Voting, rationality and reputation

Political Studies

Volumn 49, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 714-729

  Bufacchi, Vittorio ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039189803     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00338     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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