Liberals, democrats and the agenda of politics

Political Studies

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 295-308

  Vernon, Richard ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039346750     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00141     Document Type: Article

References (42)

1. For the importance of this distinction see J. Waldron, 'Locke: Toleration and the Rationality of Persecution', in S. Mendus (ed.), Justifying Toleration (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 76-8.
2. See P. Schouls (ed.), Letters Concerning Toleration (New York NY, Garland, 1984), First Letter, pp. 18-9.
3. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity [1873] (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 108.
4. See Proast, Letters, Third Letter, p. 7, and Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, p. 120.
5. See Proast, Letters, Third Letter, p. 7, and Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, p. 120.
6. That is not to say that its being chosen is what makes a life valuable. Rather, our having a choice is indispensable to our adopting a life which we have reasons to value. See W. Kymlicka, Liberalism. Community and Culture (Oxford, Clarendon, 1989), pp. 11-2.
7. See S. Holmes, 'Precommitment and the paradox of democracy', in J. Elster and R. Slagstad (eds), Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 195-240.
8. See R. Dworkin, 'Liberalism', in S. Hampshire (ed.), Public and Private Morality (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 113-43.
9. 'Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy,' and 'Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission,' in Elster and Slagstad, Constitutionalism and Democracy, pp. 19-58, the latter republished in S. Holmes, Passions and Constraint (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996), ch. 7.
10. 'Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy,' and 'Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission,' in Elster and Slagstad, Constitutionalism and Democracy, pp. 19-58, the latter republished in S. Holmes, Passions and Constraint (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996), ch. 7.
11. 'Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy,' and 'Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission,' in Elster and Slagstad, Constitutionalism and Democracy, pp. 19-58, the latter republished in S. Holmes, Passions and Constraint (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996), ch. 7.
12. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, p. 87.
13. Cf. M. Moore, The Foundations of Liberalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), ch. 6, especially pp. 150-1.
14. See B. Williams, 'Deciding to Believe', in Problems of the Self (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 136-7.
15. Though some political theorists have denied this: see R. Vernon, 'The political self: Auguste Comte and phrenology', History of European Ideas, 7 (1986), 271-86.
16. J. S. Mill, On Liberty (London, Dent, 1910), pp. 171-2.
17. R. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 88-9.
18. E. Spitz, Majority Rule (Chatham NJ, Chatham House, 1984), p. xiii.
19. J. Cohen, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', in A. Hamlin and P. Pettit (eds), The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford, Blackwell, 1989), p. 29. But see same author's 'Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy', in S. Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 95-119.
20. J. Cohen, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', in A. Hamlin and P. Pettit (eds), The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford, Blackwell, 1989), p. 29. But see same author's 'Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy', in S. Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 95-119.
21. Cohen, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', p. 30.
22. Cohen, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', p. 34 (note 22). See also Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, pp. 88-9, 169-73.
23. Cohen, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', p. 34 (note 22). See also Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, pp. 88-9, 169-73.
24. P. de Marneffe, 'Contractualism, liberty and democracy', Ethics, 104 (1994), 764-83, offers a strong recent statement of the case. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, pp. 182-3 is also relevant here.
25. P. de Marneffe, 'Contractualism, liberty and democracy', Ethics, 104 (1994), 764-83, offers a strong recent statement of the case. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, pp. 182-3 is also relevant here.
26. De Marneffe, 'Contractualism, liberty and democracy,' p. 766.
27. De Marneffe, 'Contractualism, liberty and democracy,' p. 776.
28. See Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, pp. 10-3.
29. De Marneffe, 'Contractualism, liberty and democracy,' pp. 776-7.
30. De Marneffe, 'Contractualism, liberty and democracy,' p. 775.
31. See C. Trillin, 'Drawing the line', The New Yorker, (12 December 1994), 50-62.
32. Or, can be generalized only in a 'non-neutral' way: see G. Dworkin, 'Non-neutral Principles', in N. Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls (Oxford, Blackwell, 1975), 124-40.
33. See for example I. M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990), especially ch. 4. However, Young appears to conflate neutrality, value-freedom and objectivity. This is an error, because one can hold neutrality as a value (or as something required by a value), and one can be neutral in one's attitude without enjoying objective knowledge. For a discussion of what is and is not required by neutrality, see P. Jones, 'The Ideal of a Neutral State', in R. E. Goodin and A. Reeve (eds), Liberal Neutrality (London and New York, Routledge, 1989), pp. 9-38.
34. See for example I. M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990), especially ch. 4. However, Young appears to conflate neutrality, value-freedom and objectivity. This is an error, because one can hold neutrality as a value (or as something required by a value), and one can be neutral in one's attitude without enjoying objective knowledge. For a discussion of what is and is not required by neutrality, see P. Jones, 'The Ideal of a Neutral State', in R. E. Goodin and A. Reeve (eds), Liberal Neutrality (London and New York, Routledge, 1989), pp. 9-38.
35. The distinction here resembles the distinction between neutrality of intention and neutrality of effect: see for example A. Montefiore (ed.), Neutrality and Impartiality (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975), Part I.
36. Of course, in some cases no neutral solution is available. Language issues are especially problematic here. The principle defended in this paper would require an approximation to neutrality in such cases, i.e. a solution which, like a neutral one, could not reasonably be taken to impose unfair burdens on one side.
37. Coercion, J. F. Stephen writes (Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, p. 151), is the 'ratio ultima of the majority against persons whom its application assumes to have renounced the common bonds which connect men together'. See also N. MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy (Oxford, Clarendon, 1982), pp. 30-1: 'The act of "punishing" as such is always and necessarily an expressive and symbolic act, expressive of an attitude of serious disapprobation of the thing by the person who is punished'.
38. Coercion, J. F. Stephen writes (Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, p. 151), is the 'ratio ultima of the majority against persons whom its application assumes to have renounced the common bonds which connect men together'. See also N. MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy (Oxford, Clarendon, 1982), pp. 30-1: 'The act of "punishing" as such is always and necessarily an expressive and symbolic act, expressive of an attitude of serious disapprobation of the thing by the person who is punished'.
39. Second Treatise, s. 95.
40. As R. Dworkin seems to suppose, in 'The Original Position', in Daniels, Reading Rawls, pp. 17-21.
41. B. Manin, 'On legitimacy and political deliberation', Political Theory, 15 (1987), 353-54. Interestingly, a very similar view is put forward by I. M. Young, in Justice and the Politics of Difference: 'In the absence of a philosopher-king with access to transcendent normative verities, the only ground for a claim that a policy or decision is just is that it has been arrived at by a public which has truly promoted the free expression of all needs and points of view' (pp. 92-3). Under cover of rejecting an absurd idea of normative authority, this move prevents democratic minorities from even claiming that they have been unjustly treated.
42. The title of Ch. 8 of Benjamin Barber's Strong Democracy, (Berkeley CA, University of California Press, 1984).