channels. See Milton S. Eisenhower oral history, 11 June 1975, Eisenhower Library; Fred Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President," Political Science Quarterly 94 (Winter 1979-80): 578; Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Milton S. Eisenhower Educational Statesman (Baltimore, 1983), 146-60; and Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 28-29. For the president's view of his brother see diary entry, 14 May 1953, Ann Whitman Files, Diary Series, box 4, folder 2, Eisenhower Library.
131. The two brothers conversed often on policy issues, although Milton claims scrupulously to have avoided short-circuiting the president's normal advising channels. See Milton S. Eisenhower oral history, 11 June 1975, Eisenhower Library; Fred Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President," Political Science Quarterly 94 (Winter 1979-80): 578; Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Milton S. Eisenhower Educational Statesman (Baltimore, 1983), 146-60; and Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 28-29. For the president's view of his brother see diary entry, 14 May 1953, Ann Whitman Files, Diary Series, box 4, folder 2, Eisenhower Library.
132. The two brothers conversed often on policy issues, although Milton claims scrupulously to have avoided short-circuiting the president's normal advising channels. See Milton S. Eisenhower oral history, 11 June 1975, Eisenhower Library; Fred Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President," Political Science Quarterly 94 (Winter 1979-80): 578; Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Milton S. Eisenhower Educational Statesman (Baltimore, 1983), 146-60; and Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 28-29. For the president's view of his brother see diary entry, 14 May 1953, Ann Whitman Files, Diary Series, box 4, folder 2, Eisenhower Library.
133. Memorandum of conversation, 22 June 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954 4:532.
134. FRUS, 1952-1954 4:534n.3 and 4. For discussions of Humphrey and the role he played in economic foreign policy see Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," 52-54; and Rabe, Eisenhower in Latin America, 68. For Eisenhower's views of Humphrey, whom he called "a sound business type, possessed of a splendid personality," see diary entry, 14 May 1953, Ann Whitman Files, Diary Series, box 4, folder 2. Eisenhower and Cabot tel. 2 to secretary of state, "To be shown to the President, 1 July 1953, Ann Whitman Files, International Series, box 4, Bolivia, folder 3. The cable arrived in Washington early on 2 July.
135. FRUS, 1952-1954 4:534n.3 and 4. For discussions of Humphrey and the role he played in economic foreign policy see Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," 52-54; and Rabe, Eisenhower in Latin America, 68. For Eisenhower's views of Humphrey, whom he called "a sound business type, possessed of a splendid personality," see diary entry, 14 May 1953, Ann Whitman Files, Diary Series, box 4, folder 2. Eisenhower and Cabot tel. 2 to secretary of state, "To be shown to the President, 1 July 1953, Ann Whitman Files, International Series, box 4, Bolivia, folder 3. The cable arrived in Washington early on 2 July.
136. FRUS, 1952-1954 4:534n.3 and 4. For discussions of Humphrey and the role he played in economic foreign policy see Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," 52-54; and Rabe, Eisenhower in Latin America, 68. For Eisenhower's views of Humphrey, whom he called "a sound business type, possessed of a splendid personality," see diary entry, 14 May 1953, Ann Whitman Files, Diary Series, box 4, folder 2. Eisenhower and Cabot tel. 2 to secretary of state, "To be shown to the President, 1 July 1953, Ann Whitman Files, International Series, box 4, Bolivia, folder 3. The cable arrived in Washington early on 2 July.
137. FRUS, 1952-1954 4:534n.3 and 4. For discussions of Humphrey and the role he played in economic foreign policy see Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," 52-54; and Rabe, Eisenhower in Latin America, 68. For Eisenhower's views of Humphrey, whom he called "a sound business type, possessed of a splendid personality," see diary entry, 14 May 1953, Ann Whitman Files, Diary Series, box 4, folder 2. Eisenhower and Cabot tel. 2 to secretary of state, "To be shown to the President, 1 July 1953, Ann Whitman Files, International Series, box 4, Bolivia, folder 3. The cable arrived in Washington early on 2 July.
138. FRUS, 1952-1954 4:534n.3 and 4. For discussions of Humphrey and the role he played in economic foreign policy see Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," 52-54; and Rabe, Eisenhower in Latin America, 68. For Eisenhower's views of Humphrey, whom he called "a sound business type, possessed of a splendid personality," see diary entry, 14 May 1953, Ann Whitman Files, Diary Series, box 4, folder 2. Eisenhower and Cabot tel. 2 to secretary of state, "To be shown to the President, 1 July 1953, Ann Whitman Files, International Series, box 4, Bolivia, folder 3. The cable arrived in Washington early on 2 July.
139. Diary entry, 2 July 1953, Ann Whitman File, Diary Series, box 9, folder 2. Burton Kaufman and Thomas Zoumaras focus on the first part of the diary entry and see it primarily as a defense of free trade. Eisenhower's larger strategic vision becomes apparent when one looks at the corollaries at the close of his entry. See Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961 (Baltimore, 1982), 15-16; and Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," 13.
140. Diary entry, 2 July 1953, Ann Whitman File, Diary Series, box 9, folder 2. Burton Kaufman and Thomas Zoumaras focus on the first part of the diary entry and see it primarily as a defense of free trade. Eisenhower's larger strategic vision becomes apparent when one looks at the corollaries at the close of his entry. See Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961 (Baltimore, 1982), 15-16; and Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," 13.
141. Diary entry, 2 July 1953, Ann Whitman File, Diary Series, box 9, folder 2. Burton Kaufman and Thomas Zoumaras focus on the first part of the diary entry and see it primarily as a defense of free trade. Eisenhower's larger strategic vision becomes apparent when one looks at the corollaries at the close of his entry. See Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961 (Baltimore, 1982), 15-16; and Zoumaras, "Path to Pan Americanism," 13.
142. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," 328, 329.
143. For discussions of the Solarium Exercise see Robert R. Bowie, "Commentary," in American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, ed. Ernest R. May (Boston, 1993), 113; John Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 145-46; and Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," 335-39.
144. For discussions of the Solarium Exercise see Robert R. Bowie, "Commentary," in American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, ed. Ernest R. May (Boston, 1993), 113; John Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 145-46; and Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," 335-39.
145. For discussions of the Solarium Exercise see Robert R. Bowie, "Commentary," in American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, ed. Ernest R. May (Boston, 1993), 113; John Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 145-46; and Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," 335-39.
146. Minutes, cabinet meeting, 3 July 1953, White House Office, Office of the Staff Assistant, Cabinet Series, box 1: C-6 (1); offical cabinet minutes, 3 July 1953, Ann Whitman Files, Cabinet Series, box 2. For Milton Eisenhower's impressions of Bolivia see The Wine Is Bitter, 124, 194-95.
147. Department of State Bulletin 29 (19 October 1953): 518, (2 November 1953): 584-86, and (14 December 1953): 822. See also Blasier, Hovering Giant, 89-90, 166; and Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 81, 137-38.
148. Department of State Bulletin 29 (19 October 1953): 518, (2 November 1953): 584-86, and (14 December 1953): 822. See also Blasier, Hovering Giant, 89-90, 166; and Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 81, 137-38.
149. Department of State Bulletin 29 (19 October 1953): 518, (2 November 1953): 584-86, and (14 December 1953): 822. See also Blasier, Hovering Giant, 89-90, 166; and Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 81, 137-38.
150. Department of State Bulletin 29 (19 October 1953): 518, (2 November 1953): 584-86, and (14 December 1953): 822. See also Blasier, Hovering Giant, 89-90, 166; and Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 81, 137-38.
151. Department of State Bulletin 29 (19 October 1953): 518, (2 November 1953): 584-86, and (14 December 1953): 822. See also Blasier, Hovering Giant, 89-90, 166; and Immerman, CIA in Guatemala, 81, 137-38.
152. James Reston, "With the Dulles Brothers in Darkest Guatemala," New York Times, 20 June 1954.
153. Henry F. Holland to Andrew N. Overby, 8 December 1955, RG 59,814.055/12-855; Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 223-24, 233; and LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 127.
154. Henry F. Holland to Andrew N. Overby, 8 December 1955, RG 59,814.055/12-855; Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 223-24, 233; and LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 127.
155. The process has been well studied from a number of different angles. See Lehman, "U.S. Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia," chaps. 7 and 8; Malloy, The Uncompleted Revolution, chaps. 12 and 13; Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia, chaps. 3 and 4; Siekmeier, "U.S. Economic Aid and Development Policy"; Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism; and Wilkie, Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid.
156. The process has been well studied from a number of different angles. See Lehman, "U.S. Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia," chaps. 7 and 8; Malloy, The Uncompleted Revolution, chaps. 12 and 13; Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia, chaps. 3 and 4; Siekmeier, "U.S. Economic Aid and Development Policy"; Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism; and Wilkie, Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid.
157. The process has been well studied from a number of different angles. See Lehman, "U.S. Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia," chaps. 7 and 8; Malloy, The Uncompleted Revolution, chaps. 12 and 13; Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia, chaps. 3 and 4; Siekmeier, "U.S. Economic Aid and Development Policy"; Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism; and Wilkie, Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid.
158. The process has been well studied from a number of different angles. See Lehman, "U.S. Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia," chaps. 7 and 8; Malloy, The Uncompleted Revolution, chaps. 12 and 13; Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia, chaps. 3 and 4; Siekmeier, "U.S. Economic Aid and Development Policy"; Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism; and Wilkie, Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid.
159. The process has been well studied from a number of different angles. See Lehman, "U.S. Foreign Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia," chaps. 7 and 8; Malloy, The Uncompleted Revolution, chaps. 12 and 13; Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia, chaps. 3 and 4; Siekmeier, "U.S. Economic Aid and Development Policy"; Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism; and Wilkie, Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid.
160. Holland memorandum to secretary of state, 13 December 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957( Washington, 1987), 6:354.
161. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 82-83. The attack on Nixon fostered a variety of attributions as to cause, but Rabe notes that "while publicly blaming the communists for the attack the administration knew it needed a new approach to restore public opinion and assuage Latin Americans." See Rabe, "Latin America and Anticommunism," 181-82.
162. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 82-83. The attack on Nixon fostered a variety of attributions as to cause, but Rabe notes that "while publicly blaming the communists for the attack the administration knew it needed a new approach to restore public opinion and assuage Latin Americans." See Rabe, "Latin America and Anticommunism," 181-82.
163. Memorandum of conversation, Bonsai, Dillon, Mann, and others, 11 February 1959, RG 59, 824.oo-TA/2-1159.
164. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 193; Oscar M. Powell to Rollin S. Atwood, 1 June 1959, RG 59, Office Files of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy Richard Rubottom, LOT 60 D 553, box 13, quoted with permission of Jim Siekmeier from a paper in progress. Siekmeier's dissertation and a recent dissertation by Stephen Streeter both look at the failures of U.S. policy in Guatemala in greater depth. See Siekmeier, "U.S. Economic Aid and Development Policy"; and Stephen Mather Streeter, "Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961" (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1994).
165. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 193; Oscar M. Powell to Rollin S. Atwood, 1 June 1959, RG 59, Office Files of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy Richard Rubottom, LOT 60 D 553, box 13, quoted with permission of Jim Siekmeier from a paper in progress. Siekmeier's dissertation and a recent dissertation by Stephen Streeter both look at the failures of U.S. policy in Guatemala in greater depth. See Siekmeier, "U.S. Economic Aid and Development Policy"; and Stephen Mather Streeter, "Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961" (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1994).
166. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 193; Oscar M. Powell to Rollin S. Atwood, 1 June 1959, RG 59, Office Files of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy Richard Rubottom, LOT 60 D 553, box 13, quoted with permission of Jim Siekmeier from a paper in progress. Siekmeier's dissertation and a recent dissertation by Stephen Streeter both look at the failures of U.S. policy in Guatemala in greater depth. See Siekmeier, "U.S. Economic Aid and Development Policy"; and Stephen Mather Streeter, "Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961" (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1994).
167. For succinct discussions of Kennedy policies in the hemisphere see Stephen G. Rabe, "Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism," in Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 1989), 105-22; and William O. Walker III, "Mixing the Sweet with the Sour: Kennedy Johnson, and Latin America," in The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations during the 1960s, ed. Diane B. Kunz (New York, 1994), 42-79. For a discussion of the degree to which Cold War blinders circumscribed Kennedy's avowed willingness to innovate in the hemisphere see Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy (New York, 1982), 225.
168. For succinct discussions of Kennedy policies in the hemisphere see Stephen G. Rabe, "Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism," in Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 1989), 105-22; and William O. Walker III, "Mixing the Sweet with the Sour: Kennedy Johnson, and Latin America," in The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations during the 1960s, ed. Diane B. Kunz (New York, 1994), 42-79. For a discussion of the degree to which Cold War blinders circumscribed Kennedy's avowed willingness to innovate in the hemisphere see Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy (New York, 1982), 225.
169. For succinct discussions of Kennedy policies in the hemisphere see Stephen G. Rabe, "Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism," in Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 1989), 105-22; and William O. Walker III, "Mixing the Sweet with the Sour: Kennedy Johnson, and Latin America," in The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations during the 1960s, ed. Diane B. Kunz (New York, 1994), 42-79. For a discussion of the degree to which Cold War blinders circumscribed Kennedy's avowed willingness to innovate in the hemisphere see Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy (New York, 1982), 225.