Aristotle's politics a symposium: Aristotle on human nature and political virtue

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 49, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 731-753

  Annas, Julia ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

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EID: 0039332081     PISSN: 00346632     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (63)

1. See Aristotle, Physics 199b15-18, 25-6; cf. Aristotle, Parts of Animals 641b24-6.
2. See Aristotle, Physics 199b15-18, 25-6; cf. Aristotle, Parts of Animals 641b24-6.
3. Physics 199b15-18. All translations are the author's, unless otherwise specified.
4. Aritotle, Eudemian Ethics 1247a31-b1; cf. Aristotle, Magna Moralia 1194b37-9.
5. Aritotle, Eudemian Ethics 1247a31-b1; cf. Aristotle, Magna Moralia 1194b37-9.
6. Aristotle is thinking of the conditions of Greek civilization, though he is not clear about this restriction: in book 2 of the Politics he considers Carthage at length as an example of a type of constitution, while in book 7 (1327b20-36) he appears to write off non-Greeks, for differing reasons, as incapable of political development. (However, he then adds that the same distinctions that he has drawn between Greeks and non-Greeks apply among the Greeks themselves.)
7. John Stuart Mill, Nature (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1958); and chapter 1 of The Subjection of Women (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988); Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), 80-2.
8. John Stuart Mill, Nature (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1958); and chapter 1 of The Subjection of Women (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988); Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), 80-2.
9. John Stuart Mill, Nature (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1958); and chapter 1 of The Subjection of Women (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988); Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), 80-2.
10. See Politics 1332a38-b10.
11. Politics 1332b6-8.
12. Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
13. Nicomachean Ethics 1103a18-26, 1144b1-12.
14. Politics 1252b32-33. Here completion results in production of a thing's nature, while in the "mere nature" passages habit and reason need to complete nature in order to develop it from raw material towards a goal.
15. See Politics 1324b36-7 (and 1325a27-30), 1325b7-10, 1332a21-4 and 27-30, 1334b12-17 and 24-5, 1337b28-33, 1342b22-8. Passages which seem to stress mere nature can be found at 1326a5-7, 1327b18-20 and 33-6, 1328a9-10 and 17-18, 1329a14-16, 1330a28-30, 1332a34-b11, 1332b35-41, 1334b6-8, 1336b40-1337a3.
16. However, the chapter does add to the account in Physics 2 (nature as the internal source of change) the point that a thing's nature is both the matter from which the change begins and also the substance or form which is the τέλος of the completed change. This is analogous to the distinction between mere nature and nature in the ethical and political works, though Aristotle never connects them.
17. Fred D. Miller, Jr., Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle's Politics (hereafter, NJR) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 44-5.
18. See Politics 1334b6-28.
19. "Natural" in which sense: that of mere or full nature? If reason is just part of mere nature, it will need something else to develop it into full nature, while if reason is part of our nature in the full sense, it will be, in the requisite way, distinct from the mere nature it needs to get to work on. Of course nobody starts with a fully developed reason; that is why we need to proceed through habit, and to follow established patterns until we are capable of our own fully autonomous uses of reason.
20. In The Morality of Happiness (pp. 146-9) I criticize Aristotle for not providing an overall developmental account of reason as the path from mere nature to nature, contrasting the later positions of Arius Didymus' account of Peripatetic ethics, which does recast Aristotle's theory in terms of a Stoicized story of οι + (combining comma above)είωσις, and Alexander of Aphrodisias, who returns to a more strictly Aristotelian account which leaves the two uses not clearly connected.
21. See Miller, NJR, 213-24.
22. Cf. Politics 1269b34-6: the well-run state will provide leisure from necessary activities. Aristotle presents this as an agreed point, though one providing difficulty as to its achievement. "Leisure" is apparently unavoidable as a translation of σχολή, despite the unsuitable modern connotations of triviality and relaxation. (It is perhaps significant that modern English lacks a handy word for the idea of having time that is spent in ways determined by your own priorities, not by the need to work for others, and which is devoted to serious, rather than trivial, pursuits.) There is another aspect to σχολή less obvious in the English "leisure," namely, freedom from pressures generated by money worries. Cf. 1273a31-7, 1273b6-7. (In some ways the English "independence" best combines the idea of financial freedom from want and subordination, and the idea of shaping one's life according to one's own plan, but would not be recognized as a translation of σχολή.)
23. C. C. W. Taylor, "Politics," in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 250.
24. On Aristotle's own status and self-conception as a metic, see David Whitehead, "Aristotle the Metic," Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 201 (1975): 94-9.
25. See Politics 1278a34-8. However, Aristotle's attitude to metic status seems to be objective and uninvolved; his occasional comments (collected in Whitehead's article) show that he is aware that some metics resented their lack of political rights, but is apparently free from personal resentment as well as from any judgment that, in his own political theory, the lot of metics should be improved.
26. It is not wholly fanciful to compare modern worries about loss of national autonomy in countries whose economy is dependent on the activities of multinational companies based elsewhere.
27. See Politics 1329a25-6, 1330a25-30.
28. On the argument for natural slavery, see Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 152-6, and Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
29. On the argument for natural slavery, see Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 152-6, and Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
30. See Politics 1328b22-37; cf. 1253b32-3.
31. See Politics 1330a25-33.
32. Aristotle's attitude towards the farmers in this ideal state is unexpected, given that in book 6 of the Politics he regards the best type of democracy as one based on a farming population, with workers and traders worse in character and leading to a worse form of democracy if they get into power. He adds that the life of workers and traders precludes virtue, but conspicuously fails to say this about the farmers. However, he praises the farmers' democracy rather back-handedly, saying that what makes it good is that farmers lack the leisure to go to the Assembly often or to take much interest in politics. Possibly, when sketching his ideal state Aristotle was unwilling to have half-leisured citizens, and found it preferable, despite the obvious problems, to rely on a large body of slave or serf farmers.
33. Cf. Politics 1325a24-30, where Aristotle reiterates that rule over free people is as different from rule over slaves as is the naturally free from the naturally slave, and 1325a41-b10, where he derides those who think that supreme power gives one the chance to do the most fine actions; fine actions can only be performed by treating those who are in fact equal to you as equals: treating them as unequal to you is contrary to nature, and hence not fine. In this context Aristotle repeats the lack of equality between male and female, and free and slave (and adds that of father and child): political rule respects natural equality and natural inequality.
34. See Politics 1329a2-b17, esp. b13-17.
35. Politics 1324b36-7.
36. See Politics 1327b18-33. Aristotle here connects this ability to combine factors that individually go to disabling extremes with the ability to rule others, but I shall prescind from this here.
37. Where in this classification would Aristotle fit the Carthaginians, whose constitution he discusses at length in book 2?
38. See Politics 1327b33-8.
39. See Politics 1327b34: τα τω̂ν ελλήνων εθνη; εθνη is the word used shortly before for non-Greeks (1327b23).
40. The oddity of appealing to non-Greeks to certify Greek institutions, given what has just been said about the political incapability of non-Greeks, applies also to the attempt to trace the institutions of common meals back to the native inhabitants of Italy.
41. See Politics 1328b39-1329a2.
42. See J. Stocks, "ΣΧΟΛΗ," Classical Quarterly 30 (1936): 177-87. Stocks notes the parallel in the "digression" in Plato's Theaetetus, and also its debt to conventional views: "The man of leisure was in short for the Greeks . . . a man of means. . . . It is repugnant to a Greek gentleman to have to struggle for his life, or to take thought for the morrow" (p. 182).
43. See J. Stocks, "ΣΧΟΛΗ," Classical Quarterly 30 (1936): 177-87. Stocks notes the parallel in the "digression" in Plato's Theaetetus, and also its debt to conventional views: "The man of leisure was in short for the Greeks . . . a man of means. . . . It is repugnant to a Greek gentleman to have to struggle for his life, or to take thought for the morrow" (p. 182).
44. See Politics 1260a36-b2; cf. 1277a33-b7.
45. See Politics 1328b39-41; cf. 1329a19-21 and 35-8, 1337b3-15, 1341a5-9, 1342b18-22. Outside books 7 and 8, cf. 1319a24-40, and book 3, chapter 5, where Aristotle's only ground for excluding βάναυσοι from being citizens is that their way of life precludes virtue (1278a8-11 and 15-21).
46. See Politics 1337b17-21, 1341b8-18.
47. Politics 1338b24-38; cf. 1333b5-25, especially 9-10, where Aristotle stresses the idea of vulgarity.
48. Politics 1333a4-11. There is an apparent conflict with 1277a338-37, where Aristotle calls it slavish to be able to perform the same thing, namely "service" (δια ονιός) actions. The conflict disappears if we assume Aristotle in the earlier passage to be thinking of an ability that is so developed that it "comes naturally" to serve others, thereby damaging the agent's independence of mind.
49. Politics 1342a22-8. It is interesting how often Aristotle refers to nature in the concluding discussion of types of music.
50. Miller, NJR, 240-5.
51. Ibid., 241.
52. Ibid., 242.
53. Outside these books we can at times see Aristotle's unclarity as to which inequalities are natural ones. In Politics 3.1277a5-12, he uses, in talking of dissimilar parts of the city, analogies which in book 1 imply natural subordination (soul/body, reason/appetite, man/wife, master/slave) but in book 3 merely show that there is no one single virtue of the good citizen. Cf. 1277b13-32.
54. From Hobbes, Elements of Law, 4:103. take the reference from the excellent article by J. Laird, "Hobbes on Aristotle's Politics," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 43 (1942-3): 1-20.
55. From Hobbes, Elements of Law, 4:103. take the reference from the excellent article by J. Laird, "Hobbes on Aristotle's Politics," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 43 (1942-3): 1-20.
56. οστισουν3-5. I agree with Miller that "anyone whatsoever" refers to individual members of the polis, not any individual, citizen or not, with whom the lawgiver is concerned; hence Aristotle would see no problem in excluding workers here; see Miller, NJR, 214 n. 65.
57. See Politics 1331b39-1332a2.
58. The word is ε + (combining comma above)ξουσία. In NJR, Miller discusses this term (pp. 102-4) as an indication that Aristotle has the locution to talk of liberty rights, but I do not think that this is in question in this passage. Miller says: "The term exousia is closely connected with freedom, and denotes the unobstructed ability to perform a particular action" (p. 102). Here the obstruction lies in outward circumstances, not in any behavior of others that might create a duty not to do the action in question.
59. The word is ε + (combining comma above)ξουσία. In NJR, Miller discusses this term (pp. 102-4) as an indication that Aristotle has the locution to talk of liberty rights, but I do not think that this is in question in this passage. Miller says: "The term exousia is closely connected with freedom, and denotes the unobstructed ability to perform a particular action" (p. 102). Here the obstruction lies in outward circumstances, not in any behavior of others that might create a duty not to do the action in question.
60. See Politics 1295a25-8. Note that in The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1887-1902), W. L. Newman comments that the "for" clause is added to explicate "through chance," since defect of χορηγία "is due to a defect of fortune"; thus he notices the awkwardness of φύσις and its place in the sentence.
61. See Politics 1295a25-8. Note that in The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1887-1902), W. L. Newman comments that the "for" clause is added to explicate "through chance," since defect of χορηγία "is due to a defect of fortune"; thus he notices the awkwardness of φύσις and its place in the sentence.
62. See Politics 1323a38-b29, 1332a7-27.
63. I am grateful for comments made by participants at the Liberty Fund conference on Fred Miller's book. I am also grateful to Fred Miller for letting me see his forthcoming chapter on Aristotle's naturalism for The Cambridge History of Ancient Political Thought, edited by Malcolm Schofield and Christopher Rowe.