Market power in aftermarkets

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 143-164

  Klein, Benjamin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 0039195660     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199603)17:2<143::AID-MDE759>3.0.CO;2-J     Document Type: Article

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