The war powers resolution: Time to say goodbye

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 113, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 1-20

  Fisher, Louis ^a   Adler, David Gray ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039243912     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2657648     Document Type: Article

References (71)

1. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 434-35.
2. 119 Congressional Record [hereafter Cong. Rec.] 33555 (1973).
3. 116 Cong. Rec. 37398-408 (1970). This measure passed again the next year under suspension of the rules, which requires two-thirds support; 117 Cong. Rec. 28870-78 (1971).
4. 116 Cong. Rec. 37398-408 (1970). This measure passed again the next year under suspension of the rules, which requires two-thirds support; 117 Cong. Rec. 28870-78 (1971).
5. 119 Cong. Rec. 24653-708 (1973).
6. Ibid., 25051-120.
7. Representatives Bella Abzug, Robert Drinan, John Duncan, John James Flynt, Jr., William Harsha, Ken Hechler, Elizabeth Holtzman, William Hungate, Phillip Landrum, Trent Lott, Joseph Maraziti, Dale Milford, William Natcher, Frank Stubblefield, and Jamie Whitten.
8. For example, 119 Cong. Rec. 36220 (1973) (Cong. Elizabeth Holtzman).
9. Ibid., 33870.
10. Ibid., 36221.
11. Thomas F. Eagleton, War and Presidential Power (New York: Liveright, 1974), 213-20.
12. 119 Cong. Rec. 36204 (1973).
13. Ibid., 36207.
14. Ibid., 36208.
15. Ibid., 36220.
16. Ibid., 36177.
17. Ibid., 35953.
18. Ibid., 36178.
19. See, generally, Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); David Gray Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking: The Enduring Debate," Political Science Quarterly 103 (Spring, 1988): 1-35; Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War: The War Powers of Congress in History and Law (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986); Edward Keynes, Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982).
20. See, generally, Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); David Gray Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking: The Enduring Debate," Political Science Quarterly 103 (Spring, 1988): 1-35; Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War: The War Powers of Congress in History and Law (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986); Edward Keynes, Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982).
21. See, generally, Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); David Gray Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking: The Enduring Debate," Political Science Quarterly 103 (Spring, 1988): 1-35; Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War: The War Powers of Congress in History and Law (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986); Edward Keynes, Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982).
22. See, generally, Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); David Gray Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking: The Enduring Debate," Political Science Quarterly 103 (Spring, 1988): 1-35; Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War: The War Powers of Congress in History and Law (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986); Edward Keynes, Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982).
23. See, generally, Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); David Gray Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking: The Enduring Debate," Political Science Quarterly 103 (Spring, 1988): 1-35; Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War: The War Powers of Congress in History and Law (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986); Edward Keynes, Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982).
24. Fisher, Presidential War Power, 1-6; David Gray Adler and Larry N. George, eds., The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 3-6.
25. Fisher, Presidential War Power, 1-6; David Gray Adler and Larry N. George, eds., The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 3-6.
26. Edwin B. Firmage, "War, Declaration of" in Leonard W. Levy and Louis Fisher, eds., Encyclopedia of the American Presidency (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), vol. 4, 1573.
27. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Max Farrand, ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), vol. i, 65.
28. Ibid., 65-66.
29. Ibid., 288.
30. Ibid., 292.
31. Ibid., vol. ii, 182.
32. Ibid., 318.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 318-319.
35. The Debates in the Several State Conventions, Jonathan Elliot, ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1836), vol ii, 528.
36. Ibid., vol. iv, 107.
37. Huloet's dictionary provided this definition: "Declare warres. Arma canere, Bellum indicere." We have here two meanings: to summon to arms; to announce war. Quoted in Wormuth and Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War, 20.
38. James Kent, Commentaries on American Law (New York: Da Capo reprint, 1971), vol. i, 53.
39. The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), vol. v, 195-196.
40. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist, Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 446.
41. Section 4(a)(1) applies to any case in which United States armed forces are introduced "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances."
42. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, letter to Senators Dole, Simpson, Thurmond, and Cohen, September 27, 1994, from Walter Dellinger, 3: reprinted at 140 Cong. Rec. S14314 (daily ed. October 6, 1994).
43. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, letter to Senators Dole, Simpson, Thurmond, and Cohen, September 27, 1994, from Walter Dellinger, 3: reprinted at 140 Cong. Rec. S14314 (daily ed. October 6, 1994).
44. Walter Dellinger, "After the Cold War: Presidential Power and the Use of Military Force," University of Miami Law Review 50 (1995): 107, 111-112.
45. Rappenecker v. United States, 509 F.Supp. 1024, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
46. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F.Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982). aff'd, Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
47. Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F.Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984), dismissed as moot, Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
48. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F.Supp. 596, 600 (D.D.C. 1983).
49. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
50. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F.Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd. No. 87-5426 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
51. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F.Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
52. Ibid., 1145.
53. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800).
54. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 28 (1801).
55. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 169 (1804).
56. United States v. Smith, 27 Fed. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C. N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
57. 119 Cong. Rec. 36207 (1973).
58. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and John B. Ritch III, "The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: A 'Joint Decision' Solution," Georgetown Law Journal 77 (1988): 367, 398.
59. 141 Cong. Rec. H5667 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
60. Ibid., H5672-73.
61. Michael J. Glennon, "Too Far Apart: Repeal the War Powers Resolution," 50 University of Miami Law Review 17 (1995).
62. Military operations in Panama and Grenada were conducted as though the sixty-day limit was enforceable, if not legally then politically. Fisher, Presidential War Power, 133, 142.
63. Elliot, Debates, vol. iv, 113.
64. Farrand, Records of Federal Convention, vol. ii, 550. Madison said that if the president were to commit "any thing so atrocious as to summon only a few states [to consider a treaty]," he would be impeached for a misdemeanor. Elliot, Debates, vol. iii, 500. James Iredell, member of the first Supreme Court, asserted at the North Carolina convention that the president would face impeachment for concealing "important intelligence" from the Senate in matters of foreign affairs. Ibid., vol. iv, 127. These concerns apply even more forcefully to executive usurpation of the war power.
65. Farrand, Records of Federal Convention, vol. ii, 550. Madison said that if the president were to commit "any thing so atrocious as to summon only a few states [to consider a treaty]," he would be impeached for a misdemeanor. Elliot, Debates, vol. iii, 500. James Iredell, member of the first Supreme Court, asserted at the North Carolina convention that the president would face impeachment for concealing "important intelligence" from the Senate in matters of foreign affairs. Ibid., vol. iv, 127. These concerns apply even more forcefully to executive usurpation of the war power.
66. Farrand, Records of Federal Convention, vol. ii, 550. Madison said that if the president were to commit "any thing so atrocious as to summon only a few states [to consider a treaty]," he would be impeached for a misdemeanor. Elliot, Debates, vol. iii, 500. James Iredell, member of the first Supreme Court, asserted at the North Carolina convention that the president would face impeachment for concealing "important intelligence" from the Senate in matters of foreign affairs. Ibid., vol. iv, 127. These concerns apply even more forcefully to executive usurpation of the war power.
67. Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991), 521-22, 524, discussed the fear within the Reagan administration that President Reagan might have been impeached for his actions in Iran-contra. Draper explains that Attorney General Edwin Meese III testified at Oliver North's trial that Meese was concerned that Reagan might be impeached if he did not expose the diversion of funds of the contras. The same theme appears in Lawrence E. Walsh, Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-up (New York: Norton, 1997), 3, 24, 189, 355, 358-59, 360, 379, 397, 407, 494, 499. In 1974, the House Judiciary Committee seriously considered adding to the articles of impeachment against Nixon his bombing of Cambodia. 1974 CQ Almanac (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1975), 888-89, 896.
68. Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991), 521-22, 524, discussed the fear within the Reagan administration that President Reagan might have been impeached for his actions in Iran-contra. Draper explains that Attorney General Edwin Meese III testified at Oliver North's trial that Meese was concerned that Reagan might be impeached if he did not expose the diversion of funds of the contras. The same theme appears in Lawrence E. Walsh, Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-up (New York: Norton, 1997), 3, 24, 189, 355, 358-59, 360, 379, 397, 407, 494, 499. In 1974, the House Judiciary Committee seriously considered adding to the articles of impeachment against Nixon his bombing of Cambodia. 1974 CQ Almanac (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1975), 888-89, 896.
69. Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991), 521-22, 524, discussed the fear within the Reagan administration that President Reagan might have been impeached for his actions in Iran-contra. Draper explains that Attorney General Edwin Meese III testified at Oliver North's trial that Meese was concerned that Reagan might be impeached if he did not expose the diversion of funds of the contras. The same theme appears in Lawrence E. Walsh, Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-up (New York: Norton, 1997), 3, 24, 189, 355, 358-59, 360, 379, 397, 407, 494, 499. In 1974, the House Judiciary Committee seriously considered adding to the articles of impeachment against Nixon his bombing of Cambodia. 1974 CQ Almanac (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1975), 888-89, 896.
70. David Gray Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking" in Adler and George, The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy, 206-07, 215-16; Fisher, Presidential War Power, 38-39.
71. David Gray Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking" in Adler and George, The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy, 206-07, 215-16; Fisher, Presidential War Power, 38-39.