European integration, nuclear deterrence and Franco-British nuclear cooperation

International Affairs

Volumn 72, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 771-787

  Croft, Stuart ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039332315     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2624121     Document Type: Article

References (102)

1. 75 un "saut technologique"', Le Figaro, 3 Oct. 1995.
2. 75 un "saut technologique"', Le Figaro, 3 Oct. 1995.
3. See, for example, the reactions reported in Keith Suter, 'Paradise lost', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sept./Oct. 1995, pp. 13-14.
4. Ambassador Sirous Nasseri of Iran, 15 June, cited in Rebecca Johnson, 'Rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sept./Oct. 1995, p. 11. The NPT agreement was reached on 12 May.
5. On 25 September 1995 the Brazilian Foreign Minister condemned the action, followed by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Yohei Kono, the following day and the Chilean Foreign Minister, José Miguel Insulza, on 29 September, in a debate in the United Nations' General Assembly. Cited in 'France resumption', Nuclear Proliferation News, 34, 12 Oct. 1994.
6. The Danish Foreign Minister, Niels Helveg Petersen, stressed that 'Community solidarity should go both ways': Charles Goldsmith, 'EU foreign ministers reject France's nuclear umbrella', Wall Street Journal, 11 Sept. 1995.
7. The Danish Foreign Minister, Niels Helveg Petersen, stressed that 'Community solidarity should go both ways': Charles Goldsmith, 'EU foreign ministers reject France's nuclear umbrella', Wall Street Journal, 11 Sept. 1995.
8. See Kevin Brown and Bruce Clark, 'UK and France in nuclear pact', Financial Times, 31 Oct. 1995; and see 'Rapprochement Chirac-Major sur la dissuasion alors que la France a procédé à un nouvel essai', Le Monde, 29-30 Oct. 1995.
9. See Kevin Brown and Bruce Clark, 'UK and France in nuclear pact', Financial Times, 31 Oct. 1995; and see 'Rapprochement Chirac-Major sur la dissuasion alors que la France a procédé à un nouvel essai', Le Monde, 29-30 Oct. 1995.
10. 'A mesure qu'elle construira sa défense, l'Union européenne pourrait souhaiter que la dissuasion française joue un rôle dans sa sécurité...la France prendra le moment venu une initiative sur ce sujet avec ses principaux partenaires.' Quoted in Pierre Lefèvre, 'La dimension européenne des essais français', Le Soir, 2 Sept. 1995.
11. Quoted in 'European security', Atlantic News 2745, 31 Aug. 1995, p. 2.
12. 'Alliance Française: Britain must stand by France over nuclear testing', editorial, The Times, 4 Oct. 1995.
13. Reported in Michael Sheridan, 'Major and Chirac cuddle up for entente nucléaire', Independent, 31 Oct. 1995.
14. Johnson, 'Rearranging deck chairs', p. 11.
15. For this argument, see 'That nuclear club buzz: Q: How much data does Britain get from Muroroa?', editorial, Guardian, 2.1 Sept. 1995. That Britain would acquire any technical data from the Muroroa tests was strongly denied by Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind at a press conference at the UN on 26 September.
16. Elements of this interpretation can be seen in the non-attributable comments of British officials reported in Kirsty Lang, 'Chirac chats up a British mistress', Sunday Times, 29 Oct. 1995; also see 'Cashing in on Europe's eternal triangle', Sunday Times, 29 Oct. 1995; and comments in Dominique Moïsi, 'The bomb won't go away', Financial Times, 26 Sept. 1995.
17. Elements of this interpretation can be seen in the non-attributable comments of British officials reported in Kirsty Lang, 'Chirac chats up a British mistress', Sunday Times, 29 Oct. 1995; also see 'Cashing in on Europe's eternal triangle', Sunday Times, 29 Oct. 1995; and comments in Dominique Moïsi, 'The bomb won't go away', Financial Times, 26 Sept. 1995.
18. Elements of this interpretation can be seen in the non-attributable comments of British officials reported in Kirsty Lang, 'Chirac chats up a British mistress', Sunday Times, 29 Oct. 1995; also see 'Cashing in on Europe's eternal triangle', Sunday Times, 29 Oct. 1995; and comments in Dominique Moïsi, 'The bomb won't go away', Financial Times, 26 Sept. 1995.
19. In 1990 Britain spent 7% of its defence budget on strategic nuclear forces, while France spent 23% of its defence budget on its strategic and pre-strategic forces. See Yves Boyer, 'French and British nuclear forces in an era of uncertainty', in Patrick Garrity and Steven Maaranen, Nuclear weapons in the changing world (New York, London: Plenum, 1992), p. 117.
20. On the former, see Stuart Croft, 'Continuity and change in British thinking about nuclear weapons', Political Studies 42: 2, 1994, pp. 228-42; on the latter, see Wolfgang Schlör, 'German security policy', Adelphi Paper 277 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 1993), pp. 25-7.
21. On the former, see Stuart Croft, 'Continuity and change in British thinking about nuclear weapons', Political Studies 42: 2, 1994, pp. 228-42; on the latter, see Wolfgang Schlör, 'German security policy', Adelphi Paper 277 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 1993), pp. 25-7.
22. Quoted from Le Monde, 13 July 1990, cited in Klaus Schubert, 'France', in Regina Cowen Karp, ed., Security with nuclear weapons? Different perspectives on national security (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1991), p. 162.
23. Quoted from Le Monde, 13 July 1990, cited in Klaus Schubert, 'France', in Regina Cowen Karp, ed., Security with nuclear weapons? Different perspectives on national security (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1991), p. 162.
24. Statement on the defence estimates (London: HMSO, 1992), p. 9. As Malcolm Rifkind put it, strategic nuclear deterrent forces are 'the ultimate guarantee of our country's security', p. 6.
25. Statement on the defence estimates (London: HMSO, 1992), p. 9. As Malcolm Rifkind put it, strategic nuclear deterrent forces are 'the ultimate guarantee of our country's security', p. 6.
26. From the Nassau Agreement, reproduced in Andrew Pierre, Nuclear politics: the British experience with an independent strategic force (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 346-7.
27. Some have gone further and suggested that the level of general military integration within NATO has been greatly overemphasized. See Jan Willem Honig, 'The "renationalization" of West European defense', Security Studies 2: 1, Autumn 1992, pp. 122-38.
28. To be more accurate, it re-emerged after the breakdown of the relationship following the conclusion of the Second World War. See John Simpson, The independent nuclear state: Britain, the United States and the military atom (London: Macmillan, 1986).
29. For analyses see Peter Malone, The British nuclear deterrent (London, New York: Croom Helm/St Martin's Press, 1984), esp. pp. 58-74; and A. J. R. Groom, British thinking about nuclear weapons (London: Pinter, 1974).
30. For analyses see Peter Malone, The British nuclear deterrent (London, New York: Croom Helm/St Martin's Press, 1984), esp. pp. 58-74; and A. J. R. Groom, British thinking about nuclear weapons (London: Pinter, 1974).
31. See Stuart Croft, 'Britain and the nuclear arms control process', Journal of Arms Control 9: 3, December 1988, pp. 265-80.
32. On the Franco-American relationship, see Richard Ullman, 'The covert French connection', Foreign Policy 75, Summer 1989, pp. 3-33. More recently, the United States has helped the French develop a simulation programme, notably with technical advice over the laser laboratory under construction near Bordeaux, and also in terms of access to US research facilities and data. See William Drozdiak and R. Jeffrey Smith, 'US - French nuclear links get an airing', International Herald Tribune, 20 Sept. 1995.
33. On the Franco-American relationship, see Richard Ullman, 'The covert French connection', Foreign Policy 75, Summer 1989, pp. 3-33. More recently, the United States has helped the French develop a simulation programme, notably with technical advice over the laser laboratory under construction near Bordeaux, and also in terms of access to US research facilities and data. See William Drozdiak and R. Jeffrey Smith, 'US - French nuclear links get an airing', International Herald Tribune, 20 Sept. 1995.
34. 'Inequality' is used by Schubert, 'France'; 'trump card' is used by Peter Schmidt, 'The special Franco-German security relationship in the 1990s', Chaillot Papers 8 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, June 1993).
35. On Germany and the INF, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, The zero option: INF, West Germany and arms control (Boulder, CO, Oxford: Westview, 1988). The INF Treaty seemed to 'singularize' Germany in reducing legal ranges of land-based nuclear weapons in NATO Europe so that they would only be based in Germany.Volker Rühe, later Germany's Defence Minister, coined the phrase 'the shorter the range, the deader the German'. See S. Croft and D. H. Dunn, 'Anglo-German argument over CFE', in S. Croft, ed., The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 106-35. On the Franco-German relationship and French short-range nuclear forces, see David Haglund, 'France's nuclear posture', Contemporary Security Policy 16: 2 August 1995, pp. 151-5.
36. On Germany and the INF, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, The zero option: INF, West Germany and arms control (Boulder, CO, Oxford: Westview, 1988). The INF Treaty seemed to 'singularize' Germany in reducing legal ranges of land-based nuclear weapons in NATO Europe so that they would only be based in Germany.Volker Rühe, later Germany's Defence Minister, coined the phrase 'the shorter the range, the deader the German'. See S. Croft and D. H. Dunn, 'Anglo-German argument over CFE', in S. Croft, ed., The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 106-35. On the Franco-German relationship and French short-range nuclear forces, see David Haglund, 'France's nuclear posture', Contemporary Security Policy 16: 2 August 1995, pp. 151-5.
37. On Germany and the INF, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, The zero option: INF, West Germany and arms control (Boulder, CO, Oxford: Westview, 1988). The INF Treaty seemed to 'singularize' Germany in reducing legal ranges of land-based nuclear weapons in NATO Europe so that they would only be based in Germany.Volker Rühe, later Germany's Defence Minister, coined the phrase 'the shorter the range, the deader the German'. See S. Croft and D. H. Dunn, 'Anglo-German argument over CFE', in S. Croft, ed., The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 106-35. On the Franco-German relationship and French short-range nuclear forces, see David Haglund, 'France's nuclear posture', Contemporary Security Policy 16: 2 August 1995, pp. 151-5.
38. See David Haglund, 'France's nuclear posture', p. 148; Charles Hargrove, 'Valéry Giscard d'Estaing', Politique étrangere 51, Spring 1986, pp. 121-2; and Patrick McCarthy 'Condemned to partnership', in idem, ed., France-Germany 1983-93 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 21-2.
39. See David Haglund, 'France's nuclear posture', p. 148; Charles Hargrove, 'Valéry Giscard d'Estaing', Politique étrangere 51, Spring 1986, pp. 121-2; and Patrick McCarthy 'Condemned to partnership', in idem, ed., France-Germany 1983-93 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 21-2.
40. See David Haglund, 'France's nuclear posture', p. 148; Charles Hargrove, 'Valéry Giscard d'Estaing', Politique étrangere 51, Spring 1986, pp. 121-2; and Patrick McCarthy 'Condemned to partnership', in idem, ed., France-Germany 1983-93 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 21-2.
41. See e.g. Pierre Lellouche, 'Thinking about the unthinkable: guidelines for a European defence concept', in Jonathan Alford and Kenneth Hunt, eds, Europe in the Western alliance: towards a European defence identity (London: Macmillan, 1988).
42. See Schubert, 'France', pp. 185-6. See also Pierre Lellouche, L'avenir de la guerre (Paris: Editions Mazarine, 1985), cited in Joanne Wright, 'France and European security', European Security 2: 1, Spring 1993, p. 31.
43. See Schubert, 'France', pp. 185-6. See also Pierre Lellouche, L'avenir de la guerre (Paris: Editions Mazarine, 1985), cited in Joanne Wright, 'France and European security', European Security 2: 1, Spring 1993, p. 31.
44. See Schubert, 'France', pp. 185-6. See also Pierre Lellouche, L'avenir de la guerre (Paris: Editions Mazarine, 1985), cited in Joanne Wright, 'France and European security', European Security 2: 1, Spring 1993, p. 31.
45. On Mitterrand's criticism of French strategic thought see Anand Menon, 'Explaining defence policy: the Mitterrand years', Review of International Studies 21: 3, July 1995, pp. 282-3; and David Yost, 'France's deterrent posture and security in Europe', part one, Adelphi Paper 194 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), p. 1. The 'two battles' strategy implied one battle for Germany (against the Warsaw Pact), prior to the decisive second battle, that for France.
46. On Mitterrand's criticism of French strategic thought see Anand Menon, 'Explaining defence policy: the Mitterrand years', Review of International Studies 21: 3, July 1995, pp. 282-3; and David Yost, 'France's deterrent posture and security in Europe', part one, Adelphi Paper 194 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), p. 1. The 'two battles' strategy implied one battle for Germany (against the Warsaw Pact), prior to the decisive second battle, that for France.
47. Haglund, 'France's nuclear posture', p. 147.
48. On the French defence consensus, see the excellent study by Philip H. Gordon, A certain idea of France: French security policy and the Gaullist legacy (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). On existentialism, see Lawrence Freedman 'I exist: therefore I deter?', International Security 13, Summer 1988, pp. 177-95.
49. On the French defence consensus, see the excellent study by Philip H. Gordon, A certain idea of France: French security policy and the Gaullist legacy (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). On existentialism, see Lawrence Freedman 'I exist: therefore I deter?', International Security 13, Summer 1988, pp. 177-95.
50. 'La dissuasion du faible au fort.'
51. Chevènement in Le Monde, 17 Oct. 1989, quoted in Diego Ruiz Palmer, 'French strategic options in the 1990s', Adelphi Paper 260 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1991), p. 54.
52. Chevènement in Le Monde, 17 Oct. 1989, quoted in Diego Ruiz Palmer, 'French strategic options in the 1990s', Adelphi Paper 260 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1991), p. 54.
53. Wright, 'France and European security', p. 31.
54. The Air-Sol Longue-Portée, a development of the ASMP, the Air-Sol Moyenne-Portée, deployed by the French as a pre-strategic system.
55. The Air-Sol Longue-Portée, a development of the ASMP, the Air-Sol Moyenne-Portée, deployed by the French as a pre-strategic system.
56. See Boyer, 'French and British nuclear forces', pp. 115-7.
57. President Mitterrand at the Chartres Franco-British summit, 18 Nov. 1994; reproduced by French Embassy, London (SAC/94/200).
58. See n. 8 above. For a commentary on this speech, see 'France offers "nuclear umbrella" to neighbours', Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 Sept. 1995; and 'European security', Atlantic News 2746, 6 Sept. 1995.
59. See n. 8 above. For a commentary on this speech, see 'France offers "nuclear umbrella" to neighbours', Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 Sept. 1995; and 'European security', Atlantic News 2746, 6 Sept. 1995.
60. Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on France's nuclear policy, Paris, 6 Sept. 1995: speech provided by French Embassy, London (SAC/95/192).
61. Alain Juppé, 'Resumption of nuclear tests', Le Figaro, 26 Aug. 1995; reproduced and provided by French Embassy, London (SAC/95/186).
62. Ibid.
63. Susan Bell and Adam Sage, 'Chirac offers to share nuclear shield with EU', The Times, 1 Sept. 1995.
64. Ian Black, 'Nuclear offer spurned', Guardian, 4 Sept. 1995.
65. On Pacific opposition see e.g. 'French nuclear testing: protests increase', Atlantic News 2742, 10 Aug. 1995, p. 2; 'NZ demonstrates in Pacific', Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 Sept. 1995, p. 4; 'French explosion of atomic device sparks protests', Wall Street Journal, 7 Sept. 1995. On the opinion poll in France, see 'La tension s'accroît à Paris et dans le Pacifique à la veille des essais de Mururoa', Le Monde, 2 Sept. 1995.
66. On Pacific opposition see e.g. 'French nuclear testing: protests increase', Atlantic News 2742, 10 Aug. 1995, p. 2; 'NZ demonstrates in Pacific', Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 Sept. 1995, p. 4; 'French explosion of atomic device sparks protests', Wall Street Journal, 7 Sept. 1995. On the opinion poll in France, see 'La tension s'accroît à Paris et dans le Pacifique à la veille des essais de Mururoa', Le Monde, 2 Sept. 1995.
67. On Pacific opposition see e.g. 'French nuclear testing: protests increase', Atlantic News 2742, 10 Aug. 1995, p. 2; 'NZ demonstrates in Pacific', Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 Sept. 1995, p. 4; 'French explosion of atomic device sparks protests', Wall Street Journal, 7 Sept. 1995. On the opinion poll in France, see 'La tension s'accroît à Paris et dans le Pacifique à la veille des essais de Mururoa', Le Monde, 2 Sept. 1995.
68. On Pacific opposition see e.g. 'French nuclear testing: protests increase', Atlantic News 2742, 10 Aug. 1995, p. 2; 'NZ demonstrates in Pacific', Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 Sept. 1995, p. 4; 'French explosion of atomic device sparks protests', Wall Street Journal, 7 Sept. 1995. On the opinion poll in France, see 'La tension s'accroît à Paris et dans le Pacifique à la veille des essais de Mururoa', Le Monde, 2 Sept. 1995.
69. Kohl after the 65th Franco-German summit, quoted in 'France/Germany/Testing', Atlantic News 2735, 14 July 1995, p. 3.
70. See ibid. 'While Bonn has not openly criticised Paris, outspoken opponents are a Who's Who of public life, from such notable writers as Günther Grass and Rolf Bochhuth to the highly respected former German President Richard von Weizsäcker.' James Walsh, 'Not in our backyard', Time, 14 Aug. 1995, p. 26.
71. See ibid. 'While Bonn has not openly criticised Paris, outspoken opponents are a Who's Who of public life, from such notable writers as Günther Grass and Rolf Bochhuth to the highly respected former German President Richard von Weizsäcker.' James Walsh, 'Not in our backyard', Time, 14 Aug. 1995, p. 26.
72. This German fear of swapping a more credible American deterrent for a less credible French one is examined by Karl-Heinz Kamp, 'Germany and the future of nuclear weapons in Europe', Security Dialogue 26: 3, 1995, pp. 286-9. See also Philip H. Gordon, France, Germany and the Western alliance (Boulder CO, Oxford: Westview, 1995), pp. 89-90. For a German exception that received a good deal of attention in Paris, see Egon Bahr, 'Dissuasion: avec la France, ça suffit!', Le Monde, 6 Oct. 1989.
73. This German fear of swapping a more credible American deterrent for a less credible French one is examined by Karl-Heinz Kamp, 'Germany and the future of nuclear weapons in Europe', Security Dialogue 26: 3, 1995, pp. 286-9. See also Philip H. Gordon, France, Germany and the Western alliance (Boulder CO, Oxford: Westview, 1995), pp. 89-90. For a German exception that received a good deal of attention in Paris, see Egon Bahr, 'Dissuasion: avec la France, ça suffit!', Le Monde, 6 Oct. 1989.
74. This German fear of swapping a more credible American deterrent for a less credible French one is examined by Karl-Heinz Kamp, 'Germany and the future of nuclear weapons in Europe', Security Dialogue 26: 3, 1995, pp. 286-9. See also Philip H. Gordon, France, Germany and the Western alliance (Boulder CO, Oxford: Westview, 1995), pp. 89-90. For a German exception that received a good deal of attention in Paris, see Egon Bahr, 'Dissuasion: avec la France, ça suffit!', Le Monde, 6 Oct. 1989.
75. Kamp, 'Germany and the future', p. 286. For a review of the nuclear element in Franco-German relations, see David G. Haglund, 'Who's afraid of Franco-German military cooperation?', European Security 2, Winter 1993, pp. 612-30.
76. Kamp, 'Germany and the future', p. 286. For a review of the nuclear element in Franco-German relations, see David G. Haglund, 'Who's afraid of Franco-German military cooperation?', European Security 2, Winter 1993, pp. 612-30.
77. See 'Bonn interested in French nuke shield for Germany', Reuter News Reports, 29 Sept. 1995.
78. Goldsmith, 'EU foreign ministers reject'.
79. See John Palmer, 'European peace role for NATO', Guardian, 6 Dec. 1995, and 'NATO: France returns to the non-integrated military structures', Atlantic News 2772, 6 Dec. 1995.
80. See John Palmer, 'European peace role for NATO', Guardian, 6 Dec. 1995, and 'NATO: France returns to the non-integrated military structures', Atlantic News 2772, 6 Dec. 1995.
81. Cited in 'A new NATO', The Economist, 9 Dec. 1995. See also Claire Tréan, 'France-OTAN; un nouveau départ', Le Monde, 8 Dec. 1995. As Tréan put it, 'C'est à une "alliance rénovée" que la France se déclare prête aujourd'hui à participer pleinement, en appelant ses partenaires à inscrire le fait européen dans la réforme de l'organisation militaire et dans la réflexion sur son avenir.'
82. Cited in 'A new NATO', The Economist, 9 Dec. 1995. See also Claire Tréan, 'France-OTAN; un nouveau départ', Le Monde, 8 Dec. 1995. As Tréan put it, 'C'est à une "alliance rénovée" que la France se déclare prête aujourd'hui à participer pleinement, en appelant ses partenaires à inscrire le fait européen dans la réforme de l'organisation militaire et dans la réflexion sur son avenir.'
83. See 'NATO/France', Atlantic News 2778, 22 Dec. 1995, which cites Hervé de Charette calling for a policy in NATO in which, 'If interventions are agreed upon by the Europeans in which the Americans are not involved, the European defence pillar must be able to express itself concretely.'
84. On this see e.g. Marc Rogers, 'Task force accord', Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 June 1996, p. 3.
85. Exceptions to this are: Michael Clarke, 'British and French nuclear forces', in Ivo H. Daalder and Terry Terriff, eds, Rethinking the unthinkable (London: Cass, 1993), esp. pp. 138-45; Frédéric Bozo, 'Une doctrine nucléaire européene: pour quoi faire et comment?', Politique étrangère 57, Summer 1992, pp. 407-21; the conclusions in Beatrice Heuser, 'Containing uncertainty: options for British nuclear strategy', Review of International Studies, Summer 1993; and David S. Yost, 'Europe and nuclear deterrence', Survival, Autumn 1993, pp. 97-120.
86. Exceptions to this are: Michael Clarke, 'British and French nuclear forces', in Ivo H. Daalder and Terry Terriff, eds, Rethinking the unthinkable (London: Cass, 1993), esp. pp. 138-45; Frédéric Bozo, 'Une doctrine nucléaire européene: pour quoi faire et comment?', Politique étrangère 57, Summer 1992, pp. 407-21; the conclusions in Beatrice Heuser, 'Containing uncertainty: options for British nuclear strategy', Review of International Studies, Summer 1993; and David S. Yost, 'Europe and nuclear deterrence', Survival, Autumn 1993, pp. 97-120.
87. Exceptions to this are: Michael Clarke, 'British and French nuclear forces', in Ivo H. Daalder and Terry Terriff, eds, Rethinking the unthinkable (London: Cass, 1993), esp. pp. 138-45; Frédéric Bozo, 'Une doctrine nucléaire européene: pour quoi faire et comment?', Politique étrangère 57, Summer 1992, pp. 407-21; the conclusions in Beatrice Heuser, 'Containing uncertainty: options for British nuclear strategy', Review of International Studies, Summer 1993; and David S. Yost, 'Europe and nuclear deterrence', Survival, Autumn 1993, pp. 97-120.
88. Exceptions to this are: Michael Clarke, 'British and French nuclear forces', in Ivo H. Daalder and Terry Terriff, eds, Rethinking the unthinkable (London: Cass, 1993), esp. pp. 138-45; Frédéric Bozo, 'Une doctrine nucléaire européene: pour quoi faire et comment?', Politique étrangère 57, Summer 1992, pp. 407-21; the conclusions in Beatrice Heuser, 'Containing uncertainty: options for British nuclear strategy', Review of International Studies, Summer 1993; and David S. Yost, 'Europe and nuclear deterrence', Survival, Autumn 1993, pp. 97-120.
89. Séguin, 'A rebuttal'.
90. Roberte Zadra, 'European integration and nuclear deterrence after the Cold War', Chaillot Paper 5 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, November 1992).
91. Ibid., p. 30.
92. Ibid., p. 31.
93. 'The French argued that Europe needed its own defenses because an American withdrawal from the continent was inevitable; the British retorted that it was precisely the creation of a European army at the expense of NATO which would hasten America's disengagement.' Jonathan Eyal, 'The emerging Franco-British security alliance', Wall Street Journal, 11-12 Nov. 1994.
94. Schmidt, 'Franco-German relationship', p. 50.
95. On the former, see ibid., pp. 48-9.
96. For Zadra, '...an intra-European debate over the role of European nuclear weapons and their future roles will become...necessary, and the most appropriate institution in which such a debate could begin is the Western European Union.' Zadra, European integration, p. 35.
97. See Giovanni de Briganti and Michael J. Witt, 'France, Britain pursue nuclear ties', Defense News, 27 Sept.-3 Oct. 1993.
98. Boyer, 'French and British nuclear forces', p. 117.
99. Bruce Clark, 'London and Paris join nuclear forces', Financial Times, 31 Oct. 1995.
100. Sheridan, 'Major and Chirac cuddle up '; and Brown and Clark, 'UK and France in nuclear pact'.
101. Sheridan, 'Major and Chirac cuddle up '; and Brown and Clark, 'UK and France in nuclear pact'.
102. Reported in Christopher Bellamy, 'Old alliance forges closer links in new world order', Independent, 18 Nov. 1994.